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‘The Global Informality Project unveils new ways of understanding how the state 
functions and ways in which civil servants and citizens adapt themselves to differ-
ent local contexts by highlighting the diversity of the relationships between state 
and society. The project is of great interest to policymakers who want to imagine 
solutions that are beneficial for all, but sufficiently pragmatic to ensure a seam-
less implementation, particularly in the field of cross-border trade in developing 
countries.’
Kunio Mikuriya, Secretary General of the 
World Customs Organisation, Brussels
‘An extremely interesting and stimulating collection of papers. Ledeneva’s chal-
lenging ideas, first applied in the context of Russia’s economy of shortage, came 
to full blossom and are here contextualized by practices from other countries and 
contemporary systems. Many original and relevant practices were recognized 
empirically in socialist countries, but this book shows their generality.’
János Kornai, Allie S. Freed Professor of Economics Emeritus at 
Harvard and Professor Emeritus at Corvinus University of Budapest
‘Alena Ledeneva’s Global Encyclopedia of Informality is a unique contribution, pro-
viding a global atlas of informal practices through the contributions of over 200 
scholars across the world. It is far more rewarding for the reader to discover how 
commonalities of informal behavior become apparent through this rich texture 
like a complex and hidden pattern behind local colors than to presume top down 
universal benchmarks of good versus bad behavior. This book is a plea against 
reductionist approaches of mathematics in social science in general, and cor-
ruption studies in particular and makes a great read, as well as an indispensable 
guide to understand the cultural richness of the world.’
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Professor of Democracy Studies, 
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin
‘Transformative scholarship in method, object, and consequence. Ledeneva and 
her networked expertise not only enable us to view the informal comparatively, 
but challenge conventionally legible accounts of membership, markets, domin-
ation and resistance with these rich accounts from five continents. This project 
offers nothing less than a social scientific revolution… if the broader scholarly 
community has the imagination to follow through. And by globalizing these infor-
mal knowledges typically hidden from view, the volumes’ contributors will extend 
the imaginations of those business consultants, movement mobilizers, and peace 
makers who can appreciate the value of translation from other world regions in 
their own work.’
Michael D. Kennedy, Professor of Sociology and International and 
Public Affairs, Brown University and author of Globalizing Knowledge
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‘Don’t mistake these weighty volumes for anything directory-like or anonym-
ous. This wonderful collection of short essays, penned by many of the single 
best experts in their fields, puts the reader squarely in the kinds of conversations 
culled only after years of friendship, trust, and with the keen eye of the practiced 
observer. Perhaps most importantly, the remarkably wide range of offerings lets 
us “de-parochialise” corruption, and detach it from the usual hyper-local and cul-
tural explanations. The reader, in the end, is the one invited to consider the many 
and striking commonalities.’
Bruce Grant, Professor at New York University and Chair of the US National 
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This book invites you on a voyage of discovery, to explore society’s open 
secrets, to comprehend unwritten rules and to uncover informal prac-
tices. Broadly defined as ‘ways of getting things done’, these informal yet 
powerful practices tend to escape articulation in official discourse. We 
have identified unique research into such practices across area and across 
discipline, which charts the grey zones and blurred boundaries, and dis-
tinguished types of ambivalence and contexts of complexity. Our Global 
Informality Project database is searchable by region, keyword or type of 
practice. Do explore what works and how, where and why!
The informal practices revealed in this book include emotion- 
driven exchanges (from gifts or favours to tribute for services), values- 
based practices of solidarity and belonging enacting multiple identities, 
interest- driven know- how (from informal welfare to informal employ-
ment and entrepreneurship, often not seen or appreciated as expertise), 
and power- driven forms of co- optation and control. The paradox  – or 
not  – of the invisibility of these informal practices is their ubiquity. 
Expertly practised by insiders but often hidden from outsiders, informal 
practices are, as this book shows, deeply rooted all over the world.
Fostering informal ties with ‘godfathers’ in Montenegro, ‘dear 
brothers’ in Finland and ‘little cousins’ in Switzerland – known locally 
as kumstvo, Hyvä veli, and Vetterliwirtschaft – as well as Klungel (soli-
darity) in Cologne, Germany, compadrazgo (reciprocity) in Chile, or 
blat (networks of favours) in Russia, can make a world of difference to 
your well- being. Yet just like family relations, social ties not only enable 
but also limit individual decisions, behaviour and rights, as is revealed 
in the entries on janteloven (aversion to individuality) in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, or krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility) in 
Russia and Europe.
The Global Informality Project (GIP) assembles pioneering research 
into the grey areas of informality, known yet unarticulated, enabling yet 
constraining, moral to ‘us’ yet immoral to ‘them’, divisive and hard to 


























discourse, these practices are deeply woven into the fabric of society and 
are as pervasive as the usage of the terms, or language games, associated 
with them: pulling strings in the UK, red envelopes in China, pot du vin 
in France, l’argent du carburant paid to customs officials in sub- Saharan 
Africa, coffee money (duit kopi) paid to traffic policemen in Malaysia, and 
many others (Blundo, Olivier de Sardan, 2007: 132). While they may be 
taken for granted and familiar, such practices can also be uncomfortable 
to discuss and difficult to study.
Entries from all five continents presented in these volumes are sam-
ples of the truly global and ever- growing collection online (www.infor-
mality.com). Practices are captured in the language of participants, local 
jargons that we interpret as ‘language games’, shared, understood and 
played, to follow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s take on practices. Based on ver-
nacular knowledge and assembled locally, our global collection of case 
studies allows us to view practices in a comparative context, without 
diminishing their diversity.
A unique feature of this book is that it includes material that previ-
ously has not been seen together. Each entry in this collection, describing 
the nitty- gritty of getting things done in a specific context, is fascinat-
ing in its own right. However, when these practices are clustered into a 
wider ‘family’ and looked at as constellations, new patterns of regular-
ity emerge. Such patterns, shared by some entries but lacking in others, 
tie entries together in a way that is best grasped by the notion of ‘family 
likeness’ or ‘family resemblance’ originally enunciated by Wittgenstein 
(1969: 75, 118). Hereby we discover a complicated network of simi-
larities and rela tionships, overlapping and criss- crossing (Wittgenstein 
1969: 75, 118, sections 66– 7). In such conceptualisation of family resem-
blance, its ambivalent nature – being similar and yet different, whereby 
similarities ‘crop up and disappear’ – is central (Wittgenstein 1953). Our 
dataset of practices, in all its richness and complexity, enables us to iden-
tify such ‘differing similarities’ in the four modes of human interaction – 
re- distribution, solidarity, market and domination – and to establish pat-
terns of ambivalence in the workings of doublethink, double standards, 
double deed and double incentives.
This encyclopaedia is a path- breaking collection of informal prac-
tices that reveals a number of discoveries:
• The bottom- up comparative analysis of practices from all over the 
world questions common assumptions on informality and reframes 


















• The book highlights the role of ambivalence and complexity in 
the workings of human societies. Neither hidden nor fully artic-
ulated, neither particular nor universal, the patterns of ambiva-
lence – substantive, normative, functional or motivational – prove 
essential for our understanding of fringes, grey zones and blurred 
boundaries, which are themselves central for the world to go 
round.
• It opens up new policy dimensions regarding such issues as corrup-
tion, social capital, trust, risk, mobility and migration, consump-
tion, shortages, barter, survival strategies, resistance capacity, 
alternative currencies, informal economies, remittance economies, 
labour markets, entrepreneurship and democracy.
• It illustrates the potential of ‘network expertise’, that is, cross- 
disciplinary and cross- area inquiry enabled by the network of 
researchers. Where the disciplinary methods tend to focus select-
ively on political, economic, or social aspects, the ‘networked’ 
perspective provides insights into the complexity of the forces 
at play.
• Although informal patterns, identified in these volumes, do not 
admit to quantitative analysis as readily as other phenomena, they 
have potential to become an explanatory tool for understanding 
social and cultural complexity and a basis for crowdsourcing in fur-
ther data collection.
Pavel Filonov’s Formula of Spring (on the cover) is an inspiration for 
these volumes. It tackles the paradox of the abstract and the natural, it 
formularises what is impossible to formalise, and it visualises the invis-
ible, hidden or taken- for- granted. Filonov’s personal story points to the 
importance of formal constraints for generating unintended consequence: 
his ‘anatomic’ artistic style was driven by his repeated failure to pass anat-
omy at art school and his unique, after years of study, knowledge of the 
subject. Filonov’s canvas is the best proxy to the social and cultural com-
plexity we aim to capture.
What is achieved in these volumes has been possible thanks to a 
remarkable collaboration of scholars across disciplines and area studies: 
sociologists, anthropologists, economists, historians and political scien-
tists. Without their combined scholarly commitment, the ambition to 
portray at least a fragment of the world’s social and cultural complexity 
would never have materialised. The majority of entries are based on ori-
ginal ethnographic research and materials collected through fieldwork 















journalism and media research through computer- aided technologies 
and human- assisted analysis. Collectively, it has taken the authors of 
these volumes more than a thousand years of research to build up this 
‘informal view of the world’, itself only a beginning to our understanding 
of the ambivalent patterns of social and cultural complexity, and only a 
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Russia’s Economy of Favours by anonymous reviewers has pointed us in 
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taken in this project.
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of our dissemination activities and publications.
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How to use this book
The collection is organised in two volumes, four parts and eight chapters. 
You can start reading this book anywhere, but we suggest starting from 
the end – the glossary – where you will find brief descriptions of the prac-
tices included in the volumes in alphabetical order. 
The table of contents guides you through over 200 authored entries 
from 5 continents and 66 countries and indicates the way in which they 
are clustered together. If you recognise the name of the practice or are 
interested in a particular country, you can go straight to the relevant 
entry and follow the cross- references from there.
Outsiders rarely know or recognise a local practice by its  colloquial 
name. To overcome this problem, we have clustered practices by ‘family 
resemblance’, supplied illustrations where possible, and briefly explained 
practices in the glossary. To ensure the flow of argument from one entry to 
another in each cluster, we have placed similar entries next to each other 
so that they feed into each other, add specific detail, but also develop the 
general themes of ambivalence and complexity. We intentionally have 
not organised material by historical periods, geographical locations or 
analytical concepts, in order to follow the ‘practical sense’ of informality 
in clustering the entries (Bourdieu 1980/ 1990). Where  possible, entries 
flow in the bottom- up logic in the chapters, thereby tracing the blurred 
boundaries and grey zones:
• from more socially acceptable practices to more questionable;
• from practices driven by survival to practices driven by 
self- expression;
• from daily or regular to once- in- a- lifetime needs and the needs of 
others (brokerage);
• from more visible practices to less visible (or deliberately made vis-
ible or invisible);
• from more traditional/ universal to more modern/ temporal prac-
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Finally, each cluster of entries is introduced and concluded by a piece with 
comparative or conceptual entries, indicated as ‘general’. For example, 
Chapter 6 on gaming the system benefits from an introduction to the strat-
egies of camouflage (by Philip Hanson); general entries identifying pat-
terns common for the cluster such as cash- in- hand (by Colin Williams), 
brokerage (by David Jancsics), window dressing (by David Leung), and 
pyramid schemes (by Leonie Schiffauer); as well as a conclusion with meth-
odological implications for the study of part- time crime and ‘camouflaged’ 
activities (by Gerald Mars). The authors of conceptual or reflective pieces 
offer possible perspectives, thematic links and further research questions 
in order to help the reader with the uneasy tasks of comparing the incom-
parable and theorising the practice. Such entries themselves constitute a 
‘network expertise’ – a coordinated conceptual framework – aimed at tack-
ling complexity through mastering paradoxes; articulating the unspoken 
and visualising the invisible; finding patterns in the amorphous and for-
malising the informal; finding similarities in differences and differences in 
similarities; comparing the incomparable and doing the undoable.
Please note, we do not claim the absolute ubiquity of practices in 
respective societies. Following Olivier de Sardan’s take on culture, we 
understand social and cultural complexity as ‘a set of practices and rep-
resentations that investigation has shown to be shared to a significant 
degree by a given group (or sub- group), in given fields and in given con-
texts’ (Olivier de Sardan 2015: 84).
Individual entries in this Encyclopaedia present empirical material 
that:
• makes the ‘informal order’ more visible through ethnography and 
examples;
• refers to the key themes of ambivalence and complexity explored 
in the volume;
• weaves into a critical discussion of concepts devised for tackling 
such practices (such as clan, patronage, nepotism, informal net-
works or informal institutions);
• illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of discipline- based analysis;
• points to existing research and new research questions;
• suggests cross- references to parallel practices in other parts of 
the world.
Bibliography for How to use this book
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Part III discusses the blurring of boundaries between formal and infor-
mal economies, resulting in strategies termed ‘the system made me do 
it’ (Chapter 5) or ‘gaming the system’ (Chapter 6). These entries reveal 
the complex and often symbiotic relationship between formal constraints 
and informal behaviour. Survival strategies often compensate for the 
rigidity of state regulation, while strategies of gaming the system depend 
on compliance with it. The evidence presented here suggests, counterin-
tuitively, that the informal sector is driven by regulations more than the 
formal is.
The entries in Part III illustrate the functional ambivalence of infor-
mality – supportive of participants yet viewed as subversive by observ-
ers; subversive of formal constraints (such as geographical borders, 
shortages, all kinds of regulations) yet also supportive of them; bend-
ing the rules yet also complying with and reinforcing them. The blurred 
boundary between need and greed is the key theme and an underlying 
principle by which the material presented here is organised: from prac-
tices aimed at bare necessities to those driven by greed, ambition and 
passion to challenge the constraints. Other key themes in Part III include 
the role of the state, the enabling power of constraints and the sources 
of effectiveness of informal systems emerging in response to the over- 
controlling centre.
Chapter 5, ‘The system made me do it: strategies of survival’, 
focuses on practices such as informal housing and welfare that are both 
subversive and supportive of political and socio- economic frameworks. 
In his introduction, Colin Marx outlines the puzzles of informality, chal-

























the impact of the informal economy on growth, development, innova-
tion, poverty and gender. The coping strategies described in the entries 
are often conceptualised as ‘everyday forms of resistance’ or ‘weapons 
of the weak’, channelling resistance to existing constraints, thereby sub-
verting but also supporting them. But these are not necessarily the strat-
egies only of the dispossessed, lacking more direct forms of satisfying 
their needs. Where does need end and greed begin? When does evasion 
of domination become a form of manipulation? Is it possible to distin-
guish between supportive and subversive aspects of ‘functionally ambiva-
lent’ practices and measure them? In his conclusion to Chapter 5, Scott 
Radnitz maps for us the grey zones and offers insights into when evasion 
turns into manipulation, need into greed and prey into predators.
The strategies of manipulation assembled in Chapter 6, ‘Gaming 
the system: strategies of camouflage’, can often be seen by the parti-
cipants as a forced choice, necessity or need (and therefore justified as 
restoring competitiveness rather than seeking competitive advantage). 
By outsiders, however, they are likely to be classified as bending the 
rules. In his introduction, Philip Hanson unmasks the dual functional-
ity of informal practices, subversive to the system yet still supportive of 
formal frameworks, if only to exploit them further. From the minor forms 
of free- riding and under- the- radar cash practices, where rules are bent 
but in a socially acceptable way, the argument unfolds to embrace prac-
tices of creating fronts and façades to camouflage more serious forms of 
rule- bending. These include cover- ups by intermediaries (conceptual-
ised as representative brokerage by David Jancsics), creative accounting 
and other forms of partial compliance, all the way up to the practices of 
enforcing the letter of the law in order to violate its spirit, and legislating 
for unfitting purpose. The latter deprives the formal/ informal division 
of its sense: the formal law becomes an expression of informal interests.
Hanson identifies features of the Wittgenstein- inspired ‘fam-
ily resemblance’ of gaming the system practices: the role of informal, 
sometimes illicit, intermediaries, the elements of wheeling and dealing, 
something requiring a certain skill, know- how and daring, and raises 
the question of the correspondence, or lack of it, between the values and 
beliefs underlying a society’s informal norms, on the one hand, and its 
formal institutions on the other. In his conclusion to this chapter, Gerald 
Mars offers an adaptation of Mary Douglas’ cultural matrix to classify 
‘part- time’ crime, and links gaming the system strategies to specific work- 
related contexts and types of constraints shaped by informal norms and 





























culture specific, Mars reflects on the universal methods of inquiry into 
sensitive subjects.
The dynamics, represented by the functional ambivalence of 
informal practices and the identified pattern of turning the existing 
constraints to one’s advantage, have important implications for pol-
icy- making. Producing more and more regulation enhances the ena-
bling power of constraints for those playing them against the system. 
Questioning the constraints is the common theme of Part III. It is 
implicit in most of the entries and explicit in the questions raised by 
Marx and Radnitz, who turn the tables against the wider ideological 











The system made me do it: strategies 
of survival
Introduction: the puzzles of informal economy
Colin Marx
UCL, Uk
The concept of the informal economy covers a vast and diverse array of 
economic practices. It might indeed be argued that, in its widest sense, 
the concept becomes so vague as to be meaningless. Used in a narrower 
sense, however, it affords rich and clear insights into contemporary eco-
nomic dynamics that create or sustain injustices and inequalities. This 
overview provides a brief historical sketch of the concept before consid-
ering key issues in contemporary scholarship.
The concept of informal economies began with a focus on informal 
sectors. Already present in scholarship in the 1960s (e.g. Nisbet 1967), in 
the early 1970s the concept began to attract serious attention from both 
an academic and a policy perspective. This can be dated to the publication 
of Keith Hart’s work on underemployed rural migrants in Nima (an area in 
the Ghanaian capital, Accra), and of a policy study of Kenya’s economy by 
the International Labour Organisation (International Labour Organisation 
1972; Hart 1973). Ray Bromley attributed this burgeoning interest to 
three causes: the time and place in which the concept was introduced in 
relation to other key developmental debates; its institutional adoption by 
international agencies such as the International Labour Organisation; and 
its political appeal to elites since it provided a way of ‘helping the poor 
without any major threat to the rich’ (Bromley 1978: 1036).
The concept also has regional histories. It is evident that there are 
different traditions across Latin America, the Middle East and North 














Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Varley 2013b). To some extent, these histories 
are a consequence of the dominance of different economic regimes in 
different regions with different intellectual traditions. One example is 
the dominance of the economic dependency paradigm in Latin America, 
while in Europe/ Eurasia socialism had a profound effect on economic 
activities. Consequently, it is hazardous to inscribe a single historical 
trajectory on debates. This diversity of intellectual trajectories notwith-
standing, criticism of the concept of an informal sector, on the grounds 
that it was too vague, had by the 1990s grown to such an extent that it 
became clear that the notion of ‘informal economy’ offered a better grasp 
of the dynamics at play.
The concept’s continued success has been attributed to its vague-
ness. Elaborating on an argument first made by Lisa Peattie (1987), it is 
possible to ascribe the success of the ‘informal economy’ to its ability to 
allow diverse groups to address key gaps in development thinking with-
out actually addressing what it is that constitutes the gap.
Throughout the history of the concept of informal economy, the 
problems of working with binaries have provoked animated discussion. 
Cathy Rakowski (1994) notes that scholars have continued to work 
with the concept even while accepting its limitations. In order to get 
away from binaries, attempts have been made to think of informality 
(more generally) as a mode of operation (AlSayyad and Roy 2004); to 
see the reality as more messy and less clear- cut than binary thinking 
would suggest (Roy 2009); or to argue for approaches that work on the 
‘principle of difference in practice rather than principle’ (Varley 2013a).
While dualities have plagued the precision of scholarship, state- 
policy actors have been much more willing to work with starker cat-
egories. Many states and international agencies have consistently 
implemented some of the most problematic features associated with the 
concept. As identified by Ray Bromley in 1978, these are: that the clas-
sification and accounting processes are often flawed; that the formal and 
informal are seen as separate rather than interdependent; that blanket 
policy prescriptions are applied to extremely diverse economic activities; 
that informality is seen as an exclusively urban phenomenon; that the 
informal economy has a present but no future; that economic activity 
is confused with places, so that entire neighbourhoods are described as 
informal; and that informality and poverty are seen as one and the same. 
The consequences have often been severe for poor people as states have 
sought (often violently) to harass, remove or eradicate what are con-
sidered to be informal activities (Bryceson and Potts 2006; Potts 2006, 
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In more progressive instances, the ‘solution’ to economic infor-
mality (as practised by the poor) is to convert these activities into for-
mal ones. The key work straddling this academic/ policy interface is that 
of Hernando de Soto (1989, 2001). De Soto and his colleagues at the 
Lima- based Institute for Liberty and Democracy have argued for the 
need to formalise informal property rights in order to allow the value of 
informal rights and resources to be recognised in wider capitalist econo-
mies. Among the many critiques of this position, a key argument is that 
this approach ignores the fact that many people already have rights to 
resources that are in danger of being lost should they be formalised.
The concept of the informal economy is generally recognised as a 
means of analysing a set of practices that are hidden  – either by their 
nature or because researchers lack the analytical precision to grasp them. 
Quite what is revealed through analysis, and how, often requires rigorous 
ethical consideration. Related to this, however, is a recognition that, if the 
informal economy is considered as hidden and subordinate to broader 
economy dynamics, what can be contributed to economic theory is lim-
ited. That is, if the informal economy in the global South is the ‘other’ on 
which the propulsive, dynamic, productive, advanced economies depend 
and theorisations of the informal economy do not challenge this, then 
the power of the concept of informal economy will always be curtailed.
There are a number of interrelated ways to try to address these 
problems. One has been to argue for a need to avoid both working with a 
universalised view of capitalist relations (that is, interpreting events and 
processes as functional or caused by capitalism) while avoiding the speci-
ficity of local forms of economic arrangement that suggest practices are 
simply a local particularity (Guyer 2004). Another, from Milton Santos 
(1975) onwards, has been to argue for a single economy that is com-
posed of different parts, logics, circuits and/ or activities. This is better 
to appreciate the interrelations between different economic activities. In 
this view, it is clear that informal economies are important in constitut-
ing and mediating multiple registers of value. They play important roles 
in circulating money, goods and people on which both the economies 
and the people depend. They can accelerate or slow down circulations 
and such processes can profoundly affect the performance of the ‘formal 
measured economy’.
Finally, it is accepted that the informal economy is highly gendered. 
All too often, gender determines who gets access to the most profitable 
resources and enterprises and who, as a result, will have the worst. This 
points to the deep entanglement of gender with economic dynamics and 
















Many of the initial questions that animated debates in the 1970s 
remain relevant today. For example, what is the potential of the informal 
economy to contribute to growth, employment or innovation? Arguably, 
scholarship continues to work within many of the initial limitations cre-
ated through the use of dichotomous thinking. The current state of the 
art provides important pointers for disentangling informal economies 
from a severely curtailed analysis that is situated in relation to capitalism 




University of zurich, switzerland
Squatting is mostly an urban phenomenon. The term generally refers to 
informal housing whereby, for a variety of existential, legal, political and 
ideological reasons, people settle on vacant land or occupy abandoned 
buildings, both private and public. People who squat possess no legal title 
to land or building, pay no rent for the respective property and live there 
without any formal entitlement.
Alternative names, though not always with exactly the same mean-
ing, are in use for squats. These are: informal settlements, spontaneous 
settlements, slums, shantytowns, favelas, ghettos and social housing. The 
numerous synonyms for someone who squats, i.e. a squatter, indicate the 
complexity of the phenomenon, its spread and a wide range of percep-
tions. The most common include: informal settler, illegal tenant, invader, 
thief, beatnik, homesteader and so on. It is estimated that approximately 
a quarter of the world’s urban population lives in slums, with over 863 
million slum dwellers in developing countries (UN- Habitat 2012– 13). 
Squatting is considered to be a universal phenomenon. Widely known 
squatter communities include favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Neza- Chalco- Itza 
in Mexico City, Kibera in Nairobi, Shanyrak in Alamati, squatters around 
Metro Manila, Israeli squatters on Palestinian land in the West Bank, 
Christiania in Copenhagen and Rote Flora in Hamburg.
In urban areas, rapid growth of squats is to a large extent associ-
ated with intensified industrialisation in the world. Many poor migrants 
from villages move to cities seeking jobs and opportunities. As the size 
of the low- skilled, cheap labour force grows, the demand for affordable 
accommodation increases accordingly. Shortages of legal accommoda-

























to the outskirts of cities, usually leading to the extension of existing set-
tlements or the formation of new ones. Since large numbers of newcom-
ers cannot meet the demanding financial and legal criteria for building 
permission, they start to illegally squat on private or public vacant land in 
order to build rudimentary shelter. For this reason, the developing world 
is faced with the growing conversion of rural land to urban use in city 
peripheries. As a consequence, reclassification of settlements from ‘rural’ 
to ‘urban’ has become one of the most significant determinants of urban 
population growth and expansion in the developing world today accord-
ing to the UN-Habitat (2012– 13: 30). Over time these new settlements 
become organised, vibrant and self- sustained communities, with diverse 
local economic and subcultural life. As one UN- Habitat expert said, ‘Just 
as slums and slum dwellers need cities to survive, so do cities need slums 
to thrive’ (Mumtaz 2001: 20). Nevertheless, city officials and property 
developers are not always benevolent towards squatter settlements and 
usually do not perceive them in such a positive way. That is the reason 
why squatter settlements all over the world continuously run battles 
against city administration and face threats of evictions and demolition 
of their settlements.
Although practices of squatting sporadically occurred in the 
past, the first big wave of squats emerged in developing countries and 
Western urban districts during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
second wave began in the 1980s in The Netherlands and from there 
spread further to Switzerland, Germany, Denmark and other Western 
countries (Mikkelsen and Karpantschof 2001; see Schwarzwohnen, 
5.2 in this volume) (see Figure 5.1.1). The growing and omnipresent 
practices of squatting since the 1980s have led many authors to iden-
tify them as a new urban movement (Pruijt 2003; Martinez 2007). The 
main characteristics of these movements are: illegality, in the sense 
that they violate private property rights; the subcultural character, 
displayed through symbols, messages, dress code and lifestyle; their 
association with youth; and organisational strength, as these social and 
political movements are well co ordinated on local and international 
levels (see Martinez 2013: 866– 7). Such tight interconnectedness, 
international cooperation and transnational co ordination is impressive 
and becoming increasingly formalised. For example, an international 
squatter movements conference ‘European Squatting Meeting’ was held 
in Barcelona in June 2010 in order to discuss such burning problems of 
squatter movements as evictions, development of negotiating capacity 
in dealing with governments, and prospective options for institutionali-



















Depending on the context, squatting can be perceived either as a 
crisis resolution or as a proactive strategy, or both in some cases. Five cat-
egories of squatting can be distinguished: (1) deprivation based squat-
ting – when people squat in order to avoid homelessness; (2) squatting 
as an alternative housing strategy – a temporary housing solution when 
people face a lack of housing opportunities or cannot afford them; (3) 
entrepreneurial squatting – when people want to revive a particular 
urban district or building through different entrepreneurial services such 
as bars, clubs, factories, etc.; (4) conservational squatting – when the 
main aim is restoration and preservation of an old building or quart that 
is neglected by city officials; (5) political squatting – when direct action 
such as occupation of the building aims to transmit and address certain 
political and social messages (Prujit 2012). The latter includes diverse 
political activities such as protesting, political campaigning, networking 
workshops and engagement in various environmental issues locally or 
globally.
It can be argued that squatter movements all over the world share 
some common political ground. Many authors place them on the radical 
Figure 5.1.1 Zurich Altstetten quarter.








left or left- libertarian, depending on the nature of their radicalism and 
opposition against the local or state government. Squatter movements 
challenge worldwide capitalism and neoliberal political agendas, with 
particular focus on the problems of house shortages, expensive hous-
ing, speculation on the property market and corruption in govern-
ment administration. One of the main concerns of these movements is 
the gentrification of urban spaces, which they believe adversely affects 
the middle and lower classes and pushes them to the margins of urban 
spaces. According to this view, areas previously inhabited by lower social 
strata tend to become extremely expensive and practically unaffordable 
for them after rebuilding, thus accommodating only the needs of the 
wealthy. Even more fundamental for the squatter movement is under-
mining the idea that private property rights are absolute, which is viewed 
as central to major inequalities and injustices.
Given their prevailing characteristics, such as independence 
from the existing political, social and cultural establishment, anti- 
authoritarianism, emphasis on direct action as a means of political pro-
test and autonomous lifestyles, squatter movements evoke strong, and 
often conflicting, reactions in society. Some perceive them as thieves, 
due to the fact that squatters violate someone’s private property rights, 
or prevent someone from accessing their private asset. For others, squat-
ters are pioneers in enabling social housing, in highlighting inequalities 
in society and in fighting for social justice.
Such duality in perceptions perhaps reflects the duality in the 
nature of squatting practices. These practices dwell on the important dis-
tinction made between the possessor and the owner of land – these roles 
are not as identical as could be assumed by the property rights. The time 
factor as well as active use of certain property can work in favour of an 
illegal possessor and to the detriment of the legal owner, or vice versa, 
depending on the legal system (civil code- based European or Anglo- 
Saxon common law). In other words, the time someone has spent in a 
certain property, or the activity someone has engaged in to keep the asset 
active, can be recognised as a legal basis for claiming certain rights over 
it (Jansen 2012: 158– 65). These are the most common grounds used for 
launching legal claims over specific assets. Legal battles are essential for 
legal recognition and institutionalisation – the problems that both squat-
ting communities and squatter movements share. Inactivity of an owner 
over certain property may open the way for another person to under-
take an informal, or active, possession of the property in question. An 
owner’s inactivity over property lends itself to informality and breeds 



















relativisation. In this context, squatting appears as an informal sanction 
for the inactive ownership.
There are three possible legal outcomes in the disputes over squat-
ted property. The first envisages the possibility for an illegal possessor 
(squatter) to acquire ownership due to his/ her active usage of certain 
property. The second provides an illegal possessor (squatter) with 
some protection, resulting from the fact that the owner loses his claim 
to recover immediate ownership. The third outcome does not recognise 
any of the squatter claims (Jansen 2012:  153). The legal disregard of 
squatter claims normally leads to the eviction or demolition of squatter 
settlements.
Interestingly, the first two legal solutions rely on Roman law, which 
had provisions for accommodating the interests of squatters. This shows 
that the practice of squatting had been known since ancient times, unlike 
the organised political and social movements that have emerged since 
the 1980s in response to the problems of modern civilisation. Thus, 
squatting represents probably one of the oldest informal practices that 
has evolved in conjunction with the institution of property rights, and 
one of the most universal, driven by a belief in a fundamental human 




Schwarzwohnen referred to illegal flat occupation in the German 
Democratic Republic. The literal meaning is ‘black (i.e. illegal) living’. 
The term denoted the undermining of the state allocation of housing by 
unsanctioned occupation, and thus effectively meant ‘squatting’ in the 
context of the East German communist regime.
A small minority of flat occupants rejected the term Schwarzwohnen 
because of the similar term Schwarzfahren, which means fare dodg-
ing on public transport. Nevertheless, Schwarzwohnen was widely used 
in the GDR by Schwarzwohner (those illegally occupying the accom-
modation) and administration staff as well (Grashoff 2011a). Besides 
Schwarzwohnen, other denominations were ‘living in teardown’ (Leben 
im Abriss) and ‘flat occupation’ (Wohnungsbesetzung). The latter term 
predominated in East Berlin, probably due to the proximity to the squat-
ter movement (Hausbesetzerbewegung) in West Berlin. Also, in some 

















Despite the fact that Schwarzwohnen emerged at about the same 
time as the squatting movement in Western European countries such 
as Netherlands, Denmark and West Germany (1960s/ early 1970s) 
(Squatting Europe Kollective 2013), there were significant differences 
between the two concepts. Schwarzwohnen was closely linked to the 
forced administration of habitation in the post- war period (although a 
precursory term, Schwarzmieter, can be traced back to the first years of 
Weimar Republic (Fuehrer 1995)). From the 1950s the post- war emer-
gency measure of forced administration of flats became permanent in the 
GDR (Wohnraumlenkungsverordnung 1955 and 1967).
Living in a flat without state permission was considered an adminis-
trative offence in the GDR, because the state claimed the right to entirely 
determine the allocation of flats. In contrast, most Schwarzwohner had 
no sense of guilt in view of the inefficiency of the housing administra-
tion. From the late 1960s, the phenomenon of Schwarzwohnen could be 
observed in several East German towns with more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants such as Berlin, Dresden, Halle, Jena, Leipzig, Rostock and Schwerin 
(see Figure 5.2.1). The vacancy of flats was a consequence of the GDR’s 
extensive house- building programme. While new districts were built at 
the periphery, many town centres were left to decay. Schwarzwohnen 
occurred almost exclusively in older buildings. The living conditions in 
run- down flats under the roof or in the basement were poor. Students who 
lived ‘in teardown’ sometimes compared their situation to living in a shan-
tytown. Single young people in particular had almost no chance of being 
allocated a flat. A large number of young Christians and students prac-
tised Schwarzwohnen, but it was not limited to the youth. Divorced wives 
(including the future German chancellor Angela Merkel), shift workers, 
families with children and even pensioners illegally occupied flats as well.
In contrast with squatters in Western Europe, in most cases 
Schwarzwohnen was not carried out as a collective but an individual action. 
The main concern was to live in one’s own four walls. Schwarzwohnen was 
a tacit practice. Attaching a banner at the façade would have caused the 
immediate end of the illegal housing. As long as the dictatorship was intact, 
there were no public campaigns, no squatter organisations or informal 
 networks. Most of the occupations were not politically motivated either.
Nevertheless, Schwarzwohnen provided a niche for the cultural 
opposition. Literary clubs, illegal art exhibitions, rehearsals of Punk and 
New Wave bands, parties and gatherings of opposition groups (founda-
tion of the green network ‘Arche’, for instance) took place here. Moreover, 
in the last two years of the GDR’s existence, illegal cafés and bars were 

















As flats in the GDR were cheap, Schwarzwohnen was not a means 
of saving money. Indeed, most of the Schwarzwohner paid rent, often 
anonymously. In private houses there was often an informal agreement 
with the owner. After some time had passed, many Schwarzwohner 
would try to obtain legal residency for the flat they occupied. Chances to 
obtain permission to stay in the occupied flat were reasonable. Random 
samples range from 50 to 86 per cent (Grashoff 2011a). Even though 
Schwarzwohnen was punishable by moderate fines, the state administra-
tion was limited in its power by the civil code, which allowed evictions 
only when other living space was available to the occupant. In addition, 
sometimes putting cases of Schwarzwohnen on an official footing was 
Figure 5.2.1 An occupied flat in Rostock in the 1980s.
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actually in the authorities’ interests. The run- down flats could hardly be 
allocated officially, and the government lacked the means to refurbish 
them due to the shortage economy. In such cases, legalisation could not 
only solve a housing problem but also enable provisional repair to take 
place at no charge to the state. At the same time, several Schwarzwohner 
experienced the apparent neglect as a chance to assume responsibility for 
the dwelling.
Schwarzwohnen can be quantified only partly. For the East German 
capital it is possible to calculate the number of illegal flat occupiers due 
to occasional state checks. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, a total 
number of several thousand Wohnungsbesetzer in East Berlin is realistic. 
In the Prenzlauer Berg district alone there were 1,270 unofficially occu-
pied flats in 1987. According to another statistic from Rostock the num-
ber of Schwarzwohner totalled 700 at the beginning of 1990 (Grashoff 
2011a).
Due to the unofficial character of Schwarzwohnen, oral history 
is the most effective method for researching this practice (Felsmann 
and Groeschner 2012; Grashoff 2011a, 2011b). With regard to official 
sources, the files of the communal housing administration are the most 
revealing. These files document grievances of the persons concerned, 
impositions of fines and decisions about the further occupation of the 
flats. In contrast, the Ministry of State Security was rather indifferent.
The mere fact that Schwarzwohnen was possible to some extent 
highlights the scope for action within grey zones of authority, and the 
feasibility of compromises between the state and society in the East 
German dictatorship. The experience of a weak administration encour-
aged many Schwarzwohner to subvert the state’s claim to power in other 
areas as well, and it is no coincidence that many of them played an active 
role during the 1989 ‘peaceful revolution’ (Rink 2000).
5.3 Kraken (the netherlands)
hans Pruijt
erasmus Universiteit rotterdam, the netherlands
Kraken is a Dutch word that indicates living in – or using otherwise – a 
dwelling without the consent of the owner. People involved in kraken 
(krakers) take buildings with the intention of relatively long- term use. 
Kraken is organised or at least supported and/ or inspired by a social 
movement. The common English translation is ‘squatting’. This transla-














short- term use of buildings, for example, as crash pads. The notion of 
relatively long- term use, that is part of the concept of kraken, implies that 
krakers make necessary repairs and invest in basic amenities.
From 1963, the practice of kraken became more and more estab-
lished. It was fuelled by an increasing supply of empty houses as an 
effect of planned large- scale urban transformation. The terms kraken 
and krakers came in use in 1969, when an Amsterdam- based group 
that identified itself as ‘Woningbureau (Housing Bureau) de Kraker’, 
published a squatting manual (kraakhandleiding). The verb kraken 
means to crack. ‘Krakers’ originally referred to criminals who specialise 
in cracking vaults. The manual emphasised the respectability aspect of 
kraken: ‘Furnish your home as quickly as possible. Invite your neigh-
bours to come over for coffee … Clean your windows, paint window 
frames and exterior doors, enter into a dialogue with the neighbours’ 
(Duivenvoorden 2000: 32).
While remaining a highly controversial issue, kraken came to enjoy 
some legitimacy and support. Polls show that a large minority of the 
Dutch population supported kraken, while a majority of Amsterdam’s 
population was in favour of it (Pruijt 2013). Compared to squatting in 
other countries, the level of acceptance of kraken – as at least a reason-
able if not beneficial and exciting way to make use of unused space  – 
and concomitantly a willingness on the part of the krakers to talk to the 
authorities, may be a special feature. The custom developed that once 
the krakers had a bed, table and chair in the house, and had replaced 
the front door lock, the police were not supposed to intervene. For the 
casual observer, the generally relaxed nature of the practice can easily be 
obscured by the spectacular eviction- related violent confrontations with 
the police that also occurred, especially during the early 1980s. However, 
if compared to the hundreds of buildings that were either voluntarily 
given up or legalised (around 200 buildings in Amsterdam were legal-
ised), the confrontations were exceptions.
Around 1970, kraken, promoted by the anarchist/ hippie Kabouter 
(gnome) movement, spread across the country and into all possible types 
of real estate. Support groups appeared that operated advisory services 
(kraakspreekuren). Social centres and squatters’ bars (kraakcafe’s) served 
as meeting points in a nationwide network. There were news letters, spe-
cial radio stations and regular meetings on the neighbourhood, city and 
national levels.
According to a study done by mobilising the network of local krak-
ers for the data collection, Amsterdam housed around 9,000 squatters 














Netherlands as a whole, between 1965 and 1999, 50,000 people lived 
as krakers at one time or another. After the 1980s, numbers declined 
because changes in the law made it easier for owners to obtain an evic-
tion, and above all because of the increased use of ‘anti- kraak’ occupants. 
Anti- kraak occupants are basically tenants who are denied tenant’s 
rights, and serve as security guards.
Practices similar to kraken exist in all Western nations. To some 
extent these practices are interconnected as result of international mobil-
ity and the sharing of information and ideas. The logo of the interna-
tional squatter’s movement, a circle crossed by a lightning- shaped arrow, 
originated in the Netherlands. The first version of the logo appeared in 
1979, in Kraakkrant (squatter’s paper) no. 28.
A large percentage of squatting actions (kraakacties – in Amsterdam 
more than 50 per cent, Van der Raad 1981: 37) took place in working- 
class neighbourhoods located around the city centres. This involved 
buildings that had become empty because of the planned construction 
of new social housing. With very few exceptions, krakers in these areas 
left voluntarily without protest in time for the scheduled demolition and 
construction work to start. This is because they approved of this specific 
type of urban renewal dubbed ‘building for the neighbourhood’.
In many other cases, krakers wanted control over building or land 
use, for example, in Amsterdam’s Nieuwmarkt neighbourhood in the 
early 1970s where activists attempted to block subway and urban high-
way construction. Often, krakers obstructed the plans of property specu-
lators. This led to highly contested evictions, but also to legalisation of 
occupations. Such dynamics have had a long- term effect, with more low- 
or moderate- income people living individually or communally in expen-
sive locations. In addition, various projects that combine housing, artists’ 
workspaces and venues for alternative culture, such as the Poortgebouw 




development Planning Unit, Bartlett faculty,  
UCL, Uk
The term allegado (literally: ‘close’, ‘near’ or ‘related’) is used in Chile to 
refer to poor families or individuals who live in the homes of their relatives. 
Allegados usually do not pay rent, but make small contributions towards 



















affirm that they live in this way for economic reasons (MIDEPLAN 2013). 
Typically, they occupy a single room in their relatives’ house, though they 
may also live in a larger part of the house. In this respect, allegados differ 
from South Africa’s backyarders, who build a shack in the backyard of a 
shared plot (Gilbert and Crankshaw 1999).
In countries where the poor cannot access housing through alter-
native practices such as informal settlements, renting or sharing exist-
ing housing stock becomes the only way to access accommodation. This 
is particularly the case in big cities where land is scarce (UN- Habitat 
2003). Gilbert (2014) points out that, contrary to general assumptions, 
most informal dwellers in developing countries do not live in their own 
accommodation (that is, in informal settlements) but rather rent or 
share accommodation. Relatively little attention has been paid to this 
phenomenon because of its ‘invisibility’. It is only in recent years that the 
authorities, academics and policy makers have begun to recognise the 
prevalence of this practice.
Allegados became a significant feature of Chile’s housing scene fol-
lowing the social- housing projects launched by the military regime of 
1973– 90. These were large- scale projects, constructed mainly by the pri-
vate sector but financed by the Ministry of Housing, usually on the out-
skirts of cities. While the mass construction of housing helped to reduce 
the housing deficit, its poor design, location and social conditions had 
a negative impact on people’s quality of life (Rodríguez and Sugranyes, 
2004). As a result, many young adults preferred to set up home in their 
relatives’ houses rather than apply for a housing subsidy. While doing 
research in Chile, Collins and Lear (1995: 156) observed allegados and 
described the phenomenon as follows:
The simple houses of the poblaciones [poor neighbourhoods] often 
are home to two to four extra families. These allegado (drop- in) 
families, often adult children of the owner of the house, live with 
their spouses and children one family to a bedroom, often three 
children to a bed. Within four walls they try to create a nuclear fam-
ily life, each family usually with its own TV and separate paraffin or 
gas stove.
Every two years, Chile’s Ministry of Social Development carries out 
a survey of households’ economic conditions. More than half of the coun-
try’s total housing deficit is accounted for by people living as allegados, 
while the rest are people living in poor housing conditions or informal 
settlements. Allegados are classified as ‘external’ or ‘internal’. External 



















with separate budgets, while internal allegados are two or more families 
sharing a single budget (e.g. a daughter who lives with her partner and 
their child in her parents’ house and off her parents’ income). The num-
ber of allegados is calculated by the ratio between the number of families 
and houses (external allegados), or the ratio between nuclear families 
and the main family (internal allegados) (MIDEPLAN 2013).
Chile’s allegados differ from house sharers in other parts of the 
world in several important ways. Whereas informal residents in Peru, 
Venezuela and Mexico have been able to settle on land on the out-
skirts of the big cities, in Chile such land occupation fell drastically 
under the military regime because of violence towards illegal occu-
pants. In circumstances where occupying land on the edge of the city 
became more difficult, renting and sharing inside the city became 
more common.
Figure 5.4.1 In the Municipality of San Joaquin, Metropolitan 
Region (Chile) there are 44,079 inhabitants that live as allegados. 
They have organised into 29 different Housing Committees to apply 
collectively to social housing, nevertheless due to scarce land in the 
area and long housing waiting lists only a few have managed to secure 
land and acquired social housing. The rest wait as allegados, sharing 
a reduced space with their host family and dreaming of owning their 
own house.














The situation in Chile also differs from that in countries where 
there is high migration from the countryside into the towns. In such 
cases, it is common for rural migrants to seek temporary accommodation 
in the city, often sharing with another family for a short period until they 
can find a permanent home. In the case of Chile, however, most allegados 
are city- born and can stay in this type of arrangement for several years 
(UN- Habitat 2003).
Another key distinction between Chile and other countries is that in 
Chile the occupants of a house, both host family and allegados, all tend to 
be members of a single extended family. It is, for example, common for 
young couples or single mothers to return to or remain in their parents’ 
houses. This reflects the fact that the family acts as a key social network 
in Chilean society, especially for poor communities.
Many allegados see this as a semi- permanent arrangement (Arriagada 
et al. 1999) with as many as 65 per cent stating that they are not looking 
for another solution in the near future (MIDEPLAN 2013). However, it 
is important to note that often both allegados and their host families find 
the arrangement far from ideal. This apparent contradiction reflects the 
complexity of the situation. The cramped nature of the space occupied by 
the family members creates potential sources of tension such as the threat 
of sexual assault or the discomfort of limited space in which to carry out 
daily activities. As a result, the practice can carry high psychological costs. 
Where possible, therefore, people who have lived as allegados (usually 
when they were starting a family of their own) try to move out of the fam-
ily home to unoccupied land. However, most of them stay as allegados.
Allegados have been a key factor in Chilean housing policy since 
the military regime ended in 1990. Since then, allegados have fought to 
be recognised in state assessments of the national housing deficit – they 
refer to themselves as ‘the biggest invisible settlement in the country’ – 
and their plight has prompted some housing policy reforms. An emblem-
atic case was that of the Toma de Peñalolen housing movement (toma, 
meaning ‘take’, refers here to the illegal seizure of land). In the 1990s, 
when the housing problem was supposed to have been resolved, 1,800 
allegado families seized private land in Santiago and created an informal 
settlement, claiming the right to remain in the area and not to be pushed 
out of the city (Castillo 2010). Thanks to its highly organised leadership, 
clear demands and at times radical collective action, Toma de Peñalolen 
had a strong influence on housing policy. In 2006, a location subsidy was 
introduced, providing additional funding on top of the existing housing- 
















Scholars and allegados movements alike recognise the practice of 
allegados not only as a response to the shortage of housing but also as a 
manifestation of poverty more generally. As a coping strategy, sharing 
accommodation helps people to deal not only with homelessness but 
also with other vulnerabilities such as limited childcare, access to jobs 
in the city or alternatives for domestic abuse victims. In this sense, a bet-
ter examination of allegados introduces new elements enabling us to 
better understand the relationship between housing and vulnerability. 
Allegados movements are accordingly campaigning to be recognised as a 
symbol of inequality and to highlight the social and political significance 
of the housing deficit and of poverty more widely.
5.5 Favela (Brazil)
Marta- Laura suska
department of anthropology, University of 
Wisconsin- Madison, Usa
Favela is the name given to informal settlements in Brazil, typically 
located in urban areas. The official definition of favela by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in collaboration with the 
United Nations (UN) is ‘subnormal agglomeration’ (IBGE 2011). It 
describes a community of at least 51 units illegally occupying public or 
private land in a ‘disorderly and dense manner’. The settlement is charac-
terised by lacking a property title and displays at least one of following: 
irregular infrastructure and streets; lack of basic services such as clean 
drinking water, sewage, electricity, refuse collection; and insecurity. The 
IBGE uses favela interchangeably with the English term ‘slum’. The lat-
est census of 2010 reported that approximately 11.4 million Brazilians, 
about 6 per cent of the Brazilian population, lived in favelas.
Favelas emerged due to many factors, but the most important rea-
sons were slavery and urban migration. From the mid- sixteenth century 
Brazil imported millions of slaves from Africa and when slavery was 
finally abolished in 1888, most freed slaves no longer had accommoda-
tion and enjoyed only limited rights. They built houses in less desired 
areas, such as on hilltops, near swamps and in the suburbs. More recently, 
the growth of favelas was fuelled by massive domestic migration of peo-
ple looking for work (especially from the northeast of Brazil), who were 
not able to afford housing, so they built their own. A feature of all favelas 
is that houses are in a continuous state of transformation and expansion. 
New rooms are being added or enlarged; roofs converted into second 

























alteration and production of space are what James Holston described as 
an act of ‘insurgent citizenship’ (Holston 2009).
Favelas can be found in the centre and peripheries of Brazilian cit-
ies, on hills and on flatlands. Some slums are fairly recent, others, like 
the Morro da Providência in Rio de Janeiro are over a hundred years old. 
Favelas vary greatly in size, population, political structure and layout. 
The largest favela with approximately 200,000 inhabitants (governmen-
tal and non-governmental organisation (NGO) data varies significantly) 
is arguably Roçinha in Rio. Over decades of improvisation, many favelas 
developed into self- sufficient economies – with their own supermarkets, 
bars, beauty salons and rules. Because there was no formal govern-
ment presence the residents developed their own justice system, infra-
structure, water and electricity supply. Roçinha and many other favelas 
became ‘cities within the city’.
Preparations for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics 
have seen city governments throughout Brazil investing billions of dol-
lars in ‘slum- upgrading’ projects that seek to redesign and integrate fave-
las into the city. Favela residents, however, are often resistant to such 
attempts, fearing that the benefits are only temporary and that they 
will lose their independence once international attention has ceased. 
However rudimentary and limited, favela residents generally have access 
to education and health care, and are often recipients of social pro-
grammes such as Bolsa Família, a conditional cash- transfer programme 
that makes grants available to low- income households providing that 
they send their children to school and have regular medical check- ups.
Many residents use the terms favela and comunidade (community) 
interchangeably because comunidade is supposedly a less derogatory 
term. However, critics point out that the term comunidade makes the 
false assumption that favelas are homogenous communities where the 
residents have close and friendly relationships with each other. In reality, 
most favelas host thousands of people who often do not know each other, 
nor trust each other any more than people in other neighbourhoods. In 
Rio de Janeiro, favelas are also known as ‘hills’ (morros), because favelas 
in the city centre are located on hill tops.
The concept of favela cannot be fully understood without discuss-
ing the social inequality in Brazil. Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chauí 
wrote that Brazil’s is a ‘verticalised and hierarchised’ society ‘in which 
social relations are always realized either in the form of complicity (when 
the social subject recognizes each other as equals) or in the form of orders 
and obedience between a superior and an inferior’ (quoted in Kingston 






















equality of citizens’ does not exist (quoted in Kingstone and Power 2000: 
221). Anthropologist Roberto da Matta reaches a similar conclusion; 
he argues that the cordiality and conviviality that often impress tourists 
also produce personal exceptions to every rule, the so called jeitinho (Da 
Matta 1997; see also 1.2 Volume 1). Different rules are expected for dif-
ferent layers of society and laws are not enforced universally, but inter-
nally, among peers.
In Rio de Janeiro, youth from wealthy neighbourhoods regularly 
enter favelas to attend the (in)famous Baile Funk – a specific music and 
party scene (Figure 5.5.1). In recent years, favela tourism has also become 
a popular business. However, in cities in the northeast, upper- class mem-
bers or tourists would rarely be seen entering a favela. Here the communi-
ties are much more segregated from the rest of society, as well as being 
much poorer and the favelas are less visually appealing than in the south.
The image of favelas remains predominantly associated with Rio de 
Janeiro, but it is not a representative image for favelas in other cities in 
Brazil. The public perception of favelas is distorted by the imagery offered 
by the arts and media, who paint a homogenous picture of favelas and 
obscure the realities of the life within. Favelas need to be disaggregated 
Figure 5.5.1 The favela ‘Morro da Coroa’ in Rio de Janeiro, 2009.












into specifics of geography, demography, cultural characteristics and 
institutions. While Rio’s morros have become emblematic regarding 
image, violence, music and arts, in other regions security, leisure and 
opportunities are experienced in a vastly different manner. Thus the term 
‘favela’ may not be as uniformly Brazilian as it seems.
A study jointly published by WHO, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, based on 
global data from 2012, the most recent year available, showed that Brazil 
had the highest number of homicides in the world. The nation’s death toll 
was more than 64,000 in 2012 (UN Report 2014). The characteristics of 
violence differ drastically from region to region, however, victims (and 
perpetrators) are the same:  overwhelmingly young, dark- skinned men 
from favelas.
In Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo drug gangs are highly organised 
and have significant influence over the police and local politics. Local 
drug lords will contribute to their favela’s infrastructure and help resi-
dents; they will also declare laws unilaterally and punish any wrong-
doing. In other regions, however, drug gangs are not as well organised, 
with the result that they contribute less to the community overall.
In many cities, but especially in Rio and São Paulo, heavily armed 
drug traffickers rule regions inside the city and security crackdowns 
have culminated in police raids on the sprawling favelas. The resulting 
gun battles have killed scores of innocents. Anthropologist Ben Penglase 
observed how by accusing each other of being the source of arbitrary 
violence, the police and traffickers depend on each other to justify and 
to produce their own competing strategies for ‘order’ and ‘security’ 
(Penglase 2009). Drug traffickers and the police contribute to the crea-
tion and the perpetration of a ‘state of emergency’ (Agamben 2005) in 
which no ‘normal’ rules can apply.
Due to the public’s heightened fear of crime a profound urban seg-
regation developed (Perlman 2010). Those citizens who could afford it 
retreated from public space into enclaves with private security systems 
and bulletproof windows. The poor citizens’ only option for security, 
however, was to turn to the drug traffickers, who secured their territories 
against the state with weapons. The ensuing ‘spectacular violence’ when 
police invaded favelas in urban tanks to counter shirtless drug traffickers 
using warfare weaponry was seized upon by the media who adopted the 
motif for books and movie productions. As Erika Robb Larkins argues, 
the practice of favela tourism is also a commodification of the favela and 
becomes a form of violence itself. Favela violence is transformed into a 



















serves to keep the poor marginalised and creates the ‘spectacular favela’ 
(Robb Larkins 2015).
Several public safety initiatives have emerged to address the 
alarming murder rates. The Pacification Police Unit (Unidade de Polícia 
Pacificadora UPP) in Rio de Janeiro, in particular, stands out for its 
approach to ‘pacify’ favelas. It is a military takeover of territories ruled by 
armed drug gangs and the installation of a permanent police presence, 
with the intent that the provision of social services and improvements 
to infrastructure will follow. Initially, the UPP achieved a vast decrease 
in violence but soon it faced vulnerabilities due to political volatility, 
financial cuts and historical distrust towards the police. Brazilian police 
remain among the most lethal in the world, annually killing thousands 
of civilians with impunity. Shoot- to- kill policies and death squad activi-
ties can be directly linked to a lack of political will and implicit public 
support of such practices. As a result, certain divisions of the military 
police have continued to ‘clean up’ favelas by killing drug traffickers and 
their families without facing legal charges. Their actions are deemed 
‘illegal but not illegitimate’ (Civico 2012: 79); human rights and public 
security have developed into seemingly conflicting priorities.
5.6 Campamento (Chile)
armando Caroca fernandez
Universidad Católica de Chile
The official definition of campamento, as used by the Chilean Ministry 
of Housing and Urban Planning (Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 
(MINVU)) is of ‘settlements, usually found in urban areas, of more than 
eight families living on an irregular land tenure, lacking at least one of 
the three basic services (electricity, drinking water and sewage system) 
whose homes are closely grouped together’ (MINVU 2011: 23).
According to the official statistics provided by MINVU there are 657 
campamentos in Chile, currently housing 27,378 families. This represents 
a total of 83,863 inhabitants. TECHO- Chile, the main non-governmen-
tal organisation (NGO) dedicated to working with slum dwellers in the 
country reports that 75.8 per cent of households in the campamentos do 
not have formal access to drinking water; 91.5 per cent do not have sew-
erage and 47.6 per cent are illegally connected to an electricity supply 
(TECHO 2015: 25). Moreover, TECHO has established that 27.8 per cent 
of all dwellings in the campamentos are constructed using hazardous or 

























Neither the definition nor the statistics are particularly different or 
unfavourable compared with many other ‘slums’ found in most countries 
in the developing world. Each country in Latin America has its own term 
for these informal settlements: they are known as Favelas in Brasil, Villas 
Miseria in Argentina, Barrios Brujos in Panamá and Ranchos in Venezuela. 
To a large extent all experience the same deprivations and difficulties. 
However, the Chilean case has some significant characteristics that dif-
ferentiate it from the others.
The term campamento literally means a ‘camp’ and is an explicit ref-
erence to the military camps of Chile, from which it acquired three dis-
tinct features – the settlement has a clear, well- defined social and urban 
layout; it has an internal discipline that allows for a high degree of self- 
organisation; and it is acknowledged as being temporary. Uniquely, the 
first inhabitants of campamentos made attempts at organising and pro-
viding their own systems of justice, health, education and house building 
(De Ramón 1990; MINVU 2011).
As a term, campamento entered common day language in the early 
1970s, signifying the combative and militant aspects that characterised 
illegal land occupation of that period. During the political polarisation of 
Chile leading up to the 1973 military coup and subsequent dictatorship, 
the settlements were ‘organised to fight’ (MINVU 2011: 14), turning 
their inhabitants into fundamental political actors. This political move-
ment, which found expression in the settlements, generated a new power 
base within the cities, which acted in direct opposition to local and cen-
tral authorities (De Ramón 1990). De Ramón noted that ‘This phenom-
enon, compared with similar ones in other countries, had at that time a 
magnitude and scale that went beyond merely housing or urban prob-
lems, becoming a socio- political factor that shaped a pre- revolutionary 
state, historically different to what happened in other cases’ (De Ramón 
1990: 15).
Campamentos are the latest expression of a long history of precari-
ous settlements in Chilean cities. Each stage in the development of the 
settlements was uniquely named. The first, known as the ‘indian vil-
lage’ (pueblo de indio), originated in the sixteenth century in Spanish 
colonial times, and referred to the towns located near the Spanish cit-
ies, where indigenous communities were forced to live in a highly segre-
gated urban scheme (De Ramón 1990). The second type of development 
appeared at the second half of the twentieth century and was referred 
to as a ‘mushroom village’ (población callampa). These settlements were 
the equivalent of ‘shantytowns’, in so far as they were unplanned settle-


















river banks, empty plots, train lines or other hazardous places (MINVU 
2011). In the 1960s the settlements were labelled ‘land occupation’ 
(toma de terreno). Commonly they were the construct of a political party 
and were formed ‘in a single, sudden and sometimes violent act that took 
the authorities and ... the owner by surprise’ (De Ramón 1990: 13).
Most of the campamentos that exist today were created in the 20 
years between the end of the military dictatorship in 1990, and 2010, a 
period characterised by a strong state emphasis on housing, which saw 
the creation of two specific government policies designed to solve the 
housing conditions of slum dwellers.
The first of these policies was the ‘Chile- Neighbourhood’ programme 
(Chile Barrio), which ran from 1997 to 2007. This programme, as part of 
a larger governmental policy, sought not only to provide housing for the 
slum dwellers, but also to improve other aspects of their lives, such as 
social inclusion and employability. After a period of relative success in 
reducing campamentos nationwide, this policy was replaced in 2007 by 
the ‘Informal Settlements’ Attention Programme’ (Línea de Atención de 
Campamentos), which continued until 2009. This programme’s objective 
was simpler and focused only on the provision of housing for slum dwell-
ers. However, a subsequent survey conducted in 2011 showed that the 
number of campamentos had increased after 2007, not only because of 
the emergence of new settlements, but also as a result of the resurgence 
of old ones (MINVU 2011).
Remarkably, since the end of the 1990s, and during four subse-
quent presidential periods, up to 12 official announcements have been 
made promising an end to campamentos (Domínguez 2011: 83). Yet, 
in spite of said government efforts to eradicate campamentos, they are 
still increasing in number, as are the number of families living in them 
(TECHO 2015). How can this be explained?
First, the main reason for living in campamentos remains startlingly 
simple: ‘there is no other place to live’ (TECHO 2015: 18). However, a 
number of contemporary authors define campamentos as a manifestation 
of a phenomenon that represents not only a housing shortage, but is indic-
ative of more complex social processes. They suggest that it is a strategic 
practice undertaken by the inhabitants, who have chosen to live in campa-
mentos in order to have access to employment opportunities available in 
urban centres (Brain et al. 2010; Domínguez 2011; MINVU 2011).
This may be confirmed by a study of the demographics of the cam-
pamentos’ inhabitants: 50 per cent of the families currently resident in 
campamentos have lived in them for a period of 10 years or less (MINVU 












the majority of whom are families at the early stages of their life (MINVU 
2011: 40), precisely those who most need to engage with the cities’ 
network of opportunities. According to the ‘National Socio- economic 
Characterisation Survey’ (CASEN), the official national instrument for 
measuring the socio- economic conditions of households, in 2009, the 
population of campamentos was not only younger in relation to the total 
population of the country, but also in relation to the poor population in 
Chile (MINVU 2011: 41). Furthermore, the heads of the households in 
campamentos had a higher occupancy rate compared with the poorest 
quintile of the population (MINVU 2011: 46).
Second, living in a campamento can also be a strategic way of obtain-
ing government housing (Brain et al. 2010). Paradoxically, the current 
social housing policy seems to support this strategy. Since the devastat-
ing earthquake of 2010, the government has made a great effort to build 
social housing for families who lost their homes and were accommodated 
in temporary housing. However, in the interest of presenting a just sys-
tem, the government declared that the same programme would apply to 
all families living in campamentos, which in effect gave them preferential 
treatment in obtaining housing. As a result of this policy, some families 
Figure 5.6.1 Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno campamento. Santiago, 
Chile, July 1984.













chose to go and live in a campamento in order to gain an official recog-
nition of need, and thus they were able to strategically improve their 
chances of being rehoused.
A third reason that explains the existence of informal settlements 
in Chile is immigration, in particular with respect to immigrants from 
Peru and Bolivia. While the number of immigrants does not represent a 
high percentage of the total population (in 2013 the figure was 354,581 
out of 17.6  million people), the overall number of foreigners living in 
Chile increased by 130 per cent between 2006 and 2013 (Ministerio de 
Desarrollo Social 2015: 4). Many immigrants choose to settle in campa-
mentos as it permits them faster access to opportunities in Chilean cities 
(MINVU 2011: 50; Blanco 2014). This is especially so in the north of the 
country, as found in the city of Copiapó in the Atacama region. Mining is 
the dominant force in the economic and social dynamic of this city. Local 
inhabitants prefer to work in the mines, as it is better paid than other 
employment. This in turn encourages people from other regions of Chile 
and Latin American countries to migrate to this region in search of the 
employment opportunities that arise as a by- product of mining, usually in 
low- paid service jobs such as in restaurants, housekeeping or hairdress-
ing. However, the high salaries in the mining sector produce a rise in the 
cost of living within the city, which artificially inflates the housing rental 
market. As a consequence many people are not able to afford the cost 
of housing and therefore have no choice but to live in the campamentos 
settlements.
Finally, some campamentos can be explained as a consequence of 
their productive function. The Chilean case of informal settlements is 
characterised by the wide variety of geographical, cultural and economic 
contexts in which campamentos appear. In many of these settlements, 
located in rural areas or medium- sized cities, the individual houses are 
inserted into a larger productive network, in which living and working 
occurs in the same space and time (Lovera 2015: 8, 9). Good examples 
of the above mentioned networks are found in the informal settlements 
associated with fishing activities located in the southern part of the coun-
try. They possess both a temporal dynamism, given by the fluctuating 
cycles of extractive activities, and a spatial flexibility, where courtyards 
and common spaces ‘are not only the individual houses’ extension, but 
also allow for the development of crafts and serve as support infrastruc-
ture for groups of families’ (Lovera 2015: 18). In contrast, Government 
policies aimed at providing housing for slum dwellers are, by definition, 
based on standardised solutions, and therefore they are not usually able 
























5.7 Mukhayyam (occupied Palestinian territories and 
neighbouring arab countries)
Lorenzo navone and federico rahola
department of education, University of Genoa, Italy
Palestinian refugee camps (mukhayyam) are ‘temporary settlements’ 
built to house Palestinians who were expelled from their homes after the 
first Arab– Israeli war (1947– 9), when some 700,000 Palestinians were 
forced out of territory that is currently controlled by the State of Israel. 
As defined by the United Nations (UN), Palestinian refugees are ‘persons 
whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 
1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood 
as a result of the 1948 conflict’ (UNRWA). Following the destruction by 
Israeli armed forces of 511 Palestinian villages and 11 Palestinian towns, 
the refugees fled to neighbouring countries, where most of them were 
given shelter in refugee camps (Khalidi 2006; Pappé 2006).
Today, at least 5 million Palestinians live in some 60 refugee camps. 
Of these camps, 27 are located within the occupied Palestinian territories 
(OPT) – that is, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip (where there are 8 camps) 
and the West Bank (where there are 19). Most of the camps are, however, 
situated in neighbouring Arab countries. These include 10 camps in Jordan, 
12 in Lebanon and 12 in Syria (of which 3 are not officially recognised).
The location of camps within the OPT creates a further striated 
space in territory that is already crossed by several kinds of border 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Being structures as temporary as they are 
permanent, Palestinian refugee camps trigger a set of as yet unanswered 
political questions while symbolising an unresolved and ongoing transi-
tion. Can these spaces be considered informal places? If so, how? What 
character is conferred on the camps by their specific political dimension – 
is it one that is not found in other informal urban housing? What kind of 
political discontinuity do the OPT’s refugee camps produce and reflect?
In morphological terms, Palestinian refugee camps appear to 
resemble other informal and disadvantaged settlements (ghettos, slums, 
shantytowns, favela in Brazil or villa miseria in Argentina). A tin roof with 
intermittent water and electricity supplies is not, however, sufficient to 
define the informality of these camps. At first glance, they are almost indis-
tinguishable from the surrounding space. Originally provisional encamp-
ments, consisting of blue tents erected on empty or abandoned fields that 
had been sold to the UN, many of these camps have now become a kind 
of urban fringe, encapsulated within the expansion of the main West 























Nablus, Gaza City and Rafah). They are situated in overcrowded areas 
populated by underprivileged, working- class people. Buildings usually 
consist of cement and iron grids; handmade and unstable, they are not 
built according to professional plans or standards (Hailey 2009). Even 
so, as radical urbanisation occurs within the OPT, such a dichotomy 
tends to vanish, and the outcome is a continuum, where camps and cit-
ies overlap with one another seemingly by osmosis: while the camps are 
incorporated into irregular urban growth, the cities are affected by the 
informality of the camps. The dynamic processes typifying the former 
seem to counter the apparent inertia of the latter.
In broader terms, OPT refugee camps are informal spaces not so 
much because of their marginal situation relative to urban settlements 
and governmental territoriality (Roitman 2005), but because they reflect 
the lack of state sovereignty and the suspended temporality that this lack 
produces (Parizot 2009). They form a ‘limbo’ that is configured as a kind 
of ‘definitively temporary zone’ (Rahola 2010), and that more gener-
ally reflects the peculiar predicament of a never- accomplished transition 
towards a possible state (Said 1998). It is therefore a case less of a mor-
phological or dwelling informality than of a political one.
Figure 5.7.1 Shuafat refugee camp, East Jerusalem (occupied 
Palestinian territories).




In addition, the informality caused by the lack of full sovereignty 
of the Palestinian Authority (the government established in 1994 in 
the Gaza Strip and West Bank) is reflected and intensified within the 
refugee camps in terms of a specific lack of private property over the 
space. Dwelling practices in refugee camps reconfigure symmetric rela-
tions between public and private spaces. On the one hand, the private 
dimension of space is contested by the lack of property rights (since the 
residents are temporary tenants and not owners); on the other hand, 
the public space does not properly reflect state order (since Palestinian 
property rights and ownership of the occupied territories are contested). 
In this sense, informal practices reflect both the public and the private 
dimension of the space in the form of, respectively, a refraction inward 
(fences, enclosures, barriers, protective grids) and a projection out-
ward (gardens, functional structures such as informal garages, ‘illegal’ 
workshops), thereby providing the camps with an increased interstitial 
character (Brighenti 2013). We may accordingly conceive the camps’ 
informality both as a broader attitude vis- à- vis public/ private space, and 
as an act of transformation and appropriation, claiming a form of posses-
sion beyond any formal right to property or sovereignty.
It follows that refugee camps in the OPT should be seen not only 
as informal, but also as transformative spaces: the outcome of practices 
and forms of reinvention that configure camps as dynamic and paradoxi-
cally ‘open’ spaces within a confined and imprisoned state (one whose 
sovereignty is limited or ‘concentrated’). Nonetheless, even though the 
specific space of camps should be seen as an outcome produced by its 
inhabitants, such a space materially informs the internal conditions of 
their lives, reshaping the field of social relations, actions and interac-
tions. In other words, Palestinian refugee camps must be considered as 
both ‘representational spaces’ and ‘representations of spaces’ (Lefebvre 
1991). This latter dimension, while referring to camps’ formal, objective 
and violent constraints, has a direct impact on the status of camp inhab-
itants, formally defining them as refugees – a label that may hang over 
them as a stigma. Even so, a refugee has a recognised political status, 
one that may be inherited (as testified by the existence of a second or 
third generation of refugees, who never suffered any actual forced dis-
placement) and that may also provide a crucial though as yet undefined 
right to return to the territory of the former British mandate of Palestine 
(1920– 48), nowadays part of the State of Israel.
Here a paradoxical situation emerges. In the OPT’s over- striated 
space, the (almost invisible) borders surrounding refugee camps often 



















discontinuity between inside and outside, camps and cities, tends to van-
ish) and more as immaterial signals of status. They do this by distinguish-
ing and yet deconstructing any unambiguous dimension of Palestinian 
citizenship. While these borders still reproduce class and political dif-
ferences, they first and foremost increase and multiply the processes of 
Palestinians’ differential inclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Balibar 
2015) or ‘reclusion’ within the OPT. Seen from this perspective, camps 
become apparatuses of reproduction and confinement of Palestinian pre-
carious identity (and labour).
Refugee camps are typically depicted as places of loss and depriva-
tion. In the case of the OPT camps, however, the multiplicity of inter-
nal and external borders and statuses leads to a situation that is both 
more complex and more intertwined. Camps, along with their recog-
nised informality and temporariness, represent a space that may, to some 
degree, reveal itself as paradoxically more defined and ‘structured’ than 
the surrounding ‘official’ and relentlessly transitional Palestinian urban 
territory. Being holes in a ‘hollow land’ (Weizman 2007), the camps 





The dacha is an out- of- town dwelling and plot of land for intermittent use 
by urbanites. It may be thought of as the Slavic equivalent of the ‘country 
cottage’, ‘log cabin’ or ‘second home’. But we should not be too hasty with 
such analogies: over the three centuries of its existence, and especially 
since the mid- nineteenth century, the dacha has taken a wide variety of 
forms, many of them far more modest in dimensions and appearance 
than any Western equivalent; it has catered to many different social con-
stituencies; and it has been subjected to varying, but often severe, eco-
nomic and political pressures.
Summer relocation to the dacha became a social norm for the urban 
middle strata in the second third of the nineteenth century, and the dacha 
had become something close to a mass phenomenon by the end of the 
century with the spread of the railway network and the growth of the 
population of Moscow and St Petersburg to 1 million and beyond. During 
the revolutionary period, dacha settlements saw their share of depopula-
tion, looting and expropriation. But the dacha as a social institution made 
















1920s Moscow and Leningrad, not least because overpressed urbanites 
continued to need respite from the squalid and overcrowded city. In the 
1930s, a variety of Soviet institutions – from the Central Committee down 
to trade unions and individual enterprises – began to take charge of the 
dacha stock, handing out summer dwellings or plots of land to favoured 
functionaries or employees. The dacha, then, had reinvented itself as a 
perquisite of a privileged Soviet ‘middle class’. During the war and just 
after, it once again changed its character, as the authorities handed out 
‘garden plots’ to much wider sections of the urban population. Although 
this was designed purely as a subsistence measure in desperately hard 
times, and recipients were forbidden from building habitable dwellings 
on their plots, over time the boundaries of the permissible were pushed 
back. From the 1950s onwards, a widening range of workplaces and other 
‘collectives’ set up ‘garden associations’, which allowed members to build 
modest summer dwellings in which they could spend nights alongside 
their potato patches. Besides allowing hundreds of thousands of urbanites 
to supplement their diet, this mass Soviet dacha fostered a more demotic 
kind of exurban sociability: vodka and shashlyki (meat skewers) by the fire 
rather than Chekhovian hammocks and far niente (doing nothing). The fall 
of the Soviet Union gave this model of dacha life a further boost: the severe 
hardship and economic uncertainty of the 1990s once again made urban 
Russians preoccupied with subsistence and committed to toiling on their 
garden plots. At the same time, the lapsing of Soviet restrictions on land 
use and the rewards (for some) of the market economy led to a diversifica-
tion of models of dacha existence: by the early 2000s it was quite common 
to see hulking American- style brick houses alongside Soviet- era shacks.
As this historical sketch begins to suggest, the dacha exemplifies 
well the ambivalence of the informal domain. Its defining ambivalence 
is this: although invariably used by urbanites, and for that reason an 
outgrowth of urban civilisation, dachas have often been conceived as a 
return to nature – a way for Muscovites and Petersburgers to reconnect 
with their rural roots, shed urban pathologies, and rediscover the vir-
tues of agricultural toil. But if we look more closely, the balance between 
the urban, the bucolic and the downright agricultural has tilted this way 
and that over time. In the nineteenth century, the spread of dacha use 
from a small elite to a broad urban public gave rise to apprehensions 
that dacha life was falling prey to a familiar range of urban vices (crime, 
marital infidelity, vulgarity, ‘petty bourgeois’ materialism). Many of these 
fears would gain a new lease of life in the Soviet 1920s, and then again in 
the post- Stalin era, as the guardians of communist morality policed the 



















5.9 paBirc i t i  (serBIa ,  CroatIa ,  B&h)
constitutes ‘authentic’ dacha life has never really ceased. In the nine-
teenth century, the more austere commentators focused on the health- 
giving properties of the dacha (which were very real, given the dreadful 
sanitation in Russia’s cities) without setting much store by the more 
frivolous pastimes of the dachniki; other stakeholders in the dacha expe-
rience were more interested in entertaining guests and playing games. 
Pre-revolutionary Russians did not, however, make the connection 
between dachas and subsistence, seeing out- of- town living as restorative 
and/ or recreational. In Soviet times, the intelligentsia model of dacha 
as recuperation for overtaxed urban minds coexisted with the peas-
ant- infused garden plot model. In the post- Soviet era, many dachniki 
continued to insist that their plots were primarily a survival strategy, 
even though hard- nosed economists pointed out that they could have 
obtained their potatoes and tomatoes more cheaply at the market. The 
breakneck rural– urban migration of Russia’s twentieth century has 
left many traces and imposed many costs, and the dacha has proved an 
excellent way for modern Russians to finesse the rural– urban divide: to 
engage in more or less refined recreation or to demonstrate their endur-
ing connection to the soil, as circumstances dictate. It has also provided 
a genuine protection against the uncertainties of Russian life: urban 
housing has always been scarce, apartments are usually tiny, and Soviet 
people exercised very little control over their immediate urban environ-
ment. The dacha (or garden plot) was, by contrast, a patch of land that 
was their very own (even if it was often only ‘theirs’ at the discretion of 
the cooperative). And the community of the dacha settlement – its open- 
air visibility and legibility – made for a striking contrast with the closed- 
doors anomie of the typical post- Stalin apartment block: the dirt tracks 
and fences of dacha settlements evidently did more to engage the Soviet 
spirit of collectivism than the (usually urine- soaked and graffiti- ridden) 
stairwells of apartment blocks back in the city.
Informal welfare
5.9 Pabircˇiti (or pabirc enje) (serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and 
herzegovina)
Jovana dikovic
University of zurich, switzerland
Pabirčiti is a verbal form in the Serbian and Croatian languages that 
refers to the collection of grains that are left over in the field after harvest. 

















‘remains’ in fields, vineyards and orchards after the harvest. In a broader 
context this noun may refer to the remains of food, the remains of wood 
after cutting, or small pieces of a bigger whole. The use of these terms is 
widespread in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are 
similar sounding words in Slavic languages. The Russian verb pobirat’sya 
is associated with begging for remains of food. The English term ‘glean-
ing’, French glanage, and German nachlese, all have the same meaning – 
gathering activity after the harvest or an informal ‘second harvest’. This 
practice exists in many other European languages, although in varying 
forms and degrees. The practice was depicted in one of the better known 
paintings of Jean- Francois Millet (1814– 75), a French painter in the tra-
dition of realism and naturalism. Currently in the Museum d’Orsay, The 
Gleaners (Des glaneuses) (1857) depicts three poor women picking up 
leftover grain in a field (see Figure 5.9.1).
The practice of gleaning in general is linked to the centuries- old cus-
tom embedded in common law, whereby the master of the land has the 
right to allow the poor to follow reapers in the field to gather and glean 
fallen grains for their own needs. One of the earliest Hebrew agricultural 
Figure 5.9.1 The Gleaners by Jean- Francois Millet, 1857.
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laws, described in the Old Testament, illustrates how the generosity 
of the master determined the amount of gleaned grains (The Story of 
Ruth 2: 2– 23). This early form of welfare for the needy is still present 
in countries from Syria to the USA. The old custom involves a relation-
ship between the landowner and the poor that is still maintained in some 
places, while in other places faith- based groups glean and redistribute 
the leftover crop as part of their religious calling. The practice of glean-
ing is widespread in rural areas and not constrained to Europe; rather, it 
reaches out to the areas of Biblical Levant and beyond.
The practice of pabirčenje (gleaning) in Serbia spread predomi-
nantly in agricultural regions, particularly in the province of Vojvodina 
(Pavković 2009). Part of the current territory of Serbia used to belong to 
Ottoman Empire, and part to the Austro- Hungarian Empire, so the preva-
lence of the feudal mode of production, or ‘tribute mode of production’ 
(Wolf 1982), lasted longer than in other parts of Europe. The end of feu-
dal relationships came as late as the first agrarian reform (1919– 41) in an 
independent Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, where small private 
holdings started to emerge. Until the first agrarian reform, for the land-
less, gleaning was often the only way to evade starvation. The poor could 
not, however, enter the fields without the consent of the landowner. The 
explicit or implicit, socially and culturally, communicated consent was 
fundamental for the practice of pabirčenje (Pavkovic 2014, 284– 96).
There were at least two reasons for landowners’ explicit consent 
and generosity: sociability and instrumentality. On the one hand, gener-
osity was meant to build the landowner’s reputation in the community, to 
extend and to strengthen his social network by providing favours or pro-
tection to his subordinates. In this way, pabirčenje was a way to sustain 
and support his clientelist network that could potentially become instru-
mental in support of his political ambitions, local leadership, etc. On the 
other hand, there was even more pragmatism in pabirčenje. By allowing 
the poor to glean on his field in the short run, the landowner prevented 
the potential social unrest and acquired stable political support among the 
local population in the long run. As Foster points out, in traditional 
communities all social interaction is based on well- recognised norms of 
exchange and reciprocity (Foster 1973: 105). Similarly, Wolf ascertains 
that various redistribution practices in traditional communities may not 
be as altruistic as they appear at first glance, because they were often 
socially forced, and moreover they resulted from social and class stratifi-
cation (Wolf 1982: 98).
After the first agrarian reform and subsequent changes in agricul-

























significantly due to several factors. In socialist Yugoslavia (1944– 91), 
the category of landless people officially disappeared due to the paral-
lel existence of three types of property: collective, state and private. In 
the same period, the state took over the role of welfare provision. Under 
socialism, reliance on the state for the provision of welfare rather than 
private patrons changed perceptions and practices of pabirčenje. It can 
be argued that state welfare and maintaining of private property in land 
(though limited to 10 ha in the socialist period) are fundamental factors 
that contributed to diminishing significance of pabirčenje. This continued 
following liberal- democratic reforms in the post- socialist period (from 
1991) when private owners were granted the right to enlarge their prop-
erty without any restrictions, unlike socialist times, while the state still 
remained the main provider of the welfare.
Since the 1990s onwards, due to the civil war in former Yugoslavia 
(1991– 5), and during the political and economic transition of Serbia 
after 2000, poverty and criminality have risen in cities and villages 
respectively. Given the fact that Roma belong to the most vulnerable 
groups in villages because they are unemployed, uneducated and mostly 
landless, they are often related to criminality, partly due to these factors 
and partly due to their traditional stereotype of being ‘free riders’. These 
unfavourable circumstances have influenced the fact that Roma are seen 
as trespassers, while the contemporary use of the term pabirčenje mostly 
represents a euphemism for the field theft.
The previous semantic connotations of pabirčenje – that included 
relations of social, economic and political reciprocity, plus the land-
owner’s consent (which was the main condition activating the right to 
glean) – have been almost lost today. This is due, first, to the growth of 
private property and a significant decrease in the number of landless peo-
ple. Second, the growing importance of state welfare created a general 
perception that the needy are the responsibility of the state and its social 
institutions. In such an environment landowners have neither a social 
nor a political stimulus to support persons in need. Correspondingly, 
landowner consent to pabirčenje is steadily vanishing.
On the other side, would- be gleaners (pabirčari) are well aware 
that their activity is potentially theft. This is not to say that every case 
of pabirčenje is theft, but sometimes it crosses over into stealing from 
unharvested fields. The pabirčari justify their actions by referring to 
the old meaning of socially embedded practice of pabirčenje in order to 
avoid social criticism and potential sanctions. The authorities display a 
similarly ambivalent attitude: on the one hand, the state is committed 




























be very tolerant towards alleged pabirčari – a de facto form of institu-
tional patronage over socially vulnerable groups. Such a fluid situation 
can aggravate tensions between agricultural producers and state institu-
tions such as the police and the courts, resulting in farmers’ distrust of 
the state.
In this modern context, contemporary practices of pabirčenje have 
lost their main driver, the bonds of reciprocity. It became a self- serving 
practice with little social purpose, aggressive rather than consensual, 
and satisfying short- term needs rather than long- term relationships. In 
other words, pabirčenje has drifted away from being an informal norm 
in the past, with socially shared unwritten rules, that were created, com-
municated and enforced outside of official state and public channels 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004), to a substantively different type of informal 
behaviour. Contemporary pabirčenje has become an informal strategy of 
individuals without land or regular income, who view it as socially justifi-
able in the absence of other types of access to means of survival.
Such tendencies are closely linked to the formalisation of welfare 
institutions. From the beginning of the twentieth century, and particu-
larly in the former socialist societies, the state established a monopoly 
over welfare provision (see Palmer 2012). As a result, forms of infor-
mal welfare such as pabirčenje, based not merely on charity but also on 
mutual supportive mechanisms for the interested parties (the landowner 
and the poor), have been ‘crowded out’ by the state provision of welfare. 
Correspondingly, practices of pabirčenje that remain have lost their give- 
and- take embeddedness in the local community, and gained an aspect 
of parasitism. The role of self- regulating informal forms of organisation 
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In English, the term ‘skipping’ refers to the action of collecting objects 
or food items from the waste. It is the equivalent of the American term 
‘dumpster diving’, and both expressions are now widely used in the media 
and in the press. The term comes from ‘skip’, which defines the bins them-
selves, generally large open- topped waste containers, but the term also 
refers to the items that can be found within them.
‘Skipping’ as an urban foraging technique is a widespread practice 

























land, see 5.1 in this volume) and as part of radical political movements. 
Just like squatting, ‘skipping’ can be defined as a polysemic practice 
(Pruijt 2004) as it can acquire different functions and meanings. It can 
be practised as a provisioning strategy in the contexts of marginality, but 
also exists as a critical commentary on the enormous waste and the poor 
distribution of resources in both housing and in social support in a capi-
talist economic system. This provisioning practice therefore does not nec-
essarily emerge as a direct product of violence, marginality and survival 
strategies, but is often part of a whole movement of resistance, supported 
and informed by literature, culture and ideology. It is also related to other 
movements that advocate consumption consciousness, such as ‘freegan-
ism’, the practice of reclaiming food thrown out by shops, anti- consumer-
ism and environmentalism.
‘Skipping’ is normally performed by a heterogeneous group of peoples, 
including the homeless, squatters, political and environmental activists, social 
anarchists, artists and students with limited income (see Figure  5.10.1). 
‘Skipping’ is rarely carried out as an individual practice, but often performed 
within an organised community of people sharing resources, especially 
in the context of big cities. In fact, these types of reclaimed resources are 
abundant in urban areas, as a result of a socio- economic model in which the 
increasing demand for goods leads to the constant production of commodi-
ties and their continuous replacement (Bauman 2004).
As different items are collected in different spots, these urban forag-
ers re- map the city according to the potential items that can be found: fur-
niture, mattresses, appliances and clothes may be collected in residential 
areas, while shops, local markets and supermarkets in the main streets 
provide a constant and regular supply of food items. Supermarkets are 
obliged on a daily basis to get rid of food, which according to the prod-
uct labelling is reaching its optimum consumption date and ignores the 
actual status of the commodity itself. In other cases, items are thrown 
away because the packaging is broken or damaged. The same happens in 
local markets, where fresh vegetables and fruits with small imperfections 
or slight signs of decay are discarded (Black 2007).
As a rule, communities that practise ‘skipping’ as a provisioning 
strategy develop certain routine habits regarding their favourite spots. 
Usually a further consideration is to scavenge in bins that provide the 
widest variety of wasted goods. For example, for daily provisioning, a 
supermarket or a grocery store bin will be favoured over the waste bin 
of a Japanese take away. These parameters of choice reflect personal 
tastes and needs, reproducing a standard comparison between costs and 






















garbage are usually brought into the community (be it a squat, a social 
centre or a shared habitation), to be redistributed and consumed.
Both official and informal social centres, community centres and 
non- profit associations employ a variety of different strategies to redis-
tribute the resources that have been discarded from the mainstream 
economic system. One of these strategies is the establishment of a ‘free 
shop’ – an anti- consumerism area where items like second- hand clothes, 
Figure 5.10.1 Skipping does not require specific tools: people 
normally wear washable gloves and coats and use plastic bags or old 
backpacks to carry the items they find in the bins.









bags and shoes can be left or taken for free. ‘Free shops’ are commonly 
present inside squats and social centres, where dwellers, friends and visi-
tors can acquire objects they like or need, but also leave items they do not 
use anymore, making them available to others.
In a similar vein, a popular way of redistributing soon to be date 
expired or unsold food is through what is known as the ‘People’s Kitchen’. 
Activists and volunteers reclaim edible goods from the skip or from the 
shops, then cook it and share it in a communal meal for free, often invit-
ing disadvantaged people, friends and fellow activists to join them. Such 
events can be seen as collective performances of social critique and often 
provide an occasion to discuss related political issues.
While structured non- profit organisations prefer to negotiate with 
and reclaim food directly from the shops, squats and occupied social cen-
tres use ‘skipping’ as their predominant way of provisioning. ‘Dumpster 
diving’ is not a socially accepted behaviour and foragers risk incurring 
criminal charges for theft (applicable when the bin is technically owned 
by someone else) or trespass (applicable when a bin is located on private 
property). The prevailing social attitude towards garbage is that it rep-
resents objects of no value, thus cases of criminal prosecution relating 
to ‘skipping’ are rare. However, several companies have taken action to 
prevent their garbage being taken by locking their bins or surrounding 
them with secure fencing.
It should be noted that on a political level, the semi- legal status of 
‘skipping’ makes the practice difficult to measure, but its high visibility 
reinforces its value as a protest action. Re- appropriating something that 
has been expelled from the production/ distribution chain represents a 
reconfiguration of consumption choices, but also redefines what is con-
sidered ‘clean’, ‘edible’ and ‘desirable’. Reclaiming useful goods from the 
garbage not only aims at denouncing the amount of wasted resources in 
the neoliberal world, but it also implies the creation of alternative values 
and criteria of consumption (Clark 2004).
5.11 Caffè sospeso (Italy)
Paolo Mancini
University of Perugia, Italy
Why do many Neapolitans (napoletani) enter a bar and ask ‘C’è un caffè 
sospeso?’ (‘Is there a suspended coffee?’) Those who ask this question 
know that an old tradition exists in Naples whereby a customer who has 
had a coffee in a bar elects to pay for two cups of coffee instead of one, 
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We can only speculate about the origins and meaning of this tra-
dition, as it has not been the subject of scientific investigation. One of 
the few literary sources associated with the topic is a book entitled ‘Il 
caffè’ sospeso, which features a collection of essays on the variety of daily 
life in Naples, written by a well- known Neapoletan writer, Luciano De 
Crescenzo (De Crescenzo 2005). Although the book does not detail this 
particular practice, the subtitle ‘Everyday wisdom by small sips’ suggests 
that the caffè sospeso tradition comes from distant times and is deeply 
rooted in the everyday culture of Naples.
The question ‘C’è un caffè sospeso?’ conceals a rich history of tra-
ditions, social and cultural attitudes, and specific ways of determining 
community life. First, caffè sospeso is informed by a subtle stereotype: 
the Neapolitan fantasy. People living in Naples are renowned for their 
creativity and this is often displayed in a tendency to use symbolic lan-
guage. In this case, ‘suspended’ indicates that something is floating in 
the air, moving continuously over the heads of the bar’s customers, 
just waiting to be captured. Caffè sospeso is a metaphor; it is an image 
that does not go directly to the heart of the matter. A more straightfor-
ward expression such as a ‘paid for coffee’, or ‘left coffee’ would have 
been too trivial an expression, and in Neapolitan society considered 
almost rude as a question directly addressed to another guest. Equally, 
an expression such as ‘Would you pay for a coffee for me?’ would imply 
a direct commitment by the donor to the receiver, stressing also pos-
sible economic differences between the two persons. Instead, the caffè 
sospeso question is a gentle query, in which the identity of the one who 
has paid for the coffee and the one who receives the coffee is kept in 
the background. Neither of them is directly involved in the exchange: 
the coffee falls down ‘from the clouds’, not from the donor’s hands 
(Schwartz 1967: 2).
Iconic and metaphoric language is typical of Naples and consti-
tutes one of the subtlest stereotypes of the inhabitants of this city. But, 
as Walter Lippman says, often stereotypes are tools for knowledge and 
for sharing knowledge (Lippman 1922). In other words, simplicity and 
directness are not typical of this city. Asking for directions in the street 
will not receive a simple response such as ‘Go left’. It would be too direct 
and definitive, removing the possibility of establishing a personal rela-
tionship with the questioner as part of the exchange, something that is 
not considered polite in Neapolitan society. In the context of Naples, the 
person answering the question would be likely to show his left hand to 
the enquirer, adding in strictly Neapolitan dialect, ‘vai pe sta mano accà’, 















Second, the coffee itself has a specific meaning for the cultural and 
social background of the city. Here coffee is synonymous with Naples; in 
Naples it is widely held that there is no other place in Italy in which it is 
possible to enjoy a coffee of such a high quality. Coffee in Naples is very 
‘small’ (corto), much smaller than any other Italian coffee. It is ‘intense’ 
and ‘strong’. Common wisdom states that the very special quality of the 
Neapolitan coffee is governed by the quality of the water but, of course, 
no scientific validation of this exists. Coffee embodies Naples more than 
any monument of the city itself. Along with pizza, coffee defines the iden-
tity, the life and the tradition of this city.
Finally, it is well known that Naples is a superstitious city. Superstition 
is part of every act and action of the Neapolitan people (Di Nola 1993). 
Before doing anything it is necessary for napoletani to ensure that luck 
will be with them. The tradition of caffè sospeso itself is connected with 
superstition: through this practice, people aim to gain positive favour 
from those who may ‘decide’ their future (patron saints, deceased’s souls 
and so on). The action of leaving a caffè sospeso is informed by a kind of 
reasoning that asks ‘If I do not leave an already paid for coffee, who knows 
what may happen to me?’ As superstition is an important part of the cul-
ture of Naples, the fear is that the decision not to obey this old tradition 
may bring a curse upon the person who has declined; therefore they con-
sider that it is a risk not worth taking. This is a widespread, yet largely 
unspoken, dynamic underpinning the practice of caffè sospeso.
Caffè sospeso embodies the very cultural soul of Naples and some 
of its attributed characteristics. This well- rooted practice highlights the 
existence and importance of community in Naples. Neapolitans know 
how to behave when they enter a bar; they know that this tradition exists 
and that they can benefit from it. In contrast to the criminal reputation 
that contemporary Naples enjoys, urban legend states that caffè sospeso 
was originally an act displaying the elegance and politeness of Neopolitan 
society. According to some literary sources, the tradition was born out of 
discussions in a bar between friends and relatives over who should pay 
for the coffee they had enjoyed. Everybody in the group desired to take 
responsibility for payment as a way of showing and reinforcing the sense of 
friendship that bound the members of the group together. It is commonly 
held that the group, unable to reach an agreement, incorrectly identified 
the number of coffees needing to be paid for, and overpaid, which resulted 
in them leaving an ‘already paid for’ coffee for a future customer.
The consequence of this action was that the community embodied 
by the group of friends or relatives expanded its borders of friendship to 





















and Pipolo 1999). The message left by the one who paid is:  ‘All those 
living in this area are friends of mine, even if I do not know them person-
ally’. Since caffè sospeso embodies the idea of reciprocity as shared knowl-
edge at the Neapolitan local level, both the giver and the receiver act on 
the basis of mutual expectation, which constitutes the fundamental roots 
of a community (Komter 2005).
The idea of community is completed and enriched by a sense of soli-
darity: leaving an already paid for coffee is recognition of social and eco-
nomic differences that need to be bridged. It clearly acknowledges that if 
someone cannot afford a coffee, there is someone who wishes to help by 
leaving a gift that embodies the idea of community, of ‘Neapolitan- ness’ 
itself (napoletanita), and that is expressed in donating the coffee. To sum 
up, lacking any written codification, caffè sospeso is an informal prac-
tice, which articulates everyday culture in Naples. Within this practice 
fantasy, iconic language, solidarity and superstition are mixed together, 
establishing a shared Neapolitan identity.
Caffè sospeso has been imitated in other parts of the world, where 
it assumes similar characteristics. Besides several other Italian cities and 
towns, initiatives of this kind have been reported in Romania (Getlokal.
ro), the Netherlands (AT5 2011) and the UK (BBC 2013). Some of these 
imitators have highlighted the solidarity aspects of this practice, regard-
ing it as an occasion to offer the poor the possibility of enjoying a cof-
fee, if not a whole meal (Nove.Firenze.it 2004; Retedelcaffesospeso.
com). In other cases the practice of charity embodied by caffè sospeso 
has entered the logic of market competition, becoming an occasion for 
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Gap means ‘word’ or ‘conversation’ in Uzbek (also known as gapkhuri, gap-
fona, shai (tea), gashtak, meshrep in Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Uyghur communities in Central Asia). It refers to regular, 
informal get- togethers over dinner by groups of people, usually of the 
same age. As an indigenous institution, gaps are common in both urban 
and rural Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan and other parts of Central 
Asia. Usually they bring together between 3 and 12 individuals, but that 
























The primary aim of the meetings is to enable people to socialise and 
share information, but some gaps also run a rotating savings fund – an 
informal safety net whereby members can quickly access cash for per-
sonal use and in case of an emergency. In the wider context, gaps help to 
build close- knit communities with high levels of mutual trust, reciprocity 
and support. Historically, only men attended gaps. Today, women may 
also attend; generally, however, gaps still tend to be single- sex events. 
Members are likely to be related to one another through friendship, fam-
ily, school, residential, professional or other social ties. Many people 
belong to two or three gaps (Hiwatari 2008).
The practice of such regular face- to- face meetings predates the 
arrival of Islam in Central Asia. They were held in places with hearths in 
rural settings (alowkhonas) and money was typically collected to pay for 
meat, rice and oil (Andreev 1928). With the arrival of Islam in the eighth 
century, alowkhonas evolved into mosques. Men of all ages could social-
ise and seek advice from elders (aksakals) in a reception room (mekh-
monkhona) (Rakhimov 1990, 2007). The fact that both alowkhona and 
mekhmonkhona had heating made it possible for food to be prepared and 
shared, thereby building on the tradition of collective meals. Gaps con-
tinued to be held during the Soviet period, enabling aksakals to pass on 
local values, ethics and traditions to the younger generation, along with 
regional etiquettes of communication and hospitality (Seiple 2005).
At present, gaps are particularly popular in the Uzbek capital 
Tashkent, and in the Fergana Valley, which extends across eastern 
Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan. Gaps bring 
together individuals from different classes and social standing. The social 
capital derived from gaps translates into various forms of mutual sup-
port – it may help to reduce transactional costs related to contracts and 
official procedures. Informal personal relations between people who are 
not of equal social status may imply the presence of patronage relations 
(see blat, 1.1 Volume 1). For example, this occurs when a person obtains 
goods and services with the support of an influential member from the 
same gap circle.
Gaps are organised according to specific albeit informal rules. They 
may be held in the home of one of the members, or in a café, restaurant 
or tea- house (chaikhona) where members can rent cooking utensils and 
prepare the traditional rice dish, plov (see Figure 5.12.1). A table laden 
with exotic food is frowned upon since it is seen as an attempt by the host 
to show off in front of other members. While the plov is being eaten, con-
versation normally focuses on social life in the local neighbourhood com-
































relating to mutual help. Usually, at the end of the lengthy dinner, every-
one chips in and makes an equal contribution to pay for food and rental 
costs. Alternatively, members may take it in turns to host the gap and pay 
for the meal.
Each gap is headed by a group leader (jo’ra boshi) who must be 
a respected and sociable individual able to motivate the members and 
organise meetings. The principle of equality is crucial: if it is not main-
tained, the gap can elect a new leader. Mutual trust is another crucially 
important condition and determines who may or may not become a 
member of the gap.
The practice of gaps has evolved over time to include modern trends 
such as joint savings funds as a social safety net, and the organisation of 
gaps among women. Joint savings funds make it possible to raise substan-
tial amounts of cash in a short time. Members hand over to the host an 
agreed amount of cash at every dinner. In accordance with a pre- agreed 
rotation list, a lump sum will be handed over to the member whose turn it 
is to receive payment. In Uzbekistan, this process is known by the Russian 
term igrat’ v gap (literally, ‘to play in the gap’). How much each individual 
Figure 5.12.1 Artwork depicting Uzbek men engaging in gap meeting 
over dinner in chaikhona (tea-house).











contributes varies from gap to gap. In some instances, members hand 
over 50,000 Uzbek Som (about US$10); in others, as much as 500,000 
Uzbek Som (US$100). In gaps whose members are wealthy businessmen, 
individual contributions have been known to reach as much as 1–2 mil-
lion Uzbek Som. The recipient is free to spend the money as he chooses: 
on family or personal needs, to launch a small business, or to purchase 
durable goods. Gap- generated funds may also be used to pay for a wed-
ding feast (toi); this enables families with modest incomes to organise 
lavish wedding celebrations for as many as a thousand guests.
In this respect, gaps closely resemble the practice of rotating sav-
ings and credit associations (ROSCAs), also known as peer- to- peer lend-
ing, which is found in many other parts of the world (see, for example, 
esusu, 5.18 in this volume). In the former USSR, the practice was known 
as mutual assistance fund (kassa vzaimopomoshchi) or black cashbox 
(chernaya kassa) (Kandiyoti 1998). The major difference between mod-
ern interest- free gap loans and ROSCAs is that the latter are aimed only 
at generating cash, whereas gaps provide social as well as financial ben-
efits. Indeed, the social function remains considerably more important 
than the financial. For example, some gaps also generate a separate travel 
fund. This is collected during the year and is spent not on individual 
travel but on collective trips to the mountains, to sanatoriums, or to rent 
of a country house (dacha, see 5.8 in this volume).
Women’s gaps trace their roots to the female labour cooperatives of 
the Soviet era (Bushkov 2002). Like men, women are likely to belong to 
several gaps. Also like their male counterparts, women’s gaps tend to be 
formed between neighbours, workmates, former classmates, neighbours 
and relations; wives often meet, for example, with the wives of their hus-
bands’ circle of friends. Women’s gaps are generally organised according 
to age: middle- aged women meet together in one group, while young mar-
ried women and daughters- in- law (kelins) meet in another. Membership 
of women’s gaps is by invitation- only and, in the case of kelins, the per-
mission of the mother- in- law is also required. Women’s gaps tend to focus 
on entertainment and recreational activities. Women dress nicely for the 
occasion and do their best to project themselves as successful and happy 
mothers, sisters, kelins and wives. The money contributed at female gaps 
is used primarily to cover the cost of dinner. Anything left over goes to the 
hostess, to spend on her personal needs. Some contributions may also be 
generated for joint recreational activities.
Interview data collected by the author during ethnographic field-
work in the south of Kazakhstan in 2014 found that, for women, gaps 





















up with local news. For married women, a gap may be a legitimate rea-
son to be away from home for several hours and spend time with friends. 
Gaps between kelins provide moral support and advice on family life. 
Gaps with female colleagues help to broaden professional horizons and 
identify opportunities for career development.
Both male and female gaps enable their members to expand their 
contacts and build networks beyond the simple gap circle itself. For 
example, they may mobilise participants to volunteer to help (khashar) 
other members from the wider local community when, for example, a 
house is being built. In this way, gaps may be seen not only as a mani-
festation of comradeship, brotherhood and sisterhood, but also as fertile 





Pomochi is a Russian term denoting an occasion of collectively helping, 
on request and free of charge, a member of the village community to 
accomplish a particular task in one day. On completion of the work, the 
effort was rewarded with a feast provided by the beneficiary. The prac-
tice was widespread among peasant communities in Imperial Russia, but 
died out in the early twentieth century, due first to increasing monetisa-
tion of the economy, and then due to the collectivisation of agriculture 
under the Soviet system.
The noun pomochi is derived from the verb pomoch, which means 
‘to help’. In grammatical terms the word is plural in form, but can also 
be used to designate a singular occasion of help (although this is subject 
to regional variation  – in some areas a singular form, pomoch, exists). 
Vladimir Dal in his Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian 
Language (1882) recorded the word pomochi as common in the north-
ern and eastern parts of the Russian Empire, with the equivalent term 
toloka used in the south, west, Tver and Novgorod regions. In addition, 
there were many specific terms denoting pomochi for particular kinds 
of work:  to complete reaping  – dozhinki, vyzhinki, otzhinki, boroda, 
borodnye, kasha, salamata; to muck out, transport and spread manure –  
navoznitsa; to make a mud stove – pochebit’e; to erect the timber frame 
of a house – vzdymki; to process cabbage into sauerkraut – kapustki; to 


















Fundamentally, pomochi was the custom of collective assistance 
in peasant communities, encompassing a wide range of practices. 
Pomochi could be organised by either a family in need or the village 
assembly (skhod). In the former case, the family’s members would go to 
each individual household asking them to come on a particular day to 
help. Participation was voluntary and reward was never monetary but 
a good party. The absence of formal payment and the fusion of work 
and enjoyment were important for the participants. Evidence from the 
Tobolsk region in 1810 states that, ‘people readily help each other and 
this is called pomoch … Festivities afterwards involve singing and danc-
ing to the accompaniment of balalaika or violin… working for money on 
such occasions is considered reprehensible and nobody would agree to 
do pomoch for money’ (Gromyko 1975: 78). In poor Belarusian neigh-
bourhoods, verbal gratitude was provided after talaka instead of a feast 
(as toloka was called there). A specific type of pomochi was the ‘round 
pomochi’ (krugovye pomochi) when several households worked together 
for each other, sometimes without any special reward but each benefit-
ting from a greater number of hands put to work when time was of the 
essence. On those occasions when pomochi were organised by decision of 
the village assembly, participation was considered mandatory and was 
not rewarded with a feast. Such pomochi were typically used for help-
ing a family in misfortune, or infirm and disadvantaged members of the 
community. There were many other variations: in some places pomochi 
to complete harvesting or to erect roof beams of a new house involved 
ritual elements to mark the occasion; sometimes it was mostly young 
people who participated (as with making a mud stove, processing cab-
bage into sauerkraut), or women (as with scutching flax, spinning yarn); 
some pomochi were organised during workdays, others on weekends or 
holidays. Usually pomochi lasted one day, but in the Tver region it was 
customary to work only until midday, while gatherings for scutching flax 
took place in a barn at night. The common traits were informality, mobi-
lisation of the collective to help a community member, the free nature of 
the help, and fun as its accompaniment.
Pomochi were a case of generalised reciprocity, which is a very dif-
ferent form of exchange to market exchange based on pre- agreed pay-
ment for goods and services. Only with the ‘round pomochi’ was there a 
specific expectation of help in return. For the most part, the participants’ 
‘reward’ consisted in enjoyment of the social occasion, with the general 
understanding that one would also be helped in the future if in need. 
Lone elderly people, widows and the infirm were helped even though 
















The vast ethnographic surveys conducted in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, systematised by Gromyko (1986: 39– 48) confirm 
the ancient origin and wide geographical spread of pomochi in Imperial 
Russia. For the earlier period, evidence has been found in local archival 
materials concerning administrative and criminal proceedings (Gromyko 
1986: 32). The very word toloka also meant commons – publicly owned 
pastures – strongly suggesting links with the communal farming system 
(Gromyko 1986: 36– 7). ‘Round pomochi’ appear to be a survival from 
earlier times when land was farmed collectively by the village community 
(see Figure 5.13.1). In general, practices of pomochi were rooted in the 
system of peasant economy. Chayanov (1967), who in the 1920s devel-
oped a fully fledged theory of this system, emphasised the absence of the 
institution of hired labour as its key element. In peasant economy the 
basis of production is not the capitalist enterprise but the household unit 
that has rather limited relations with market. Consequently, labour is val-
ued not in monetary terms (wages), but in subjective terms: its perceived 
difficulty measured against the necessity to satisfy the family’s needs. 
Seen from this economic perspective, mutual collective assistance in the 
form of pomochi is an alternative to hiring labour on occasions when a 
family does not have enough hands for the job. Hence, practices similar 













to pomochi can be expected in peasant societies other than in Imperial 
Russia. Such practices were recorded in the early twentieth- century 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary for the Bulgarian, Chechen and Ingush popula-
tions and Jewish diaspora in the Caucasian Mountains, as examples in the 
entry for the term toloka (Brockhauz and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary 
1901: 439). Despite pomochi’s economic functionality, its social aspect 
was a fundamental part of the custom. A respondent from Siberia wrote 
to the Geographical Society in 1850 (Gromyko 1975: 79):
processing of cabbage, which marks the completion of field work, 
is joyful for the young:  kapustki start the village parties, the vil-
lage balls so to speak; it is a rare family with even one daughter 
of marriageable age, which would make sauerkraut themselves … 
all invite young people of both genders to come in the morning to 
take part.
The practices of pomochi were eroded by monetisation of the rural 
economy. In 1894 the author of Olonetskie pomochi was already 
lamenting the decline of ‘this wonderful ancient custom’, conveying 
reports that rewarding with a feast was being replaced by payment 
of money in places located near main roads and towns, meaning the 
participants of such help were becoming just hired hands (Kulikovsky 
1894: 412). In 1898 a respondent from Vologodsky region noted that 
pomoch was becoming more expensive than hired labour because one 
had to thank the participants with costly treats (Gromyko 1986: 59). 
Some forms of pomochi, such as those involving spinning yarn, easily 
mutated into low- wage employment of the village poor by their better- 
off neighbours. A woman born in 1908 recalls how in her youth she 
worked hard spinning wool for other people, and the money she earned 
in this way over the winter only sufficed to buy new boots and galoshes 
(Berdinsky 2011: 43). Evidence from the Saratov region, collected 
in the early 1990s, depicts pomochi as a thing of the past, of the time 
when the respondents were young, but also provides plentiful exam-
ples of later practices which seem to be transitional forms between the 
old- style mutual assistance and fully monetarised exchange based on 
formal agreement, typical of modern economies (Davydova 1999). 
Examples of such ‘transitional forms’ include: craftsmen charging less 
for their work when the buyer was a relation or a neighbour, especially 
if poor; a girl taken as a nanny, receiving lodging but no wage; a fam-
ily that lost their horse being helped to transport their sheaves, but 
returning the favour with their labour, by weeding and reaping on the 















bartered for grain pilfered from the collective farm, to be used to feed 
the household’s own livestock, which later might be sold at market. With 
collectivisation of farming in the USSR in 1929– 34, households ceased 
to be the primary production units, which made much of the rationale 
for pomochi redundant. Caring for the elderly and infirm was gradually 
taken over by the state. Mechanisation made easier tasks that in the past 
had required many hands – such as felling and transporting timber for 
construction of a house. Now when in need one had to ask for assistance 
not from the village community, but from the individuals with access 
to the collective farm public resources, such as machinery. This unequal 
access to public resources and to people with such access fed corruption 
and much resentment. A form of abuse of the retreating custom of pomo-
chi was inviting people to ‘help’ with certain chores and then not feed-
ing them, as if the job done was disinterested help. The expectations of 
reward were informal, and as such could not be enforced. Generally, the 
boundary between help and paid work was blurred at that time due to 
the rural practice of paying for work (such as digging a kitchen garden, 
chopping and piling up firewood, weeding a field, occasional cleaning 
of the house, etc.) with food or drink rather than money. This created 
ambiguities that could be exploited by the greedy. Yet the social aspect 
of pomochi – fun of collective work and merrymaking afterwards – was 
much missed by those who had memories of it when the custom finally 
died out.




The term Nachbarschaftshilfe is a compound word formed from 
Nachbarschaft (neighbourhood) and Hilfe (help), describing aid and sup-
port given to neighbours, family or friends. The practice can be found 
in all German- speaking countries, but varies in terms of definition and 
legality. While Nachbarschaftshilfe itself is legal in all German- speaking 
countries, it sits right at the border of illegality and therefore as a practice 
lends itself to being used as a cover for illicit employment.
Hake (2003) defines Nachbarschaftshilfe as a practice in which (at 
times unpaid) labour is provided to neighbours, friends or family. It is 
found in particular to be common in rural areas of a country. The term 
itself covers a wide array of different forms of support and help, but is usu-

























or on construction sites, and used in particular with reference to construc-
tion projects involving the building of private houses. Other areas in which 
the term Nachbarschaftshilfe is commonly used include childcare and car- 
pooling. Activities attributed to the umbrella term Nachbarschaftshilfe 
differ widely, however the common denominator of definitions is that 
Nachbarschaftshilfe describes (manual) labour provided to people who 
are in one’s extended social network. A crucial element of the practice is 
that the labour is neither recorded, nor are taxes paid on the remunera-
tion for it. It therefore follows that Nachbarschaftshilfe takes place largely 
outside the government’s sphere of control (Sonnenschein 1976; Igl et 
al. 2002; Hake 2003; Wiesinger 2005; Der Tagesspiegel 2013; Buhl Tax 
Service GmbH 2014; Die Presse 2015).
The concept of Nachbarschaftshilfe lends itself by nature of its def-
inition to be used to disguise illicit employment and illegal work. This 
problem has been recognised and discussed by legislators (see, for exam-
ple, Nationalrat XX.GP 1998), however, despite legal adjustments, vari-
ous forms of Nachbarschaftshilfe remain in the grey area between legality 
and illegality, with parts of Nachbarschaftshilfe being recognised as legal 
activity in compliance with the law, and the rest continuing to be associ-
ated with illicit work and moonlighting (Janisch and Brümmerhoff 2004).
An additional hurdle in the general separation of legal activities 
from illegal activities in the context of Nachbarschaftshilfe can be attrib-
uted to legislature itself, which differs even in countries with similar 
legal traditions. Thus even in law Nachbarschaftshilfe is not a clearly 
deliniated or strictly defined term, but instead can be interpreted in a 
number of different ways. If positively connoted an actual valid syno-
nym for Nachbarschaftshilfe is ‘community service’ (Gemeinschaftsarbeit) 
(Teichert 1988).
In recent years Nachbarschaftshilfe has become commonly used 
to describe forms of structured and organised help particularly across 
municipal and state borders specifically in the aftermath of natu-
ral catastrophes. The new usage of the term has been used primarily 
by authorities in this context to describe any form of organised help 
offered to affected regions for the sake of disaster relief. Additionally, 
Nachbarschaftshilfe is sometimes used to describe the activities of clubs 
and associations (Vereine) that exist to serve public interest, for example, 
to descibe the work of the volunteer fire brigades (Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz 2009; Österreichische 
Präsidentschaftskanzlei 2012).
The most obvious reason for engaging in Nachbarschaftshilfe 












opportunity to acquire goods and services at a lower rate than would nor-
mally apply. Wiesinger (2005) goes so far as to argue that these informal 
practices can noticeably contribute to safeguarding the means of exist-
ence (livelihood) of a population. This becomes especially relevant in 
the instance of projects that require large investments: without the aid of 
Nachbarschaftshilfe, for example, many family homes, shops, workshops 
or farms would never have come into being (Hake 2003). Wiesinger 
(2005) argues that enhanced living standards, typically manifested in 
owning a family house rather than a flat in rural communities, can only 
be realised with the help of Nachbarschaftshilfe and other forms of infor-
mal practices.
This rather simple one- dimensional interpretation focusing merely 
on monetary incentives to engage in Nachbarschaftshilfe may not always 
hold true. Lamnek et al. (2013) argue that informal labour is a preva-
lent part of lifestyle, particularly in rural communities. Due to tighter 
social networks in rural environments, both demand and supply offered 
by opportunities to work informally together are greater, and are said 
to some degree to require people to take part in such activities as part 
of their social obligations to the community. The implication is that 
Nachbarschaftshilfe is more often perceived to be legal in rural areas than 
in urban environments. Consequentially, the perception of legality is 
shifting.
Generally, the compensation for labour provided in this context 
can come in the form of barter trade, money or labour itself. Seen from 
a legal perspective, any agreement on remuneration shifts these trans-
actions from the legal into the illegal sphere, even though the people 
involved may regard the informal agreements as being entirely norma-
tive. Lamnek et al. (2013) continue to argue that the higher degree of 
solidary usually found in rural networks as compared with their urban 
counterparts leads to a phenomenon in which informal labour is not 
immediately remunerated, but often repaid after some period of time. 
If this is the case, the remuneration might consist of labour being pro-
vided for a person who had not even been part of the initial transac-
tion (Lamnek et al. 2013). It follows that Nachbarschaftshilfe in both its 
legal and illegal form is more prevalent in rural communities and is in 
fact an important social element contributing to the well- being of the 
social group. However, this does not imply that the practice is totally 
unknown in urban environments. Rather, the motivation for engaging 
in Nachbarschaftshilfe shifts noticably in an urban environment from a 

















The expression Nachbarschaftshilfe itself is often used synony-
mously with other practices such as Pfusch. The latter, however, can have 
one of two meanings, and it depends on the context as to which inter-
pretation is applicable. In the context of Nachbarschaftshilfe, Pfusch is 
work that is being carried out illegally, i.e. outside of the formal sector. 
It is synonymous with ‘moonlighting’ (Schwarzarbeit) and is a term fre-
quently used in Austria (Politik- Lexikon 2016). It is therefore an expres-
sion describing the work usually carried out by a professional to evade 
the payment of taxes. The second meaning of Pfusch is a term describing 
something of low quality, something undertaken in a hasty manner and/ 
or not living up to one’s expectations in terms of quality (Maschmann 
1990). Other terms that are frequently used in order to describe illegal 
labour include ‘informal sector’ (Informeller Sektor) and ‘shadow econ-
omy’ (Schattenwirtschaft). Per definition, these terms are not actual syn-
onyms of Nachbarschaftshilfe, but rather umbrella terms that can include 




Catanduanes state University, Philippines
The sosyudad refers to an entire class of voluntary associations prac-
tised in Virac, the capital town of the province of Catanduanes in the 
Philippines. Sosyudad is a local term for the Spanish sociedad, which 
denotes either a society or a sodality (Catholic association). As a prac-
tice of association, the sosyudad was first extensively described in an 
ethnographic study conducted between 2007 and 2008 (Sarmiento 
2009). Two types of sosyudad were identified, a secular type and a devo-
tional type; the basic difference being that the latter takes on a religious 
observance while the former does not. But there are other aspects of 
distinction. First, the secular associations are much more numerous. 
The author’s study found that around 300 secular groups were active, 
distributed around the 63 villages of the town, compared with only 20 
groups of the devotional kind. Second, the study found that the secular 
group membership of sosyudads is small, usually restricted to an average 
of 11 members, whereas the devotional association groups often have a 
membership of more than 100 each. The difference in size matters – the 
secular groups typically meet weekly, while the devotional groups tend 
to meet on a monthly basis or more infrequently. Membership is open 
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higher. Typically, practitioners are middle aged and married, but groups 
also exist with younger members. Groups are formed according to vari-
ous bases of affinities such as age, occupation, kinship, school affiliation 
or neighbourhoods. The practice has been observed to cut across the 
social classes.
For the people of Virac, mention of the sosyudad invokes two 
things:  the weekly gatherings to partake of food and alcoholic drinks, 
and the depositing of money in a savings and lending enterprise. While 
there are exceptions, the typical sosyudad and the secular type in par-
ticular, revolves around these two activities. In most cases the majority 
of practitioners assert that eating and drinking takes precedence over 
saving and lending activities. The weekly meetings are the core of the 
sosyudad and the economic element lends a long- term and more utilitar-
ian purpose since it operates in a one- year cycle. In addition to drinking 
and saving, many sosyudad groups find time to engage in other activities 
such as one- off economic enterprises, various forms of mutual aid and a 
few are involved with civic projects.
The eating and drinking, however, is not an end in itself, but merely 
the means to the enactment of egalitarian camaraderie, which appears to 
be the essence of the sosyudad. Accordingly, the intoxicated participation 
involves an elaborate set of norms that allows gratification of expressive 
fellowship among equals. For example, participants take equal number 
of shots from the same glass that goes around in a circular sequence, to 
symbolise equality. Conversational exchanges take place without any-
body assuming leadership, and few topics are taboo, although discus-
sions do not get serious and easily stray from the point. Language can 
become graphically profane, and participants joke and mock or insult 
each other just for the fun of it. The more expressive groups might even 
spontaneously break into playful and silly antics.
With such basic purpose pursued through its brand of interactive 
practices, the sosyudad is essentially a form of what Victor Turner called 
communitas (Turner 1969:  96– 203). For Turner, the communitas is an 
experience of egalitarian liberty that is a stark contrast to the asymmetri-
cally contoured mainstream social arrangement. In the sosyudad, com-
munitas is generated through the reversal of the norms of status quo, 
which allows practitioners a respite from hegemonic social structures. 
Thus, to be able to sustain active participation in the sosyudad, a mem-
ber must cultivate the practical competency involved in conjuring up the 
communitas- like state during sessions. But in spite of being a practice of 
reversal and resistance, the sosyudad does not pose a challenge to the 

















where practitioners, having recharged from the weekend experience of 
communitas in the soyudad are afforded a new lease of endurance for the 
struggle and strains of everyday life throughout the rest of the week.
The anti- structure character of the sosyudad is further manifested in 
the ways it shuns the more formal aspects of society: it operates with the 
barest minimum of organisational structuring, having no set of hierarchical 
roles and positions. It requires only a secretary- cum- treasurer who keeps a 
record of transactions relating to the savings/ lending scheme. Nonetheless, 
the sosyudad avoids any dealings with formal institutions, be they govern-
ment or non- government organisations. Attempts by some development 
workers to convert sosyudad into proper cooperatives failed. It thrives in 
what Turner termed as the ‘interstices of social structure’ (Turner, Ibid.). 
In fact, practitioners see their sosyudad enterprise as ‘a game played out’ 
(karawat-kawat), albeit by adults, and therefore not worthy of preoccupa-
tion by the legitimating schemes of formal institutions.
Sosyudad as a form of sociality is akin to many similar types of 
informal aggrupation observed elsewhere in the Philippines and 
typically associated with the agricultural economy (Castillo 1981; 
Manalili 1990; Abaya 2001). Early sosyudad groups were really labour- 
exchange circles of farmers called cumbinyu (from the Spanish con-
venio meaning ‘conference’) that had decided to extend their regular 
congregations beyond the working seasons in the fields through 
weekly drinking sessions. Labour- exchange arrangements were pop-
ular in agricultural Philippines until recently, specifically in small- 
scale cultivation, and practised along various aspects of farming such 
as clearing of land, planting, irrigation and harvesting. They were 
known by different names such as alayon, kompang, bataris, kabis-
ilyahan, amuyong, pakyawen, sangheras, palusong, payuhwan, loyohan 
and hunglos (for various cooperative forms in rural Philippines see 
Ortiz 1915; Lewis 1971; Ricafort 1980; Zialcita 1981;  Jocano 1982; 
Mangahas 2008). Other informal cooperative systems were also pop-
ular all over Philippine rural society, some of them still being prac-
tised today. For example, the atag in Catanduanes is a mobilisation 
of voluntary labour for community purposes such as church building 
or clean- up campaigns. Neighbours in Virac may be summoned for a 
day of free labour to assist with the start of the building of a house 
(duksoy, Sarmiento 2009: 372). Groups may also form for specific 
purposes such as mutual assistance in cases such as the ‘adoptive sib-
lings’ (minagsoon), as seen in the Visayas region. When death occurs in 
the family of a member, the minagsoon mobilises its resources to pro-
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emotional support (Morales- Madrid 1990). There are also various sav-
ings schemes collectively known as ‘rotating credit associations’ such 
as the paluwagan, which is used for general purposes and is popular 
all over the Philippines (Bunda 1990), and the komboy in Mindanao, 
where year- round savings are collected to be used for fiestas or village 
feasts (Cuezon 2006).
Informal mutual aid and common- interest voluntary groups have 
been reported all over the world and are held to thrive in so- called 
developing societies. In early studies of people experiencing transition 
from traditional to modern, common interest groups are seen as adap-
tive mechanisms (Little 1957; Kerri 1976). More recently, the notion of 
civil society and social capital has been applied, seeing these groups jux-
taposed against the coerced organisational scaffolding of the state and 
attributing to them an essential role in sustaining democracy (van Deth 
1997). Purportedly, they are virtual training grounds for participation in 
the larger polity; greater civil society translates into more vibrant demo-
cratic governance. Can this be said of the sosyudad? The impact of the 
sosyudad on the broad scheme of Catandunganon society, even as a form 
of reversal and resistance, is at best ambivalent. It represents the limited 
small- scale sort of civil society, that while being a practice of egalitarian 
relations, hardly makes a democratising dent on the largely patronage 
character of local and national politics.
5.16 Vay mu'o.'n (Vietnam)
abel Polese
tallinn University of technology, estonia and  
dublin City University, Ireland
Both vay and mượn refer in Vietnamese to the act of borrowing money. 
Used together, they come to mean ‘borrowing from all available sources’. 
This describes a situation where an individual, a couple or a family col-
lects funding from a variety of sources to buy property or start a business.
The practice is fuelled by three main factors. The first is the large 
number of people in Vietnam who are informally employed. Because of 
the informal nature of their contract and hence of their income, many 
self- employed workers cannot meet the formal requirements to apply for 
a mortgage. Second, many ordinary people tend not to trust the banks 
(Le and Nguyen 2009). Third, the idea of a mortgage runs against pre-
vailing ideas of property in Vietnam and, while mortgages are becoming 
more commonly accepted in urban areas, banks have so far identified few 





















manage risk in such a way as to enable the banks to loan money to private 
borrowers.
In 1986, Vietnam launched a series of reforms known as ‘renova-
tion’ (Đổi Mới). Aimed at moving Vietnam towards a socialist- oriented 
market economy, these reforms included allowing competition between 
the state and the private sector in non- strategic sectors of the economy. 
While the state formally retained ownership of land, it now allows land to 
be privately rented. This has led to substantial growth in private agricul-
tural investment and production (Kerkvliet 2005; Fforde 2007).
These reforms have enabled private individuals to rent property, set 
up companies and carry out most of the activities that are commonplace 
in market economies. Modernisation has taken place relatively quickly 
and entrepreneurship has flourished (Szalontai 2008). Even so, the 
availability of start- up capital remains limited, not least because interest 
rates on loans remain relatively high. In 2015, for example, the interest 
rate stood at 7.1 per cent (World Bank 2015). This was, however, the 
lowest rate for the previous decade, which saw interest rates peak at 17 
per cent in 2011.
In these circumstances, vay mượn has proved an effective mecha-
nism for satisfying the demand for start- up capital. The practice is based 
on social solidarity and a scaled approach to secure money. Once some-
one decides that they need capital in order to make an investment, they 
discuss the issue with their close relatives who, depending on their own 
financial situation and the level of trust they feel for the borrower, will 
offer a sum of money, possibly at zero interest, to be repaid within a 
flexible timeframe. The lender may seek to agree a deadline by which 
the loan should be repaid, but will in practice have no formal means of 
enforcement. Unlike a formal bank loan, for example, the lender cannot 
repossess property in the event of a delay or failure to repay a loan. Even 
so, the practice is commonplace and remains widely used. This is because 
there are social and moral mechanisms in place to punish those who fail 
to repay loans. A borrower who fails to repay risks losing face and reputa-
tion, as well as the loss of family and social connections. As a result, the 
borrower has every interest in repaying the loan as quickly as possible. 
The borrower may in future be invited to reciprocate and to offer a loan 
to another relative to give continuity to the practice.
In cases where an aspiring borrower’s close relatives are unable to 
come up with as much money as is needed, the borrower will approach 
extended family members or close friends. The capacity to request a loan, 
and to be trusted by others, depends largely on one’s personal reputation. A 





















a track record of defaulting on loans. An exception might be a relative 
in dire circumstances, in which case relatives might become more flex-
ible and lend money in spite of higher risks of non- repayment. Interest 
rates tend to be zero, or close to zero, when money is borrowed from very 
close relatives. Rates are, however, likely to be higher when a borrower 
approaches friends or distant relatives, and when the sum in question is 
substantial. In such circumstances, the interest rate is likely to depend 
not only on how likely the borrower is expected to repay the money on 
time, but also on the nature of the personal relationship between the 
borrower and the potential lender. Every loan is negotiated on a case by 
case basis. If, for example, the lender thinks that one day they may need 
the borrower’s services, they may suggest a zero interest rate that will 
give them informal credit with the borrower, enabling them to request a 
return favour at some future date. It may also be the case that a potential 
lender (A) owes a favour to or is dependent on someone (B) who, in turn, 
requests assistance for a borrower (C). In such circumstances, A may con-
sider assisting C as a means of repaying a debt to B.
How much and from whom to borrow depends largely on individ-
ual choices. The practice of informal loans is acceptable both socially and 
legally. A possible related danger vay mượn presents is that people may 
fall victim to loan sharks when trying to borrow from outside their closest 
circle. While the practice is well known and openly discussed in Vietnam, 
it has not as yet been closely studied in the academic literature.
5.17 Loteria/Lloteria (albania)
drini Imami
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In addition to state lotteries, in Albania loteria refers to a private lottery 
scheme through which money is poured into a common pool and is then 
awarded to one member of the community each month by drawing lots. It 
works in a way that is similar to the tanda scheme in Mexico (see Tandas 
and cundinas, 5.20 in this volume). The scheme originated in communist 














the start of the practice to be located chronologically, it is possible to place 
the practice in the 1970s, as this was the period to which most inform-
ants refer and was also the period when many of the industrial complexes 
and large factories started operating in Albania (Kovacs et al. 2016).
The lottery scheme was conceived as a solution to several issues. 
First, the lack of private banks and the scarcity of loans from state banks 
made it difficult to borrow large sums of money. This situation was exac-
erbated by the fact that savings deposits in the state banks were poorly 
rewarded with low annual interest rates of 1– 2 per cent. Second, aver-
age salaries were low: in agriculture cooperatives, earnings were in the 
region of 150– 250 Albanian Lek (ALL) a month; factory workers could 
earn 400– 500 ALL a month, while teachers, professors and engineers 
were paid a monthly salary of 700– 900 ALL (for comparison purposes, 
at that time the price of a large loaf of bread was around 5 ALL and a kilo 
of meat cost 15 ALL; one US dollar was converted at 8 ALL in the late 
1980s). It is interesting to note that these sums did not change substan-
tially during the last two decades of communism (1970– 90), thanks to 
government measures to control inflation.
As in other socialist countries, the housing policy was dictated by a 
state monopoly. Citizens had to apply for accommodation by signing up 
to a waiting list. Depending on the family situation, the city and location 
where the family were living (in addition to the possible strings the fam-
ily was able to pull), applicants had to wait a number of months or years 
for a home. However, furniture and other household equipment were 
rarely, if ever, provided with the accommodation; rather it was generally 
sold through state- owned retails chains.
Items such as televisions and washing machines were allocated 
according to existing supplies. An applicant would make an order and 
wait, sometimes years, until stocks became available, regardless of the 
fact that they might have the money available for the purchase at the 
time that the order was made. As in other communist states, active party 
members and those with large personal networks advanced up the queue 
faster than common people with no resources or connections.
However, not everyone was in a position to pay for a desired item. 
For instance, people working in agricultural cooperatives could save so 
little that it might take them 10 years to save sufficient funds. Meanwhile, 
although people on higher salaries were able to save some money, they 
still faced an unknown waiting time for the supply of each of the items 
they wanted.
In larger employment institutions, employees commonly estab-

















agreeing on a fixed amount to be deposited every month (eg. 50 or 100 
ALL) into a common pool that would grow more rapidly than an indi-
vidual savings pool. For example, a pool of 10– 12 participants (which 
was the common group size), each saving 100 ALL per month, were able 
to save a total of 1,000– 1,200 ALL in the first month alone – a sum suffi-
cient to buy a television or a washing machine. To determine the winner, 
at the end of the month the organiser of the scheme would allocate lote-
ria tickets to all the participants and draw a winning number. The win-
ning number, or ticket, would secure the owner the total money required 
to purchase the equipment. However, the lucky ticket holder was not 
obliged to purchase a particular item. In some instances families used 
the money to cover an unexpected or extraordinary expense, such as a 
wedding ceremony. Whatever their decision, once a participant had won, 
they were then obliged to continue contributing to the pool every month 
until each of its participants had received the same amount of money.
The situation was a win- win for everyone. The ‘winners’, that is 
those awarded the money at the very beginning, gained by having the 
available sum of money they required much more quickly than if they 
had saved money individually. The ‘losers’, that is those who received the 
money after a period of a few months or a year (the usual lottery cycle 
would be up to one year), would still have the money at a similar time 
as they would have had if they had continued to save individually. The 
scheme could also be seen as a way of saving money, obliging a partici-
pant to put money aside every month, de facto forcing them into some 
saving habits; an opportunity that did not exist for all.
Finally, these schemes enhanced social solidarity among partici-
pants and created a bond between them that could then be used on other 
occasions. For instance, participants could decide to allocate the money 
in a given month not by lottery, but according to need. If it was known 
that one participant needed money urgently for a wedding or to remedy 
an emergency situation, then by consensus, the money could be awarded 
to the needy person, without a lottery draw taking place.
Because salaries were all paid on the same day, there was no need 
to store the money anywhere. On payday each participant gave their con-
tribution to the savings pool accountant, who might also be the person 
in charge of paying out the salaries. After the draw had taken place the 
accountant would then pay the money directly to the winner. In spite 
of the high level of regulation and control present in socialist Albania, 
these lottery schemes were never formally banned. In fact, it is possible 
that they were boosted by the low rate of geographical and job mobility, 














same time this was accompanied by peer pressure and a desire or neces-
sity to create dependency relations in order to have people to rely upon.
Interestingly, this informal practice has survived and can be found 
in present- day Albania, albeit in different forms and in spite of the fact 
that commercial loans are available and interest rates on deposits have 
increased. The modern version of the loteria still rests on cash- only con-
tributions (bank transfers are rarely, if ever, used) made by a group of 
people into a common pool that is smaller than that used in socialist 
times. One explanation for the smaller groups may be the desire to com-
pensate for the higher risk associated with the scheme, as participants no 
longer always come from the same neighbourhood or workplace. They 
might not know one another well and may be dependent on the loteria 
organiser knowing and trusting them all individually.
The goal is no longer the purchase of household equipment, but 
rather having an available sum of money that would allow an extraordi-
nary purchase. The money might be used for a variety of items ranging 
from the purchase of a mobile phone or an ipad, to paying for a holiday. 
Because salaries are now paid at different times, and participants may 
come from different environments, they need to agree on a specific pay-
day and a draw day. They might also on occasions decide not to apply the 
lottery scheme at all, but simply agree consensually on when each partic-
ipant will receive their money. Should they fail to agree, if, for instance, 
too many people want the money in the same month, then they would 
revert to drawing tickets and get back to the lottery- like method of allo-
cating the savings.
5.18 Esusu (nigeria)
evans osabuohien and oluyomi ola- david
Covenant University, nigeria
Esusu describes traditional forms of cooperation in African societies 
whereby groups of individuals contribute to informal savings and credit 
associations for their mutual benefit. These associations are found 
mainly in agricultural production and credit financing and they substi-
tute for and complement modern cooperative institutions and formal 
financial systems. The practice is believed to have originated among the 
Yoruba people of Nigeria and to have spread from there to Liberia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and most of the West African countries 
(Seibel 2004). While known as esusu or esu among the Yorubas in south- 
western Nigeria, the practice is called etoto by the Ibos in south- eastern 

















Nupe people of Nigeria’s Kwara and Niger States; osusu by the people 
of Ogoja in Cross River State; isusu by the Igbos from Abia, Anambra, 
Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States; asun by the Ishans of Edo State; etoto by 
the Ibibios of Akwa Ibom State (Nigeria Real Estate Hub (NREH) 2014); 
bam by the Tivs of Benué State (Seibel 2004); tortine in Cameroon and 
Niger; and susu in Ghana (Iganiga and Asemota 2008). The term refers 
to the funds collected, not to the contributors themselves (Bascom 1952; 
see obshchak, 5.22 in this volume).
Outside Africa, esusu practices can be found in the Caribbean 
Islands, where they presumably migrated at the time of the transatlantic 
slave trade. Maynard (1996) documents the translocation of the Yoruba 
esusu rotating- credit association in Anglophone Caribbean. In Jamaica, 
the practice is called partner, while in other Caribbean Islands it is called 
syndicate. Migrants were also instrumental in establishing contribution 
societies in several American cities (Bascom 1952).
Among the Yorubas, traditional cooperatives known as aaro, owe, 
esusu and ajo are common. Aaro refers to a cooperative agricultural 
arrangement in which peer farmers form ad hoc groups and work on 
one another’s farms at peak periods on tasks such as land preparation, 
planting, weeding and harvesting, until all the members of the group 
have been serviced (see pomochi, 5.13 in this volume). Owe is another 
form of agricultural cooperation whereby physically capable members of 
the community (usually young or middle- aged men) unite to assist the 
needy, elderly and chieftains on their farms.
Esusu and ajo describe means of informal financing, whereby indi-
viduals come together to further their individual and collective inter-
ests. This may take several forms. First, there are units that are aimed at 
mobilising savings but that engage in little or no lending. Second, there 
are lending units that engage in little savings mobilisation. Third, there 
are groups that engage in self- help finance and involve various types of 
savings, including rotating ones as well as those provided by licensed 
cooperatives (Ojenike and Olowoniyi 2013). In the literature on infor-
mal finance, esusu is generally associated with rotating savings and credit 
associations (Seibel 2004).
Among the Yorubas, esusu cooperatives operate as follows: a group 
of people team up to contribute a fixed and equal sum of money at specific 
intervals – daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly or bi- monthly – enabling 
each member to collect the entire sum in rotation. When everyone in the 
group has benefitted from the pool, a new rotation cycle is launched. The 
order in which people get to draw the money is usually decided by means 

















In urban areas, the Yorubas distinguish between esusu and ajo. In 
ajo, a professional collector, the alajo, goes round to collect contribu-
tions, usually on a daily or weekly basis, and is paid a small commis-
sion for this service. This is more personal than the formal financial 
system, since no one needs to go to the bank to make a deposit. At 
the same time, it is less personal than esusu associations, since ajo 
contributors do not necessarily know the other contributors. Rather, 
their relations are mediated by the alajo, who keeps a record of con-
tributions. Each contributor must make regular contributions within a 
given period, but is at liberty to contribute according to their budget. 
In certain circumstances, such as an emergency, a contributor may 
ask the alajo to return a certain amount of their contribution; this is 
what distinguishes ajo from esusu. In some cases, the alajo has a bank 
account, in which he or she deposits the funds until the end of the 
collection cycle, at which point the money must be paid to the chosen 
contributor. The decision on how and when the contributor gets the 
money from the alajo is mutually agreed between the two of them. For 
instance, if the contributor contributes daily (which is popular among 
traders and small business owners) and the contribution ‘matures’ at 
the end of the month, the alajo will, after subtracting his or her fee, 
return the rest of the contribution to the contributor.
It is left to the alajo’s discretion whether or not to use a bank account 
for the collected funds. Many Nigerians are reluctant to subscribe to for-
mal financial services. In southern and northern Nigeria, for example, 
street traders resort to informal means of credit and savings mobilisation 
because they do not trust most formal microfinance institutions (Oloyede 
2008). When an alajo chooses to use a bank account, however, this means 
that informal finances enter the formal financial system, and creates a 
link between the formal and the informal systems. This coexistence has 
been recognised under the concept of financial dualism (Osabuohien and 
Duruji 2007).
Esusu operates outside the formal legal and financial systems 
and tends to function solely on an oath of allegiance and mutual trust. 
This ensures that members of the association who have collected their 
funds early do not pull out of the system, causing other members to 
lose some or all of their contributions. As for ajo, the credibility of 
the alajo plays the key role in preventing risk and ensuring continued 
patronage.
Esusu remains popular despite the establishment of formal micro-
finance institutions in Nigeria. It is used by workers of the informal sector, 



















particularly popular among low- and middle- income earners. Many rural 
workers rely on it because they are poorly paid and therefore do not have 
access to the formal financial system. Esusu, by contrast, tailors its financial 
services to the real, day- to- day needs of each member of the group. With 
esusu, saving is more convenient and credit is less costly than it would be 
in the formal financial system (Oloyede 2008). There are also cost- related 
incentives for joining an esusu group: it is interest free. Gender also plays 
a role: Nigerian women are more likely to use esusu as an informal means 
of saving than men (National Bureau of Statistics 2013).
While esusu is largely an informal practice, it also penetrates formal 
work settings and serves individuals and groups within business organi-
sations. Engaging in esusu is often seen as supplementary to other means 
of obtaining credit (such as cooperatives). Many people engage in esusu 
in order to pursue a specific objective such as purchasing assets, starting 
a business or expanding their trade. Informal business operators often 
resort to esusu since they find it hard to obtain loans from banks.
Empirical studies of informal finance, financial exclusion, modern 
cooperatives, poverty alleviation, micro- financing and savings mobili-
sation in Nigeria recognise the significance of esusu and its variants and 
acknowledge its impact. Legal aspects and trust issues around the practices 
of esusu are less straightforward. Nonetheless, esusu practices in Nigeria 
and beyond are based on trust and on the integrity of the contributing 
members (Hofstede 1980; Fukuyama 1996). Comparative research into 
the origins and instruments of informal financing in a cross- country or a 
cultural- type perspective may bring interesting, if unconventional, results.
5.19 Mahalla (Uzbekistan)
rustamjon Urinboyev
department of sociology of Law, Lund University, sweden
Derived from the Arabic mahali, meaning ‘local’, the term mahalla is 
formally used in Uzbekistan to mean neighbourhood, local community, 
or state administrative unit. There are today some 12,000 mahallas in 
Uzbekistan, each of which consists of anything between 150 and 1,500 
households (Micklewright and Marnie 2005: 431). However, the word’s 
rich cultural roots mean that mahalla has multiple meanings and defini-
tions. In Uzbekistan it is also used by local people to describe community- 
based, informal economic practices (Sievers 2002; Urinboyev 2013). In 
this sense, mahalla denotes the means whereby people obtain access to 
public goods, services and social protection while bypassing the state. It is 



















and the ‘social’ (informal) functions. For example, the term informal 
mahalla may be used to refer to mahalla- based welfare and redistributive 
practices.
Typically, mahalla practices include monetary and labour exchanges, 
rotating savings and credit initiatives, mutual assistance and non- compen-
sated labour, housing construction and contributions to charity, all carried 
out within the local community. A non- compensated community project 
(hashar) is the commonest mahalla practice, where local residents cooper-
ate with one another by the reciprocal exchange of labour, money, material 
goods and services. Mahalla residents arrange hashar for a variety of pur-
poses, such as constructing irrigation facilities, cleaning streets, asphalt-
ing roads, building houses or mosques, organising weddings, funerals and 
circumcision feasts and many other services not provided by the state. 
Sievers notes that, ‘In modern Uzbekistan, few weddings, emergency med-
ical operations, university matriculations, house repairs, or funerals take 
place in the life of the average mahalla resident without some community 
financial support’ (2002: 129). Similarly, Seiple (2005) depicts mahalla as 
a means by which neighbours look out for one another by collectively par-
enting children, providing labour for repairs to houses, connecting friends 
and family to jobs and distributing funds to needy families.
The origin of the practice dates back to the eleventh or twelfth cen-
turies when Islamic empires dominated Central Asia. In the pre- Soviet 
period, mahallas were usually communities of several hundred people, 
organised in accordance with Islamic rituals and social events. A group of 
elders known as ‘white beards’ (oqosoqol) acted as administrators, provid-
ing advice and direction to the local community (Geiss 2001; Dadabaev 
2013). According to Olga Sukhareva (1976), a Russian anthropologist 
specialising in the study of mahallas in medieval Bukhara, mahallas gave 
residents access to services and infrastructure that were not accessible 
to non- residents. These included mosques, tea-houses, bazaars, cooking 
areas and water supplies.
During the early Soviet period, the authorities attempted to elimi-
nate the mahalla as an institution; these attempts were abandoned after 
it became evident that they would provoke social unrest (Abramson 
1998). As a result, the Soviet authorities changed their strategy and tried 
instead to use mahallas to disseminate communist ideology by integrat-
ing them into the state and party structures. As a result, mahallas con-
tinued to serve as local village councils throughout the Soviet period 
(Bektemirov and Rahimov 2001).
After Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, the authorities 























mahalla was transformed into the basic administrative unit of local gov-
ernment. Mahallas are now hybrid institutions, operating both as part of 
the formal system of public administration (formal mahalla) and as an 
informal, community- based welfare system (informal mahalla) (Sievers 
2002; Urinboyev 2011, 2013, 2014). One may distinguish between ‘for-
mal’ and ‘informal’ mahalla by looking at their functions and regulatory 
Figure 5.19.1 Dinner at a mahalla.






structures:  formal mahallas take the form of committees headed by a 
state- salaried chairman (rais) and act on behalf of the state; informal 
(social) mahallas are founded on moral ideas of solidarity and mutual 
help and are led by an oqsoqol chosen by residents.
Given the existence during the Soviet period of an all- encompassing 
social protection system, people in those days felt less need for a mahalla- 
based welfare system. But cutbacks in state welfare support in the post- 
Soviet period mean that mahallas have now become primary providers 
of social welfare. Sievers (2002: 103) notes that, ‘The economic signifi-
cance of mahalla has shifted from a vehicle through which to amass addi-
tional or disposable wealth to a vehicle for basic survival’.
Since 1991, the Uzbek authorities have portrayed the mahalla as 
an Uzbek national brand, but analogous institutions may be found in 
Islamic areas stretching from Central Europe to Southeast Asia. Similar 
traditions persist in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan (Trofimov 1995; Coudouel et al. 1998; Sievers 2002; Louw 
2007). Other examples may be found in the Balkans, dating from that 
region’s Ottoman (Islamic) past (Choleva- Dimitrova 2002).
Mahallas embody moral ideas of solidarity and mutual help. But 
while this mahalla- based solidarity is based on ties of kinship, reciproc-
ity and good neighbourliness, it may also contribute to the emergence 
of initial elements of nepotism, cronyism and patron– client relations. 
According to informal norms of mahalla, the individual is expected to 
share his or her economic resources and political influence with his 
mahalla (family, relatives, neighbours). These mahalla norms shape the 
behaviour of individuals when they engage in public administration, busi-
ness and social life. State officials frequently find themselves compelled 
to choose between, on the one hand, loyalty to their kin and mahalla, 
and, on the other hand, honesty at work. Therefore, upholding respect 
and loyalty for kin and mahalla networks often comes at the expense of 
the formal structures, thereby leading to an omnipresence of clientelistic 
relations in state institutions (Urinboyev and Svensson 2013). In this way, 
mahalla structures undermine the rule of law and good governance initia-
tives by promoting alternative versions of how people should behave.
5.20 Tandas and cundinas (Mexico and south- western Usa)
Carlos G. Vélez- Ibáñez
arizona state University, Usa
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS), known as tandas 
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the south- west United States, are informal economic mechanisms that 
enable members to save and, when necessary, to access money.
In its simplest form, a ROSCA might consist of an organiser and four 
other individuals who agree to contribute a set amount equivalent to, 
say, US$10 a week. The order in which these sums are distributed may be 
decided either by lot or by the order in which the members joined. Each 
person, including the organiser, will receive a one- time payment of $50, 
and the lifespan of this hypothetical ROSCA will be five weeks. In the 
words of Shirley Ardener, one of the pioneers in the study of this phe-
nomenon, a ROSCA consists of ‘a core of participants who agree to make 
regular contributions to a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to each 
contributor in rotation’ (Ardener 1964: 201). From this simple model, 
however, ROSCAs have evolved into much more complex structural and 
institutional types, which vary widely in their formality. ROSCAS are 
a worldwide phenomenon, with comparable practices found in North 
America, Africa (see esusu in Nigeria, 5.18 in this volume), Asia (see gap 
in Uzbekistan, 5.12 in this volume) and Europe (see loteria in Albania, 
5.17 in this volume). ROSCAS are often (though not always) associated 
with population migration. That said, the Mexican versions can be both 
local and trans- border in character.
Originally, ROSCAs were organised by men and developed from 
forms of agricultural exchange. Women in land- based economies were 
traditionally excluded from owning land and, other than payment for 
their labour, had access to few resources. This was, for example, the 
case in rural India and Africa, as well as elsewhere. In today’s monetised 
economies – whether rural or urban, developing or developed – many 
ROSCAs are in the hands of women (Ardener 1964). Many of the thou-
sands of tandas or cundinas in northern Mexico and the south- western 
United States are today run by women, who act as managers as well as 
participants. Women have few resources other than limited wage labour 
to develop capital for consumption, investment or saving. With credit 
markets limited – because of low wages, lack of collateral or attitudinal 
or market conditions – women must use all available means to provide 
for their families. Among these are ROSCAs, which can be a means for 
generating savings in order to create income- producing enterprises. The 
main strength within networks of women worldwide is social capital and 
their willingness to extend it to others. This enables and helps to explain 
the rise of ROSCAs run by women (Vélez-Ibáñez 2010: 15– 17).
The database cited in this section draws on field research carried 
out by the author from 1971 intermittently through to 2008. The first 



















identified in Mexico and the United States. Snowball and opportunistic 
samples generated data on 65 informal and intermediate ROSCAs, 4 of 
which may be described as Rotating Credit Associations (RCAs), that 
is, formally organised institutions. The author’s 1983 book, Bonds of 
Mutual Trust, was based on this fieldwork. From 2000 to 2009, two inten-
sive field studies used opportunistic and snowball- sampling to gather 
additional data. This work focused on the US states of Arizona, south-
ern California and Washington; the Mexican states of Baja California, 
Sonora and Sinaloa; and the Arizona- Sonora border. This database 
included 65 new informal ROSCAs and 7 RCAs. The entire sample cov-
ered 137 ROSCAs and 25 RCAs, representing about 5,000 people, with 
data gathered from more than 90 informants, 10 web pages, countless 
emails and numerous conversations with at least 40 people, from 
Seattle in the north- west of the USA all the way to Xalapa, Veracruz 
in south- west Mexico. The author also participated in three ROSCAs: 
two in Phoenix, Arizona and one in San Luis Río Colorado, which strad-
dles the Arizona- Sonora border. This last was a complex trans- border 
organisation, with participants living on both sides of the border and 
using both Mexican pesos and US dollars as currency (Vélez-Ibáñez 
2010: 21– 3).
The number of individuals participating in informal and intermedi-
ate ROSCAs (the latter defined as occurring in institutional settings) is 
shown in Figure 5.20.1. ROSCA members commonly numbered between 
10 and 12, with higher numbers in intermediate ROSCAs.
The amount of contributions (given here in US dollars) is shown 
in Figure  5.20.2 with a contribution of $100 being the most typical, 
made on a weekly basis for the informal tandas and monthly for the 
intermediate ones.
As shown in Figure 5.20.3, for the majority of ROSCAs the total ‘fund’ 
(that is, the amount dispersed or rotated at each turn) averaged between 
$1,000 and $1,250. Of all the funds dispersed, the highest amount was 
$10,000 dollars for 4 per cent of the sample. This amount was distributed 
in tandas made up mostly of individuals in business enterprises or larger 
networks of associates. If, for example, over a period of 40 months 40 
individuals made a monthly contribution of $250 each, at each turn one 
of the 40 could receive $9,750 (the person on the receiving end does not 
make a contribution); alternatively, 20 individuals could receive $500 
each, or 10 persons $1,000. The permutations are endless.
Risks associated with fraud, non- payment or any other ‘act of God’ 
were mitigated by two factors. First, most participants were members 
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be relatives or friends, to visit one another’s homes, to exchange useful 
information and to attend the same local events or social activities. This 
in turn developed dense relations of trust. The second factor was the 
establishment of mutual trust based on kinship, friendship or other such 
relationships (confianza). In most of the 130 ROSCAs studied, informants 
Figure 5.20.1 The number of individuals participating in informal 
and intermediate ROSCAs.
Source: Vélez-Ibáñez 2010: 68.
Figure 5.20.2 The amount of contributions (in USD).









raised the issue of risk, but only a few had actually suffered the conse-
quences of someone defaulting or of the organiser absconding with the 
funds. Out of 130 ROSCAs with a total of 1,300 members (calculated on 
the assumption that 10 is the normative size of a tanda), 4 defaults prior 
to 1983 and 5 after 1983 had resulted in a default rate of slightly more 
than 0.005 per cent of the total funds (Vélez-Ibáñez 2010: 111).
Why would someone not just simply go to a bank to deposit their 
savings, collect interest and borrow money when the need arises? The 
reason is that participation in tandas is a social as much as a financial 
activity. There is no social glue enforcing weekly or monthly savings 
deposits in a bank. Tandas, by contrast, create an environment in which 
the social glue strengthens with every transaction. In particular, they 
help to alleviate the stress and uncertainty generated by dynamic migra-
tion processes.
5.21 Salam credit (afghanistan)
James McLeod- hatch
UCL, Uk
The salam credit system is an informal credit system in which the repay-
ment of cash advances towards agriculture is made in agricultural pro-
duce. This system is prevalent in the south and east of Afghanistan, and 
Figure 5.20.3 The total amount distributed in tandas.
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generally refers to the advance of cash for agricultural inputs, such as 
seeds and fertiliser, to be repaid by the debtor in raw opium paste.
During times of financial stress, a farmer will enter into a contract 
to provide a certain amount of opium to a creditor, usually just after the 
harvest (salam credit tends to be a short- term seasonal loan). The loan 
can be used to finance the cost of agricultural inputs for poppy cultiva-
tion, although this is not always the case – it may also be taken to service 
another debt, such as marriage costs (Mansfield 1999b: 12). The amount 
of the loan is typically 50 per cent of the value of the current price of 
opium. So for example, a farmer agreeing to provide 10 kilos of opium 
at a time when opium costs $100 a kilo will receive a $500 loan. The 
cash value of the loan will vary according to such factors as the proxim-
ity of the harvest (the closer to harvest, the higher the farm gate price 
due to falling stocks) (Anand 2004: 26), and the creditworthiness of the 
farmer (often opium cultivation in itself gives the farmers access to more 
favourable credit). Less creditworthy farmers might receive less than the 
typical 50 per cent, if, for example, they do not own any land (Mansfield 
2004: 4).
This type of informal credit mechanism does not uniquely pertain 
to opium poppy cultivation: it can also (less commonly) be used for agri-
cultural inputs towards the cultivation of livestock and fruit (Mansfield 
2001b: 11) or grains and spices (Mansfield 2004: 3). However, the salam 
credit system is most commonly associated with the cultivation of pop-
pies, especially as formal micro- financing strategies that (intentionally) 
support the cultivation of illicit crops do not exist.
The term salam (ملس) can be roughly translated as ‘delivery’, and 
comes from the Arabic financial concept of Bai’ Salam, ‘an ancient form 
of forward contract wherein the price was paid in advance at the time of 
making the contract for prescribed goods to be delivered later’. Its princi-
ples are laid out in the Hadith (the body of works discussing the words 
and actions of the Prophet Mohammad) and it appears to have originated 
specifically as a method for farmers to raise finance (Ayub 2009: 241). 
The mechanisms by which it operates, under its original design, were 
such that it was compliant with other Islamic financial principles, such as 
avoiding usury (Ayub 2009: 242).
Although salam is a basic Islamic financial principle, the fact that it 
involves money being repaid with commodities means that it is not a suit-
able mechanism for formal Islamic financial institutions, such as banks, 
to employ. It is a more useful mechanism for traders of goods. Outside 
of Afghanistan, it is not commonly reported, although such a system 
























Using opium as a form of credit is also not exclusive to Afghanistan  – 
similar systems advancing payments against opium exist in Thailand, 
Pakistan and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Ayub 2009: 11).
In the literature on salam in the 1960s and 1970s, the practice is 
only referenced in relation to in extremis funding to support licit farming 
activities – typically, for a sharecropper to feed his family wheat during 
the winter (Stevens and Tarzi 1965: 63). By the mid- 1970s, the high cost 
of borrowing and the introduction of formal, more efficient borrowing 
mechanisms such as banks meant that salam credit had ‘largely been 
abandoned’ throughout Helmand (Farouq and Scott 1975: 61). However, 
large- scale geopolitical developments, including the Soviet incursion and 
subsequent civil war, meant that opium became an extremely attractive 
crop to grow (Goodhand 2005: 191– 216). By the time the Taliban were 
toppled, salam credit was resurgent – and squarely associated with the 
opium trade (Stevens and Tarzi 1965; Farouq and Scott 1975). Thus, 
salam credit did not emerge in Afghanistan specifically to service the 
opium economy: rather, it was adapted from existing agricultural financ-
ing practices.
Salam is not the only informal economic practice associated with 
agricultural credit in Afghanistan. There are similar mechanisms in other 
parts of the country, such as raf- e- zawat and pishaki in the north and 
north east Afghanistan. Other informal practices for raising money also 
exist, such as anawat (also known as jawzai in eastern Afghanistan), ‘the 
short-selling of commodities for cash loans’ (Mansfield 2015, personal 
correspondence) – although it too has negative associations ‘due to the 
punitive mark- up charged by the lender’, which could be argued as being 
interest and therefore un- Islamic (Mansfield 2004: 4). The preferred 
option to borrow cash in the first instance is always an interest- free loan – 
qarz- e- hasna – which usually comes from a family member (Mansfield 
1999a: 14). In early 2015, salam had disappeared from many areas where 
it had been formerly used, due to increased liquidity in these areas allow-
ing for qarz- e- hasna. Farmers recognise that opium is an expensive form 
of credit: in some areas salam has disappeared simply because poppy cul-
tivation no longer occurs (Mansfield 2015, personal correspondence).
Due to the loan being agreed in terms of output, and not the cash 
sum borrowed, poor harvests can lead to indebtedness. If the amount of 
opium the farmer has produced is less than that required to pay off the 
salam credit, he may have to borrow enough through another type of loan 
to purchase the shortfall in opium; or he might try and parlay the short-
fall to the next season, if the creditor agrees. This encourages cycles of 
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poppy cultivation, since the farmer must grow more poppy to make up 
the shortfall from the last season. Moreover, if the price of opium has 
increased in the period between the loan being taken and the repayment, 
the farmer will find himself even more indebted. This means that ‘the real 
cost of repaying the salam initially received could be as much as six times 
the original loan’ (Mansfield 1999a: 15).
The effects of a spike in opium prices were especially evident in the 
2000/ 1 growing season, following the Taliban (then governing the coun-
try) banning poppy cultivation. Just 7,606 hectares of poppy were grown 
in 2001, down from 82,171 hectares in 2000 (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2012: 28). With a markedly reduced supply, the mar-
ket consequently responded with increased opium prices, which had ‘the 
equivalent effect of charging interest at 1,000– 1,500 per cent’ (Mansfield 
1999a: 8).
Currently the government of Afghanistan does not have the writ 
to impose an effective ban on poppy cultivation, but there are other 
extreme price risks that the farmers face, for example, from disease. The 
2010 poppy crop was badly affected by disease; as a result, opium prices 
jumped from an average price of $71/ kilo in July 2009 to $300/ kilo in 
February 2011 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics 2013: 64). Other 
threats facing the farmer include drought, which would also negatively 
impact on opium yield, or government eradication of the farmer’s poppy 
crops.
The potential for a salam loan to spiral out of control is greater for 
more marginal farmers who are less liquid. If other loan sources have 
been exhausted, and the creditor will no longer let the loan ride to the 
next season, the farmer is forced to resort to more extreme cash- raising 
strategies. This might include engaging in wage labour; the sale of live-
stock or a vehicle; or, if the debt is larger still, the sale of land or even fam-
ily members is sometimes used as a last resort to service debts – giving 
away young female family members in marriage as settlement (Gayan 
2012:  308). This practice is effectively an extension of the marriage 
dowry system common across the subcontinent and especially in Pashtun 
culture. In 2008, it was reported that the incidence of these so- called 
‘opium brides’ was increasing (Yosafzai 2008).
Salam credit is one of the myriad complicating factors that under-
mines efforts by the government of Afghanistan and the international 
community to encourage farmers to grow licit crops (such as the provi-
sion of formal micro- finance initiatives). Combatting it is simple in prin-













especially popular, and people will naturally seek cheaper and more sta-
ble debt. As in the mid- 1970s, in the past few years salam loans have 
become less common in Helmand, where ‘liquidity and the possibilities 
of getting cash loans from family members mean that few farmers stake 
salam’ (Mansfield 2015, personal correspondence). However, the entire 
matrix of factors that lead to illicit cultivation in the first place – eco-
nomic necessity, instability, lack of formal alternatives, lack of infrastruc-
ture, corruption, etc. – needs to be comprehensively addressed in order 
to permanently reduce the prevalence of salam credit. In the meantime, 
any formal alternatives – such as micro- finance initiatives – that are 
attempted must be efficiently delivered and institutionally sound enough 
to withstand corruption or abuse. They must be aimed at the most eco-
nomically vulnerable farmers in poppy cultivating areas, especially dur-





The obshchak is a term that emerged in the early Soviet penal system 
in Russia (Gurov 1995; Varese 2001; Dolgova 2003). It derives from 
the Russian adjective for shared, common or communal (obshchii) and 
denotes a collective fund, used primarily for the purposes of mutual aid 
among like- minded convicts.
The practice of collecting the obshchak was originally confined to 
the Soviet Union. In the post- Soviet period, the term is used in criminal 
communities and prisons in most countries of the former Soviet Union. 
In the Baltic States, the South Caucasus countries and in Central Asia, 
the Russian word is given a local twist. Georgians, for example, call it 
the obshchaki, where the addition of i, a Georgian nominative ending, 
makes it sound colloquial. In Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan, the 
word is used as an adjective to denote any prisoner who concedes to the 
informal code of the prisoner elite, the vory v zakone, (see kanonieri qur-
debi, 3.21 Volume 1). Thus, a prisoner can be described as obshchakovyi. 
In some Russian regions, the word has acquired an additional meaning, 
synonymous with criminality. For example, in Khabarovsk in the Russian 
Far East there is a powerful organised criminal grouping that simply 
calls itself Obshchak. The norms associated with such practices have 
also spread outside the successor countries of the Soviet Union through 























In criminal contexts, funds are raised through the extortion or vol-
untary contributions of prisoners or entities outside prison. Those who 
give voluntarily signal their commitment to the criminal community. The 
term is linked to organised crime in a two- fold way. On the one hand, 
obshchak is part and parcel of extortion, whereby so- called protection 
money is paid by racketeered businesses. On the other hand, the obshchak 
ensures integration within and cooperation between criminal groups. 
This penetrates all levels, from individual prison dormitories and street 
gangs to city districts and even regions, with funds funnelling upwards 
to the most powerful groupings (Varese 2001; Volkov 2002). Both func-
tions  – the collection (informal taxation) and redistribution (informal 
welfare) of common funds, dissociated from the state or other legal pro-
viders – are essential for the emergence of mafias (Gambetta 1996). The 
colloquial use of the word obshchak can also be used in non- criminal con-
texts, as an abbreviation of ‘common fund’ (obshchaya kassa), to high-
light the informal nature of collection and distribution (see ‘black cash’ 
or ‘black coffer’ – chyornaya kassa).
While the criminal obshchak can be used for mutual aid and sup-
port to those who are ill, in police custody, or in the segregation unit of 
the prison, the spoils generally accrue to those at the top of the criminal 
ranks. Thus, the obshchak should be understood as a form of generalised 
reciprocity that locks those who practise it into consistent lines of action. 
This means it represents an investment by criminals who do not receive 
immediate benefits but who then have an interest in remaining within 
the criminal community to reap the long- term returns as they move up 
the ranks. As such, voluntary investments in the obshchak can be under-
stood as a signal of commitment, solidarity and positive attitudes towards 
the criminal community (Slade 2013). Investments are a measure of this 
commitment and can lead to promotion within the prison hierarchy or 
organised criminal group. However, for those who do not adhere to the 
inmates’ code that supports the obshchak, it may be nothing more than a 
source of extortion.
The practice of pooling resources for mutual support and insurance 
against the worst is of course common in many informal settings. Paoli’s 
work on the Cosa Nostra and ‘ndrangheta mafia groups in southern Italy 
shows similar common pooled resources (Paoli 2003: 85– 6). As well as 
creating rational incentives for long- term individual commitment to a 
social group, such pooling of resources is often sacralised as surrender 
of the individual to a higher good – that of the collective. In post- Soviet 
Georgia, criminal materials confiscated by police included a docu-
























2004: 118– 19). The pious language it uses is revealing: ‘The obshchak is 
a sacred place. It may only be governed by saintly people … These people 
must be absolutely honest to the thieves’ idea, dedicated in their heart 
and soul … Every keeper [of the obshchak – GS] must have from five to 
fifteen people in his care’ (Glonti and Lobjanidze 2004: 118– 19) Misuse 
of the obshchak and abuse by the keepers is a particular sin. This sacral-
isation of the community that the obshchak represents is by no means 
unique. Communal work and investments that inspire feelings of a higher 
calling to a collectivity is widespread in groups such as religious sects and 
utopian communities (Kanter 1972; Tilly 2005).
The obshchak norms and practices are related to other informal 
practices that emerged in the prison camps of the Soviet Union and 
became institutionalised. The practice of the skhodka – an informal ‘court’ 
for meetings of elite level prisoners – was and still is important for organ-
ising the obshchak, sanctioning breaches of rules connected to it, and 
electing those who should look after the fund. An insight into the rules 
and sanctions in Russia comes from the 2015 conflict between factions of 
one of the most powerful organised criminal groupings of vory v zakone 
over irregularities in obshchak book- keeping. After conducting an ‘audit’ 
of obshchak finances, a high- ranking boss uncovered instances of dubi-
ous book- keeping in the prison colonies of Ryazan region in Russia. This 
serious episode led to the person responsible for the obshchak records 
having his criminal status downgraded as punishment (Znak.com 2015). 
While in the past, the importance of the obshchak lay mainly in provid-
ing mutual support to prisoners and in furnishing the authority of the 
prisoner elite in the Soviet gulags, today the practice has been adapted 
for the purposes of organised crime- led business and is monitored more 
closely by both insiders and outsiders.
Police forces from Sweden to Armenia have endeavoured to find 
hidden resources associated with the obshchak, to uncover traces of their 
investment and to establish their beneficiaries. As the obshchak was the 
key mechanism of criminal coordination and cooperation for those impris-
oned in the Soviet gulags, its norms and practices have lent themselves to 
transnational organised crime in the present day. Transfers of resources 
can be made without actual flow of funds, thus making payments invis-
ible to the authorities. In this respect, the obshchak resembles under-
ground banking systems based on informal rules and honour operational 
in the Middle East, India, Pakistan and North Africa (see hawala, 5.40 in 
this volume). In cases where obshchak has been exported beyond the geo-
graphical boundaries of the former Soviet Union – for example, among 




















in Israel and Eurasian criminal bosses laundering money in Spain – there 
is a shared understanding of what the obshchak is and of the correspond-
ent code that enables its operation.
Perhaps the most important implication of obshchak practices is 
their functionality for, if not symbiotic relationship with, formal institu-
tions. Prison is the most common example (see krugovaia poruka, 3.10 
Volume 1). According to ex- prisoner respondents in Kyrgyzstan, the 
criminal authorities are actively involved in the running of prisons. They 
report that obshchak contributions are collected on Fridays in all prison 
dormitories, records of the contributions are kept, and the resources are 
then redistributed according to need. In Lithuania, prisoner respondents 
report the obshchak is still collected as it was in Soviet times, though its 
importance has declined with the prison reforms and the greater effi-
ciency of the formal prison authorities.
Prison reforms aimed at inmates’ well- being reduce their depend-
ence on obshchak, while anti- mafia policies directly targeting obsh-
chak can make a real difference. Thus, during an anti- mafia campaign 
in Georgia in 2006 as part of President Saakashvili’s anti- corruption 
reforms, 19 people were arrested and an obshchak, containing 100,000 
lari ($50,000 USD) was seized. Along with the money, an encoded list 
was recovered with names, dates and amounts given. According to the 
Georgian police, ‘the money was collected by criminal authorities or con-
tributed by people who voluntarily donated money to support the crimi-
nal world and transferred funds to this criminal account’ (Prime Crime 
2006). These examples show the importance and variation of obshchak 
as a distinct form of collective resource pooling and wider solidarity 




independent scholar, kyiv, Ukraine
Zarobitchanstvo is a term used in Ukraine for ‘earnings made away from 
home’, that is, labour migration, both internal and external. Today, 
between 10 and 20 per cent of Ukrainians of working age are engaged in 
zarobitchanstvo. Recent years have seen a surge in female migrant labour, 
and this is having a significant impact on Ukrainian society. Travelling 
abroad to work is not a new phenomenon in Ukraine:  it has long been 


















practised both in tsarist Russia and under Soviet rule. In the USSR, for 
instance, there was a common informal practice known as ‘to leave in 
search of a long rouble’, meaning to travel to work in the Russian Far 
North, where salaries were substantially higher than elsewhere in the 
country. There were also informal cooperative associations of people 
who travelled around the country in search of temporary or seasonal 
work, chiefly in building or agriculture, and mainly with private employ-
ers (artels of shabashniks, Zemtsov 2001:  332), In the 1990s, during 
Ukraine’s transition from a command to a market economy, working 
abroad became commonplace.
Work has traditionally been assigned in Ukraine according to gen-
der, and migrant workers are no exception. As a result, the ‘gendered 
structure of zarobitchanstvo’ is a key characteristic of migrant labour 
today (Haidinger 2008: 132). Ukrainian men generally find work abroad 
as builders, drivers, mechanics and fitters. Ukrainian women, by con-
trast, are generally employed as office cleaners, domestic or factory work-
ers, carers for the elderly, or dancers in bars and nightclubs. In the 1990s, 
when the construction industry was the main source of foreign work for 
Ukrainians, migratory flows were mostly male (GfK Ukraine 2008: 9). 
The 2000s, by contrast, saw a surge in female migration. Recent esti-
mates put the female share of the workforce at between 35.4 per cent 
and 50.5 per cent (Markov 2009).
Many migrant workers come from the rural regions of western 
Ukraine. For example, 41.9 per cent of the population of Transcarpathian 
Oblast (region) in south- western Ukraine are believed to have worked 
abroad, of whom 56.1 per cent are male and 43.9 per cent are female. In 
Ternopil Oblast in western Ukraine, 17.6 per cent of the economically active 
population have worked abroad, of whom 51.4 per cent in the region overall 
are female, while in the regional capital the female share reaches as high as 
62.5 per cent (Shushpanov 2009). Of the European Union (EU) countries, 
Ukrainian women are most likely to travel for work to the Mediterranean 
region. In Spain, for example, up to 55 per cent of Ukrainian labour migrants 
are female; in Greece 75.5 per cent; in Italy 90.2 per cent. Male workers are 
more likely to find work in Portugal, where they make up 68 per cent of the 
Ukrainian workforce; in Russia 60.4 per cent; or in Germany 60 per cent. 
Recent years have seen an acceleration of female labour force outflow to 
Russia (up from 39.6 per cent in 2001 to 50 per cent in 2009) and to Poland 
(up from 19.4 per cent in 2001 to 66 per cent in 2009).
The feminisation of zarobitchanstvo has led to several new phe-
nomena. These include:  Neapolitisation. This term describes the pro-













Ukrainian migrants in Italy where Naples is the most common destination 
(Ukrainian  – Neapol); ‘New Cinderellas’ (Tolstokorova 2011) or ‘Naples 
Cinderellas’. These terms describe Ukrainian migrant women whose tar-
get country of migration is often (though not always) Italy, again with 
Naples as a frequent destination; ‘Skype mommy’ (Savka 2013) and ‘trans-
national supermom’ (Tolstokorova 2013). These terms refer to migrant 
mothers whose children remain in Ukraine; ‘Italian syndrome’. This term 
was coined by psychologists in western Ukraine to cover a complex of 
mental and physical disorders that migrant workers, especially women, 
may develop during their time abroad (not necessarily in Italy, but also 
elsewhere). These include depression, paranoia, agoraphobia and other 
psychological problems resulting from alienation from family and loss 
of familiar social connections. Female domestic workers may suffer spi-
nal injuries, for example, as a result of having to lift bed- ridden patients. 
Long absences from home and a fragmented style of transnational family 
life may also encourage unsafe sexual relations, which may in turn harm 
migrants’ reproductive health; ‘Italian children’ (Majdanik 2010). This 
describes children of migrant workers (again, not only those working in 
Italy) who, in the absence of their parents, become ‘social orphans’ – a 
term usually used in Ukraine to describe children who have biological 
parents but who live on the streets, with foster families, or in boarding 
houses. Deprived of family socialisation and gender role models, these 
young people often lack opportunities to learn survival skills such as 
self- organisation, individual responsibility and emotional maturity. As a 
result, labour migration has been accused of fostering a generation of 
young people who are reluctant to work and choose instead to live on 
remittances sent by their parents, frittering them away on luxuries, alco-
hol or drugs (Kyrchiv 2004). They do not see how hard their mothers and 
fathers work abroad to provide for their well- being. All they see is the 
remittances arriving from abroad and they regard their parents as ‘pay-
check Moms’ (Tolstokorova 2010), ‘personal money bags’ and ‘private 
ATMs’ providing them with banknotes. They come to associate interna-
tional employment with easy money and la dolce vita, and to believe that 
money can only really be made abroad. Being financially better- off than 
children from non- migrant families, they are perceived by their peers as 
proof of this belief. A  sociological poll of migrants’ children at several 
Kyiv high schools found that 86 per cent of them did not see their futures 
in Ukraine, and that 65 per cent of school leavers wanted to leave Ukraine 
and work abroad as soon as possible (Kyrchiv 2004). This suggests that 
‘Italian children’ may come to represent a lost generation that is unlikely 



















The term ‘Italian husbands’ denotes spouses left behind in Ukraine 
by female migrant workers. There is evidence of social alienation among 
such husbands, who are often unemployed and dependent on the remit-
tances sent home by their wives. Alcohol and drug abuse are commonly 
reported problems, as is unprotected sex, which may have damaging 
health effects and lead to higher male mortality. The positive effect of 
this trend, however, is that many husbands of female migrants take on 
the roles of carers and housekeepers – if only for as long as their wives 
remain abroad – and this is changing the stereotypes of masculinity in 
the direction of responsible fatherhood.
In today’s Ukraine, zarobitchanstvo is perceived not merely as a 
spontaneous form of self- organisation of the population but as a frame 
of collective thinking. It is a specific Ukrainian phenomenon with its own 
social values. It is not just a means of making money, but a lifestyle choice 
that has implications for Ukrainian society at large.
5.24 Rad  na  crno (serbia)
kosovka ognjenovic 
Institute of economic sciences, Belgrade, serbia
Rad na crno, literally ‘black labour’, is a Serbian term that describes 
socially acceptable ways of coping with the problems experienced by 
ordinary people during Serbia’s turbulent transition from socialism, 
that is, away from the system of worker- managed enterprises that 
characterised the Yugoslav economy from the late 1940s until the 
late 1980s. Specifically, rad na crno denotes payment for jobs that are 
not officially registered or that are only partially reported to the state 
authorities, and that are therefore not subject to taxation, social insur-
ance or labour law. While the term has negative connotations in for-
mal and legal contexts, ordinary people use it routinely and generally 
accept it as legitimate.
The term was commonly used in all the republics that, until the 
beginning of the 1990s, constituted the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. For instance, rad na crno is translated in Slovenian as delo na 
črno and in Macedonian as rabota na crno, while similar phrasing is used 
in Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin. The term was not included in the 
early editions of the Economic Encyclopaedia (published in Belgrade in 
1984 and 1986) or the Economic and Business Encyclopaedia (1994), but 
it did appear in dictionaries of the Serbian language published in 1986 
and 2003. These define rad na crno as ‘work without a permit’, ‘illicit’ or 
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socialist Yugoslavia, however, the post- socialist transition can be seen as 
shaping its subsequent use and meaning.
Informal practices such as rad na crno are associated with the ‘black’, 
‘grey’, ‘shadow’ or ‘hidden’ economy in Europe and elsewhere (European 
Commission 2014). These terms are used interchangeably and surface 
in the media to denote activities in the informal economy. In the social 
sciences, the informal economy is defined as ‘all economic activities 
that contribute to the officially calculated gross national product, but 
are currently unregistered’ (Schneider and Enste 2000: 77). According 
to this definition, illegal activities such as the production and distribu-
tion of criminal or forbidden goods and services, or legal activities such 
as unpaid household work, are excluded. In common usage, however, 
‘informal’ may be seen as a euphemism for other adjectives in ‘coloured 
markets’ (Katsenelinboigen 1977: 69). Accordingly, rad na crno encom-
passes all wage earners in principal, secondary or self- employment who 
work without or outside labour contracts.
One of the first researchers into the workings of the informal econ-
omy and rad na crno in Serbia and the other former Yugoslav republics 
has concluded that, as a result of anonymity and lack of data, it is difficult 
to accurately measure or even to approximately estimate the incidence of 
rad na crno practices (Božović 1992). This is also because the lines are 
not clearly defined: rad na crno may denote not only economic activity 
that is illegal because it is not officially reported, but also work that is 
legal but that is only partially reported. For example, the activity of only 
some of the employees may be reported to the authorities, or workers 
may be reported to have received only the minimum wage, whereas in 
reality they have been paid above that rate (see Latvian alga aploksnē, 
6.27 in this volume). Such ‘informal’ employment is seen as beneficial 
by wage earners since their income is not taxed, but it may also be det-
rimental, since those who earn money in this way are not covered by 
the social security system. The ambivalence surrounding such practices 
makes them hard to pin down and creates avenues for tax avoidance and 
social- protection fraud.
The transition from Yugoslavia’s socialist economy began in the late 
1980s, when the system of worker- managed enterprises was abandoned 
and new legislation on business enterprises came into force. However, 
ethnic tensions, which were already high throughout the 1980s, provoked 
widespread conflict and declarations of independence by Yugoslavia’s 
constituent republics, resulting in the break- up of the federation. The 
conflict disrupted Serbia’s transition to the market and its economy was 



















the international community from 1992– 2000 and by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) bombing campaign of 1999. Serbia suf-
fered heavy economic disruption throughout the 1990s.
In these circumstances, rad na crno became the ‘last resort’ for 
people who had suffered the loss of the socialist principles of guaran-
teed employment and pension provision. How people behave in such 
circumstances may also be explained through the prism of creating dis-
tance between the official and actual norms that make up a particular 
social structure (Collins 1981). In circumstances where official norms are 
not clearly enough defined to provoke sanctions when they are broken, 
people may instead follow actual norms that are generally accepted by 
the majority. This mirrors the conditions of disadvantaged urban com-
munities in ‘Third World’ countries, where informal employment stud-
ies originated (Hart 1973). In this sense, rad na crno is part of a global 
phenomenon of informal employment and shares many of the features 
observed elsewhere, though of course the specific dynamics and scale of 
the practice vary across countries and regions.
One of the most important shared characteristics of informal 
employment is its paradoxical relationship with state control. The scope 
of informal practices increases as levels of state regulation increase, 
meaning that market economies tend to be less burdened with infor-
mality (Portes and Haller 2005). While people may consider informal 
employment an opportunity, it has negative implications for social and 
economic development. What people perceive as a solution is seen by 
the state as a problem. Researchers of Serbia’s informal economy in the 
transition period branded it as ‘a kind of mirror in which we can see 
all too clearly the reality and relationships in our society’ (Marinković 
2004). The ‘reality’ embraces informal practices, while the ‘relation-
ships’ refer to people’s responses to the situation created by the political 
establishment, often viewed as corrupt and incompetent. It may per-
haps be concluded that, where they are pervasive, informal economic 
activities are indicators of existing contradictions between official and 
actual norms.
Under socialism, small- scale rad na crno was widely practised in the 
agricultural sector and in traditional crafts. In the post- socialist period, 
when the labour market has been re- oriented towards business and job 
seekers have been pushed from the public to the private sector, rad na 
crno serves to accommodate surplus labour and ‘hidden unemployment’. 
One of the new practices associated with rad na crno in this period is 
wages ‘in hand’. This involves an oral agreement reached between a pri-
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formally, ‘on the books’, and that part will be paid in cash and will not be 
officially recorded. Such an arrangement allows enterprises to misreport 
how much they have spent on wages and thereby reduces their social tax 
payments and mandatory contributions to the state pension and health 
funds; it also enables them to pay workers a certain sum of tax- free 
income over and above the minimum wage. Other common forms of rad 
na crno include paid household work (cleaning, cooking, looking after 
children or the elderly), street vending, the sale of goods on green or flea 
markets, private tutoring, small repairs and other forms of moonlighting 
(Alter Chen 2006; Radović- Marković 2007; Schneider 2012).
The role of rad na crno practices may be interpreted in different 
ways. According to one interpretation, it is a way to cope with unem-
ployment and supplement the household budget. Another interpretation 
focuses on the state budget. While these practices directly contribute to 
an increase in employment and personal consumption, they do not have 
an effect on collective consumption.
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) recognises two forms 
of informal employment (Hussmanns 2004; ILO 2013). The first is enter-
prise- based, such as paying workers in cash as described above, but also 
including the operations of those enterprises and employees who are not 
registered with the official authorities. The second is a broader, job- based 
concept. Given that an employee may have more than one formal and/ or 
informal job, this concept comprises informal jobs in formal sector enter-
prises, in informal sector enterprises, or in households. Research on rad 
na crno is usually based on surveys that cover respondents’ participation 
records, scaled up to reflect the population as a whole and with economic 
effects estimated on the basis of expert assessments. The most important 
effects of rad na crno are the under- reporting of gross domestic prod-
uct and the loss of tax revenue from under- reported economic activity, 
meaning that the whole society loses out.
In post- socialist Serbia, rad na crno practices have increasingly 
come to be associated with corruption. Nowadays, it is often necessary 
to pay in order to get either a formal or informal job; one must also give 
a kickback to the ‘right person’, or exploit one’s personal connections 
in order to secure employment for one’s relations. Pursuing one’s eco-
nomic interests individually, through informal and illegal payments or 
as part of ‘informal groups’, is symbiotic with systemic corruption and 
organised crime (Ekonomska enciklopedija 1984–1986: 1154). In such 
circumstances, the capacity for elites to reinvent themselves is limited 
and reforms of formal institutions remain ineffective, while the burden 























5.25 Small- scale smuggling (general)
Bettina Bruns
Leibniz Institute for regional Geography, Germany
Small- scale smuggling is a fairly universal practice associated with bend-
ing the rules on the passage of goods through the borders between coun-
tries. In the majority of cases it is an illegal economic practice aimed 
at income generation, made possible by permeable, or porous, bor-
ders; price differential between countries; or unequal supply of goods. 
Ordinarily, small- scale smugglers exploit the loopholes in regulations; 
navigate the ineffective enforcement of these regulations; or risk carry-
ing more goods than allowed across a border without declaring them. 
They either sell these goods at a small profit or keep them for their own 
use. In short: they use the border as a resource. The practice is a case of 
the enabling power of constraints.
Etymologically, ‘smuggling’ stems from the Germanic word smeug 
or smugan, which means ‘to lurk secretly and spitefully’ (Kluge 1960: 
667), and from the Danish smug, which means ‘secretly’, ‘hidden’ 
(Schomburg 1992: 6). It originated during the 1660s in the North Sea 
region, from the Low German smuggeln or Dutch smokkelen, which origi-
nally meant something like ‘to sneak’ or perhaps literally ‘to slip’ (smug-
gled goods through), as well as ‘to creep’ and ‘to move in a ducked way’ 
(Pfeifer 1993). It is also connected with the German word schmiegen, 
which means ‘to nuzzle’: ‘Smuggling comes from nestling. One nestles 
up against the circumstances’ (Finckh 1943: 8, own translation). Thus, 
originally smuggling was associated with ‘hiding’, with getting around 
customs rules and reacting to external conditions. This significance also 
holds true in completely differently rooted languages: the Swahili chora 
chora, which refers to smuggling also means ‘to flee’, ‘to by- pass’ and ‘to 
hide’ (Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo 2012: 100). In contrast to this 
rather cultural linguistic development, the Russian translation of smug-
gling is simply provozit’ kontrabandoi (literally ‘to transport contraband’), 
which focuses on the illegality of the practice: the term originates from 
the Latin contra bannum: against the ban.
Small- scale smuggling is rather a technical term used in print and 
science (see, for example, Wallace et al. 1999; Wagner and Łukowski 
2010; Archer and Ràcz 2012), but usually not by the smugglers them-
selves. People carrying out this informal practice are rather reluctant 
to define their activities so clearly, as this might be potentially harmful 
for their business (see Stammler- Gossmann 2012: 239). They prefer to 
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on where, what and how they perform it. One example is the use of the 
word mrówki (English: ants) in Poland, which focuses on the smugglers’ 
arduous frequency (up to several times a day) of crossing the border to 
import a small amount of goods each time. Mrówki might even transport 
goods in a legal way across the border, provided that the quantity of their 
merchandise does not exceed the allowed norm. Russian traders who 
regularly cross the border to Finland to make a profit on selling goods 
and providing tourist services such as transportation, advice on visas 
and other information, refer to themselves as ‘carriers’ (perevozchiki, 
Stammler- Gossmann 2012: 240), avoiding completely any potential ille-
gality and/ or informality in the description of their activities.
Formally, small- scale smuggling differs from small- scale trade in 
respect of legality: ‘Traditionally, “trade” is the legal and “smuggling” is 
the illegal means of moving items from one side of the border to the other’ 
(Thuen 1999: 741). However, in practice legality and illegality in small- 
scale smuggling cannot be separated quite so neatly. On the one hand, 
parts of the activity may be perfectly legal: purchasing the goods, paying 
Figure 5.25.1 An informal market in front of a railway station close to 











for the transportation across the border and for the visa to enter another 
country. On the other hand, illegal elements of the smuggling activity 
involve bending the rules such as non- declaration of all the goods, brib-
ing customs officials, or subsequently selling the goods at a local market 
without a licence. Circumventing official rules while observing formal 
procedures is expressed in a motto circulating among smugglers:  ‘Do 
not violate the law, but know the ways to avoid it’ (Stammler- Gossmann 
2012: 241). It is also an indication of the ambivalent nature of the prac-
tice: neither wholly legal nor illegal.
The practice of small- scale smuggling also has a normative ambiv-
alence, inasmuch as its illegal elements are not always perceived as ille-
gitimate or morally reprehensible. In countries with high excise duties 
on alcohol and cigarettes, small- scale smuggling of such goods is often 
seen as justified in the face of ‘unfair’ taxes, especially if the goods are 
only intended for personal use. In cases of high unemployment and pov-
erty levels, small- scale smuggling is frequently regarded as a survival 
strategy, viewed as entrepreneurial by individuals and as legitimate by 
the wider population. Even the local authorities, including police, can 
be the conniving parties out of necessity. The legitimacy of smuggling, 
however partial, is the reverse side of the state’s failure to improve eco-
nomic conditions and to provide employment for its population. The 
lack of opportunities for legitimate income creates a justification for 
alternative income. Although the government is not likely to admit the 
acceptance of small- scale smuggling, it often enjoys greater tolerance 
than smuggling on a larger scale or by organised crime. Thus, at least 
two levels of smuggling have to be differentiated: ‘Commercial smug-
gling involves the transportation of large quantities to be sold for profit 
… [while] petty smuggling applies to individual people crossing a bor-
der to purchase goods at a cheaper price’ (Deflem and Henry- Turner 
2001: 473). The first one is associated with profits, the second with 
survival.
In the socialist period, small- scale smuggling was a popular 
means for the population in many countries to cope with ongoing sup-
ply shortages. Schleichhandel across the GDR- Polish border was a reac-
tion to the all- encompassing economy of shortage under socialism 
(Logemann 2012). The practice of petty smuggling carried out on trains 
from Vojvodina in Serbia to Hungary and Romania (šverc) was rooted 
in the economic crisis of the 1980s (Archer and Rácz 2012: 62). In the 
post- socialist period, small- scale smuggling has compensated for eco-
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Polish- Russian border indicate that small- scale smuggling plays very 
diverse roles in individual households (Bruns 2010). The economic func-
tion of smuggling is defined by the degree of the financial dependence on 
the activity: when smuggling is the only source of income, the household 
is totally reliant on it. Therefore, smuggling is carried out on a regular 
basis and in a professional fashion, in the sense that the gains are used for 
further investment in smuggling equipment and the structure of daily life 
is organised around smuggling activity. In other households, smuggling 
is combined with other sources of income, such as formal employment or 
social benefits (these are normally very low and insufficient to live on). 
In such cases, smuggling is also regular and constitutes an essential addi-
tion to the household’s income, but it is the formal employment schedule 
that determines possible time slots for smuggling. It can be difficult to fit 
smuggling into the weekly routine, because the waiting times at border 
crossing points are often unpredictable. The most rare and adventurous 
scenario involves profit- oriented smuggling. In this case the household 
has a good standard of living guaranteed from other sources, for exam-
ple, in the form of pensions or parental contributions, but the income 
from smuggling funds additional consumption, such as lifestyle con-
sumer goods and/ or leisure activities.
Economic necessity aside, small- scale smuggling contains one fur-
ther very important function for individuals carrying it out:  it replaces 
not only the economic, but also social aspects of formal employment. ‘I 
go out normally every day, just as I would go to work’ is how one smug-
gler put it. Small- scale smuggling structures daily life, providing social 
contact as well as filling the day with activity.
Although smuggling has a short- term positive impact on the eco-
nomic situation for individuals and the regional economy, these pre-
carious activities cannot be relied upon for sustainable development in 
the long term, whether micro- or meso- level. People involved in small- 
scale smuggling do not enjoy any social security and insurance benefits, 
thereby creating the danger of massive poverty among the elderly. This in 
turn will be very expensive for local authorities to deal with.
Small- scale smuggling is widespread in all central European post- 
socialist countries, but also prevalent in other parts of the world, such as 
at the Afghan- Iranian, Mexican- Belize and Rwandan- Congolese borders. 
Smuggling of gold bullion from Peru to Bolivia is a widespread practice, 
with smugglers using special clothing such as ‘long, purpose- built verti-
cal pockets in a bulbous down- filled coat’ designed exclusively for smug-

















cigarette smuggling across the Polish- Ukrainian border to smuggling 
household commodities from Russia to Finland and trafficking of wal-
nuts from Azerbaijan into Georgia.
Due to its ambivalent nature and functional relevance for survival, 
small- scale smuggling is a sensitive research topic (Lee 1993). In order 
to collect data, a relationship of trust between researcher and smuggler 
should be established. This needs time, long- term ethnographic field-
work and a mixture of methods such as participant observation and in- 
depth interviews.
5.26 Chelnoki (russia and fsU)
anna Cies’lewska
research Unit of Iranian studies, Institute of oriental studies  
of the Jagiellonian University, krakow, Poland
Chelnok (pl. chelnoki) is a colloquial Russian term used to describe a 
trader involved in shuttle trade in regions of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and in Eastern Europe. The term chelnok literally means a shut-
tle that is moved from one edge of a loom to the other in the process 
of weaving. The activities of shuttle traders are similarly associated with 
constant movement – travelling from a point of purchase to a point of 
sale of goods. In Polish, two equivalent terms are used: ‘tourist- trader’ –  
handlarz- turysta, or ‘anti- trader’ – handlarz- mrówka. Similar practices 
across the world are associated with unstable labour markets and occupy 
a semi- informal sphere of business (see small- scale smuggling, 5.25 in 
this volume). Petty trans- border traders are referred to as ‘ants of glo-
balisation’, ‘the new nomads of underground economy’ such as sacoleiros 
in Brazil, or African mobile phone buyers in Hongkong and Guangzou 
(Telles di Silva 2012: 90).
Chelnoki has its origins in the phenomenon of meshochnik(i) – 
speculator(s), the vendors engaged in the prohibited trade of food during 
the Russian Civil War (the period after the 1917 Russian Revolution until 
1922). The term meshochniki is derived from the sack (meshok), in which 
people transported goods. During the period of the Civil War, the Soviet 
regime banned private trade. Famine in the cities forced the Soviet gov-
ernment to develop a system of rationing, whereby food was distributed 
to those in possession of ration cards. In consequence, surplus food in 
rural areas was smuggled from the villages to the cities. Food was bought 
from farmers or exchanged for valuable goods and frequently ended up 
at the cities’ black market (Davydov 2007). Under Soviet criminal law, 
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profit – was defined as ‘one of the most dangerous economic crimes 
which affects the normal functioning of Soviet trade and genuine inter-
ests of buyers’ (Kaiser 1997). Traders were persecuted as ‘speculators’.
Under the Soviet command economy, food and consumables were 
in short supply and foreign trade was controlled as part of the state 
planning system. Nevertheless, everything from fashionable clothes 
to imported electronic goods (in the latter period) could be accessed 
through blat (Ledeneva 1998), informal contacts or on the black market. 
In time, black market traders, specialising in imported goods, became 
known as fartsovshchik(i) (Kaiser 1997) (see baraholka, 5.35 in this 
volume).
After 1988, restrictions on trade became less severe and the number 
of trading agencies sharply increased. Nevertheless, the majority were 
state agencies that concentrated on exporting goods produced in the 
USSR and focused little on importing consumer products. Consequently, 
when the economy opened up at the beginning of the 1990s the official 
retail trade sector was not ready to import goods. By the mid- 1990s the 
number of foreign trade outlets reached 20,000 (IMF 1998: 9, 10).
Concurrently, the labour market in post- communist Russia was col-
lapsing. Shrinking domestic production triggered an increase in informal 
activities. The transitional period, associated with porous borders, as well 
as non- existent regulations for export and import, allowed for relatively 
free movement of people and goods. The shortages in foods and diversity 
of provisions in different regions made it profitable to buy certain goods 
in one country and to sell them in another, thanks to significant discrep-
ancies in prices between the countries of the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. For example, traders brought a variety of domestic and 
hardware goods to Poland (mostly from the territory of the former Soviet 
republics) and on their return journeys purchased textiles, electronic 
equipment and other goods, which were in demand in their home mar-
kets (Esim 2002: 8; Ozcan 2006; Cieślewska 2014: 126). Chelnoki also 
travelled from regions of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
to China, India, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, Syria, 
Thailand, Turkey and Central Europe in order to buy goods destined for 
the domestic market. In the 1990s, chelnoki business was associated with 
those travelling with big suitcases full of consumer goods, containing in 
the main, food products, textiles, clothes and household goods (Esim 
2002: 8). Small tour companies organising ‘tourist excursions’ flourished 
at this time. Although officially, such trips were targeted at tourists, the 





















According to some estimates, chelnoki trade provided employ-
ment for up to 30 million traders in the mid- 1990s. It is thought that 
the majority of chelnoki are women, for whom bazaars became the only 
source of employment during the turbulent years of transition (Taraban 
2002; Abazov 2009: 27– 9). A popular myth reinforces the notion that 
women are more skilful at trading than men. Men involved in chelnoki 
trade are often related to the female traders, and play a significant role in 
helping to develop business and in protecting the women from a variety 
of dangers such as intimidation by strangers or sexual abuse. A typical 
chelnok trader operated though a personal network, involving flexible 
distribution of responsibilities. Members of the network of family and 
friends might be involved in a range of activities from the transportation 
of goods across borders, to selling the products at market and distribut-
ing goods among the group. Another form of assistance included provid-
ing relevant personal contacts and advice (Slonimski et al. 2012: 174). 
Traditionally, chelnoki are especially widespread in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, but their overall number is declining (Avtokratov 2001; 
Abazov 2009: 27– 9; Cieślewska 2014: 126).
Figure 5.26.1 Chelnoki. Margaret Morton©OmbraLuceLLC_ 2006.
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Over time, some of the chelnoki trade has transformed into profit-
able business. Traders still travel, but the scale of trade and their purchas-
ing power has increased. Many former chelnoki became retail suppliers 
to wholesale outlets. Others continue to travel abroad to buy a variety 
of goods for their own stalls in the markets; but in the majority of cases, 
they send the purchased goods through intermediaries, thus they are 
required only to supervise their delivery. At the outset of the post- com-
munist transition, chelnoki trade suffered from unstable economic condi-
tions, racketeering and operated in a high- risk environment. A so- called 
‘protection fee’ was often extorted from shuttle traders and collected on 
a regular basis. Typically a particular gang or criminal entity controlled 
each bazaar. Traders were forced to pay up to 30 per cent of their prof-
its to racketeers. Theft of the chelnoki’s possessions occurred on a daily 
basis, either as punishment for those who had not paid their dues or as 
a warning to others. Further financial exploitation was experienced by 
chelnoki at the hands of customs officers at the cross- borders control 
points, by transport police and other officials keen to benefit from the 
earnings of traders who were readily identifiable. Officials continue to 
seek personal gain from the chelnoki trade to this day (Cieślewska 2014: 
126; see also Avtokratov 2001).
A number of monuments commemorate chelnoki trade. In July 
2009, a monument to chelnoki was erected in Yekaterinburg, near the 
main entrance to the largest market in the Urals, Taganskii riad (Lenta.ru 
2009). Another shuttle trader monument was constructed in Manzhouli, 
on the border between Russia and China. The sculptures, dedicated 
to chelnoki entrepreneurs of the 1990s were erected in the centres of 
Belgorod in November 2007 and in Blagovshchensk and Sloviansk in 
Ukraine (Polsergmich.blogspot 2012).
A documentary entitled Chelnoki: A School of Survival (Chelnoki. 
Shkola vyzhivaniia), released in Russia in 2011, showed the reality of chel-
noki business in the first years following the fall of the Soviet Union, dur-
ing the period of transformation. Another documentary, Jarmark Europa, 
by Minze Tummescheit was produced in 2004. It depicts Warsaw’s 
Dziesieciolecia Stadium, one of Eastern Europe’s largest bazaars, and a cen-
tre of the trans- border trade between the early 1990s and 2007. The book 
Wielkie Bazary Warszawskie (Warsaw’s Big Bazaars) describes the ‘life’ of 
two bazaars in Warsaw: Jarmark Europa and Różyckiego and includes the 
life stories of the traders, their clients and the policemen who controlled 
the bazaars (Kurczewski et al. 2010). Overall, chelnoki trade became a 
symbol of the rapid changes of the 1990s, a period of uneven transforma-




















5.27 Spaza shops (south africa)
Vanya Gastrow
african Centre for Migration and society, University of the 
Witwatersrand, south africa
In South Africa, a spaza shop is a small informal grocery shop operated 
from residential premises in townships. The term spaza lacks clear etymo-
logical roots (Spiegel 2005: 192). One view is that it originates from the 
Zulu word isiphazamiso or the Xhosa word isiphazamisa, both meaning 
something that causes a disturbance or hindrance (Spiegel 2005: 195). 
This interpretation supports the common belief that spaza shops first 
emerged during boycotts of white businesses in South Africa in the late 
1970s and garnered the name spaza because they were seen as enabling 
the disturbance of apartheid and white- dominated institutions. Yet, as 
early as the 1960s spaza was also understood to mean cheap, fake and 
imitation, or to tease and fool around (Spiegel 2005: 196– 7, 202) indi-
cating several different and contrasting etymological roots.
Today the term spaza shop (or just spaza) is used throughout South 
Africa to refer to informal grocery shops operated from houses in town-
ships (i.e. areas formerly classified as ‘black’ by the apartheid govern-
ment). These shops supply basic household items such as food, soft drinks 
and toiletries to nearby residents. Spaza shops are located in large cities 
as well as in small rural towns across the country and vary in size and 
form. Traders operate shops from converted garages, shipping containers 
placed in front yards, corrugated iron structures attached to houses, and 
from houses themselves. Some shops comprise small rooms where shop-
keepers serve customers through a window, while other shops resemble 
small supermarkets where customers can walk in and select goods.
Spaza shops are considered informal as they tend not to be reg-
istered with state authorities. This does not necessarily mean that 
shops operate illegally. While legal frameworks differ from municipal-
ity to municipality, generally very few laws regulate spaza shops. For 
instance, until recently there was no requirement for businesses earning 
below the tax threshold to register with South Africa’s revenue service 
(Charalambou 2010). Not all municipalities require spaza shops to pos-
sess trading licences or permits. While a number of spaza shops trade in 
illicit cigarettes, most of their goods are legal items purchased from for-
mal wholesalers. Furthermore, many township zoning schemes permit 
the operation of businesses from residential properties on condition that 
the dominant use of the property remains residential and the business 
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meant that spaza shops are relatively easy to set up and operate. Yet at 
the same time they have resulted in state authorities possessing very little 
information about or control over spaza shop activities.
In recent years South African spaza shopkeepers have faced increas-
ing business competition from large formal supermarket chains, as well 
as spaza shops that are operated by foreign migrants originating from 
countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Burundi and China. Large 
supermarket chains were historically based in distant central business 
districts, and were not easily accessible for township consumers. This 
benefitted spaza shopkeepers, whose businesses were located closer to 
where township residents lived. However, over the past few years super-
market chains have increasingly penetrated township grocery markets, 
offering low prices and wide product ranges within closer reach of where 
township residents live. This poses a challenge to smaller spaza shops, 
many of which can no longer rely solely on geographical convenience to 
remain competitive.
Foreign migrant traders began to enter the spaza market from the 
mid- 1990s. While some foreign migrants reside illegally in the country, 
others are documented asylum seekers or refugees and thus are entitled 
to work in South Africa. They access township premises by renting shops 
from South African landlords, who were often previously spaza shop-
keepers themselves. Foreign migrant spaza shopkeepers characteristi-
cally sleep on beds or mattresses in their shops, or in rooms behind their 
shops to save income on rent as well as to guard their shop’s contents. 
Their arrival has introduced new competitive trading practices into the 
spaza market. For example, foreign migrant spaza shopkeepers invest 
great efforts in sourcing low prices for their goods, place low mark- ups 
on them, and offer enhanced customer services (such as credit, longer 
operating hours, bulk ‘hampers’ sold at discounted prices and flexible 
quantities such as small pouches of sugar or single eggs (Gastrow and 
Amit 2013: 26)). They also collaborate by sharing transport costs and 
jointly investing in new shops. These competitive practices contrast with 
those of many South African spaza shops, which tend to be more ‘surviv-
alist’ than opportunity driven (Charman et al. 2012).
Increased supermarket and foreign migrant spaza shop competition 
in townships has seen a corresponding decline in South African spaza 
shops (Charman et  al. 2012). This phenomenon has had widespread 
political, social and economic implications for the country. In particu-
lar it has ignited anger among many South African spaza shopkeepers 
who resent having to compete against foreign nationals and allege that 











hostilities have often spilt over into violence, with some foreign migrant 
spaza shopkeepers falling victim to orchestrated murders and arson 
attacks (Gastrow and Amit 2012:  35). Many township residents also 
view foreign migrant spaza shopkeepers as depriving them of economic 
opportunities and have engaged in frequent xenophobic lootings of for-
eign migrant shops, as occurred in Soweto in January 2015 (Essa 2015).
These attacks have garnered extensive negative publicity for South 
Africa, which since 1994 has enjoyed a worldwide reputation for com-
batting discrimination and embracing diversity. In response to violence 
and political lobbying by South African shopkeepers, the South African 
government has generated new policy proposals aimed at regulating for-
eign migrant spaza businesses. These include considering placing lim-
its on the ability of foreign nationals to trade (Department of Trade and 
Industry 2013a: 20– 1), and requiring all businesses in the country to reg-
ister with local authorities (Department of Trade and Industry 2013b). In 
June 2015 South Africa’s Competition Commission launched an enquiry 
into the business practices of foreign migrant spaza shops in South Africa 
(Competition Commission 2015) to assess their impact on South Africa’s 
grocery sector.
Figure 5.27.1 Spaza shop in the town of Velddrif, Western Cape 
Province, South Africa.
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There is still much to learn about the scale and nature of the spaza 
market in South Africa. Research methods used thus far include locational 
mapping (Charman et al. 2012), surveys (Hikam 2011) and qualitative 
interviews (Gastrow and Amit 2013). Challenges faced in measuring the 
market include the lack of official data, the frequent relocation of for-
eign migrant spaza shopkeepers, the context of fear and violence, as well 
as privacy concerns relating to the disclosure of personal income levels 
and shops’ legal compliance. Because spaza shops vary in size, ownership 
and business methods, attempts to measure their activities should ideally 
combine qualitative and quantitative approaches.
In endeavouring to resolve conflict in the spaza market, state 
authorities have had to try and balance diverse and conflicting concerns. 
These include the interests of South African consumers and landlords, 
the country’s obligations towards asylum seekers and refugees, the eco-
nomic interests of South African spaza retailers, and popular fears over 
restricted economic opportunities. The lack of detailed information 
about the market makes the resolution of competing interests in the spaza 
market more difficult. It also hinders the state’s ability to collect tax and 
ensure compliance with health and safety standards. At the same time, 
low levels of state regulation enable traders with relatively little educa-
tion and financial resources to set up businesses for themselves, and also 
contributes to the spread of ownership and competition in South Africa’s 
grocery sector.
5.28 Shebeens (south africa)
nicolette Peters
the University of the Western Cape, south africa
Informal alcohol outlets commonly known as shebeens operate in South 
Africa’s townships. The Oxford Dictionary defines shebeen as, ‘an unli-
censed establishment or private house selling alcohol and typically 
regarded as slightly disreputable’ (Oxford Dictionary 2015). The word 
shebeen was coined in the late eighteenth century from the Anglo- Irish 
síbín, from séibe, mugful (Oxford Dictionary 2015). It was commonly used 
in Ireland and Scotland as well as South Africa. Currently shebeens are 
the most widespread enterprise in South African townships; the Western 
Cape is estimated to have 25,000 unlawful shebeens and 152,500 people 
working in shebeens (Barnes 2012).
Shebeens sell legally manufactured alcohol, but in an illegal fashion 
(i.e. without a licence). There is no economic incentive for them to sell 


















Indeed, South African Breweries (SAB), which dominates the South 
African beer market with a market share of 95 per cent, actively supports 
shebeens and in turn is dependent on them – over 82 per cent of SAB beer 
is sold in shebeens (Tsoeu 2009: ii).
In 1902 licences were introduced for traditional beer sellers in 
South Africa, which led to the growth of shebeens (La Hausse 1992: 89). 
During the colonial and apartheid eras, the manufacture, distribution, 
sale and use of alcohol were regulated by the Liquor Act 30 of 1928 and 
the Native (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 (Cameron 1999: 14). These 
statutes prohibited the supply and delivery to, or possession of, alco-
hol by ‘non- whites’. Only white people could trade liquor; black people 
could only drink at beer halls introduced in 1908, established to fund 
the improvement of black areas, though the profits were in fact not used 
for this purpose (Freeman and Parry 2006: 4– 5). In addition, Singer 
claims that the regime ensured that alcohol was more easily obtained by 
Indians and ‘coloureds’ than by black Africans. These racial restrictions 
on alcohol forced black people to enter the illegal alcohol industry, and 
consequently led to the growth of shebeens as an act of resistance to the 
apartheid- era exclusion (Singer 2003: 2).
Despite the legal restrictions, black women brewed and sold tradi-
tional beer, and rural women played a significant part in creating urban 
shebeens (La Hausse 1992:  86). The beer industry was unique in that 
it was mostly controlled by black women, known as ‘shebeen queens’. 
Shebeen queens gained prominence in a political context due to their 
key role in the Cato Manor Beerhall Riots of 1959 and the killing of nine 
policemen in riots seven months later. However, shebeen queens were 
mostly apolitical and simply sought to earn a livelihood: their opposition 
to the municipal beer halls (symbols of the apartheid government) was 
motivated by the need to protect their own revenue (Edwards 1988: 75– 
6, 95). Shebeen queens were not always the owners of the shebeen: some 
shebeen queens managed shebeens for men. Shebeen queens used their 
femininity and that of their female workers to encourage patrons into 
purchasing alcohol (Tsoeu 2009: 127).
According to Hernando De Soto, the law on shebeens restricted eco-
nomic growth under apartheid by limiting informal businesses (quoted in 
Marquez 1990: 209). Shebeens could have been legalised had the barriers 
to entering the formal economy been lifted, which could have enhanced 
economic growth and employment. Likewise, lifting barriers to entering 
the legal alcohol trade in the post- apartheid era could lead to economic 
development, but since 2010 moral and public health arguments have 
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The views of the African National Congress (ANC, the ruling party 
since 1994) and the Democratic Alliance (the official opposition party) 
illustrate the existing tensions regarding shebeens. The ‘moral regenera-
tion movement’ originated in the 1997 meeting between Nelson Mandela 
and key South African religious leaders, followed by the 1998 ‘moral 
summit’, where Mandela spoke on the moral agenda for the regenera-
tion campaign. The central problem discussed was crime (Rauch 2005: 
16), without much focus on shebeens. However, the moral regeneration 
movement has subsequently advocated a stricter alcohol policy. While 
not explicitly criticising shebeens, the movement has called for the law to 
ensure that premises selling alcohol are not set too close to one another, 
and that new licences should not be awarded in communities where this 
is already the case (Mdhladhla 2012: 5). These recommendations would 
impact shebeeners, especially those in poorer areas where the proximity 
of shebeens is common. Similarly, the Democratic Alliance (DA) calls for 
more regulation of shebeens on its website, under the titles such as: ‘DA 
welcomes proposed clampdown on illegal shebeens’. Media reports and 
the DA’s rhetoric suggest that a moralistic framework has influenced the 
party’s views on both alcohol and shebeens.
Since 2009 the ruling ANC has also come to adopt a tougher stance 
towards shebeens. The ANC youth league has called for a crackdown on 
illegal shebeens and a ban on all alcohol advertising. In 2011, the party 
chief whip, Mathole Motshekga, stated that abuse of alcohol and drugs 
has led to moral deterioration in South Africa. Motshekga reported that a 
group of women from the Cape Flats townships complained that shebeens 
were selling liquor to school children on a daily basis (Motshega 2011: 
1– 2). In 2012, the Minister of Social Development, Bathabile Dlamini, 
launched an anti- alcohol campaign with the theme: ‘Towards an alcohol 
and drug abuse free South Africa – take a stand’. In addition, the 2011 
‘substance abuse summit’ saw Dlamini and other participants calling for 
restrictions on liquor marketing and the re- examination of licence fees 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012: 40). Thus, both major parties 
express great concern about the harm caused by alcohol in South Africa. 
The availability of alcohol via informal outlets has certainly made it easy 
for people to access it; however, because shebeens are informal busi-
nesses, there is no direct way to measure to what extent shebeens contrib-
ute to alcohol- related problems.
The term shebeen is used to refer to similar establishments in sev-
eral other southern African countries, namely Botswana, Zambia and 
Tanzania. Shebeens and other forms of trading in illegal alcohol continue 











the few accessible forms of employment for poor people (see hoyos or 
hoyo in Mexico). In South Africa today there are legal shebeens that oper-
ate. Legal shebeens are run from residential homes and possess the nec-
essary alcohol trading licence to make the business legal. These include 
shebeens that converted to legal operation after the end of apartheid. 
Nonetheless, unlicensed shebeens continue to operate in South Africa 
today and constitute illegal, informal businesses. Shebeens continue to 
operate because of South Africa’s high unemployment rate. Poor people 
have chosen to operate illegal businesses to provide for themselves and 
their families. Shebeens are usually run by black or coloured women who 
are minimally or entirely uneducated. Shebeening is perceived as the only 
way they can provide for their families, and the establishments are there-
fore largely tolerated by local communities. The widespread practices 
of using or running shebeens continues to be under- researched, as she-
beeners are usually reluctant to participate in research due to the illegal 




In Russia and regions of the former Soviet Union, samogonovarenie is 
the illegal process of distilling homemade spirits, or samogon. The word 
samogon is derived from the Russian verb gnat’ (‘to chase, drive out, dis-
til’) with the prefix samo- , or ‘self’. As a form of homemade hard alcohol, 
samogon is similar to homebrew, ‘bathtub gin’, or moonshine whiskey in 
American Appalachia, but it has a far longer history both as an intoxicat-
ing beverage and facilitator of informal exchange.
Often mistaken as simply homemade 80- proof vodka, samogon can 
vary significantly in terms of strength, flavour and ingredients. Unlike 
American moonshine, which is typically distilled from corn mash, Russian 
samogon can be distilled from grains, corn, potatoes, beetroot, fruits, 
honey or other ingredients at hand, occasionally achieving a strength of 
up to 160 proof. Similar to American moonshining, samogonovarenie is 
an illegal practice that is often conducted away from the prying eyes of 
the state and law enforcement, while the revenues gained from the sales 
of such untaxed and unregulated products often contribute to the cor-
ruption of those same organs.
The origins of samogonovarenie are contested, but date from 
the era of the Russian empire. Some suggest that it was the inevitable 

















alcohol, established under Ivan the Terrible in the mid- sixteenth century. 
Samogonovarenie tends to flourish in the vast expanses of rural Russia, 
especially during times of economic hardship.
Samogon is integral to the Russian system of mutual assistance, con-
nections, and favours used to cope with economic hardship, known as blat 
(see 6.2 in this volume). Unlike cold and impersonal exchanges embodied 
in ‘bribery’ or ‘corruption’, blat exudes the warm solidarity of a commu-
nity struggling through hard times together. A useful illustration of the 
roots of this traditional peasant hospitality is the practice of pomoch’, or 
‘help’ (see pomochi, 5.13 in this volume). Since the Orthodox priest in a 
Russian village could only derive income from nominal fees for adminis-
tering sacraments, they relied on the collaboration of local parishioners. 
‘Pomoch’ is inconceivable without vodka’, wrote nineteenth- century par-
ish priest Ioann Belliustin. ‘The work begins with vodka; it continues with 
vodka; it ends with vodka’ (Belliustin 1985: 129– 30). Since priests had 
little money to begin with, they often had to resort to samogonovarenie.
Despite a complete prohibition against vodka and draconian penalties 
for homebrewing under Vladimir Lenin and the Bol’sheviks, their ideologi-
cal outlet Pravda reported ‘an ocean of home brew’, as entire villages essen-
tially became spirit- distilling cooperatives. In Tomsk, prosecutors were so 
overwhelmed with illegal distillation cases, they simply gave up. Even in 
the shadow of the Kremlin anyone could buy samogon by simply ‘requesting 
“lemonade” and winking at the salesman meaningfully’ (Schrad 2014: 210).
Yet the flood of samogon was not just about quenching a thirst for 
alcohol; it also provided a vital medium of exchange at a time when the 
ruble was virtually worthless. An official Soviet delegation to the country-
side in 1923 concluded: ‘A peasant needs samogon or vodka, it does not 
matter which. For example, if one needs to build a house, one can never 
find workers; but if there is vodka or samogon, you treat the neighbors to 
it, and the house is soon ready’ (quoted in Transchel 2006: 76). Samogon 
was well placed to serve as a medium of exchange: if peasants could not 
get adequate value for their grain, they distilled it. Samogon did not spoil, 
and was more easy to transport (or conceal from requisitioners) than piles 
of grain, and it could more easily be traded, divided and consumed by 
end users. Most importantly, since homemade alcohol could be sold for 
more than artificially low grain prices, it evened out the terms of trade 
between manufactured goods from the cities and agricultural produce 
from the villages. Consequently, every time agricultural and industrial 
prices diverged – as with the ‘scissors crises’ of the 1920s – the Russian 
countryside would be awash with illegal alcohol, even as foodstuffs disap-





















Vodka and samogon also greased the wheels of the Soviet admin-
istrative- command economy, as Soviet enterprises employed well- con-
nected supply officers – tolkachi – who could find the scarce materials 
necessary for their firms to fulfil their production quotas, often for the 
cost of a few bottles or cases of vodka (Simis 1982). Living on fixed 
budgets, pensioners in the countryside often turned to samogonovarenie 
in  order  to obtain pomoch’ from nearby collective farmers (Gerasyuk 
1984: 4).
The very first reform initiated under Mikhail Gorbachev upon 
his ascension to the post of General Secretary was a public health and 
labour- discipline campaign against alcoholism in the Soviet Union. While 
drastic restrictions on the availability of vodka produced tremendous 
and immediate benefits to health and demographic indicators, Soviets 
soon turned to samogonovarenie to pick up the slack. As home brewing 
increased, poisonings from samogon and other surrogates increased. By 
1988 the failed reforms were withdrawn, tainting Gorbachev’s other 
reforms of perestroika and glasnost’ with a public cynicism that was dif-
ficult to overcome, while the loss of state vodka revenues to the ‘home 
brewers’ (samogonshchiki) exacerbated the economic crisis, and collapse 
of the Soviet ruble, and ultimately the Soviet state.
Samogonovarenie and barter exchange rise in tandem during times 
of extreme economic crisis, such as the post- Soviet economic collapse. 
‘You can buy anything for a bottle, they don’t know any other price’, 
explained a newcomer to Orel region in the 1990s (Pilkington 1998: 
170). Even in the capitals of Moscow and St Petersburg, pensioners 
openly sold samogon on the streets just to make ends meet.
Many inefficient Soviet firms that should have gone bankrupt in 
a pure market economy of the 1990s stayed afloat thanks to samogo-
novarenie and non- monetary barter transactions. Some factories even 
started up their own self- distilling operations to produce the liquor nec-
essary for their tolkachi to swap for much- needed raw materials and 
supplies. Alcohol was also necessary to buy off good relations with high- 
level officials: firms employed government- relations specialists known 
colloquially as pechenochniki – literally, ‘those with liver problems’ – 
based on the copious amounts of alcohol they had to drink to secure 
government favours (Schrad 2014: 319). For a time, the Kremlin even 
accepted in- kind payments of alcohol for tax bills – which the Ministry 
of Agriculture then used to pay subsidies to collective farmers (before 
a wave of alcohol poisonings ended the experiment). Throughout the 





















pivotal links in extensive barter chains that maintained Russia’s so- 
called ‘virtual economy’ (Humphrey 2000). In more recent years, as the 
Russian economy has strengthened and beverage markets have diver-
sified, the traditional samogonovarenie of necessity has been joined by 
hobbyists making craft and artisanal samogon, similar to the micro- 
brewing boom in the West.
Estimating the pervasiveness of samogonovarenie can be a difficult 
task, as it can take on a variety of forms, from individual pensioners dis-
tilling a few bottles to entire factories manufacturing their own illicit 
alcohol. The difficulties are compounded in historical eras where poten-
tially telling statistics on crime or even alcohol consumption are either not 
available or not published, as during the years under Nikita Khrushchev 
and Leonid Brezhnev. However, in the 1970s, Duke University economist 
Vladimir Treml began to construct estimates of samogon based upon 
available data. Treml’s method involved accounting for urban– rural pop-
ulation differences (as samogonovarenie was primarily a rural phenom-
enon), estimating how much alcohol constituted the ‘other foodstuffs’ 
category in official Soviet statistical digests, then double- checking the 
model against regional indicators of consumption of primary samogon 
ingredients – sugar, flour, potatoes, sugar beets, etc. The data produced 
suggested that from the 1950s to the early 1980s, the illegal produc-
tion of samogon added roughly 30 per cent to official alcohol production 
figures (Treml 1982). Treml’s rigorous estimates were corroborated by 
Soviet statisticians, anecdotal evidence, interviews with Russian experts 
and even defectors from Soviet officialdom, and today are cited widely 
in Russia as more accurate than Soviet government statistics. Treml and 
others have stated that samogon was a leading contributor to the spike in 
Soviet alcohol poisonings that claimed some 50,000 fatalities per year, or 
over 100 times higher than the rate in the United States (Murphy 1983).
Illegal alcohol production in general and samogonovarenie in par-
ticular present a continuing challenge to the Russian state. Whenever 
restrictions on legal alcohol rise in the interest of public health, samogon 
rises to pick up the slack – especially in times of economic crisis. 
Demographic investigations in the present- day Russian Federation sug-
gest that consumption of samogon and other hazardous, high- alcohol 
surrogates may account for up to half of all deaths of working-age men 
in Russia (Leon et al. 2007). While contemporary samogonovarenie may 
be a short- term, informal coping mechanism to deal with shortage and 



















5.30 Buôn có ba
·
 n, bán có phu'ò'ng (Vietnam)
abel Polese
tallinn University of technology, estonia and  
dublin City University, Ireland
Buôn Bán is a Vietnamese term meaning ‘buy to then sell’ (in simple 
terms it can be defined as trading); bạn means ‘friend’ and phường 
‘(small) association’. Buôn có bạn, bán có phường can be translated as 
‘you need friends when trading’. It may refer to an informal association 
(in Vietnamese HỘI) of sellers who unite to gain greater control over a 
given market, agree on a common price for a given, or simply defend 
themselves from external threats.
It is a trading principle particularly used by food vendors and 
it refers to a group of traders, each specialising in a limited number of 
dishes – sometimes just one dish – who pool their resources to offer their 
potential customers a wider variety of choice. The practice is also known 
simply as an ‘association’ (of street vendors) since these vendors associ-
ate with one another in a cooperative- like fashion.
Vietnam is a society driven by entrepreneurs and small entrepre-
neurs make up a good part of it. Since the reforms of 1986 known as Đổi 
Mới (renovation) private initiative has been encouraged in a number of 
sectors, allowing private individuals to rent land and entrepreneurship 
has flourished.
Women play an important role in the development of business in 
Vietnam (Leshkowich 2011, 2015) and, in particular, in small and micro 
business. This refers to a very small activity, often limited to one person, 
with a low turnover. From moto- taxi ownership to the provision of street 
food, a large portion of the Vietnamese society specialises in micro busi-
ness that tends to be labour intensive, but requiring little initial capital 
investment. It is common, therefore, that a single person  – usually a 
woman – cooks a single dish and tries to sell it on the corner of a street, or 
wherever she is able to find some available space.
The practice of an ‘association’ of vendors can be regarded as solv-
ing at least two issues. The first is division of territory: when a large space 
is available and many vendors want to use it, they can share the territory 
and work together, rather than fighting to prevail to win space over oth-
ers. The second issue is the diversification of supply. If a single customer 
needs to buy something (rice, noodles, drinks) they can simply go to the 
person selling what they are looking for. However, if two or more per-
sons go out to eat together, the likelihood that they want to eat the same 
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offering them more choice. However, an association of vendors allows 
each one to offer their customers a full menu of diverse food and drink, 
which increases the chance of attracting customers both individually and 
collectively.
Once a space is made available for trading, it is occupied by a num-
ber of micro entrepreneurs, each specialising in a single product. One 
will sell spring rolls, one will prepare fried rice, another noodles, another 
drinks (ice tea, juices). The greater the number of sellers within an asso-
ciation, the wider the availability of different items. Each entrepreneur 
occupies a small part of the available space and sometimes will place 
plastic chairs and tables in their area for customers to use.
Once a customer arrives, each of the vendors tries to attract them 
and invites them sit in their designated area. However, once they are 
seated, customers will be given a menu containing all the dishes that are 
available to order from each of the competing vendors. In more advanced 
unions the venders prepare a common menu listing all the items availa-
ble from which customers can choose. In less advanced unions the menu 
will be offered orally.
The customers place their order and the vendor brings all the 
dishes that have been ordered. Some will be prepared by the ‘owner’ of 
the sitting area, others, the dishes the seller does not specialise in, will be 
‘bought’ from another stand. Accounts will be kept so that each seller will 
accumulate debts and credits with the other sellers. At the end of the day 
a balance will be calculated and all credits and debts paid.
People participating in this mechanism are not always linked by 
family ties, nor are they necessarily long- time acquaintances. They might 
simply find it convenient to join forces with other people to increase sales. 
Although they profit only when they sell their own dishes, an alliance 
is convenient for two reasons. First, it allows street vendors to increase 
the number of customers, and thus the potential number of items sold. 
Second, it allows them to sell their own dishes through other vendors. 
In theory, it is possible for a customer to sit at one vendor’s table but not 
order anything that that particular vendor produces, in which case only 
the other vendors benefit from that particular customer. In a more com-
plex scenario, the vendor might get a discount when buying from their 
colleagues, so in effect he makes a small profit even if he is not selling his 
own products. In other cases simple reciprocity applies: I sell your dishes 
to my customers at no extra cost and you will sell mine later on, when 
they come to you and order things that I produce.
The scheme is, however, not free of risk and conflict is perhaps 












vendors might not agree on the amount of credit or debit they have 
accrued with other vendors. This disagreement might escalate into a 
fight between tired vendors at the end of the day, or in a conflict bearing 
more long- term consequences such as stigmatisation and progressive 
marginalisation from the community, pushing them to look for another 
alliance elsewhere. When the practice is successful, however, it helps to 
bond the sellers and gives them a definite competitive advantage since 
it exploits the mechanism of a cooperative, where everyone contributes 
capital and labour, and profit is shared more or less evenly among the 
participants.
5.31 Cho. 
' cóc (socialist republic of Vietnam)
Gertrud hüwelmeier
department of european ethnology, humboldt- Universität zu 
Berlin, Germany
In the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, chơ ̣ cóc (lit. toad markets) are infor-
mal trading places that emerged starting in the late 1980s, after the polit-
ical and economic reforms known as đổı̉ mơí. The term chợ cóc refers to 
small amphibians, toads, which are considered unobtrusive with regard 
to their colour and can quickly disappear in the case of danger, just like 
the many small traders selling their wares in the informal marketplaces 
(Figure 5.31.1). Often located at backstreet crossings, these small street- 
corner markets are considered illegal by the communist government, and 
as a result are prone to unannounced inspection by the local authorities. 
Petty traders, most of whom are women from lower- class backgrounds 
or urban– rural migrants, are targets of government control, and they 
risk having their goods confiscated in the case of the sudden arrival of 
the authorities. Nonetheless, these small- scale traders, most of whose 
clients have been regular customers for years, will continue trading the 
next day, delivering fresh fruit and vegetables to people living in the 
neighbourhood.
Since the introduction of economic reforms in 1986, a ‘socialist 
market economy’ has developed through shifting processes of mobil-
ity within cities and between cities and the countryside, resulting in 
new places for trading. The emergence of chơ ̣ cóc is linked to new eco-
nomic activities taking place on a private basis, after the collapse of 
the planned economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the early 
1980s. Even shortly before the collapse, poor peasants from the sur-
rounding countryside would travel to the city to sell fresh produce, 
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participate in trading in general (Leshkowich 2014), vending in infor-
mal markets is a highly gendered activity (Agergaard and Vu 2010). 
Small traders sell their goods in mountain regions (Bonnin and Turner 
2014) and in cities (Turner and Schoenberger 2012) to earn the liveli-
hood for their families. The increasing emergence of chơ ̣ cóc in urban 
Hanoi points to the difficult living conditions of poor families and a 
growing rural– urban migration in contemporary Vietnam (Endres and 
Leshkowich, 2017).
Informal markets in North Vietnam must be placed within the con-
text of war damage and the shortage economy that started in the 1960s. 
During the Second Indochina War (1955– 75), known as the American 
War in Vietnam, the black market (chợ đen) flourished, in particular 
in Hanoi, the capital of communist North Vietnam. The black market 
existed parallel to the establishment of two kinds of government shops, 
one for political elites and cadre families, and the other one for ordi-
nary people. Female shop assistants (mâ ̣u di ̣ch viên) in the government- 
controlled shops were considered very powerful by many people as they 
reserved the better quality pieces of meat for special clients according 
to the strength of the beneficial relations (quan hê ̣) or connections they 
shared with them. The black market was ‘regulated’ via food ration cards, 
Figure 5.31.1 Chơ ̣ cóc (informal market) in Hanoi, 2015.

















many of which were illegally exchanged for money in front of the govern-
ment stores.
All female shop assistants lost their jobs when the government shops 
were closed as a result of the introduction of economic reforms in 1986. 
Based on their specialist knowledge of buying and selling, many former 
shop assistants became small traders (tiê ̉u thương), with a number of the 
women running small stalls in covered marketplaces that had been built 
in French colonial times. Others opened privately owned retail shops in 
Hanoi, a type of business that had not existed during the war. Farmers 
from the surrounding countryside came to the city on a daily basis to sell 
vegetables, eggs and chickens in informal urban trading places, the chợ 
cóc. Whenever the police approached, the petty traders would quickly 
drop their goods into boxes and carry them to small backstreets (nhỏ), to 
hide and wait for the police to disappear.
Over the past 25 years, buying and selling in the chợ cóc has become 
increasingly popular in the neighbourhoods and backstreets of Hanoi. 
Thousands of trading families are involved in this economic activity, as 
they are unable to pay huge sums of money (the informal transfer fee to 
the previous ‘owner’ of the place), to receive the state- registered ‘right 
to use’ a trading place in one of the covered government- controlled mar-
kets. Apart from the small traders in the chợ cóc, an increasing number of 
female mobile traders (ngươ ̀i bán rong) are selling products in the streets 
of Hanoi. Due to growing rural– urban migration, many women from the 
countryside sell their goods, which they buy in the central wholesale 
fruit market in the early morning, by roaming the city streets with the 
traditional pole on their shoulder and two baskets on each side (gánh 
rong). A number of mobile street vendors also walk around with bicycles, 
offering flowers, fruit and vegetables for sale from baskets on their bikes.
Distinct from mobile street vendors (cf. rod- re, 5.32 in this volume), 
petty traders in the informal marketplaces sit at backstreet crossings on 
small stools made of plastic. They either settle in the neighbourhood and 
sell wares in front of their houses or live elsewhere in the city and offer 
fruit and vegetables on the stairs of a house owner they know personally. 
These retailers start work around two o’ clock in the morning, transport-
ing goods from the central fruit market in Hanoi, a wholesale market, 
to the chợ cóc to meet the needs of local people. From 5am until about 
11am, the hustle and bustle of the chơ ̣ cóc, where employees from nearby 
offices and middle- class women have breakfast by consuming the tradi-
tional noodle soup (phở) or rice rolls, is characteristic for city life and part 
of the daily experience of urban residents. Many Hanoians do not like 
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consider the supermarket goods to be expensive and not fresh. Moreover, 
customers cannot drive through supermarkets by motorbike, as they used 
to when shopping at the many traditional open- air markets in the past. In 
addition to housewives who visit the small markets every morning, shop-
pers on motorbikes pass through the informal markets and are therefore 
as much a part of urban mobility as the many traders (Truitt 2008).
The recent demolition of traditional marketplaces by the gov-
ernment in order to create a ‘beautiful, green and clean’ city resulted 
in the reconstruction of these localities (Endres 2014). However, the 
related relocation of market stalls contributed to an economic decline 
for a number of female traders, as they lost their regular customers. 
Simultaneously, the numbers of street vendors increased near the former 
traditional marketplaces and new chơ ̣ cóc emerged throughout the city. 
Due to processes of neoliberalisation, including accelerating real estate 
development, investors constructed high- rise buildings on the grounds 
of former marketplaces, while the traditional markets were transposed 
to other localities while construction work was carried out. After the new 
buildings were completed, the vendors returned to the previous location, 
but now found themselves in air- conditioned basements, venues with no 
windows and no market atmosphere. Having lost most of their former 
customers as a result of moving and the new venue, many of the female 
traders gave up their ‘right to use’ the small market stalls in the new build-
ing, which both traders and clients consider ghost markets (Hüwelmeier 
2017), empty places in formerly bustling localities.
In recent times, tensions have emerged among various groups, 
in particular between small traders (tiểu thương) doing business in the 
new high- rise buildings, and the mobile and sitting traders in the sur-
rounding chơ ̣ cóc. Even as tiểu thương wait for customers in the basement 
and hope for business, they simultaneously claim that the goods of the 
mobile and sitting street vendors are not controlled by the government, 
and complain that these vendors do not pay taxes and that they just dis-
appear in the case of police raids. In contrast to the ‘safer’ trading condi-
tions in the government- controlled markets, selling in the chợ cóc may 
become uncomfortable at certain times. In order to be protected, women 
selling in the chơ ̣ cóc (ngươi bán lẻ) make arrangements with the owners 
of houses in backstreets to sell goods on their stairs. For the opportunity 
to sit and sell from the stairs, the women pay a small amount of money 
to the owner, and in return, the traders can feel safe in the case of police 
raids, as they can quickly carry the wares into the owner’s house. Newly 
arrived female street vendors selling goods on the pavement (ngươi buôn 


























therefore targets of ‘the black society’ (or mafia, xã hôị đen), known to be 
threatening and violent and to put pressure on small traders, either by 
requesting money on a regular basis or fresh products daily. However, by 
expanding trading geographies and appropriating urban space, women 
are not simply victims of state policies, but simultaneously agents of 
change in an increasingly globalising Vietnam.
5.32 Rod- re (thailand)
kisnaphol Wattanawanyoo
UCL, Uk
In Thai, the term rod- re is a name given to a form of mobile street vending 
practice that has emerged over the last three decades. The prefix rod in 
general indicates any type of vehicle that can be both motorised and non- 
motorised. The suffix - re is the adjective describing ‘the act of moving or 
wandering around into any places’. Thus, rod- re is used to describe this 
particular kind of street vending in the form of modified pick- up truck, 
filled up with food, goods and products, that moves around the urban 
area providing market services to various groups of customers. Many of 
them can be found operating in Bangkok and the neighbouring cities, 
but they can also be found in the other big regional cities of the country.
Rod- re can be seen as the adaptation or transformation of the tra-
ditional street vending known as harb re (hawker). Street vending is a 
dominant form of urban informality that can be found in cities of the 
Global South. It is a form of occupation, highly persistent and yet diverse 
and flexible (Bromley 2000: 1), which fills the gap of incomplete urban 
services. Mobile street vending or public space vending in Bangkok has 
long historical roots that date back to the early days of the capital city 
formation during the period of King Rama I- III. The practice of rod- re 
has also incorporated the traditional ‘wet market’, or so- called talaad 
sod, and the well- known ‘floating market’ or the talaad nam, along with 
the informal street market into a new configuration of contemporary 
mobile and dispersed marketplaces. Rod- re, along with other various 
forms/ typologies of existing mobile vending found in the Thai cit-
ies reflect the persistence of local culture in Thai society (Polakit and 
Boontharm 2008: 175, 185).
During the 1980s and 1990s, even though Thailand was regarded 
as one of the ‘Asian tigers’ with rapid economic modernisation, there was 
no decline of such informal sector (Askew 2002). Also, since the 1998 



















into the informal sector, as many of the workers who lose their jobs in 
the formal sector take an informal job such as street vending as an option 
that allows them to make a living (Bhowmik 2005). This ‘new generation’ 
of Bangkok Street vendors saw the post- 1998 economic crisis as both an 
opportunity and threat (Maneepong and Walsh 2013).
Despite their contribution to urban life, street vendors are seen by 
the local authorities and elites as an undesired element, a chaotic eye-
sore in the cityscape that should be removed from modern urban areas 
(Crawford 1999, 2005; Polakit and Boontharm 2008; Yatmo 2008). At 
their arrival, street vendors make announcements through a loudspeaker, 
creating an unpleasantly loud environment. The tension between author-
ities and vendors over the use of streets, sidewalks and public spaces has 
often been high. Yet, such tension provides a picture of the dynamic 
interplay between vendors, the Thai public (customers) and the Thai 
authorities, which produces a unique Thai streetscape (Tepwongsirirat 
2004). Street vending in the public spaces adds interest to Bangkok street 
space, and hence vending has become an informal institution in itself 
(Mateo- Babiano 2012).
Nowadays, mobile street vending can be divided broadly into non- 
motorised and motorised. The existing typologies of mobile vendors can 
be grouped according to the means of mobility and the response to the 
contemporary form of transport technology, which are comprised of six 
sub- groups (Tepwongsirirat 2004; Polakit and Boontharm 2008):
1. hab- re (hawker with light bamboo pole/ stick and baskets filled with 
their products and walking around on foot);
2. rod- khen (push cart);
3. bicycle and tricycle (non- motorised peddler);
4. motorcycle (both the one with container/ storage and the one with 
extra hanging display);
5. motorcycle (with modified container/ storage) and tricycle (motor-
ised with modified container/ storage);
6. rod- re (pick- up truck with modified rear storage and covered roof to 
display food, produces and goods).
From the above typologies, hab- re (hawker) is the only type that still 
maintains the traditional form of street vending. Rod- khen (push cart) is 
one of the most popular types with great variations in the cart design that 
can support various forms of trading activity and investment. The first 
two types are more ambulatory in nature and can cover nearby distances, 






















typology, rod- re, is the most advanced form of mobile vending, capable 
of covering the longest distances.
This study of rod- re is based on fieldwork data collected by the 
author in Bangkok in 2015 and 2016. The author conducted part of 
his research by riding along with or driving after the vendors, depend-
ing on the modes of transport and conditions. In many cases, the 
vendors meandered through Bangkok’s busy streets into smaller alley-
ways (sois) of the inner neighbourhoods and peripheral communities. 
Following some of these vendors provides the basic understanding 
of the spatial practices in relation to their trading activities. It also 
reveals how the vendors select and manage their schedules, routes 
and trajectories.
In order to provide a variety of goods similar to that of more formal 
kinds of market, and also due to the limitation of the pick- up truck’s back 
storage and display space, the rod- re vendors have to select certain types 
of products to fill their trucks accordingly. This selection shapes the prac-
tice of rod- re into three variations, which are:
1. rod- kub- khao (selling fresh food, meat and vegetables);
2. rod- phak phon- lamai (selling fruits and vegetables);
3. rod- khong- cham or rod- cho- huay (selling wide range of groceries, 
clothing, fashionable and gift items, also consumerist products).
The first two variations are often mistakably perceived by the public as 
the same type. The two types might look alike and even provide similar 
products. But the slight difference or variation here is that rod- kub- khao 
provides fresh meats, whereas rod- phak phon- lamai do not.
Another common feature of these two types is connoted in the 
given nickname of rod- phoom- phuang. The word ‘phoom- phuang’ – 
means ‘in bundle’, and hence rod- phoom- phuang in this context refers to 
the outstanding display of ready- made packages of the products in small 
bundles, hanging on both sides of the truck. Most people consider both 
rod- kub- khao and rod- phoom- phuang as the same, and use these names 
interchangeably. But for most of the vendors, they prefer to be called rod- 
kub- khao or rod- re, rather than rod- phoom- phuang, as the latter could 
also refer to the motorcycle type of food vending.
The third type of variation, rod- khong- cham or rod- cho- huay, is 
a kind of grocery shop that also provides clothing and other consumer 
goods. Besides variations in their product provision and their display fea-
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In fulfilling the daily need of food and services, vendors play a cru-
cial role, especially in the everyday life of those inhabitants who are in 
remote areas and far away from marketplaces, or those who find it incon-
venient to move around. Vendors bring the market to the customers’ door-
steps. Mundane spaces are transformed into a temporary marketplace, an 
ephemeral social gathering. The vendors’ presence also fosters interaction 
between the people who live and work within a given area. Moreover, in 
some cases, different social classes are drawn together through such tem-
porary market events, yielding a mix which rarely happen nowadays.
As rod- re takes place in the so-called ‘subsector of urban informal-
ity’ (Askew 2002: 74–5), with a larger amount of investment and better 
means of accumulation, these vendors seem to be making a profit. Also, 
due to their mobile nature and their economic status, for a long time they 
have not been the authorities’ top priority in terms of being removed from 
the urban landscape. However, new regulation on banning street vend-
ing from major Bangkok streets imposed in mid- September 2016 by the 
Thai Government might affect the resilience of this practice. Yet, recently, 
the conflicts that have risen in relation to street vending are not between 
local authorities and vendors, but rather between vendors themselves, 
ranging from minor arguments to major disputes in terms of competing 
for the same group of customers, or operating in overlapping areas.
In summary, rod- re has evolved from the traditional mobile vending 
as a practice that makes good use of the interstitial, fragmented urban 
spaces providing economic opportunities to vendors. It is a creative 
appropriation of space- time by the ordinary people. With their strong 
characteristics of diversity, fluidity and flexibility, these practices gen-
erate enough creativity in negotiating the possibilities of the informal 
economy and its spaces (Askew 2002: 74– 5).
5.33 Boda- boda taxis (Uganda)
tom Goodfellow
department of Urban studies and Planning,  
University of sheffield, Uk
Boda- boda is the local term for bicycle and motorcycle taxis in Uganda 
(Figure 5.33.1), although the term is also used in some neighbouring 
countries such as Kenya. While informal motorcycle- taxi transport is 
prevalent across many parts of the world, the sector has particular eco-
nomic and political significance in Uganda, where it has come symboli-


















Involving a sizeable proportion of the country’s male youth, this thriving 
informal occupation is seen to fill critical gaps both in transport provision 
and employment, while at the same time posing threats to security and 
undermining the authority of local government agencies that have long 
sought to control and regulate its growth.
The use of bicycles as a form of transport service for both goods and 
people dates back to the 1960s and 1970s in this region of Africa, but it 
was in the 1990s that the term boda- boda came into common currency. 
The term derives from the English word ‘border’, emerging in the context 
of transport across the Kenya- Uganda border in the town of Busia. Here 
there was a gap of over half a mile between the border gates on either 
side, and bicycle drivers offering their services would call out boda- boda 
(‘border to border’) to passengers who might want to be transported 
across the divide.
The use of these services quickly spread to other parts of Kenya and 
Uganda, and with the increase in cheap, low- powered Japanese motorcy-
cles flooding Uganda from the 1990s, motorcycle taxis increasingly came 
to dominate over pushbikes in many parts of the country – especially in 
the major cities (Bryceson et al. 2003). The popularity of this transport 
option can be linked to the lack of good road infrastructure, collapse of 
the national public transport system from the 1980s onwards, deregu-
lation of transport services, increased congestion in cities that motorcy-
cles can navigate much more easily than larger vehicles, and sustained 
economic growth. Indeed, the poor can rarely afford to use boda- bodas 
as they can cost as much as seven times more per kilometre to use than 
buses or minibuses. They do, however, benefit greatly from boda- bodas as 
a source of income. One 2003 study found that some 1.7 million people, 
or 7 per cent of the population, received part or all of their livelihood 
from the industry (Howe 2003).
In the Ugandan capital Kampala, boda- bodas grew at an exponen-
tial rate during the 2000s, as the city mushroomed in size and the large 
number of matatu minibus taxis contributed to traffic gridlock. It has 
been claimed that nowhere in the world are motorcycles more popular 
as a public transport option, and an estimated 800,000 boda- boda trips 
are taken every day (Kidimu 2015). Various studies indicate a rise from 
around 4,000 boda-boda drivers in Kampala in 2003 to 16,000 in 2007, 
40,000 in 2010 and as many as 100,000 in 2014 (Bryceson et al. 2003; 
Goodfellow 2015). This rapid growth was partly a consequence of gov-
ernment policy, with the introduction of credit schemes to allow drivers 
to purchase their own motorbikes. For the most part, however, driv-
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through a hire- purchase system. This provides a very lucrative opportu-
nity for investors, who frequently make profits of at least 60 per cent per 
motorcycle when they sell to a driver incrementally. Boda- bodas there-
fore quickly became ‘big business’; those with means would often pur-
chase tens or even hundreds to re sell in this way.
Despite initial government efforts to stimulate the sector, the 
Kampala City Council soon began to fear that the sector was running 
out of control, dominating the roads without any regulatory oversight, 
generating huge numbers of traffic accidents. Around 60 per cent 
of the people admitted to the city’s main hospital with fractures are 
there due to boda- boda related accidents. In 2014 alone, 3,124 peo-
ple died on the spot as a result of boda- boda accidents, while 12,754 
were seriously injured (Kidimu 2015). It is therefore little surprise that 
boda- boda drivers are often considered to be an out- of- control group 
of ‘hooligans’. Very few are registered as operators with the Transport 
Licensing Board, and many do not even possess driving licences. They 
also pay nothing by way of tax. These problems led to repeated efforts 
in the 2000s to introduce regulations in the form of mandatory driv-
ing licences, Passenger Service Vehicle permits, helmets (for driver 
and passenger) and third- party insurance, as well as controls on num-
bers. There were also repeated attempts to impose a basic local tax on 
drivers.
Figure 5.33.1 Boda-boda taxis.












These efforts overwhelmingly failed, often due to interventions by 
central government politicians who would make announcements say-
ing that these new regulatory systems were not compulsory or that the 
tax was inappropriate (Goodfellow and Titeca 2012; Goodfellow 2015). 
These deliberately undermined the city government’s efforts and made it 
extremely difficult for them to enforce their regulations. It is this highly 
politicised nature of the sector, and the way in which it became a focus of 
conflict between the central government under the National Resistance 
Movement and the opposition- controlled Kampala City Council, that 
gives boda- bodas their particular socio- political significance. The drivers 
in the sector were effectively cultivated as a client group by the central 
government, both through micro- credit schemes and through ‘protect-
ing’ them from the city government’s efforts to regulate. This played a 
key role in the ruling party’s strategy for building political support in an 
opposition- controlled city.
These political dynamics further fuelled the growth of the sector, 
because the continued absence of controls or taxes made it ever more 
appealing as a livelihood option, particularly given the lack of alterna-
tive employment opportunities. In 2011, the central government abol-
ished the City Council and replaced it with a new Kampala Capital City 
Authority that pledged to ‘clean up’ the city. Yet even though the cen-
tral government was now officially committed to greater regulation, the 
vested interests in the sector were so powerful that it was difficult to bring 
about any effective change. The police regularly round up drivers who 
lack the relevant paperwork and confiscate their motorcycles, but this 
rarely achieves much beyond creating opportunities for bribes and recir-
culating some of the resources in the sector among the police.
The uncontrolled growth of this sector and the failure to for-
malise, regulate or tax it over successive decades contrasts strongly 
with neighbouring Rwanda, where the same phenomenon (known 
as taxi- moto) was brought under tight regulatory control from 2007, 
with strict limits on numbers and the introduction of numerous taxes 
(Rollason 2013; Goodfellow 2015). In Uganda, boda- boda drivers are 
now such a substantial component of the urban population that they 
have come to represent a broader socio-economic category, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘boda- boda class’, which implies an uneducated, rogu-
ish urban underclass with particular political leanings. In reality, this 
is not always an accurate characterisation, as many boda- boda drivers 
are actually highly educated – some even have university degrees – and 
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Even though the state has achieved little by way of control of the 
sector, various entrepreneurs have entered to try and capitalise on and 
improve the operation of boda- boda activities in recent years. One ini-
tiative is Safe Boda, a business start- up along the lines of the global taxi 
phenomenon Über, which was set up by a former Deloitte employee and 
– interestingly – a former advisor to the government of Rwanda, in con-
junction with local drivers. Through a mobile phone application, users of 
this service can guarantee to be linked to trained, registered boda- boda 
drivers. Though a promising initiative, drivers registered to this service 
numbered only 50 in 2015 – a small drop in the ocean of boda- boda oper-
ators. Another initiative is Tugende, a company started by an American 
entrepreneur that aims to provide hire- purchase motorcyles to large 
numbers of boda- boda drivers on more favourable terms than were oth-
erwise available to them.
5.34 Stoyanshiki (Georgia)
Lela rekhviashvili
Leibniz Institute for regional Geography, Leipzig, Germany
Stoyanka is the Russian word for a parking space. In Georgia, the term 
stoyanshik (stoyanshiki-pl.) is used to denote a person that watches over 
cars parked in public spaces; the suffix – shik signifies a person in Russian. 
In other words, a stoyanshik is an informal parking attendant/ guard (see 
Figure 5.34.1). Stoyanshiki may be found in different parts of Georgia, 
but their activity is most widespread in the capital city, Tbilisi.
The practice emerged in the late Soviet years, but became much 
more widespread in the 1990s, when crimes rates rocketed as a result of 
the collapse of the USSR and resulting loss of state authority. Stoyanshiki’s 
services – ensuring the security of cars against theft or vandalism – were 
thus in high demand. Later in the 1990s stoyanshiki became semi- for-
malised when the Tbilisi city government licensed the guards, distrib-
uting special uniforms and using them as agents for collecting parking 
charges. Given that at that point Georgia was one of the most corrupt 
countries in the region (Shelley et al. 2013), a share of the rents col-
lected by the guards was most probably informally distributed among 
state officials. By the mid- 2000s, however, two crucial factors making 
stoyanshiki’s services relevant – the rent collection and ensuring cars’ 
safety – were eliminated. Since 2003, crime rates in Georgia have fallen 
significantly due to high- profile reforms pursued by the United National 
Movement headed by President Saakashvili (2003– 12) (Engvall 2012; 



















individual stoyanshiki for revenue collection for parking services in the 
city from 2007, when it held an open tender for parking management 
in the city. The winning company, C.T. Park, marked the parking slots 
and established annual parking fees to be paid by drivers, which meant 
that stoyanshiki’s role as unofficial collectors of parking fees became 
redundant.
The author’s fieldwork (conducted in summer 2015) revealed that 
neither drivers nor the stoyanshiki named the threat of car theft as a rea-
son for car guarding. Nevertheless, stoyanshiki continue to operate to the 
present day, but their role has adapted to the new circumstances. There 
are no official or other forms of data concerning the number of stoyan-
shiki in Tbilisi, although fieldwork informants interviewed by the author 
estimate that there are at least a few thousand stoyanshiki in the city. It 
is notable that every important parking spot in the city has an informal 
car guard safeguarding the place. They are mostly concentrated around 
parking spaces with high car turnover, such as banks, shopping centres, 
state institutions, bars and entertainment centres. In central districts of 
Figure 5.34.1 Picture taken in Tbilisi, near Galaktion Tabidze bridge. 
The stoyanshik is listening to the radio while having no customers.
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the city, parking slots are extremely scarce and the cars are often parked 
behind each other, blocking cars in. In such cases, stoyanshiki collect 
drivers’ phone numbers or even store the car keys themselves, so that 
they can either call the driver to move the car or move it themselves. 
Sometimes the cars are parked so tightly that the stoyanshiki’s presence 
is also necessary to ensure that a car drives off safely, without damaging 
the other parked cars.
Nevertheless, at the majority of parking spaces, drivers can eas-
ily park and drive off without the help of a stoyanshik. Stoyanshiki often 
underline that tips are voluntary. They do not try to force drivers to pay 
tips, and indeed do not have any means to attempt to do so. They do 
report that, despite the existence of free riders, most drivers do tend to 
pay tips. As a rule, stoyanshiki tend to stay at parking spots throughout 
the day (working for more than 10– 12 hours) and do not report hav-
ing any other job. Thus, car guarding is their main means of generating 
income, and would appear to generate sufficient income for them to earn 
a living.
Informal parked car attending as an informal service is reported 
mostly in developing and ‘transitioning’ countries. However, as the prac-
tice is usually marginal and sometimes of a temporary nature, the lit-
erature on informal parking attendants is limited (Blaauw and Bothma 
2003). Most of the existing literature concentrates on Africa, notably on 
the case of Cape Town, where informal car attending is a widespread and 
socially and economically significant phenomenon. In Cape Town the 
car- guarding industry started up as an entirely informal activity, and was 
often equated to begging. Over time it came to receive partial recognition 
from the state as well as from private businesses (Bernstein 2003). In 
the South African case, two reasons are commonly named to explain the 
proliferation of car guarding:  extremely high levels of unemployment, 
and high crime rates, especially car theft (McEwen and Leiman 2008). In 
Georgia, high unemployment rates, reaching up to 30 per cent in urban 
centres, is certainly a possible explanation for the widespread nature of 
car- guarding practices.
Due to the very nature of the service, car- guarding services are 
susceptible to what in economics is known as the ‘free- riding problem’ 
– the opportunity for people to benefit from a service or resource being 
paid for by others. Car guarding can be seen as a semi- public good: it 
is mostly non- excludable and non- rival (McEwen and Leiman 2008). 
This means that if the parking guard is present at the parking site, their 
very presence will ensure the security for all the cars present (non- rival), 
















not (non- excludable). However, car guarding persists, indicating that 
the practice withstands the free- riding problem and generates enough 
income for the guards to continue the activity. Explanations for driv-
ers’ willingness to pay ‘tips’ include altruistic motivations (McEwen and 
Leiman 2008), and desire to gain social approval (Saunders and Lynn 
2010). Another possible explanation is that to a certain degree the park-
ing guards’ presence is beneficial for local private businesses and in some 
cases the local and national authorities, who are therefore willing to sup-
port the activity. In Cape Town, for example, private businesses came to 
endorse the services of the car guards as beneficial for their customers. 
While guards were rarely hired officially and largely depended on infor-
mal tips, the business owners offered selected guards a uniform, name 
tag and permission to operate on their company’s car park. Moreover, the 
city municipality started contracting the parking guards to collect com-
pulsory parking payments from drivers (McEwen and Leiman 2008).
Existing studies thus illustrate that despite free- riding problems, 
local governments and businesses in the South African context saw 
car- guarding services as useful and informally cooperated with them. 
However, in the Georgian case, stoyanshiki have not benefitted from such 
unofficial ‘sponsorship’ from public or private institutions. Their capacity 
to collect tips thus depends on the driver’s goodwill, and stoyanshiki’s 
own creative tactics to invent new functions for their services.
Drivers in Tbilisi express a range of opinions on stoyanshiki. While 
some see them as useless ‘parasites’ (in the words of one interviewee), 
others – in particular inexperienced drivers – view stoyanshiki’s services 
as valuable. Most commonly, however, drivers report that they do not 
need the services of stoyanshiki, but feel compelled to pay – both out of 
compassion, and appreciation of stoyanshiki’s efforts to provide some 
kind of service. Hence, drivers’ decisions to pay tips to stoyanshiki appear 
to be motivated by altruism or the observance of a social norm. In this 
sense, stoyanshiki are rewarded for their efforts to provide a service, 
rather than fulfilling an actual demand for the service.
Acknowledging that their existing services are of limited use for 
customers, stoyanshiki have recently invented new services. An impor-
tant one is protecting cars from punitive action by the supervisors of C.T. 
Park. The C.T. Park supervisors are responsible for issuing fines to driv-
ers parked without possessing the annual parking licence. Stoyanshiki 
will often ask supervisors to refrain from issuing fines for their regular 
customers. Curiously, despite there being no benefit to the supervisor 
from acceding to such a request, they sometimes do refrain from issuing 




















stoyanshiki as ‘they are also human’, adding that the favour is not asked 
too frequently.
It is interesting to note that the government has not attempted to 
eradicate the phenomenon of stoyanshiki. Georgia’s post- revolutionary 
government under President Saakashvili was determined to tackle 
all sorts of informal and illegal practices (Slade 2012; Curro 2015; 
Rekhviashvili 2015), but the services of stoyanshiki were never targeted. 
This might be due to the fact that stoyanshiki are not connected with 
mafia and organised crime circles. Furthermore, stoyanshiki do not com-
pete with the private parking management system administered by the 
C.T. Park, but operate in parallel, based on drivers’ voluntary tips. The 
government has found ways to collect parking charges with a private 





In Russian, a baraholka is a pejorative term for an outdoor, open- air 
flea market where second- hand goods are bought and sold. The Russian 
words for ‘market’, rynok or bazaar, are more neutral synonyms. Related 
terms include the noun barakhlo, which refers to low- quality junk, and 
the verb barakhliit’, which is to hoard or to collect items of little value.
In Kazakhstan, baraholka refers to a series of bazaars located along 
the Northern Ring road in the outskirts of Almaty. Almaty’s Baraholka 
gained notoriety in the late 1990s as a regional hub for informal trad-
ing. The baraholka was one of many open- air markets that mushroomed 
across the former Soviet Union: others include Moscow’s Cherkizovskii 
rynok (Cherkizon), the Hippodrome in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Dordoi 
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The dismantlement of Soviet institutions and 
supply chains left millions of former Soviet citizens unemployed and 
devoid of retail outlets. Desperate to make a living, many of them began 
trading anything they could find – from pots and pans from local fac-
tories to Japanese cell phones. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs, Dungans 
and Uighurs revived relations with their kinsmen in Xinjiang, in north- 
western China, and began shuttling goods by car across the border to 
Almaty’s baraholka where they would resell them at a premium to other 
traders. These traders, who came from all parts of the former Soviet 
Union, Turkey and Korea, resold goods purchased from the baraholka in 




















informal purchasing, transporting and reselling of goods by individuals 
defined the supply chains. Almaty’s proximity to China, and connection 
to rail, road and air networks, made it a central location for a wholesale 
trading hub. In Almaty’s baraholka, in the 1990s, the volume of trad-
ing activity was such that traders did not need storage facilities – they 
worked side by side out of wooden crates.
While informal trading contracted over time in Southern and 
Eastern Europe as the implementation of privatisation reforms and tran-
sition policies allowed for formal trading mechanisms to materialise, 
weak state capacity, corrupted privatisation efforts and an unsuccess-
ful transition policy led to the proliferation of baraholkas. Beginning in 
the early 2000s, well- connected entrepreneurs formed limited liability 
partnerships (Tovarishchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennost’iu, or TOO) 
and utilised abandoned shipping containers to assemble open- air trad-
ing centres (torgovye tsentry) in the area that had become known as 
baraholka. In Almaty’s baraholka, the bazaars were constructed on land 
that was reportedly acquired illegally in the 1990s. Between 2004 and 
2012, the number of registered bazaars in Almaty oblast increased from 
66 to 85, while the number of individual trade spaces grew from 8,480 
to 18,880 (Agency of Statistics of Kazakhstan 2014). By the late 2000s, 
Almaty’s baraholka contained between 25 and 35 independently owned 
bazaars. An informal system of commerce was effectively institutional-
ised throughout Kazakhstan as a result of the construction of TOO- owned 
bazaars, and the state’s failure to modernise trade processes, streamline 
customs procedures and strengthen public institutions for small- and 
medium- sized enterprises. Almaty’s baraholka is the poster child of this 
system.
Quantifying the baraholka’s impact on Almaty’s economy is chal-
lenged by methodological discrepancies: differing definitions of which 
bazaars are part of the baraholka, limited self- reported statistics and the 
high level of undocumented migrant workers. In 2012, the World Bank 
estimated that the baraholka contained 15,450 trade spaces, directly and 
indirectly employing 250,000 people, or 5.1 per cent of local employment 
(Kaminski and Mitra 2012: 57). In 2013, the Chamber of Entrepreneurs 
of Kazakhstan (PPK) reported (in a private report given to the author) 
that the baraholka contained only 20,000 traders and 11,000 trading 
spaces across 35 markets, and yet in an interview with the author, the 
PPK highlighted that trading alone constitutes 70 per cent of Almaty’s 
economy.
Beyond Almaty, baraholkas continue to fulfil an important eco-
















was estimated that baraholkas generated 51 per cent of total retail trade 
turnover and occupied 67 per cent of all retail trade spaces (Statistics 
Committee of Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2016). 
Between 2004 and 2014, according to the Agency of Statistics, while the 
number of registered bazaars throughout the country fell from 935 to 
752, the number of trading spaces increased from 150,497 to a high of 
189,177 in 2012, before falling to 174,149 in 2014. During the same 10- 
year period, the total square footage occupied by trade spaces grew from 
4.4 million to 6.6 million cubic meters (Statistics Committee 2014). This 
suggests that bazaars were consolidated and expanded. By 2012, 818 
registered bazaars employing 968,000 individuals operated throughout 
the country (Today.Kz. 2015). Furthermore, nearly 70 per cent of infor-
mal workers in Kazakhstan are employed in the market services sector, 
primarily in trade and food services (Rutkowski 2011: 7).
Today, traders who own the containers from which they trade 
lack legal title to the land on which their containers stand and are 
therefore not entitled to compensation in the event of forced expul-
sion. They continue to operate informally, following an unwritten set 
of rules, norms, values and practices. Traders purchase and sell goods 
Figure 5.35.1 Baraholka in Almaty.












based on trust and oral agreements, without written documentation of 
transactions and inventory. Gross earnings and tax deductions are cal-
culated on pocket- sized notebooks with a mobile phone calculator. All 
transactions are conducted in cash. Employment in the bazaar is gained 
through informal social connections, svyazi, and the most successful 
traders maintain formidable relations with the bazaar security person-
nel and other traders. Whereas formal retailers market goods for fixed 
prices that account for the products’ value chain, goods in the bazaar 
can be sold for prices that are barely above face value. For traders, the 
tradition of ‘price haggling’ in the bazaar means that there is no univer-
sal model for wage compensation: an individual can earn zero, or over 
10,000 KZT in a given day depending on the quantity of goods, and at 
what prices they are sold for (the annual average exchange rate was 
152 KZT per USD in 2013, 179 in 2014, 223 in 2015 and 342 in 2016).
Despite their economic impact, President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
has called for the ‘installation of order’ in all bazaars. Beginning in 2011, 
former Akim (mayor) of Almaty, Akhmetzhan Esimov, among others, 
undertook an initiative to ‘install order, eliminate chaotically assembled 
trade centers behind the red line and impose a civilized appearance’ 
(Zakon.kz 2013). Esimov emphasised that the baraholka attracted illegal 
migrant workers, smuggled goods and was a fertile ground for fires and 
infectious diseases. By 2014, the combination of forced closures by the 
local government led by Akimat, along with a series of destructive fires, 
eliminated 26 bazaars in the baraholka. By the end of 2015, the Akimat 
planned to close an additional 20 markets. In April 2015, Zakon.kz 
declared that the liquidation of 28 bazaars in the baraholka signified the 
‘end of an era of uncivilized trade’ (Mutalipov and Ashimzhanov 2015), 
declaring that Almaty residents would be able to enjoy a more civilised 
retail experience on the territory of the baraholka, on which the Akimat 
was constructing modern trade centres.
Despite the disruption, trade in the baraholka increased by 9 per 
cent in 2014, as consumers continued to rely on it for affordable goods 
during times of economic stagnation (Esenkulova 2015).
Local authorities have, to a certain extent, succeeded in civilising 
baraholkas. Since January 2013, traders have been required to register 
as individual’nye predprinimatel’i (individual entrepreneurs), and are 
accordingly obliged to pay taxes on 6 per cent of generated revenue, as 
well as social security contributions, at six monthly intervals. Authorities 
also attempted to require the use of POI (point of sale) terminals by 2017, 


















Notwithstanding state- led efforts to modernise the baraholka’s 
infrastructure and eliminate open- air trade, baraholkas in general and 
Almaty’s baraholka in particular will continue to exist given their impor-
tance in job creation, supply chains and in providing an affordable retail 
outlet for consumers. Kazakhstan’s ‘formal’ economy is not as yet condu-
cive to small business creation. Reducing the baraholkas requires insti-
tutional reforms to the formal sector: individuals will continue to opt for 
informal employment in baraholka as long as formal sector opportunities 
are less attractive. Despite the stigmatisation of Almaty’s Baraholka, and 
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Budženje (noun) can be translated as jerry- building, cobbling together, 
jury- rigging or bodging. The verbal form budžiti implies a sense of aug-
mentation. It suggests not only rigging something up in a makeshift, slip-
shod or improvised manner, but also in a way that makes the thing bigger, 
more awkward and ungainly. Budženje may be carried out on houses, cars 
and household and electrical objects. As a verb, budžiti is often used with 
prefixes. Thus zbudžiti, and an even more powerful skarabudžiti, have a 
stronger connotation of cobbling something together quickly – in order 
that it might hold for a minimum period of time. Nabudžiti, on the other 
hand, emphasises the quality of augmentation, or making something big-
ger and stronger, but in a rough manner. Prebudžiti has an additional sense 
of transforming something into something else by rough rigging. The 
noun, budževina (the product of budženje) is sometimes modified with 
the prefix kara- as in karabudževina. In this instance it serves to augment 
words it precedes in a particularly rough manner. Karabudževina could 
therefore, but only imperfectly, be rendered as ‘mega- cobbling together’.
The word budženje has a Turkish feel for Serbian speakers, possi-
bly due to the sound dzh that occurs mainly in words of Turkish origin. 
However, rather than having a Turkish origin, the word may have come 
from an etymologically obscure Romani word ‘budzho’, meaning ‘bundle’, 
‘pack’ or ‘rag’ but also ‘scam’ (Victor Friedman, personal communication). 
This etymology resonates interestingly with the local acknowledgement 
of Roma as renowned masters of budženje, as illustrated by the 2003 doc-
umentary Pretty Dyana: A Gypsy Recycling Saga. The film gives an insight 






























living in Belgrade lovingly rebuild Dyanas – the successor to the legend-
ary Citroen CV2s  – equipping them with radios, cigarette lighters and 
even miniature TVs, and attaching them to their carts (Mitić 2003).
Budženje is a type of bricolage and therefore, as a practice, firmly 
identifies as informal. Typically it is what is done to homes, cars and 
computers in ways deemed to be in direct opposition to official, proper 
or legally, technologically and scientifically legitimate actions. It is the 
general shoddiness of infrastructure and everyday objects associated 
not only with socialism, but also with general Balkan backwardness that 
necessitates budženje.
Cars present the original and most important locus for budženje, 
perhaps rivalled only by houses. The concept has two basic mean-
ings when applied specifically to cars. One involves modifying the car 
by enhancing the engine and other parts (a more specific synonym 
is frizirati). There is still a lingering sense of rough and improvised 
work, yet the word in this context usually conveys a kind of approval 
and even admiration. The other sense is more negatively connoted 
and means jury- rigging or jerry- building that may or may not include 
enhancements.
Figure 5.36.1 Trabi and Fića on a Belgrade street, 2003. 


















In the former Yugoslavia, the domestically produced version of the 
Italian Fiat 600, the Zastava 750, popularly known as Fića and produced 
from 1955– 85, served as a canonical object of car budženje. As the first 
domestically produced car, and the first to become affordable for a rela-
tively wide segment of the population, Fića became the ‘people’s car’. It 
was small and hardy and could pull astounding loads, but when suitably 
souped up (nabudžen), Fića could leave bigger and more expensive cars 
in the dust. Augmented by Abarth racing car parts, the Fića became the 
mainstay of the so- called National Class category in car racing, as dem-
onstrated in one of the most cult of Yugoslav movies, The National Class 
(Marković 1979).
Just like the Trabi in the German Democratic Republic (Berdahl 
2001), the Fića was an object of endless modifications and enhance-
ments, involving huge expenditure of time, effort and blat- capital (cf. 
blat, 1.1 Volume 1) in order to keep it running (see Figure 5.36.1). Just 
as the Trabi became the icon of Ostalgie, nostalgia for aspects of life in 
East Germany, so the Fića became the icon of the Yugoslav equivalent, 
Yugonostalgia.
A personal ad nailed to a tree at a Belgrade street corner in 1998 
(author source) offers an interesting example of budženje in relation to 
housing. The advert offered ‘Budžim po kućama’ (‘I rig at your home’, 
or ‘I will jerry- build at home’). The interesting feature of this usage is 
its apparent lack of irony and the universality of application. Normally 
a part of an intimate repertoire of resourceful improvisation, budženje 
is here presented as a straightforward business proposition. It would 
appear that the advert was addressed to people who lacked money for a 
proper plumber, painter or contractor, but desperately needed problems 
fixed in the home and would settle for a cheaper jury- rigger who could fix 
something so that it held, albeit temporarily.
As with similar informal practices of ‘making do’, practitioners 
of budženje tend to see it ambivalently – somewhere between pride in 
their own resourcefulness, and shame in failing to attain some sort of 
posited standard of civilised or ‘normal’ living. If Americans joke that 
the whole universe is held together by duct tape, ex- Yugoslavs could be 
beset by a profound sense that their whole social existence is jury- rigged 
– one huge, ugly karabudževina. In 2006, social commentator, Milosav 
Marinović lamented that Serbia was a karabudževina (2006),
that is to say, as a country where closets are made out of balconies, 
basements out of closets, rooms out of basements, living rooms out 
























wisdom out of ignorance, victory out of defeat … We discard noth-
ing, we are constantly cobbling something together [budžimo 
nešto] just so it could continue to serve some impossible, useless, 
and wrong purpose.
Here, society itself is seen as a fine mechanism that has been jury- rigged 
over and over again to the point of hopelessness. Things are made to 
serve purposes they were never intended for, and most importantly, all 
kind of past debris is jerry- built into the present, making it hopelessly 
confused, makeshift, crooked, improvised, shoddy, unreliable, irrational, 
ill- formed and ungainly.
Budženje provokes contrasting reactions among Serbs. Some feel a 
kind of pride in their countrymen’s resourcefulness and ingenuity that 
goes into all this bodging of things – from cars and living spaces to poli-
tics and society in general (de Certeau (1988) famously celebrated these 
everyday improvisations and bricolage). On the other hand, laments 
such as Marinović’s come from a particular type of intellectual elite in 
Serbia, and regret the country’s apparent inability to produce an ideal-
ised rational and orderly environment. This ideal state of things is often 
referred to as ‘normality’, while to have to constantly resort to budženje, 
and to sense one’s entire social world as an ungainly budževina, is pre-
cisely what is not ‘normal’. ‘Normality’ has emerged as one of the central 
keywords in post- socialist studies (Fehérváry 2013; Jansen 2015), and 
popular notions of what constitutes ‘normal life’ among citizens of post- 
socialist societies project an ideal often associated with ‘Europe’ or ‘the 
West’. Yet paradoxically, it is often everyday life under socialism, noto-
rious for its informal techniques of survival, that is seen as ‘normal’ in 
Serbian society, as opposed to the instabilities of that which came after it. 
It is this sense that life under socialism was ‘normal’ that accounts for the 
great appeal of various socialist nostalgias that persist to this day such as 
Yugonostalgia and Ostalgie.
As with other informal practices of ‘making do’ found in socialist 
societies such as ‘economies of favours’ (see Chapter 1 Introduction, 
Volume 1), budženje can be seen as both ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. As a 
practice and metaphor, budženje tends to hover between seeming oppo-
sites – not only between ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’, but also between 
bricolage and engineering, sometimes emphasising one, sometimes the 
other, and sometimes suspended between the two. That budženje could 
be considered as a feat of engineering is attested to by a comment that a 
Belgrade taxi driver made in response to the author’s mention of ingen-
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While ‘mathematics’ should normally be the exact opposite to budženje, 




Blavatnik school of Government, University of oxford, Uk
Jugaad denotes a way of solving problems by working around con-
straints and improvising with limited resources. The concept originates 
in a Hindi word that means ‘cobbled together’ – jugaad initially referred 
to jury-rigged vehicles common in rural India. Built from diesel pump 
engines and old motor vehicle parts fitted onto wooden carts, jugaads 
are a cheap and useful form of motorised transport. Unregulated, unli-
censed and uninsured, they transport people, fertiliser, farm tools and 
produce.
In contemporary India, jugaad refers to various sorts of improvised 
machines and makeshift structures, quick- fix solutions or workarounds. 
It might also refer to an object or technology used in a new or unintended 
way. A commonly cited example of jugaad is the ‘missed call’ – a mobile 
phone call that enables communication without cost to either sender or 
receiver. A missed call might be used to signal arrival at a designated 
meeting place or convey any other pre- decided message. Initially driven 
by expensive call rates when mobile phones were introduced, missed 
calls remain a feature of everyday life in India, saving money as well 
as time.
In a broader sense, jugaad implies devising fixes and strategies that 
are not on the books, intended to address practical problems and cope 
with a lack of resources, burdensome rules and regulations, inadequate 
infrastructure and unreliable services. In urban India, residents of squat-
ter settlements use jugaad to gain access to municipal water connections, 
illegally affixing small- bore pipes and pumps to water mains, typically 
with the collusion of political representatives and street- level municipal 
workers. ‘Share taxis’ and ‘share auto- rickshaws’, which run short, fixed 
routes, serve as a jugaad form of intermediate public transport in Indian 
cities, but operate outside of the official regulatory system.
Jugaad has in recent years gained currency in the fields of manage-
ment and engineering, spurred by popular business books such as Jugaad 
Innovation (Radjou et al. 2012). The idea of jugaad has been co- opted 















an indigenous system of adaptation and innovation that is well suited 
to what the CEO of Hindustan Unilever describes as ‘an increasingly 
resource- starved, volatile and unpredictable world’ (http:// jugaadin-
novation.com/ supporters/ ). Jugaad today finds regular mention in the 
international business press, as a characteristic of India’s major firms 
as well as small entrepreneurs and informal businesses. Jugaad in this 
sense implies a flexible and adaptive mode of practice, a ‘mindset’ geared 
towards improvising and solving problems as they come up. The Tata 
nano car, launched in 2009 by one of India’s largest industrial con-
glomerates, was extolled as an example of jugaad innovation. Priced at 
roughly $2,000 at its launch, making it the cheapest car in the world, the 
nano was a safe, no- frills, ‘frugally engineered’ car intended to make car 
ownership accessible to India’s newly emerging middle class (Rajagopal, 
2011; Radjou et al. 2012). The nano, a small but conventional looking 
four- door vehicle, used unconventional and innovative methods in its 
design and manufacturing process in order to keep costs low, such as glu-
ing some parts together with high- performance glue (Rajagopal 2011).
The missed call is a classic example of an informal jugaad practice 
that has been put to commercial use. Indian firms, from banks to vegeta-
ble vendors, use ‘missed calls’ to communicate with customers and pro-
vide information about services (Pandey and Verma- Ambwani 2015). 
For example, a local newspaper lets customers renew subscriptions with 
a missed call, and a mass political campaign against corruption invited 
citizens to register support through missed calls.
The positive and celebratory spin that jugaad has acquired reflects 
India’s new self- confidence as an emerging economic power, buoyed 
by the global success of some homegrown firms. Much of the litera-
ture on jugaad comes from the field of management, and consists of 
case studies of innovative low- cost products, technological adaptations 
and flexible, responsive management strategies (Radjou et al. 2012). 
There has been less research on jugaad in rural and informal settings, 
the environment within which jugaad vehicles and other grassroots 
innovations and adaptations emerged and scaled up. A study on jugaad 
among the so- called ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (a management term that 
refers to India’s poorest but largest consumer class) argues that it is a 
survival strategy adopted by households with meagre resources (Singh 
et al. 2012). In small- town North India, the idea of jugaad has gained 
traction among unemployed youth, who work as brokers and fixers 
and see themselves as small entrepreneurs (Jeffrey and Young 2014). 
Jugaad Urbanism: Resourceful Strategies for Indian Cities, a well- received 
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resourceful and efficient ways in which slum residents, small- scale and 
informal businesses addressed daily problems of housing, livelihood 
and basic services. The exhibit framed jugaad as more than just ‘mak-
ing do’, a model of doing more with less that architects, engineers and 
designers could emulate. Anthropologist Vyjayanthi Rao, in her write- 
up for Jugaad Urbanism (Center for Architecture 2011) uses the term to 
describe the ‘messiness’ of Indian cities, ‘but not based on notions of fail-
ure and chaos … jugaad incorporates an assembly of different notions of 
urbanism, far more variegated than the western models’. The flipside of 
jugaad – the constraints of unreliable infrastructure and services, weak 
institutions and an unwieldy regulatory and bureaucratic system – are 
underplayed in these accounts.
Jugaad is a pervasive feature of Indian urban space. Slums and 
squatter settlements, bazaars and informal industrial districts are con-
tinuously improvised and adapted to absorb new migrants or new sorts 
of economic activity (many Indian slums function as informal industrial 
districts). Their existence circumvents official plans, laws and regulations 
and involves a continual negotiation with state authorities just to avoid 
demolition, let alone gain a measure of public services and resources. 
Slum structures grow in a jugaad fashion, from makeshift shelters to 
more permanent structures, adding extensions, mezzanines and upper 
storeys – not according to pre- existing plans or drawings, but based on 
functional needs and available resources. Slums may be seen as jugaad 
solutions to the housing and livelihood needs of the urban poor that for-
mal institutions – both state and private – have failed to meet. But they 
also help ensure that India’s growing cities have a readily available, ‘flex-
ible’ low- wage labour supply, under the radar of state regulation.
Jugaad patterns of urban growth are not restricted to slums. As 
India goes through a period of rapid urban transformation and growth, 
the capacity of formal institutions to plan and manage urban develop-
ment is stretched. In the absence of effective municipal governments, the 
ad hoc conversion of rural land to urban use, unregulated urban devel-
opment, illegal construction, encroachment on public land and the self- 
provision or informal provision of services are widespread.
The state, in most accounts, is considered the ‘enemy’ of jugaad 
practices. However, this author’s research in Mumbai finds that jugaad 
practices also characterise the working of local state. ‘Jugaad governance’ 
is engendered by the contradictions between the state’s legal and regula-
tory regime – which is that of a centralised, high- modernist bureaucracy, 
little changed from its colonial roots – and the need to govern a largely 

























eliminate or formalise informal activities, but must instead accommodate 
and control them, to ensure economic activity and maintain social order. 
In Mumbai, the author finds that the state governs the informal city not 
through the organisational tools of a centralised bureaucratic state, but 
through decentralised, flexible, improvised and on occasion extra- legal 
practices of governance (Chattaraj 2012).
Jugaad governance enables the state to service slum areas, infor-
mally regulate and tax informal economic activities, incorporate and 
‘regularise’ unplanned urban development. Mumbai’s municipal engi-
neers, in Björkman’s (2014) account of the city’s water supply infra-
structure, are not merely corrupt individuals providing illegal services 
for a fee, but state actors involved in a complex, extra- legal process of 
negotiation, adjusting and tweaking in order to meet service demands 
in a city that grows in little accord with statutory plans. Senior offi-
cials may participate in corruption, but even upstanding bureaucrats 
implicitly tolerate jugaad practices. They overlook infractions, apply 
discretionary interpretations of rules and regulations, identify loop-
holes or delay taking actions that disrupt informal economic activi-
ties or impose heavy financial, social or political costs on the state 
(Chattaraj 2012).
Jeffrey and Young (2014) argue that jugaad is used as a euphe-
mism for corruption but with a virtuous tinge, necessary to get by and 
improve one’s circumstances. The concept thus serves to legitimise 
corruption. Some Indian business leaders chafe at the term, recalling 
its association with the shoddy and make- do jugaad vehicles and an 
unsavoury cutting of corners (Sharma 2015). Critics argue that jugaad 
is often a product of necessity rather than choice and leads to less than 
ideal solutions. For example, jugaad strategies enable residents of ille-
gal slums to gain access to water ‘one way or another’, but might reduce 
their incentive to organise collectively to demand services. They allow 
the state to renege on its obligations, but make it difficult to plan and 
manage an adequate water supply system. The implications of jugaad 
for India’s politics, economy and society are empirical questions that 
need further research.
In popular accounts of the practice, jugaad is considered a 
uniquely Indian attribute, born out of the ingenuity of India’s ordinary 
people in the face of scarce resources and a sclerotic state. Jugaad has 
several elements in common with the Brazilian concept of jeintinho, 
and system D or debrouillard in West Africa. It is sometimes mentioned 
as analogous to guanxi in China, but the element of reciprocal social 





















will be useful to tease out similarities and differences between these 








author of north Korea confidential
Contemporary North Korea effectively has two messily interlinked econ-
omies:  the ‘official’ economy (where people work in state jobs and are 
paid a state salary) and the ‘real’ economy, where people earn money in 
the shadows. The latter is de facto of much greater importance in today’s 
North Korea, and at its heart is the jangmadang. A portmanteau of jang 
meaning ‘market’ and madang literally meaning ‘place’, jangmadang is 
an archaic Korean term for marketplace that was brought back into wide-
spread usage in North Korea in the 1990s, when a devastating famine 
forced North Koreans to engage in informal market activities in order to 
survive. The word has its roots in old- fashioned Korean farmers’ markets, 
often seen at the busy intersections of narrow, muddy residential streets 
in rural North Korean towns or, on occasion, in specially constructed 
buildings designed for market activity.
Before the famine of the 1990s drove people to private trade, the 
state presided over one of the most tightly organised command econo-
mies in world history. The system was neither efficient nor innovative, 
but thanks in part to subsidised trade and aid from other communist 
countries, the state- socialist economy was relatively serviceable and pro-
vided the people with their basic needs. Following the disintegration of 
the USSR in 1991, former communist countries withdrew their economic 
subsidies to North Korea. This resulted in the collapse of the economy, 
causing a devastating famine and forcing a long- term decentralisation 
and restructuring of the economy and a bottom- up opening of society 
that continues to this day. Realising that they could no longer rely on 
the government for food and other basic needs, ordinary North Koreans 
abandoned their defunct work units and turned to private farming and 
private entrepreneurialism centred around the new jangmadang in 












without the jangmadang, survival would be impossible. This is reflected 
in the popular saying, ‘you can buy anything in the jangmadang but a 
cat’s horn’, meaning, if it exists, you can buy it in the jangmadang. Some 
62 per cent of defectors surveyed in 2010 stated that they had engaged 
in work other than their official jobs before leaving North Korea (Tudor 
and Pearson 2015: 16).
As the jangmadang grew they became networked both to each 
other and through the porous border to China, with the result that 
the sub- systems and mentality of capitalism became increasingly 
entrenched. The government, uneasy with this development but ulti-
mately powerless to stop it, has oscillated between trying to rein in the 
market forces and making halting steps to formalise and co- opt certain 
aspects of the market economy. Officially, private property and pri-
vate trade are still illegal in North Korea, yet in practice private trade 
accounts for a major share of the economy. The fact that many govern-
ment insiders are now using trade as a means of generating personal 
wealth, as well as the potentially destabilising economic and social 
upheaval that clamping down on private trade would bring at all levels 
of society, effectively neutralises any desire the government may have 
to wage war on the jangmadang.
People setting up stalls in formalised jangmadang are required to 
pay a stall tax to Party cadres in order to keep their slots – thus making 
the state complicit in marketisation. In some large markets, there are even 
electronic registration systems in effect, to keep track of who has paid their 
stall tax. Traders looking for new customers often transport their goods by 
hand over mountain paths, across rivers and through muddy valleys or 
dusty tracks in order to avoid the prying eyes of government officials who 
may try to stop them or, more likely, demand a cut of the profits.
The typical jangmadang stallholder is a lower- or middle- class, 
middle- aged married woman (ajumma). Though Korean culture has 
been male dominated since neo- Confucianism stamped its imprint on the 
Joseon dynasty (1392– 1910), it was often the case among the peasant 
population that women were the market traders, not men. This legacy 
can still be seen in South Korea today, where poor old ladies sell vegeta-
bles and rice cakes on street corners, and appear en masse outside metro 
stations with baskets full of umbrellas on rainy days. It is therefore nat-
ural that jangmadang traders in North Korea are usually female. There 
is an additional reason why the ajumma dominate the jangmadang. In 
North Korea, adults are assigned to work units, to serve the state in return 
for pitiful salaries. Married women, however, are exempt from this rule, 















earn significant multiples of what their husbands make, turning them 
into breadwinners and challenging the traditional Korean husband– wife 
dynamic.
The term jangmadang is also used by North Korea watchers to 
denote the ‘Jangmadang Generation’, the cohort of North Korean youth 
born in the 1980s and 1990s who grew up during the famine and post- 
famine era. This generation has little to no memory of a functioning 
state- socialist economy, instead operating in and relying on the market 
economy from an early age. Researchers of social change in North Korea 
also note that this generation came of age at a time of unprecedented 
access to illegal foreign media smuggled into the country on DVDs and 
USB sticks, contributing further to a cultural and ideological shift among 
this generation, making them harder to control through traditional North 
Korean propaganda and social controls.
Many officials working in government agencies and institutions 
have also seized opportunities for covert or camouflaged capitalism in 
order to generate operating budgets for their department, as well as 
enriching themselves personally and making payments to senior levels 
to buy good favour. This has spawned a plethora of de facto private busi-
nesses operating under the guise and licences of state- socialism, which 
seek protection and stability through links to the top political families 
in the country. Lack of funding by the state for its own bureaucracy fol-
lowing the economic collapse of the 1990s led to the emergence of these 
informal ‘public– private partnerships’, which outstrip in size and scale 
grassroots jangmadang trading. Joint ventures or import– export oppor-
tunities in food, agricultural supplies, medicine and consumer luxuries 
are particularly lucrative. A successful firm may contribute 30– 40 per 
cent of its profits to its parent department (as well as bribes to senior offi-
cials), with the remaining 60– 70 per cent being pocketed by its private 
de facto owners (Tudor and Pearson 2015: 36). The practice bears simi-
larities to the phenomenon of ‘state capture’ in 1990s Russia and other 
post- Soviet countries, whereby private individuals, firms and groups 
(including the mafia) were able to extract enormous rents from the state 
due to its institutional weakness (Frye 2002). However, the crucial dif-
ference in the North Korean case is that there is no legally recognised 
private sector. There thus obtains the somewhat paradoxical situation 
that these informal private companies can only exist under the guise of 
the state, and sustain it while simultaneously siphoning resources away 
from it into private hands.
This loss of centralised control over the economy and resource 













power. These trends seem not only to be irreversible but are actually 
increasing year by year. The growth of the jangmadang means that it 
is inaccurate to classify the contemporary North Korean economy as 
‘communist’ or ‘collectivised’. The growing market economy and the 
increasing economic independence of the people is one of the biggest 
long- term challenges facing the North Korean government, and how 
they respond will be a key determining factor for the future of the 
country.
5.39 Informal mining (general)
alvin a. Camba
the Johns hopkins University, Usa
‘Informal mining’ describes the locally based exploration and extraction 
of precious and base metals. ‘Mining’ in this sense does not denote a par-
ticular manual activity. Rather, it describes a series of activities such as 
digging, marking, panning and shovelling that leads to the extraction of 
minerals. Meanwhile, the term ‘informal’ denotes mining by individuals, 
groups and cooperatives that is carried out without formal restraints and 
sometimes even illegally. In this way, ‘informal mining’ (also known as 
‘artisanal’ or ‘small- scale’ mining) is distinguished from ‘formal’, capital- 
intensive mining carried out by large state or transnational mining com-
panies (see Figure 5.39.1).
Informal mining has the following characteristics: (1) reliance on 
physical labour for all types of operations, making minimal use of tech-
nology; (2) lack of legal mining licences, titles, leases and claims to the 
mineral areas for exploratory and extractive activities; (3) low levels of 
productivity per mining operation, resulting from relatively small geo-
graphical areas and water resources; (4)  absence of economic, health 
and environmental security for miners, workers and local communi-
ties; and (5) the transient character of employment due to the seasonal 
dependence of mining.
Informal mining has deep historical roots throughout the world, but 
recent changes in the world economy through the decline of agriculture, 
logging, foraging and state- sponsored employment have caused increas-
ing numbers of people to become informal miners. The World Bank put 
the number of informal miners in 2014 at 13 million. Meanwhile, as 
many as 100 million people are estimated to depend on informal mining 
in 80 countries across the world (Hentschel et al. 2002). The spread of 
informal mining has been further fuelled by the rollback of state regula-
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mean that state companies that had traditionally held a monopoly over 
access to leases and employment have effectively been disenfranchised 
in many states. As a result, informal mining associations have sprung up 
across the world to compete for loan and credit opportunities (Hilson 
2010, 2012; Bridge 2011; Camba 2015).
Informal mining relies on labour- intensive methods to extract min-
erals. Manual labour such as shovelling, picking, digging and extract-
ing, and the use of explosives such as mercury and cyanide, are common 
features in underground mining tunnels. While capital- intensive mining 
digs deep into specific sites, informal mining tends to move on to other 
sites as soon as easily accessible mineral deposits have been gathered 
(Hilson and Garforth 2013; Camba 2015). Membership in an informal 
mining firm is subject to social and market concerns, which include com-
munity involvement, ethnic kinship and families (ELLA 2012; Hilson 
2012). As organisations grow to employ more people and as demand for 
minerals increases, market- based employment concerns take increasing 
precedence over social ones.
Often the families of informal miners take part in the mineral- 
production process. In most cases, informal mining has been and remains 









male dominated, with men involved in manual work and handling of 
technical equipment (Hentschel et al. 2002; Hilson 2010, 2012). Even 
so, informal mining enterprises in many places employ female workers. 
Typically, women supply food and water, handle tools and provide aux-
iliary services such as vending, marketing and bartering (Hilson 2012). 
In Guinea, 75 per cent of informal employees are women; in Madagascar, 
Mali and Zimbabwe the figure is 50 per cent; while for Bolivia it is 40 per 
cent (Hentschel et al. 2002; Hilson 2012). Children are often employed 
as auxiliaries, going on to become fully fledged miners when they reach 
adulthood. Gold- panning is carried out in some places by children aged 
as young as 3, picking by those aged 6, and underground extraction by 
12- year- olds (Hentschel et al. 2002; Hilson 2010).
Informal mining, like other human pursuits, may act both to bring 
workers together and to provoke conflict among them. A  gold or gem 
rush can attract hundreds or even thousands of people, leading to aggres-
sion and encouraging the takeover of an area by armed groups. In the 
Philippines, 150,000 informal miners swarmed into the Diwalwal gold 
mines after the mineral sector was neoliberalised in 1986 and the mines 
were abandoned by state companies (Nem Singh and Camba 2016). 
Local governments, regional mining companies, community- based min-
ers, indigenous organisations and rebel groups all fought for access. The 
conflict ended in a truce only in 2011, when the various groups carved 
out niches in their own areas. Overall, informal mining provides 15 to 
20 per cent of precious metals such as gold, along with gemstones such 
as rubies and sapphires, while the rest of the market is taken up by the 
production of base metals such as bauxite, marble, iron ore, copper and 
nickel.
National governments, local agencies and communities have tried 
to create formal structures to legitimise and tax informal mining. In the 
Philippines, the People’s Small- Scale Mining Act of 1991 gave local gov-
ernments the power to approve licences and operations for informal min-
ers. Various kinds of informal- mining organisations have been created by 
local communities to lobby the state and protect their rights. Similarly, 
Tanzania tried to formalise informal mining by liberalising the gold 
trade (Hentschel et al. 2002), while Ghana has gone through a similar 
experience in recent years (Hilson and Clifford 2010). However, many 
informal mining organisations have been reluctant to deal with the state 
authorities because they fear bureaucratic rent- seeking and corruption 
(Hentschel et  al. 2002; ELLA 2012; Nem Singh and Bourgouin 2013). 
Their unwillingness has not, however, prevented these and similar illegal 
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often operates in a black market that thrives on rent- seeking, smuggling 
and money laundering (Hilson 2010, 2012). Middlemen and dealers 
profit financially precisely because there are fewer people in the produc-
tion chain. In 2010, the value of illegally and informally mined Peruvian 
gold was estimated at $2.9 billion (ELLA 2012).
As mentioned above, informal mining has deep historical roots 
throughout the world. The twenty- first century has seen an influx of 
Chinese financial investment that has further increased the global 
demand for informal mining. In the Philippines, for example, infor-
mal mining firms have been formed by local communities in response 
to Chinese demand, and millions of dollars’ worth of gold is annually 
shipped to Hong Kong and mainland China. Across the world, Chinese 
investments in Peru, Mali, Namibia and Burma have fuelled similar 
demands for informal mining (Lee 2014). The mineral sector, both 
formal and informal, has become a source of resource conflicts, global 
in equalities and environmental damage.
5.40 Hawala (Middle east, India and Pakistan)
nauman farooqi
Mount allison University, new Brunswick, Canada
Hawala is an informal value transfer system operating through a large 
network of money brokers that allows money to be transferred from one 
geographic location to another. The hawala system operates outside of 
more traditional financial and banking channels, and is based mainly 
in the Middle East, Indian subcontinent and parts of Africa. In Arabic, 
the root h- w- l signifies ‘change’ or ‘transformation’. The word hawala 
is derived from this root and is defined as a bill of exchange or promis-
sory note that can be used as hawala safar or a traveller’s cheque (Jost 
and Sandhu 2000). The word permeated into Hindi (national language 
of India) and Urdu (national language of Pakistan), retained its original 
meaning but acquired the additional connotations of ‘trust’ and ‘refer-
ence’. This reflects the basic principles on which the system operates. 
A hawala dealer is described as a hawaladar (Jost and Sandhu 2000).
An alternative term is hundi, a word that is etymologically rooted in 
Sanskrit and means ‘to collect’. This meaning is synonymous with prom-
issory note, bill of exchange, or hawala. A hundi operator is referred to as 
a hundiwala. Padayachee and Morrell (1991: 71) define hundi as:
A kind of bill of exchange or written order for payment that its draw-





















draw on their checking accounts. In order to draw a Hundi, a client 
had to open up an account and maintain a correspondence relation-
ship with a [private] banker.
Essentially, hawala and hundi have the same meanings and are used 
interchangeably, especially now that the system has gained international 
notoriety. However, hawala is an Arabic term while hundi is its Indian 
and Pakistani variant. It has been suggested that hundi and hawala have 
amalgamated into one network and their distinctions have been dis-
solved (Jost and Sandhu 2000).
Every year billions of dollars are transferred across countries and 
continents using Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS). The Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) defines IVTS as ‘any system, 
mechanism, or network of people that receives money for the purpose 
of making the funds or an equivalent value payable to a third party in 
another geographic location, or not in the same form’ (US Department 
of the Treasury 2003). Hawala is one of the key forms of IVTS. It is esti-
mated that every year US$100 billion to US$300 billion flow through the 
IVTS (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002).
IVTS were established means of transferring valuables and money 
long before any of the formal methods were conceived. However, since 
the growth of formal value transfer systems, informal systems have oper-
ated in the shadows, albeit maintaining a devoted following. Many of 
today’s IVTS originated among ethnic Asian peoples who based codes 
of conduct for value/ money transfer on mutual trust within groups and 
individuals. The various systems derived their names from the geograph-
ical locations and the ethnicity of the groups that practised them. Passas 
(1999) has summarised some of the more common names for IVTS prac-
tices in different parts of the world:
• Hawala (‘trust, reference, exchange’; the Arabic root h- w- l means 
‘to change’ or ‘to transform’) –  India.
• Hundi (commonly translated as ‘trust’; it means bill of exchange 
or promissory note; comes from a Sanskrit root meaning ‘to 
collect’) – Pakistan.
• Fei ch’ien (‘flying money’) – Chinese.
• Phoe kuan – (‘message houses’) – Thailand.
• Hui k’uan (to remit sums of money) – Mandarin Chinese.
• Ch’iao hui (‘overseas remittance’) – Mandarin Chinese.
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• Chop (shop)  – non- Chinese use this term for one of the Chinese 
methods.
• Chiti banking – refers to the ‘chit’ used as receipt or proof of claim 
in transactions introduced by the British in China (short for ‘chitty’, 
a word borrowed from the Hindi ‘chitthi’, signifying a letter, docu-
ment or mark).
• Hui or hui kuan (‘association’) – Vietnamese living in Australia.
• Stash house (for casa de cambio) – South American systems.
A simplified model of a hawala transaction is provided by El- Qorchi 
(2002):
• Customer A (CA) wishes to send money to customer B (CB).
• CA visits hawaladar A (HA) in country A.
• HA receives money to be remitted (Q)  to CB plus a service fee 
from CA.
• CA receives code of authentication and passes it on to CB.
• HA then instructs hawaladar B (HB) in country B to remit Q to CB.
• CB discloses the code to HB who then presents CB with the funds.
Hawala persists due to a number of reasons, which include; anonym-
ity, cultural friendliness (Chene, 2008), low transaction costs (Maimbo, 
2003), less transit time (Schramm and Taube, 2002), enhanced level 







































Figure 5.40.1 The Model of Simple Hawala Transfer.










of trust versus banks and other conventional channels (Schramm and 
Taube, 2002), and increased efficiency (Ballard, 2003).
‘Underground banking’ is a core term widely used to describe 
hawala. This term, however, is inherently fallacious. The actual trans-
fer process rarely involves any banking procedures. It is structured 
more as an exchange on open accounts between two or more indi-
viduals (Passas 1999). For these reasons, ‘underground banking’ is a 
misnomer and incorrectly implies a submerged activity of illegality 
and corruption. Another term coined by media hype is ‘black hawala’, 
which alludes to illegal hawala transactions (Jost and Sandhu 2000). 
However, for some critics, ‘black hawala’ has come to define all hawala 
transactions. This is typical of the partisan thrust of many present- day 
media commentaries.
By their nature, hawala networks enable transnational eco-
nomic activity conducted in a world of increasing interconnectedness. 
However, unlike ‘formal’ transnational economic activities that oper-
ate from relatively static identifiable entities (such as banks and other 
multinational corporations), and that are regulated by national and 
international governmental institutions, the hawala economy is consti-
tuted by networks of spatially dispersed heterogeneous actors with no 
specific centre. As hawala is located in the ‘grey’ area of legality and 
may be illegal in some circumstances, one might expect that the default 
rate and default risk would be high, fraud would be rife and exploita-
tion common. However, there is a surprising consensus among scholars 
that the hawala has a history of being reliable, speedy and convenient 
(Schramm and Taube 2003; Ballard 2005a, 2005b). Thus, hawala pro-
duces positive economic outcomes but without the traditional visible 
elements of management control (reporting processes, audit/ docu-
mentation, formalised clearing system) normally associated with the 
formal sector.
Hawala gained increasing attention in the US and international 
media after the 9/ 11 terrorist bombings involving Al- Qaida. It has been 
alleged that Al- Qaida used hawala to transfer money – undetected – 
across international borders to finance its terrorist activities. Since then, 
research into various aspects of hawala by governments, academics and 
journalists has increased significantly. This sudden surfeit of informa-
tion has generated a ‘fact by repetition’ phenomenon (Passas 1999). 
Emanating mostly from the West, a large number of negative commen-
taries have cast hawala as a dangerous practice that needs regulation, 
monitoring, or even abolition. However, contrary to popular miscon-
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financial malpractice, and continue to be used primarily for legitimate 
purposes all over the world (Passas 1999). De Goede (2003) has com-
mented on the general misconception that hawala is an ‘underground’ 
banking system, noting that these informal networks are connected to 
Western banking systems in many ways.
Although hawala is considered an alternative to formal transfers 
involving banks and financial institutions, the processes involved are 
quite similar. Formal value transfers can take several forms: cash carri-
ers, exchange houses, and money remitters. Apart from cash carriers, 
formal value transfer systems do not physically move cash or valuables, 
but an institution forwards a sum to an individual/ business entity on 
behalf of another institution representing a different individual/ busi-
ness entity. An illustration of this is a transfer of funds through Western 
Union. Detailed records are kept that are then settled through the formal 
banking sector, while impartial third parties monitor and enforce rules 
and regulations.
In contrast, while hawaladars keep some records of transaction 
these are not to monitor their activity but as reminders for details of 
individual accounts, transactions and balances. This record- keeping is 
a matter of individual practice, in contrast to the standardised proce-
dures followed by the formal sector. However, the settlement process 
for hawala works on the same basis as the formal system: open accounts 
are kept and there is occasional netting off between hawaladars to set-
tle accounts, although they may not necessarily use formal channels 
(Wilson 2002).
The biggest difference between the two systems is the monitoring 
process. As mentioned, the formal system relies on an impartial third 
party to monitor all transactions and ensure compliance with the rules. 
Any party that departs from fair transactions would become liable to 
penalties imposed by the laws governing the system. On the other hand, 
the informal system does not rely on third-party monitoring. Individual 
hawaladars and other members of the network monitor all transactions. 
This is enabled by the customary trust that exists between the hawala-
dars, a trust that stems from a homogeneous set of beliefs that governs 
code of conduct within ethnic groups and communities. Any individual 
engaging in acts contrary to the code of the network is punished accord-
ingly (Schramm and Taube 2002). The informal mechanism does not 
have the detailed documentation that is the essential part of monitor-
ing in the formal system. While records exist, they are neither stand-
ardised nor available in a form that would be accessible to monitoring 

















fund transfers. The hawala system is based on a hierarchy of agents, each 
involved in a certain segment of the transaction, making it very difficult 
to trace the fund’s transfer chain.
5.41 Bitcoin (general)
Jean-Philippe Vergne and Gautam swain
Ivey Business school, Western University, Canada
Bitcoin, originally described as a ‘peer- to- peer electronic cash system’, 
was introduced in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto (a pseudonym) as an alter-
native to national currencies issued by central banks (Nakamoto 2008). 
Unlike the formal institutions of global finance (e.g. banks, credit card 
companies), bitcoin is to a large extent a bottom- up, activist-driven, 
lightly regulated ecosystem. Like other software innovations in the past, 
its creation draws upon various technological building blocks developed 
among libertarian hacker communities since the mid- 1980s (Durand and 
Vergne 2013), particularly in the areas of peer- to- peer networking and 
cryptography. With Internet access and a digital wallet, which can be cre-
ated for free in a few seconds, anyone can transfer value to a third party 
anywhere in the world, whether to purchase goods from merchants who 
accept bitcoin payments, or to exchange bitcoin for fiat currency such as 
Figure 5.41.1 Bitcoin symbol.











the US dollar. All bitcoin transactions are recorded on a public ledger, 
called a blockchain, which is maintained in a decentralised fashion by 
thousands of computer nodes (Swan 2015). These nodes secure the bit-
coin network by verifying and validating cryptographically all the trans-
actions. As well, each node stores a copy of the public ledger that can be 
compared to other copies in order to ensure integrity and detect fraud.
More specifically, the security of bitcoin transactions relies on 
public- key cryptography, based on the generation of random pairs of keys 
consisting of alphanumeric characters and used to digitally sign transac-
tions. Bitcoin users are assigned a public key upon joining the bitcoin net-
work, and that public key acts as an address (similar to a bank account 
number) to which funds can be transferred. The blockchain records the 
number of bitcoin held by each address and can verify the authenticity of 
associated transactions. The private key associated with each address (or 
public key) must be kept secret since it is used to prove ownership of the 
address and allows the user to unlock the funds. Public- key cryptography 
enables bitcoin users to transfer value without having to reveal their real 
identity, which makes bitcoin transactions ‘pseudonymous’. Even though 
full anonymity is not a feature of bitcoin (i.e. public keys can sometimes 
be connected to real- world identities), it still offers more privacy than 
traditional financial transactions. As a result, bitcoin has been a tool of 
choice for transferring value outside the boundaries of formal financial 
institutions, occasionally helping black market entrepreneurs eschew 
scrutiny by law enforcement and tax authorities (for a detailed, multi-
media overview of how bitcoin works, see Vergne and Lomazzo 2015).
Not only does bitcoin have the potential to power the informal 
economy, but it also represents an attempt at managing informally an 
international payment system. Indeed, bitcoin is not a corporation, nei-
ther is it a for- profit structure of any kind. Instead, it is run as (and by) a 
multi- stakeholder community comprising users, merchants (who accept 
bitcoin), developers (of the bitcoin software), and miners (i.e. the own-
ers of network nodes in charge of maintaining the integrity of the bit-
coin blockchain in exchange for bitcoin rewards) (Antonopoulos 2014). 
Over time, third- party service providers backed by venture capital firms 
have entered the scene (e.g. Coinbase, Kraken), offering tools to facili-
tate bitcoin storage and exchange. The decentralised nature of bitcoin’s 
governance means that the traditional tools of monetary policy are inap-
plicable to bitcoin – for instance, no central authority can debase bitcoin 
by ‘minting’ additional coins. New bitcoins are released gradually into 
the ecosystem following transparent rules, and the maximum number of 



























at 21  million. It would require a large consensus among bitcoin stake-
holders to change this parameter.
While bitcoin offers a promising digital alternative to the central-
isation of financial transactions, its future is still mired in uncertainty. 
Bitcoin’s total market capitalisation has been highly volatile since its 
inception and represents a tiny fraction of the market capitalisation of 
the world’s largest banks (i.e. the top three are each valued at more than 
$200 billion). Besides, the regulatory environment remains unpredict-
able (De Filippi 2013), and standardisation efforts by the bitcoin commu-
nity have been slowed down by persistent governance issues, including 
feuds between factions of bitcoin developers who disagree about the 
cryptocurrency’s future (World Economic Forum 2016). Some countries, 
such as Iceland, Russia or Bangladesh, have sought to ban the use of bit-
coin, while China prohibits its financial institutions from transacting in 
bitcoin (Swan 2015). In contrast, countries such as the UK, Singapore 
or Canada are more open to the technology and seek to design attractive 
regulation.
One of the major obstacles to bitcoin’s mass diffusion is the dif-
ficulty to understand what bitcoin represents at a deeper level or, put 
differently, to classify bitcoin using an adequate category label, such 
as ‘asset’, ‘payment system’, ‘commodity’, ‘property’, or ‘virtual cur-
rency’. In fact, in the British media alone, more than a hundred distinct 
category labels have been used to describe bitcoin between 2009 and 
2015 (Vergne and Swain 2017), creating substantial confusion among 
the general public. In addition, many category labels used to refer to 
bitcoin are inconsistent and fail to accommodate some of bitcoin’s core 
features (e.g. a ‘virtual currency’ is typically issued by developers in 
a centralised fashion, as is the case in videogames, yet bitcoin was 
designed precisely to avoid centralisation) (European Central Bank 
2012). The multiplicity of category labels used to describe bitcoin also 
nurtures contradictory beliefs regarding which attributes bitcoin pos-
sesses – or not (e.g. bitcoin is not ‘anonymous’, despite numerous pub-
lic claims to the contrary).
Such instances of ‘categorical anarchy’ (Vergne and Swain 2017) 
are rare, but do not necessarily imply the ultimate failure of the inno-
vation. For instance, back in 1993, the New York Times (Johnson 1993) 
wrote, rather ambiguously, about ‘a television station without pro-
grammers or a newspaper without editors’ to describe what is now 
consensually labelled ‘the Internet’. Interestingly, in the case of bitcoin, 
the ambiguity regarding which category labels adequately describe the 




















bitcoin leave the sphere of the informal economy. While some clari-
fication around bitcoin’s definition and applicable regulatory regime 
would likely reassure potential investors, it would also constrain users’ 
ability to transact without having to rely on the institutions of global 
finance. For example, if regulators were to categorise bitcoin as a ‘com-
modity’ instead of ‘currency’, then sales tax would apply to bitcoin 
transactions (Peters et  al. 2015), and the latter would require addi-
tional records and reporting, thereby diminishing bitcoin’s potential 
as the informal economy’s currency. Today, cash is still (by far) the 
preferred means of payment for racketeering, money laundering, drug 
and human trafficking, bribery, tax evasion, extortion, and terrorism 
(Rogoff 2016). But bitcoin – now recognised, with increasing consen-
sus, as the first ‘decentralised cryptocurrency’ – continues to develop 
regardless of censure because it cuts out the financial sector’s middle-
men and provides ways to mitigate both regulatory power and govern-
ment surveillance (Maurer et al. 2013).




People have an amazing capacity for resilience in the face of oppres-
sion. As the examples in this chapter show, those with limited means 
who are excluded or marginalised from the system often resort to vari-
ous ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 2008). These include community net-
works; informal institutions of reciprocity, favours and backscratching; 
and tricks to eke out a living outside the formal economy. The combina-
tion of in genuity, cooperation and official tolerance of (or connivance in) 
informal practices can, in some cases, transform the survival instinct into 
a viable business plan.
While our normative sympathies may lie with the underdog suc-
ceeding against long odds, there is a darker side of this story. It turns out 
that the measures taken in collective self- defence are dual purpose and 
can be used to amass, consolidate and exercise power in ways that may 
transform the exploited into exploiters and lead to collectively unfavour-
able outcomes.
This chapter identifies several mechanisms that determine how 


















occurring simultaneously on a different scale, or taking on a new pur-
pose when conditions change. Examples of informality from Soviet and 
post- Soviet Central Asia show how network construction, authoritarian 
governance structures, exclusive identities and internalised narratives of 
victimhood can turn prey into predators.
The ironic notion that the same actors may occupy distinct and ethi-
cally incongruent niches with respect to power has broad resonance in 
popular culture and folk wisdom, illustrated by tropes such as revolutions 
devouring their children, generational cycles of victimhood and abuse, 
and captives turning into tormentors. In times of turmoil, it is often the 
case that groups are simultaneously victims and aggressors, while peo-
ple engage in the self- justifications that turn themselves into the former 
and their enemies into the latter (Ross 2007; Deák et al. 2009). Informal 
responses to social or political restrictions during ordinary times can also 
serve as weapons of the weak or the strong.
First, the process of network construction is a sociological behaviour 
that protects assets and information from the powerful while solidifying 
exclusivity. Actors collaborate with those with whom they have a previ-
ous relationship, or form strategic alliances with people who have access 
to complementary resources. In the fluid environment that emerged 
after the Soviet institutions collapsed, the rule of law was weak and new 
threats and opportunities appeared. Actors at all levels endeavoured to 
secure their interests by strengthening social ties and exploiting institu-
tional remnants of the old system (Ledeneva 2006). In many cases, it is 
difficult to tell a ‘defensive’ from an ‘offensive’ motivation, as networks 
help actors both to protect their property and persons, and to accumulate 
resources to improve their well- being. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, busi-
nessmen who had succeeded in accumulating wealth formed alliances 
with other elites unaffiliated with the regime in order to defend their 
assets. However, these networks also competed for the spoils of power 
against other elite groups, perpetuating the concentration of the nation’s 
wealth in a few hands at the expense of the majority (Radnitz 2010b).
Informal networks that are engaged in illicit economic activity or 
subversive collective action operate sub rosa because of the high risk 
that exposure would cause harm. An authoritarian governance structure 
with centralised decision- making and strict monitoring and sanctioning 
of subordinates has the advantage of ensuring discretion and securing 
compliance where negligence could be damaging to the organisation 
(Hechter 1988). But what may benefit the organisation can limit the 
freedom and autonomy of its members and those who cross its path. In 






















levels – from republic- level leaders to ordinary cotton farmers – carried 
out a massive conspiracy to profit from the underreporting of the har-
vest and the black market siphoning of cotton from state procurement 
channels (Gleason 1991). Contemporaneous reports pointed to a highly 
organised and hierarchical system of justice and public  goods provision 
parallel to the formal system based in Moscow. It was run as a fiefdom 
with punishments meted out arbitrarily by a local strongman (Rumer 
1989). In more recent times, the leaders of organised criminal groups 
from the region have displayed the dual markers of ‘Robin Hood’- type 
providers of substitute public goods and ruthless defenders of their turf 
(Kupatadze 2012). Finally, protest leaders who inveighed against tyranny 
and corruption, once ascendant, were tempted by the seduction of power 
and turned into despised imitations of their predecessors (Mitchell 2009; 
Collins 2011).
Another feature of informal networks that has the potential to lead 
to exploitation is the tendency of members to develop exclusive iden-
tities. The imperative of self- protection leads to the establishment of 
rules, norms and conventions that help draw a clear line between the 
in- groups and out- groups. Identity markers associated with language, 
region, lineage or dialect can act as shortcuts to distinguish members 
from non- members but also, more insidiously, to shape the boundaries 
of competition, which can be perceived as zero- sum (Richerson 2003). 
Soviet personnel policy in Central Asia sought to balance between cadres 
representing different regions, which in turn derived from historical set-
tlement patterns and imperial administrative boundaries. By sharpening 
lines of division that were previously fluid, Soviet governors intensified 
competition over official posts (Jones Luong 2002). This laid the ground-
work for the Tajik Civil War of 1992– 7, which arose from an inability of 
regional groups to share power; and intermittent but (mostly) low- level 
clashes between Tashkent/ Fergana and Samarkand/ Bukhara cohorts 
in Uzbekistan (Tunçer- Kılavuz 2009; Markowitz 2013). Aside from the 
potential for violence, losers included people distant from the elite rep-
resentatives of these interest groups, and people hailing from weaker 
regions.
Finally, informal networks and ethnic divisions of labour can lead 
to divergent perceptions of success, disempowerment and potential 
threat. Social comparisons between groups, coupled with stereotypes 
and national myths, may lead multiple groups to consider themselves the 
weaker party and others a threat to their livelihood or even existence. 
Take the case of Kyrgyzstan, for example, where ethnic Uzbeks make up 


















near majorities of the population in several major cities near Kyrgyzstan’s 
south- western border with Uzbekistan. Since Kyrgyzstan became inde-
pendent in 1991, ethnic Kyrgyz have dominated the public sector in the 
south of the country, including the power ministries, while members of 
the ethnic Uzbek population have concentrated on business and trade 
(Fumagalli 2007). While this division can be complementary as each 
works within its own sphere and interacts with the other in shared spaces 
such as bazaars, it may also be a volatile arrangement, since groups may 
propagate self- serving narratives about their own entitlement versus 
the dishonesty or illegitimate practices of the other. This has generated 
insecurity and concerns over sovereignty among the Kyrgyz population. 
Thus, when Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek Bakiev was overthrown 
in 2010, causing a vacuum of state power, insecurity fuelled violence as 
members of each group sought to act on long- held grievances and protect 
their own group interests (Radnitz 2010a). In this instance it was impos-
sible to distinguish the oppressed from the oppressor; what mattered was 
that both sides believed themselves to be the former and the other the 
latter.
The above examples illustrate the propensity for adaptive behav-
iours in response to adversity to become predatory in their own right. It 
raises the question of how (or even whether) we can recognise a thresh-
old at which one effect turns into the other. But perhaps this is the wrong 
question, premised on an assumption that surviving and thriving are dis-
tinct activities. Instead of trying to identify an illusory boundary, we can 
perhaps understand more by loosening dichotomies that often motivate 
the investigation of informality.
First, we might argue for watering down the distinction between 
the elite and mass levels. Networks that are primarily ‘political’ or ‘social’ 
are usually studied in isolation, by different disciplines and using dif-
ferent methodologies, consistent with the ‘hourglass’ depiction of post- 
Soviet societies (Rose 1995). But the actions of communities or firms 
that are at first blush merely adaptive and apolitical may, in certain 
circumstances, put pressure on existing institutional arrangements 
and have political ramifications. These include the co- optation of state 
actors, erosion of formal institutions through noncompliance, mobilisa-
tion of protest, the operation of a parallel state and even making a bid 
for state power.
Second, we might dispense with assumptions that state and non- 
state networks operate according to different principles. States are osten-
sibly unitary and come with standard operating procedures. States rule 

















In practice, the difference in the basis of relations and the types of order 
that emerge ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the state may be a matter of degree 
rather than of kind (Darden 2008). A depiction of a more porous bound-
ary helps us make sense of cases in which informal networks become 
state- like, and people who begin by evading or manipulating formal 
rules come to make and enforce their own; and how economic agents 
who evade strictures such as taxes and regulation can reach such a scale 
that they seek to impose them on others.
Given the fluid categories and complex webs of relations at different 
levels that predominate in weakly institutionalised systems such as those 
in Central Asia, we find actors who resist as they rule, evade while they 
enforce and contest as they connive. Scholars attuned to these possibili-
ties can advance the study of informality beyond traditional categories.
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The notion of ‘gaming the system’ may be summed up as manipulating 
the formal rules and procedures that are intended to preserve an exist-
ing system, in order to exploit that system for one’s own purposes. The 
notion does not, however, lend itself to a simple definition, as is shown 
by the complexity and richness of the material contained in this chap-
ter. In my introduction, I offer some reflections on the degrees of com-
plexity of the informal practices described here; on family resemblances 
across the practices of different countries; on the importance of symme-
try between formal rules and informal norms, and, since the period that 
followed the end of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
offers so many rich examples of gaming the system, on the effects of post- 
communist social change.
Complexity
A system can be gamed with widely varying degrees of elaboration. Parking 
your car in a disabled parking space barely qualifies as gaming the system, 
even if you get away with it. You have secured the advantage of a park-
ing place by breaking a formal rule; that is all. That is akin to simple fare- 
dodging. If, however, you illicitly acquire a ‘Disabled’ sticker for your car 















slightly more elaborate way. A cartoon by Alex (Daily Telegraph 2016) illus-
trates a particularly sophisticated variation on the theme of insider trading 
(see insider trading in USA, 6.16 in this volume). A city trader thanks a 
financial analyst for his share tips, which are invariably wrong. The grati-
tude is double- edged. By basing some of his trades on those tips, the trader 
can keep his overall performance down to a level at which it does not 
arouse suspicion. The rest of his trades are based on inside information.
In gaming the system, complexity can vary a great deal. Blat in 
Romanian usage can refer to something as straightforward and innocent 
as hitching a ride, through fare- dodging on public transport to giving 
(and taking) bribes. In Arabic, wasta can refer to informal intermediation 
in family disputes but also to ‘politicians swapping political largesse for 
votes’. Intermediary in exchanges of favour (see economies of favours in 
Chapter 1) may simply help the speeding up of a bureaucratic procedure 
or it can be used to protect students from extortion of informal payments 
by instructors and teachers.
Some of the terms explored in this chapter, however, are highly spe-
cific. They do not permit a great deal of variation in the sophistication with 
which they are applied, and they seem to be endemic to a particular coun-
try. This is true in particular of externe Personen in Germany and flipping by 
British members of parliament. What makes them so apparently specific? 
Could they be assimilated into informal practices of a more general kind?
family resemblances
‘Gaming the system’ applies to a range of activities that bear a certain 
family resemblance to one another. In this it resembles the word ‘game’ 
itself. It is impossible to concoct a neat definition of ‘game’ that covers card 
games, board games, ball games and children’s games like ring- a- ring- a- 
roses. Very little is in common between all of these. Rather ‘Similarities 
crop up and disappear’, like family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1953).
Are there groups of family resemblances within the most general 
characteristic of gaming the system, namely that of winning some advan-
tage by acting against the spirit of the formal rules? It seems that there 
are. One family resemblance is the role of informal, sometimes illicit, 
intermediaries who secure, or try to secure, some advantage for some-
one from a third party who is in a position to provide that advantage. 
Wast a in the Middle East, torpil in Turkey, pulling strings in the UK and 
USA and raccomandazione in Italy all have this in common. This fam-
ily resemblance is visible across societies in which patron– client rela-





















case the practice can take forms that are regarded as scandalous and 
other, milder forms that may be regarded as routine.
Another family resemblance across the varieties of system- gam-
ing is that an element of wheeling and dealing is involved, something 
that requires a certain skill, know- how and daring. This is apparent in 
a number of the practices described below but perhaps most strongly in 
the Bulgarian s vrutka and the Polish kombinacja. The entry on s vrutka 
in Bulgaria says that ‘The phrase … invokes creativity, fluidity and mas-
tery of the social milieus and social and cultural knowledge’. The entry 
on kombinacja in Poland quotes sociologist Joanna Kusiak as saying that 
kombinacja ‘has been considered a skill which one should be proud of’ 
(Kusiak 2012: 296– 7). These descriptions lead one to wonder what the 
relationship may be (across countries) between entrepreneurship and 
the wheeling- and- dealing varieties of informal practice. Are s vrutka and 
kombinacja practices that amount to informal (unincorporated) enter-
prise? Or are they behaviour that is provoked by a bureaucratic environ-
ment inimical to business?
There is a rich source of data on national rates of business owner-
ship and on national environments for enterprise, assembled from sur-
veys conducted by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. That might be 
one source on which to draw in making cross- country comparisons of 
entrepreneurial informal practices.
formal rules and informal norms
The entry in this chapter on cash in  hand in the UK raises the question 
of the correspondence or lack of correspondence between the norms, 
values and beliefs underlying a society’s informal institutions on the one 
hand, and its formal institutions on the other: where there is a lack of 
correspondence between the two, cash in  hand is more likely to be a com-
mon practice. Empirical studies across many European countries support 
this conclusion.
Is this true of informal practices in general? If most of the indi-
viduals in a society trust that society’s politicians, police officers and tax 
inspectors and have internalised the values embodied in official arrange-
ments, there will be less tolerance of tax evasion. The same might well 
apply to pulling strings in the UK, insider trading in the USA, and otkat 
(kick- backs) in Russia, to take a few more examples of informal practices 
described in this chapter.
There are, however, some other practices that amount to a semi- 























Hyderabad, India, for handling property transactions on land where for-
mal property rights are not established, is one example. It has evident 
uses in developing countries; there are parallels in Bogota, Cairo and in 
some sub- Saharan African countries. It is not obvious that in cases like 
this an asymmetry of informal and formal norms and values is necessarily 
involved; rather, the defective machinery of state needs patching up, and 
the patching up is done by an informal practice that has acquired a degree 
of formal support.
Other informal practices seem mostly to depend on a divergence 
between formal and informal norms. That probably would help to 
explain two phenomena: the popular view of some practices that they 
exist in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ versions (e.g. kombinacja in Poland and tapş in 
Azerbaijan) and that there is often a moral stigma attached to a practice 
in which many people nonetheless engage (such as raccomandazione in 
Italy).
Are there countries where formal and informal norms substan-
tially converge, and confidence in formal institutions is high, so that 
our informal practices play only a marginal role in people’s lives? This 
may be idle speculation, but I am struck by the absence, in the wealth 
of material provided here, of examples from the Nordic countries – 
the perennial good guys (along with New Zealand) in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Perhaps there really is an 
unusual degree of congruence between formal and informal norms in the 
Nordic countries (see janteloven in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and 
Vetterliwirtschaft in Switzerland (3.11 and 3.15 Volume 1)).
Post- communist transformation
The end of communism in Europe meant the end of certain informal 
practices. For example, the tolkach – the Soviet enterprise’s supply fixer – 
was needed only as long as the Soviet Union was a shortage economy 
with centralised supply- planning. The end of enterprise output targets 
meant the end of the games described by the economist Janos Kornai 
for Hungarian light industry. In a rare empirical study of state- enterprise 
performance, Kornai showed how fulfilment of output targets had a bi- 
modal distribution. If, near the end of the year, it became clear that you, 
the enterprise director, were going to miss your output target and there-
fore fail to collect your bonus, it made sense to miss it by a clear margin 
in the hope of securing a correspondingly easier target next year. If you 
were going to collect this year’s bonus anyway, it equally made sense, for 
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At the same time, the end of communism meant the beginning 
of many other informal practices that replaced blat and enabled the 
transition to work (Ledeneva 2006). Some could exist only in a world 
of private enterprise. The Russian term dzhinsa, for example, denotes 
paid-for material presented in the media as ordinary news. Ukrainian 
deryban – the looting of state property – is also dependent on there 
being non- state entities to sell to or otherwise do business with. It 
might be argued that the environment required for these practices is 
not simply that of a private  enterprise, market economy, but a poorly 
regulated private enterprise, market economy. In any case, private 
enterprise is a necessary, if perhaps not a sufficient, condition for such 
practices to flourish.
Some practices, including deryban in Ukraine, may be limited to the 
early phase of economic transformation: the period depicted so vividly 
for Russia in Steven Solnick’s Stealing the State (Solnick 1998; see also 
Chayes 2015). After all, the point comes when, in the popular phrase, 
there is no more state left to steal. What happens then? One answer, at 
any rate in some ex- communist economies, is asset- grabbing from exist-
ing private owners, or reiderstvo. As is described in this chapter, reiderstvo 
has evolved from asset- grabbing by the use of private violence to asset- 
grabbing with the assistance of law enforcement agencies and the courts. 
Indeed it can on occasion end with the state’s taking back an asset previ-
ously privatised: capture of the state gives way to capture by the state.
Some informal practices appear to be more marked in ex- communist 
than in never- communist countries, though not confined to the former. An 
example would be wages in an envelope, alga aploksne in Latvia but also 
cash  in  hand in the UK. Others, such as reiderstvo and Russian ‘bankruptcy 
to order’ (zakaznoe bankrotstvo), seem on the face of it to be specific to 
some former Soviet states. If this is really the case, and not just a reflection 
of unavoidably incomplete coverage, it suggests that many informal prac-
tices observed in the ex- communist world are a response not to capitalism 
as such but to capitalism when combined with a weak rule of law.
Free-riding (staying under or over the radar)
6.1 Cash in hand (general)
Colin C. Williams
sheffield University Management school, Uk
In the UK in particular and in developed economies more generally, a 




















doing home maintenance and repair work, is ‘How much for cash?’ 
Similarly, it is commonly the case that such tradespeople will give cus-
tomers an official quote for doing a job with value-added tax (VAT) 
included, and then say, for example, ‘or 20 per cent less for cash in hand’.
‘Cash- in- hand work’ refers to monetary transactions that are 
unregistered by, or hidden from, the state for tax, social security and/ 
or labour  law purposes but that are legal in all other respects (Williams 
and Windebank 1998; European Commission 2007; Williams 2014a). 
‘Cash- in- hand’ work has been denoted in other contexts using over 45 
different adjectives and 10 different nouns. It has been called the ‘black’, 
‘concealed’, ‘informal’, ‘irregular’, ‘hidden’, ‘invisible’, ‘off the books’, 
‘subterranean’, ‘undeclared’, ‘underground’, ‘unobserved’, ‘unorganised’ 
or ‘unregulated’ economy, sector, work, employment, activity, sphere 
or realm, to name but a few of the adjectives and nouns employed. It is 
immediately apparent when one examines these adjectives that they all 
describe something that is absent, insufficient or missing.
The one thing absent from ‘cash- in- hand’ work, and its only illegiti-
mate feature, is that it is not declared to the authorities when it should 
be. It is not declared for three reasons:  to evade paying direct or indi-
rect taxes (income tax in the former case; VAT or excise duties in the lat-
ter); to make a fraudulent benefit claim (where someone who is officially 
unemployed claims state benefits while working); and to avoid labour 
legislation (such as employers’ insurance contributions, minimum- wage 
agreements or safety standards in the workplace). Cash- in- hand work 
covers only activities where the means do not comply with regulations 
but the ends (goods and services) are legitimate (Staudt 1998). It does 
not include criminal activity where the goods and services are them-
selves illegal, such as drugs- trafficking. The only illegitimate feature of 
cash- in- hand work, to sum up, is that the monetary transactions are not 
declared for tax, social security or labour law purposes (Thomas 1992; 
Portes 1994).
Examining the extent of participation in cash- in- hand work, an 
English Localities Survey conducted at the turn of the millennium found 
that 4.6 per cent of those surveyed had engaged in cash- in- hand work in 
the past 12 months (Williams and Windebank 2001). Similarly, a 2013 
Eurobarometer survey found that 4 per cent of respondents across the 
European Union (EU) had engaged in cash- in- hand work in the previous 
12 months (Williams 2014b). These were, however, likely to be lower- 
bound estimates given the likelihood of under- reporting in these surveys.
Cash- in- hand work has traditionally been viewed as low- paid 
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employers (Gallin 2001). Since the turn of the millennium, however, it 
has been recognised that much cash- in- hand work is conducted not only 
voluntarily but also on a self- employed basis. More recently, it has been 
recognised that much of this work is conducted for and by kin, neigh-
bours, friends and acquaintances for community- building and redistribu-
tive rationales (see ‘paid favours’, 2.5 Volume 1) (Williams 2004a, 2004b; 
Williams and Windebank 2004). Indeed, the English Localities Survey 
found that some 20 per cent of the cash- in- hand work that respondents 
had undertaken had been waged employment, 15 per cent had been 
self- employment for previously unknown customers and 65 per cent had 
been ‘paid favours’ (Williams and Windebank 2001). This finding was 
reinforced at EU level in a 2007 Eurobarometer survey, which found that 
in the EU 20 per cent of cash- in- hand work had been waged employment, 
25 per cent had been self- employment for previously unknown custom-
ers and 55 per cent had been paid favours (Williams 2014b).
How can participation in cash- in- hand work be explained? In 
recent years, the lens of institutional theory has been increasingly used. 
In institutional theory, institutions are defined as the cognitive, norma-
tive and regulative structures that give stability and meaning to social 
behaviour (Scott 1995). Institutions or governance mechanisms exist in 
every society (North 1990; Baumol and Blinder 2008). On the one hand, 
there are formal institutions, which are the codified laws and regula-
tions. On the other hand, there are informal institutions, which are the 
‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communi-
cated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004: 727); the norms, values and beliefs held by citizens 
reflect their individual views about what is morally right (Denzau and 
North 1994).
The norms, values and beliefs of a society’s informal institu-
tions may be ‘complementary’ if they reinforce formal institutions, or 
‘substitutive’ if the rules they prescribe are not compatible with the 
formal institutions (North 1990; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). When 
there is symmetry between formal and informal institutions, cash- in- 
hand work will be largely absent since citizens will adhere to the legal 
rules of the game. If, however, there is asymmetry between a socie-
ty’s formal and informal institutions (caused for example by a lack of 
trust in government), cash- in- hand work is more likely to be preva-
lent (Feige 1999). The view has therefore emerged that, the greater 
the non- alignment of formal and informal institutions, the greater the 




















Evaluating whether or not this is the case, numerous studies have 
analysed whether there is a statistically significant correlation between 
participation in cash- in- hand work and institutional asymmetry. These 
studies have used ‘tax morality’, which refers to the intrinsic motiva-
tion to pay taxes (Torgler 2007; Cummings et al. 2009), as a proxy for 
institutional asymmetry. They have found a strong statistically signifi-
cant association between participation in cash- in- hand work and the 
degree of institutional asymmetry in the EU (Williams and Horodnic 
2016a), East- Central Europe (Williams and Horodnic 2015a), the Baltics 
(Williams and Horodnic 2015b, 2015c), South- East Europe (Williams 
and Franic 2015; Williams and Horodnic 2015d) and the UK (Williams 
and Horodnic 2016b). Studies have also revealed that socio- demo-
graphic and socio- economic groups with lower tax morality are more 
likely to engage in cash- in- hand work (Williams and Horodnic 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c, 2016a, 2016b).
This opens up a new avenue for tackling cash- in- hand work, sug-
gesting that there is a need to move beyond stricter penalties and higher 
risk of detection. Rather, it is necessary to tackle the causes both by 
improving formal institutions and by raising citizens’ norms, values and 
beliefs through campaigns to increase awareness of the benefits of taxa-
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In its primary sense, blat in Romanian means ‘cake batter’. Colloquially, 
however, it has many more colourful meanings, which have been in com-
mon use for many years. The first documented use of the term dates back 
to 1906, in a newspaper article describing prison life (Zafiu 2009). Later, 
in the period between the two World Wars, it acquired new meanings. 
It might refer, for example, to a thief’s accomplice, a friend, cheating at 
cards, or acting out of camaraderie.
During the communist period (1947– 89), the word grew increas-
ingly popular and its meaning more specific. At that time, it was used 
mainly to denote informal ways of securing access to various kinds of 
services, usually by means of negotiating with state officials. In the late 
1950s, dictionaries defined blat as meaning ‘comrade’ or ‘friend’ – mean-
ings that are now lost – while the verb a bla ̆tui in those days meant ‘to 















2002). Later, the term acquired the meaning ‘to hitch a [free] ride’ or 
‘thumb a lift’. Travelling by blat became part of youth subculture and was 
romanticised in songs such as ‘The train without a godfather’ (‘godfather’ 
in this sense meaning a ticket inspector) performed in 1984 by the rock 
band Iris, and ‘The hymn of the blatists’, a hiking song popular in the 1980s.
After the collapse of communist rule, Romania’s newly independ-
ent media made frequent use of the term blat to mean fare- dodging not 
only on the railways but also in the context of sports events and match- 
fixing. The word’s multiple meanings are spelled out in the Explanatory 
Dictionary of the Romanian Language (Academia Română 1998, 2009) 
and in the dictionary of slang (Volceanov 2007): these range from fare- 
dodging on a train or watching a show without buying a ticket, to more 
general forms of illicit activity, such as paying a bribe or securing influ-
ence by exploiting one’s connections. The term is also found in the pun 
Blătescu, meaning ‘Mr Freedrider’ (Zafiu 2001: 222). Terms commonly 
used today include ‘to practise blat’ (a face blatul), ‘to travel by blat’ (a 
merge pe blat), and simply ‘to do something by blat’ (pe blat), that is, 
secretively or furtively. The etymology of the word is contentious. Some 
linguists suggest it is German or Russian in origin (Zafiu 2009: 15) while 
others argue, more plausibly, that in the case of both Romanian and 
Russian its origin is Yiddish.
In both Romania and Russia, blat denotes the exchange of ‘favours 
of access’ at the expense of public resources (Ledeneva 1998; see also 
blat, 1.1 Volume 1). It follows that, in both countries, the practice stands 
in clear opposition to the official rules and subverts the formal economy. 
Linguistic and etymological similarities apart, however, the way in which 
blat is practised differs significantly in the two countries. This relates not 
only to the nature of the exchange and the scale of the transaction, but 
also to relations between the participants and the duration of their rela-
tionship over time. Unlike the Soviet practice, which was essentially non- 
monetary and was closely linked to relationships based on friendship, 
the Romanian variant implies the exchange of money. The amount may 
vary considerably, depending on the formal price of the service to which 
access is granted, and it may also be the subject of only a brief negotia-
tion. In Russia, by contrast, blat normally implies, as it did in the Soviet 
period, either a pre-existing relationship between the participants in an 
exchange, or the use of an intermediary agent personally related to one 
or both of the parties. Connections are nurtured and usually extend over 
an indefinite period of time. In Romania, no such prerequisite is required. 
More often than not, the connection between Romanian participants is 






















a frequent traveller on a specific train serviced by the same ticket inspec-
tor, they rarely lead to the development of a personal relationship or 
extend beyond the nature of a here- and- now transaction. Whereas 
in Soviet Russia blat could take the form of a system of generalised 
exchange, in Romania it was necessarily dyadic and did not entail any 
future commitments. In Romania under socialism, blat was confined to a 
limited set of services (such as going to a cinema or theatre, taking a train 
or bus, getting accommodation) and its primary goal was to minimise 
costs. In Soviet Russia, blat included access to a wider range of goods and 
services, and was used to get hold of goods in short supply or of better 
quality than those available through formal channels (Ledeneva 1998).
Another important distinction between the practices observed in 
Romania and Russia concerns the post- socialist trajectory. In Russia, the 
transition to capitalism from an economy of shortage and the resultant 
monetisation of society created conditions under which blat reoriented 
itself towards new shortages – whether of money, information or know- 
how that could be later converted into money. In Romania, by contrast, 
blat was already a form of monetary exchange, exercised for the pursuit 
of financial reward, and so it remained in the post- socialist period.
As in Russia, blat in Romania is surrounded by moral ambiguity. In 
the USSR, the non- monetary character of transactions and familiarity 
between participants created conditions for misrecognition and conceal-
ment (Ledeneva 1998: 59– 72, 2000: 185). People involved in exchange 
networks justified their actions through the rhetoric of friendship, invok-
ing norms of camaraderie and unselfish generosity to discount the moral 
responsibility of engaging in informal practices. In Romania, by contrast, 
where money is exchanged and participants are connected only by the 
transaction itself, the illicit nature of the practice is more easily apparent. 
Even so, and despite the official representation of blat as petty corruption, 
illegal and reprehensible, the practice remains common, if not widely 
accepted. Numerous surveys indicate the pervasiveness of petty corrup-
tion in Romania. According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, for 
example, 65 per cent of Romanian respondents said they thought corrup-
tion had increased over the previous two years, whereas 27 per cent said it 
had remained unchanged (Transparency International 2013). According 
to the same study, 17 per cent of Romanian respondents claimed to have 
paid bribes, a figure well above the European Union (EU) average of 11 
per cent. It should, however, be noted that, while this and other reports 
clearly indicate that the incidence of petty corruption in Romania con-
tinues to be perceived as high, there is as yet no report that explicitly dis-

























The word used for informal payments in blat is șpagă, a colloquial 
term meaning a bribe but without moralistic overtones. Another expres-
sion used to describe payments is the ironic ‘give what one is entitled to 
receive’ (a da dreptul). It has been suggested that dreptul conveys the idea 
of pervasive, organised corruption, whereas șpagă is generally used in a 
more generic sense (Zafiu 2007: 132– 3). The vocabulary attests to the 
fact that official condemnation of blat fails to affect the common under-
standing of the practice, as is the case with other forms of informality 
akin to petty corruption (Zerilli 2005).
The scale of blat in Romania has not been scientifically assessed, 
but estimates of its incidence on the railways and of its economic con-
sequences do exist. While these reports are impressionistic in their find-
ings, they concur in showing that blat is not a marginal phenomenon. 
Over a period of nine months in 2001, for example, 300,000 individuals 
were fined for travelling without a ticket (Șerban 2001). Unofficial esti-
mates by the railway police suggest that, between 2005 and 2010, train 
operators lost as much as 370 million Euros as a result of fraudulent blat 
transactions, the equivalent of 40 per cent of the total revenue from tick-
ets sold (Cană and Fantaziu 2012). A criminal investigation into 43 rail-
way workers, the majority of whom were ticket inspectors, estimated the 
damage at 44.5 million Euros (Roșca 2012).
Blat as match- fixing is a hot topic in sports journalism. A search 
on the websites of two major national publications, Gazeta Sporturilor 
and ProSport, reveals, respectively, 1,199 and 1,144 entries for the 
word blat, and 399 and 499 entries respectively for the plural form, bla-
turi. But, while blat is believed to be widely practised in sports events, 
concrete evidence of matches whose outcomes were pre determined by 
informal agreements is scarce and anecdotal. More often than not, it 
consists of retrospective confessions of involvement in games that took 
place at least two decades earlier. Drawing on statements by football- 
team managers who admitted to having engaged in blat practices, a 
sports journalist has argued that match- fixing was reconfigured dur-
ing the season 2001– 2 (Udrea 2008). The traditional practice, founded 
on honour and involving the exchange of commonplace goods such as 
wine, cured meat or training equipment, was replaced by monetised 
exchanges devoid of any moral obligations. However, the alleged trans-
formation applied exclusively to teams in the highest home division, and 
the argument is not supported by sound empirical evidence. Moreover, 
confessions by retired players indicate that, even under socialism, finan-
cial recompense for members of the losing team was a prerequisite of 



















Apart from linguistic studies of the word’s origins and semantic 
reconfiguration, blat has so far attracted only limited academic interest 
in Romania. One of the few studies of post- socialist informality (Stoica 
2012) acknowledges the existence of the practice, but focuses on pile, 
the functional equivalent of the Russian blat. Very little is known about 
the structural factors that shaped the development of blat and confined 
it to specific forms of access, or about how transactions are realised in 
practice. Research is needed to disentangle blat conceptually from pile 
and other local practices involving personal connections. The subjective 
motivation for and rationalisation of involvement in blat both during 
socialism and in the post- socialist period remain largely unresearched; 
rigorous data collection will be necessary to advance knowledge and 
understanding of the practice.
6.3 Švercovanje (serbia, Bosnia and herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro)
Ivana spasic 
department of sociology, University of Belgrade, serbia
Švercovanje is a colloquial term used in Serbia for free- riding on public 
transport. It is used in slightly different forms in other parts of former 
Yugoslavia where varieties of the Serbo- Croatian language are spo-
ken: švercanje in Zagreb and švercanje or, still more informally, šveranje 
in Sarajevo. While the practice of free- riding can be found throughout 
the world, this entry focuses on the Serbian capital Belgrade, where 
švercovanje has a long and glorious history. It has developed a rich reper-
toire of techniques and justifications and traditionally enjoyed consider-
able cultural acceptance. What is particularly remarkable is the extent 
to which the practice is used in Serbia as a gesture of defiance to state 
authorities.
Derived from the German words schwarz (‘black’) and schwärzen 
(‘to blacken’), švercovanje is the gerund of the verb švercovati. Švercovati 
today has two meanings, which are reflected in the different grammati-
cal forms that the verb follows. The first denotes black- marketeering as 
in ‘to smuggle, trade illegally, speculate’. In this sense, the verb is used in 
the transitive form. The second meaning denotes ‘free- riding’ and in this 
sense the verb is used in the reflexive, švercovati se, roughly translated as 
‘to smuggle oneself’.
Švercovanje is practised mainly on urban buses, trams and trolley-
buses. It may also occur on inter- city coaches and trains, but it is much 
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coach without being spotted by the driver. And whereas on trains people 
may simply try to dodge the ticket collector, a more widespread practice 
is to collude with the conductor by giving him or her a small bribe (simi-
lar to blat in Romania, see 6.2 in this volume), a practice that does not fall 
under the heading of švercovanje.
In order to qualify as a true case of švercovanje, an act must con-
tain a component of ‘beating the system’. Merely saving money, even if 
that remains the main motivation, is not the point. Rather, the practice 
is culturally framed as the underdog versus the powerful and is associ-
ated with notions of cunning, courage and popular resistance. A satirical 
linguistic website defines švercovanje as ‘an excellent opportunity for you 
to feel at least once a day like an action hero hiding from the evil mutant 
ninjas’ (vukajlija.com 2016). These ‘evil mutant ninjas’ are the conduc-
tors or ticket inspectors – informally known as ridža, after the American 
general Matthew Ridgway (Andrić 2005)  – who are representatives of 
the ‘system’. They show up unexpectedly, demand to see passengers’ tick-
ets, and (supposedly) fine anyone without one.
Free- riding has been part of Belgrade’s urban lore since the begin-
nings of its public transport system in the late nineteenth century. A prac-
tice especially valued by reckless young men in the decades leading up 
to the Second World War, but trailing off in the late 1960s, was ‘hooking 
onto a tram’ or ‘taking a hitch’ (kešanje na tramvaj), which consisted of 
hanging off the back of the carriage on the outside. Later, ways of tricking 
the ticketing system changed as the technology developed. Free- riding 
became easier in the late 1970s, when human conductors were replaced 
by ticketing machines. Since then, the prospective free- rider is con-
strained more by moral concerns – personal conscience or (more rarely) 
reprobation by fellow passengers – than by the (relatively low) risk of 
being caught by the ridža.
Švercovanje comprises a variety of methods, ranging from ‘passive’ 
to ‘active’. Passive methods are the most common: keeping on the alert 
for inspectors, avoiding them whenever possible and leaving the carriage 
if they approach. An active method is to engage in conversation with 
the inspector and attempt to get away with free- riding, either by play-
ing dumb (‘I left my pass at home’, ‘I forgot to top up my card’, ‘I got onto 
the bus just a second ago’) or by being unfriendly, quarrelling with the 
conductor and refusing their request for an ID. Sometimes these alterca-
tions escalate into verbal (or occasionally even physical) fights, and it is 
usually the švercer who is the abusive actor.
In such on- the- spot rows or in broader public debates, several argu-




















confronted by a ridža may say, ‘I didn’t buy a ticket because I’m poor/ 
unemployed/ haven’t received my salary in months’. The same reason-
ing claims that tickets are too expensive relative to the material status of 
the majority of the population. Another argument focuses on the quality 
of service: old, dilapidated, uncomfortable, crammed, unsafe carriages; 
irregular schedules and long waiting times; wild drivers.
Most interesting are the political arguments. Following Serbia’s 
experience of undemocratic government in the 1990s, švercovanje may 
be seen as an expression of political resistance. Another argument is 
framed in terms of civic entitlement: public transport is a public good and 
should be free for all. Yet another version of the resistance argument sees 
švercovanje as a civic fight against institutional corruption. This became 
particularly popular in Belgrade following the introduction in 2012 of a 
new electronic monitoring- cum- ticketing system by a public– private part-
nership between the city government and a Turkish company. Street pro-
tests focused on allegations of corruption and of high profits reaped by the 
private company to the detriment of the public interest. A contemporary 
website informs users of public transport about their rights and defines 
švercovanje as a method of conscious resistance (99posto.org 2016).
Such arguments are based on diverse, even contradictory, under-
standings of the institution of public transport. On the one hand, passen-
gers wish to be treated as customers who should receive service for their 
money according to the logic of the market; on the other, they see them-
selves as citizens for whose welfare the state has responsibility (Simić 
2014: 185) and who therefore have the right to challenge faulty govern-
ment policies. As an arena for ongoing confrontation between the micro 
and the macro, the mundane and the institutional, public transport may 
be seen as a kind of social laboratory, providing insight into the condi-
tion of society and its changing cultural traditions (Živković 2010). The 
willingness of passengers to pay for a journey may be interpreted as an 
indicator of the overall level of social trust (Marković 2007). During the 
transition from socialism, public transport became a potent symbol of 
the disturbed relations between citizens, with their old and new expec-
tations, and what was perceived as a mostly failing state (Lemon 2000; 
Simić 2014; Jansen 2015).
Švercovanje is essentially a solitary practice, pitting the individual 
against the authorities. It is not an exchange and it does not normally 
establish a social tie. It does not rule out solidarity entirely, but it does not 
assume it, either. While fellow passengers tend to stay aloof, they are also 
likely to side with the free- rider. Švercovanje is no great moral violation 
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rights as a citizen, one’s independence and one’s identity. It is also used to 
express one’s defiance of or contempt for the powers that be.
It is hard to say how many people in Belgrade engage in švercovanje 
on public transport. Estimates have fluctuated since the 1980s from as 
low as 5 per cent to as high as 90 per cent (Marković 2007). The official 
figure of 2– 3 per cent of travellers who have been prosecuted and fined 
is merely a fraction, since the majority of passengers without tickets go 
undetected, while the figure of 50 per cent sometimes cited in the press 
appears inflated. More significant than the actual numbers, however, are 
the persistence of the practice and the lack of any moral sanction.
6.4 Deryban (Ukraine, russia)
olga kesarchuk
independent scholar, Ukraine
Deryban denotes the process of distributing public or state- owned 
resources among a narrow circle of the elite, serving their private inter-
ests at the expense of the public interest. It is closely associated with 
corruption. Deryban often occurs by formally legal means, without vio-
lations of laws and procedures that are themselves designed in a way 
that creates opportunities for deryban. The term has been used widely 
in Ukrainian and Russian. It takes various forms – derybanyty (verb), 
derybanivshiy (participle), derybanshchyk (noun referring to the one 
who loots) and deryban- team (noun referring to a team of looters) 
(Chepurnyy 2015).
No one English term fully captures the meaning of deryban, but 
looting, asset- stripping, embezzlement or (political) corruption come 
closest. In Ukrainian, prikhvatizatsiia (literally, grabbing of state- owned 
resources, which is a play on the Russian word privatizatsiia, meaning 
‘privatisation’) comes closest to deryban. The difference between the 
two terms is that prikhvatizatsiia refers to the corrupt nature of a spe-
cific process – privatisation of former state assets – whereas deryban has 
a broader meaning, even though it also refers to the misappropriation of 
state resources. In the private sphere, the term reiderstvo (raiding, see 
6.36 in this volume) comes closest to deryban. Reiderstvo refers to a sud-
den, illegal change of ownership of privately owned assets, usually by use 
of force. Delyozh or raspil (Russian), which mean ‘distribution, sharing, 
partition’, also come close in meaning to deryban, which tends to be used 
more often in the Ukrainian media.
Deryban is used across all sectors of the economy, but refers most 



























Facebook group Deryban.net (‘No to deryban’) was set up, and a web-
site with the same name, which aimed to identify cases of unlawful land 
distribution in Crimea (Sereda 2012). Deryban may also refer to the mis-
appropriation of budget resources. For example, it is used to describe 
corruption during the state purchase of goods and services, when a gov-
ernment official informally privileges a supplier who charges a higher 
price than others. In return, the official receives personal favours or 
money (vidkat in Ukrainian and otkat in Russian, meaning ‘kickback’, 
see 6.29 in this volume). Privileged individuals may also obtain oppor-
tunities for deryban by exploiting their control of state property to serve 
their private interests. In an article published in mid- 2015, for example, 
Serhiy Kuyun discussed the potential implications of the changes in man-
agement of Ukraine’s largest oil- extracting company, Ukrnafta. The state 
owns 50 per cent plus one share, yet the company is controlled by Ihor 
Kolomoyskyy, one of Ukraine’s richest oligarchs and head of the Pryvat 
business group. Under its previous head, Ukrnafta accumulated substan-
tial debts to the state. Kuyun predicts that deryban will continue under 
Ukrnaftas’s new management, since the new head has close ties to Pryvat 
(Kuyun 2015).
Deryban became widespread following the collapse of communism, 
when the post- Soviet states inherited significant resource endowments 
from the Soviet era yet were too weak to enforce their power. The state’s 
poor control over its property was the main driver that created opportu-
nities for deryban. In many cases, indeed, the state deliberately disman-
tled its own control mechanisms (Ganev 2007:  47)  in order to enrich 
certain societal actors. By this means, the state was able to buy loyalty 
and political support and to maintain its own power (Darden 2008).
The scale of deryban differs from case to case and different levels 
of government may be involved; in all instances, however, access to 
state resources is granted with the permission and compliance of state 
authorities. This exemplifies the neo- patrimonial nature of many post- 
Soviet states, where the boundaries between private and public inter-
ests are blurred (Van Zon 2001). In the words of Chrystia Freeland, the 
tragedy of the post- Soviet states was that ‘the best opportunity [for self- 
enrichment] was ripping off the decaying state’ (Freeland 2000: 180). 
Tilly (1985) famously argued that west European elites agree to cer-
tain constraints in exchange for the right to extract resources from the 
population. In the post- communist states, by contrast, the fact that the 
bulk of resources was initially located in the hands of the state made 
the state a target for predation by former managers of state enterprises 
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building of efficient state institutions (Ganev 2007: 180– 8). Moreover, 
certain individuals who in the Soviet period had been on the margins 
of the society, or even outside the law, had connections to state officials 
that they were able to use to grab state assets. The practice, which is 
now known as deryban, was a common way of so doing.
Deryban has had negative implications for the economies of the post- 
Soviet states since it has deprived the state of the key resources needed to 
maintain state capacity. Deryban shapes but also reflects the nature of rela-
tions between business and the political elite since it involves the distribu-
tion of public resources according to private interests at the expense of the 
broader public good. Deryban is focused on short- term gain: assets taken 
from the state are consumed immediately, with no regard for their poten-
tial future value. Often, therefore, assets simply disappear or are wasted. If, 
for example, a forest is privatised, its trees may be chopped down and the 
land on which it stood distributed among a number of privileged individu-
als, who will use it to build their ‘cottages’ (often mansions); as a result, 
the forest is lost as a public good. In the case of reiderstvo, by contrast, the 
expropriated assets may continue to function. For example, a factory may 
continue production, even though ownership has shifted illegally and by 
use of force (Ivan Presniakov, personal correspondence, 2015).
Deryban has important political and social implications. In the 
majority of cases, it occurs with the approval of a state bureaucrat who 
not only profits materially from the transaction but also gains power 
through patronage. As a result, deryban undermines state legitimacy 
since the population comes to view the bureaucracy and the political elite 
as corrupt. The social implications of deryban can therefore be severe. For 
example, a few privileged pharmaceutical suppliers in Ukraine, intent on 
creating opportunities for deryban, deliberately undermined public trust 
in imported vaccines. According to Ukraine’s Security Service, up to 40 
per cent of the cost of medicaments purchased by the state disappeared 
into the pockets of these companies (Tsentr Protydii Koruptsii 2015).
Deryban is difficult to measure given its informal nature. 
Independent media that expose cases of corruption are the most helpful 
in identifying the frequency and scale of deryban (see Holmes 2015 for a 
discussion of potential ways to measure corruption).
Deryban could be prevented or diminished if there were political 
will to change the nature of business- state relations and to eradicate cor-
ruption. So far, such will has been missing in Ukraine and much of the 
rest of the post- Soviet space. There are, however, public initiatives aimed 
at eliminating deryban. The popular website Nashi Hroshi (‘Our Money’ 





















budgetary funds in the course of official tenders. The site aims to raise 
social awareness of the misuse of taxpayers’ money and to draw attention 
to specific cases of the misappropriation of funds. The website also covers 
cases of land deryban. For example, it speculated that the Suprun family, 
closely related to Ukraine’s former president Victor Yanukovych, might be 
the owners of 17 plots of land in Kyiv’s elite Feofaniia park (Nashi Hroshi 
2015). Similarly, Ukraine’s Anticorruption Action Centre (antac.org.ua) 
works to expose instances of corruption and identify those involved in 
it. Deryban has also been offset by means of symbolic gestures, such as 
the erection of a monument in protest against construction in downtown 
Kyiv that destroyed ancient monuments.
6.5 Fimi Media (Croatia)
ružica Šimic  Banovic 
faculty of Law, University of zagreb, Croatia
The term Fimi Media emerged from a political scandal surrounding 
the marketing agency of the same name, FIMI- Media, which operated 
between 2003 and 2009. The agency was established by the Croatian 
Figure 6.4.1 Representation of deryban as greedy hands.
Source: Pyrozhyk, O. ‘Yakyy “deryban” zadumaly novi “volyns’ki 
















Democratic Union (HDZ) – one of the country’s two major political par-
ties, in power 1990– 2000 and 2003– 2011 – with the purpose of siphon-
ing money from ministries, state agencies and state companies. In its 
current use, Fimi Media refers to any scheming or misuse of public funds 
and power by political parties at the local or national level. The term has 
become a euphemism for the widespread political corruption and fraud 
involving top officials in Croatia.
High government spending, a strong collectivist culture and insuf-
ficient civic participation in Croatia provide fertile ground for the cor-
rupt activities of incumbent politicians under the façade of economic and 
political reforms (Šimić Banović 2015). Such simulation is evident in the 
FIMI- Media court case, where numerous economic crimes, embezzle-
ment and misuse of power were revealed. The exposure of the case also 
brought to light other similar schemes, in which the Head of the Croatian 
Chamber of Economy and the Mayor of Zagreb have been implicated 
among others (these cases are still under investigation).
The FIMI- Media marketing company operated under the direct 
patronage of Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. Sanader himself, government 
ministers and other heads of state institutions all gave orders to the direc-
tors of state companies to enter into business contracts with FIMI- Media. 
These contracts were not subject to open tenders, and thus breached pro-
visions of the Public Procurement Act. FIMI- Media would submit invoices 
for fictitious consultancy services, at rates substantially higher than the 
market price, and the payments would be duly authorised by state lead-
ers. FIMI- Media’s owner would then deliver the payment, in cash, to the 
State Secretary Mladen Barišić, who would pass it to Sanader. The pro-
ceeds were used both to fund the HDZ political party, and for the personal 
enrichment of the individuals involved (Vuletić 2014: 144). Sanader fled 
Croatia in December 2010, shortly before the Croatian parliament voted 
to remove his immunity from prosecution. He was arrested in Austria a 
day later, and extradited back to Croatia in July 2011.
The Zagreb County Court’s 2012 verdict (No. 13 K-US-8/12) in 
this case is quite unique, because in addition to six individuals and FIMI- 
Media as a legal entity, the political party HDZ was also convicted. The 
individuals convicted included the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, 
former State Secretary and Head of Customs Mladen Barišić, former 
Government spokesman Ratko Maček, HDZ’s chief accountant Branka 
Pavošević and the director of FIMI-Media Nevenka Jurak. The total 
embezzled funds amounted to over 3 million EUR (USKOK 2011).
Even though the FIMI-Media affair is considered to be a land-
mark case of the misuse of public power and authority in Croatia and 


























has gained significant domestic and international media coverage, it has 
been little researched in the academic literature. Nor has Fimi Media as 
a general practice been subject to academic research. However, media 
headlines give a sense of both the pervasiveness of Fimi Media as a form 
of political corruption at various levels, and the expansion in use of the 
term to refer to corruption in Croatian politics in general. The following 
headlines are examples from 2010– 14: ‘Is Rizol Media SDP’s Fimi Media?’ 
(Soundset 2014), ‘Euromarket – Fimi Media of Virovitičko- Podravska 
County’ (Virovitica 2010), ‘Is Labin Stan Just Like Fimi Media?’ (Labin.
info 2010), ‘Is the Company RMC Owned by Darko and Igris Smrkinić 
a Fimi Media from Zadar?’ (Voxportal 2011), ‘Periska is SDP’s Fimi 
Media…’ (Slobodna Dalmacija, 2010), ‘Pre- Electoral Imputations or 
SDP’s Fimi Media?’ (Vidov 2013). Furthermore, The Economist coined 
the term ‘Sanaderisation’ after Ivo Sanader, and used it to describe the 
arrests of the top officials in the region, in particular in Montenegro in 
2010 (The Economist 2010).
Since 2007, businesspeople in Croatia have consistently ranked 
corruption among the top three most problematic factors for doing 
business (WEF 2015). According to the most recent Global Corruption 
Barometer (TI 2013) 72 per cent of the general public in Croatia believe 
that political parties are corrupt, 70 per cent consider the judiciary to be 
corrupt, followed by public officials and civil servants (64 per cent) and 
parliament/ legislature (63 per cent). However, despite the scandals, pre- 
election opinion polls suggest that HDZ still enjoys high levels of support 
among voters.
The fact that the term Fimi Media has entered common parlance 
to describe the embezzlement of public funds points to a widespread 
societal perception that such schemes remain active even after the FIMI-
Media convictions. Shell companies and charity funds serve as a façade 
to collect cash at the level of the municipality, county or a nation and 
can usually be traced back to a certain political party, political stream 
or a powerful official. Such firms and schemes are aimed at construct-
ing ‘Potemkin villages’ (see 6.30 in this volume) in order to hide the real 
beneficiaries and political brokers, but their existence (and the kickbacks 
associated with them) are an open secret in Croatian society.
Corruption, the misuse of public funds for private gain, appears to 
be inevitable in post- communist societies. During the transition to a free 
market economy, economies based on personal relations are slowly trans-
formed into impersonal rule- based markets. Despite its formal shift from 
a police state to a market- supporting institution, the role of the govern-
























6.5 F imi media  (CroatIa)
the 1990s. On the one hand, in such countries ‘there is consistently more 
support for authoritarianism and economic intervention of government’ 
(Roland 2012: 165– 6), something that is chiefly explained by the com-
munist legacy and cultural inertia. On the other hand, the de facto role 
of the government has often been that of a ‘grabbing hand’ that feeds 
parasitically on weak economic institutions (Abed and Davoodi 2000), 
including ‘the sale by government officials of government property for 
personal gain’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1999: 91). The grabbing hand model 
relies on government officials possessing the opportunity to convert their 
power into income via the use of politics. In seeking powerful positions, 
election and re- election, politicians are motivated by their own self- 
interest rather than ideological goals. In any case, such motivation is sub-
stantially different from the idea of welfare maximisation (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1999: 2– 7).
Figure 6.5.1 Cost of corruption across EU.










In general, there is a substantial degree of (tacit) tolerance for cor-
ruption in Croatia as it is a common way of shortening procedures and 
solving problems (with public services in particular). Quite contrary to 
their responses in various corruption surveys, most ordinary people in 
Croatia have been involved in some corrupt act at the street level even 
though most of them do not consider themselves as bribe givers or bribe 
takers; businesspeople on the other hand possess a higher level of aware-
ness on these issues (UNODC 2011; European Commission 2014; Ernst 
and Young 2015). In a recent international survey (Ernst and Young 
2015: 21), Croatia took the top place for perception of the prevalence 
of bribery/ corrupt practices in business: 92 per cent of respondents 
perceived them to happen widely. Thus, despite nominally criticising 
corruption at any level, ordinary people still rely on the omnipresent 
practices that work for them immediately (i.e. petty corruption) rather 
than time- consuming, fully legal yet uncertain, solutions. These attitudes 
and behaviours of ordinary citizens, combined with the extremely slow 
implementation of any top-down anti- corruption policies, means that 
Fimi Media is likely to remain a feature of Croatian politics and adminis-




The term Tangentopoli comes from the words tangente, meaning ‘kick-
back’ or ‘bribe’ in Italian, and poli, from the ancient Greek word polis, 
meaning ‘city’ (De Mauro and Mancini 2000). It is commonly trans-
lated in English as ‘Bribesville’ (Clari and Love 1995) or ‘Kickback City’ 
(Bareggi 2010). The word was coined by the Italian media to describe 
the web of corruption that characterised the political and entrepre-
neurial scene in the city of Milan (Treccani Vocabolario 2015). This was 
revealed in February 1992 when Mario Chiesa, a member of the Italian 
Socialist Party (PSI), was arrested on suspicion of accepting a bribe in 
order to promote a business deal (Guanci 2011). The PSI disavowed 
Chiesa, claiming that he had been acting as a lone wolf and did not repre-
sent the party (Corriere della Sera TV 2012). Chiesa retaliated by spilling 
the dirt on the political system as a whole. His revelations uncovered a 
web of corrupt relations between political parties, business and organ-
ised crime, and provoked a judicial investigation known as Mani pulite 
(‘Clean hands’) (Guanci 2011). Soon it became clear that what had been 

















6.6 tangentopoli  ( ItaLy)
system of political corruption (Treccani Enciclopedia 2015). The term 
Tangentopoli, accordingly, came to denote a system based on tacit agree-
ments whereby entrepreneurs paid bribes to politicians as an informal 
‘tax’ to obtain public contracts, and politicians then used the money to 
fund their political parties (Della Porta 2015). In its broadest sense, the 
term became synonymous with any kind of widespread political corrup-
tion (Treccani Vocabolario 2015).
The term Tangentopoli was widely used both in the Italian media 
and in the international press (see bibliography). The level of coverage 
of corruption in the Italian media is higher than in most other European 
countries and encompasses national politics, the judicial system and, to 
a lesser extent, business (Mazzoni 2016: 3– 22). An analogous practice 
might be otkat in Russia (‘kickback’, see 6.29 in this volume) whereby 
officials choose a supplier of goods or services for a public contract and 
receive remuneration from the provider in the form of a fixed sum of 
money or a percentage of the transaction amount. However, Tangentopoli 
differs from otkat in that in Italy it denotes kickbacks that are mainly used 
to fund political parties, whereas in Russia the money may be used how-
ever the recipient chooses.
Figure 6.6.1 Milan as Tangentopoli.
Source: ‘Si ruba ancora ma per sé stessi ecco perché Tangentopoli non 
è finita’ (Lit. ‘People are still stealing, but for themselves, that’s why 
Tangentopoli is not ended’). La Repubblica, 10 February 2012. Image not 

















The fact that Tangentopoli sees politicians asking businesspeople 
for bribes in return for public contracts suggests a degree of coercion that 
might make the practice comparable to the system of corruption prac-
tised by the mafia, where bribes are characterised by extortion of kick-
backs (colloquially called mazzette). The main difference between the 
two practices, however, is that, in the case of Tangentopoli, it is politi-
cians who ask for kickbacks to allow companies to win public contracts 
whereas, in the case of the mafia, mafia members extort money from 
civilians and owners of small businesses in return for protection. The 
behaviour of both politicians and mafia members is similar in that both 
are the ‘actors’ who demand kickbacks. Although it is always hard to 
define which direction corruption takes – who is the agent and who is the 
target – it might be claimed that, in some specific instances, politicians 
may be seen as the ‘targets’ of corruption, rather than as its instigators. 
This is the case in situations in which the mafia, being in control of some 
areas, makes financial demands to politicians in return for their votes 
and the extortion of votes from civilians. Indeed, the informal systems of 
the mafia and Tangentopoli may be closely associated when mafia mem-
bers put pressure on politicians and convince them through extortion to 
assign public contracts to companies controlled by the mafia, thereby cre-
ating a three- way system of corruption that includes not only politicians 
and entrepreneurs, but also the mafia as an active player. An example of 
such interrelation is provided by Mafia Capitale, a criminal organisation 
uncovered in 2014 through which mafia exponents controlled many pub-
lic works in the city of Rome by means of contacts and bribery of politi-
cians and public officials (Micocci 2015). While this has been compared 
to Tangentopoli, it has also been seen as a new form of corruption since it 
directly involves organised crime (Libero Quotidiano 2014).
The Tangentopoli scandal had a significant impact on Italian politics 
and society. Under strong public pressure and intense investigations, many 
politicians confessed or resigned; some fled the country, including the 
leader of the PSI, Bettino Craxi, who fled to Turkey in 1995; while others, 
including Sergio Moroni, a Socialist Member of Parliament (MP), commit-
ted suicide while under investigation (Montanelli and Cervi 2013: ch. 14). 
The ‘moralisation campaign’, headed by magistrate and future politician 
Antonio Di Pietro, won enthusiastic public support (Pollo 1996). More 
broadly, the widespread public indignation provoked by the Mani pulite 
operation resulted in significant changes on the political scene. At one 
point, more than half of the members of parliament were under investiga-
tion, while 400 city and town councils were dissolved as a result of corrup-



















Democracy, the PSI and the Communist Party, which had dominated 
the political scene for decades, lost public confidence and were eventu-
ally dissolved. By contrast, populist parties that pursued anti- corruption 
campaigns, such as the Northern League, won increased public support 
(Montanelli and Cervi 2013: ch. 15). The scandal led to a radical restruc-
turing of the ‘First Republic’, that is, the political system that had oper-
ated in Italy since the end of the Second World War, and its replacement 
by a reformed electoral system that came informally to be known as the 
Second Italian Republic (Koff and Koff 2000: 1– 3, 31). The scandal also 
had important economic implications, provoking a sharp fall both in the 
value of the Italian currency and in international confidence in the coun-
try’s reliability as a haven for investment (Barbacetto et al. 2002: 32– 3).
In popular perception, Tangentopoli left a strong mark on Italian 
culture and was depicted in literature, theatre and cinema productions 
(see Bibliography). Tangentopoli became the Italian variant of the game 
Monopoly (Corriere della Sera 1992). Music played a particularly impor-
tant role in spreading opinions and criticism. Anti- politics became a popu-
lar theme of many Italian songs, which in their lyrics depicted the negative 
elements related to Italian political life such as the unlimited power and 
corruption exercised by political parties. Singers who denounced the 
system included Franco Battiato in his song ‘Poor Italy’ (‘Povera Italia’), 
Pierangelo Bertoli in ‘Golden Italy’ (‘L’Italia d’oro’), Antonello Venditti 
in ‘Everybody to Hell’ (‘Tutti all’inferno’), Edoardo Bennato in ‘Who Are 
You?’ (‘Tu chi sei?’) and Giorgio Gaber in ‘Right– Left’ (‘Destra– Sinistra’).




school of Public affairs, san diego state University,  
Imperial Valley Campus, Usa
In general, brokerage involves the flow of valued resources from one actor 
to another via an intermediary (Gould and Fernandez 1989; Stovel and 
Shaw 2012). Any brokered relation requires at least three actors: a ‘giver’ 
and a ‘receiver’ who are the parties of the transaction, and the broker 
serves as the connection between them. Brokerage is central to informal 
transactions in particular (Jancsics 2015). In many countries informal 
arrangements provide a low- cost and low- risk infrastructure for a whole 



















friends to build their house in a village to bribing public administrators. 
Under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, informal social net-
works served as a survival tool and means of ‘getting things done’ under 
the strict, over- centralised socialist bureaucratic system (Ledeneva 1998; 
Hankiss 2002:  248; Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004; Heinzen 2007). 
Following the collapse of old communist regimes in the 1990s, the capital-
ist market economies that emerged in the region brought new uncertain-
ties, emerging inequality and high levels of unemployment. Accordingly, 
the use of informal networks has survived, adapted and even prolifer-
ated under post- communism (Sík and Wellman 1999). Although mutual 
favours, once widespread in the socialist economy, have been partially 
replaced by monetary- based informal exchanges (Ledeneva 1998), bro-
kers still play an important role in these multi- player transactions in 
many countries (Szántó et al. 2013).
Brokerage practices can be categorised according to the form of 
the exchange (market vs. reciprocal) and according to the mechanisms 
through which the broker manages the transaction (catalyst vs. mid-
dleman) (Jancsics 2015). Generally, in any market- type exchange, the 
exchanged resource is mainly cash and the players are not socially close, 
resulting in a precise balance and an equivalent return without delay 
between the players (Sahlins 1965; Gregory, 1982:  42). By contrast, 
in a reciprocal exchange the actor who gives something expects to get 
something of value in return, but what exactly and when is not spelled 
out (Sahlins 1965:  147). In the case of catalyst brokerage, the broker 
connects the client with the agent by introducing them to each other, 
but then steps aside (Stovel et al. 2011). In contrast, middleman brokers 
control the transaction throughout and remain the only link between the 
otherwise unconnected actors. These two variables – the form of infor-
mal exchange and the brokerage mechanism – give rise to four different 
types of brokerage: (1) representative brokerage, (2) entrepreneur broker-
age, (3) gatekeeper brokerage and (4) multiple insider brokerage.
Representative brokerage is probably the most widespread form of 
informal brokerage. Here a social group ‘delegates’ one of its members to 
establish contact (weak ties) with outsiders and communicate or nego-
tiate with them or obtain resources, often from formal organisational 
settings (Gould and Fernandez 1989; Granovetter 1973). A range of cul-
turally specific forms of representative brokerage are described in the 
entries in this Encyclopaedia: wasta (Arabic speaking countries), tapş 
(Azerbaijan), torpil (Turkey), ‘pulling strings’ (UK), raccomandazione 
(Italy), stróman (Hungary). Here the middlemen are usually catalyst 

























6.7 BroKerage  (GeneraL)
establish a new relationship. Since they ‘just help’ their group members – 
relatives, friends, acquaintances, neighbours, ex- classmates or colleagues 
– they are not interested in controlling the transaction and holding back 
or manipulating information between the parties. This is a reciprocal 
exchange between the broker and his/ her group member where the bro-
ker creates a gift- debt, a reciprocal dependence, which, eventually, should 
be returned (Gregory 1982: 42; Graycar and Jancsics 2016). Here the 
counter transfer may take the form of another favour, or simply the bro-
ker’s enhanced status and loyalty within his close- knit group.
An entrepreneur broker is a neutral middleman who benefits from 
the situation by controlling the flow of resources and information 
between actors who do not know each other (Boissevain 1968; Marsden 
1982: 206; Gould and Fernandez 1989; Burt 1992). An entrepreneur 
broker, for example, can help acquire counterfeit documents such as fake 
passports, driving licences, high- school diplomas, etc., which may even 
be officially registered. Such diplomas are in demand on the black market 
since they are often required by employers for particular jobs (Jancsics 
2015). This is a form of middleman brokerage where the broker does not 
let the two parties directly meet with each other; he/ she extracts com-
mission (typically cash) from the market- type exchange.
In gatekeeper brokerage the broker and the agent are members of 
the same social group (Gould and Fernandez 1989) – or in many cases, 
the same organisation or political institution – while the client is an out-
sider. The political practice of ‘cash for access’ in the UK is an example 
of gatekeeper brokerage (see 2.18, Volume 1). Here, individuals give 
monetary payment to the broker (who may be a party official, Member of 
Parliament (MP) or parliamentary aide) who in exchange secures a meet-
ing with an office holder – often a senior minister or Cabinet member. On 
the broker- client side this is a market- type exchange (as indicated by the 
name ‘cash for access’); however, there is a possible reciprocal exchange 
on the broker- agent side where fellow members of the same formal insti-
tution can share the profit of the deal or repay each other with favours. 
For example, in one form of ‘cash for access’ the money paid by the client 
is given to the political party of which the agent is a member, which helps 
to fund the political resources that guarantee the agent’s career.
Multiple insider brokers are people who are simultaneously mem-
bers of different groups (i.e. they have multiple formal organisational 
or social group memberships). This brokerage type often results in a 
strained relationship, because both groups are suspicious that their 
group member (the broker) may serve the other group’s interest (Simmel 






















Germany ‘external persons’ (externe Personen, see 6.17 in this volume) are 
individuals who maintain an external employment relationship in the non- 
state sector while working temporarily in the federal administration. These 
brokers serve ‘two masters’ at the same time and thus often have conflicts of 
interests. Externe Personen may influence laws affecting their private sector 
‘home’ organisation or leak confidential government documents to them. 
Insider traders provide another example of multiple insider brokerage (see 
6.16 in this volume). These brokers gain access to exclusive information 
about financial markets and provide tips to friends or relatives who can take 
advantage of it.
Brokered informal transactions are complex social phenomena. 
Brokers make informal (and sometimes illegal) deals possible across 
formal organisational boundaries and facilitate the ‘smuggling out’ of 
organisational resources through such boundaries. In this respect, infor-
mal brokerage may be seen as socially undesirable. On the other hand, 
brokerage is also a means of establishing or maintaining personal rela-
tionships and reproducing socio- cultural systems inside and outside of 
formal organisational structures.
6.8 Wa-st·a (Middle east, north africa)
James redman
University of Utah, Usa
Wasta is an Arabic term that, in its day- to- day usage, refers to the deploy-
ment of intermediation on behalf of an individual or a group to secure 
some benefit that would be otherwise unobtainable or too burdensome 
(Makhoul and Harrison 2004:  25– 7). The term is derived from the 
three letter root waw/ sīn/ t a’, a consonant pattern that forms the basis 
of words, both nouns and verbs, relating to ‘middle’. Accordingly, this 
configuration serves as the root of a number of expressions ranging from 
‘to place, put, or set in the middle’ to ‘medial, median, intermediate’ 
(Wehr 1994: 1250– 1). It is within this semantic variation that wasta is 
defined as an ‘act of mediation/ intercession’ (Cunningham and Sarayrah 
1994: 29), ‘mediator, mediatress, intermediary’, or a ‘personal connec-
tion (of someone, used to gain something)’ (Wehr 1994: 1251).
The scope of wa sta spans across the Arabic- speaking countries of 
the Persian Gulf, the Levant and North Africa, alongside the occurrence 
of a somewhat similar colloquial phrase, coup de piston or simply piston, 
found in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (Branine 2011: 454). Familiarity 
with wa sta is not limited solely to native Arabic speakers in the indicated 





















6.8 wa St a  (MIddLe east,  north afrICa)
accustomed with the advantages and hindrances of wa sta (Shah et  al. 
1996: 326) – a fact that underscores its pervasiveness in many Arab states.
In its least contentious guise, wasta is called upon to negotiate or 
resolve disputes between parties without resorting to formal legal pro-
cedures. The underlying logic in such cases is that, ‘intervention for 
conflict management is always recommended … [and] the intermedi-
ary is always to be preferred to the self as an effective pleader’ (Antoun 
2000:  460). Ideally, one or more mediators are to act as even- handed 
conciliators who are agreeable to the antagonists. Moreover, engaging 
wasta is intended not only to resolve the discord itself, but also to redress 
the social disruptions that the friction had caused (Ayoub 1966: 109– 10). 
The desired outcomes of wasta arbitration are compromise, reconcili-
ation and the restoration of relationships, rather than clear assignment 
of blame or one- sided punishments (Antoun 2000: 448– 50).
More commonly, though, wast a is associated with the informal 
trading of favours between persons or groups. These exchanges can 
be precipitated by various needs, but common examples include help-
ing someone to get state permits for a business, enrolling a child in a 
Figure 6.8.1 Outside an administrator’s office, wasta is seen here 
opening the door for an underqualified applicant while denying entry to 
the candidate with excellent credentials.
















prestigious school, finding employment, postponing legal action, etc. 
(Huxley 1978:  36). The deployment of wa sta in such cases involves 
chains of interpersonal ties being activated until a liaison who can 
potentially provide satisfaction is located within the networks of fam-
ily, friends, colleagues, coworkers or the ubiquitous ‘friends of friends’ 
(Boissevain 1974: 24– 5).
Unlike prototypical patron– client dealings, however, wasta is not 
normally viewed as a hierarchical transaction; instead, procuring and 
using wa sta is part and parcel of the obligations that underwrite existing, 
or coveted, social bonds. In other words, much like similar occurrences 
in other geographic and cultural settings, wasta support is infused with 
sentiments that are in line with the notion that it is ‘not a relationship 
for the sake of exchange but an exchange for the sake of a relationship’ 
(Ledeneva 2000: 184). For this reason, wasta favours tend to circulate 
within the economies of ‘good faith’ that come with social closeness and 
familial trust (Bourdieu 1990: 114– 15, 119). Consequently, when wasta 
is extended, it is usually without deadlines for compensation or expli-
cit requisites. Nonetheless, it should be recognised that there are those 
who are adept at manipulating this entire wasta framework for their 
own agendas: politicians swapping bureaucratic largesse for votes, busi-
nessmen bartering parliamentary backing for contracts, or local elites 
dispensing aid to augment the retinues and bolster their individual repu-
tations (Redman 2014: 127– 31).
Not surprisingly, wasta has attracted the attention of critics, local 
journalists and scholars who are quick to note that it carries many of the 
same connotations as nepotism, dependency and corruption (Kilani and 
Sakijha 2002: 19). From headlines in Kuwait City declaring that ‘ “Wasta” 
frees law- breakers’ (Arab Times 2009: 6) to World Bank researchers iso-
lating wa sta as an accessory to the Middle East’s ‘meritocracy deficit’ in 
employment (Gatti et al. 2013: 189– 94), it is clear that the prevalence of 
wasta practices is well known from the local community all the way up to 
international levels. On the one hand, it is true that wasta can facilitate 
the necessary inroads required to press legitimate claims, such as those 
that are put before what are often overstaffed and opaque state bureau-
cracies (Hertog 2010: 282– 3). Yet on the other hand, it is just as accurate 
to pinpoint wasta as a mechanism by which those with insufficient cre-
dentials can outflank more qualified competitors, like with landing a job 
or winning a promotion (see Figure 6.8.1). Still, whether wasta is used 
for so- called benevolent purposes (Kilani and Sakijha 2002: 25), such as 
navigating impenetrable government red tape, or utilised for more ques-
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asien- orient- Institut, University of zurich, switzerland
The Hindi/ Urdu word ‘dalal’ can be literally translated as ‘commission 
agent’, ‘broker’, ‘fixer’ or ‘mediator’, and tends to carry negative associa-
tions due to the fact that dalals take fees and commissions and produce 
nothing themselves. Stock exchange brokers, ticket touts, pimps, match-
makers, real estate brokers, and the large number of people who unoffi-
cially mediate between ordinary citizens and the state are all occasionally 
referred to as dalals, and their occupation as dalali (fixing/ brokerage). 
A vast assemblage of fixers surround the formal Indian state and claim 
to facilitate people’s access to it and its resources. Because they can be 
both helpful and exploitative, Indians frequently regard them as morally 
ambivalent characters. To emphasise their role as facilitators, some fixers 
describe their work as ‘social work’ or ‘seva’ in Hindi, as pyravee in Urdu 
(Ram Reddy and Haragopal 1985), or even simply as politics (rajniti). 
They rarely, if ever, describe themselves as dalals, or to their work as 
dalali, but their clients do so when they wish to emphasise how either 
they or their practices are exploitative and corrupt.
Fixers who mediate relations between citizens and the state can be 
found throughout the world in places where institutional channels neces-
sary to gain access to state resources are weak. Fixers arise where institu-
tionalised party structures are absent, and where citizens face difficulties 
gaining access to the state, either because decision- making centres are 
inaccessible and/or because of the lack of clear bureaucratic procedures 
necessary to gain access to state documents and entitlements. In low- 
income neighbourhoods in Argentina, they are referred to as ‘punteros’ or 
‘referentes’, and in similar neighbourhoods in Mexico as ‘padrino politico’ 
or ‘cacique’ (Auyero 1999: 302). During the earlier part of the twentieth 
century in Chicago, they were referred to as ‘party precincts’ and played 
an important role in ‘machine politics’ (Auyero 1999: 302). However, one 
thing that is arguably distinctive about Indian fixers is their sheer num-
ber in proportion to the population. Thus James Manor claims ‘they are 
a major national resource which India possesses in greater abundance 
than just about any other less developed country’ (Manor 2000: 817).
Scholars have attributed their large numbers to deepening party 

















number of services that the Indian state provides, as well as to the decline 
in caste- based power structures. Broadly, increased electoral competi-
tion has pushed competing parties to implement a growing number of 
schemes and services. The state’s limited capacity to implement these has 
fuelled both the demand for and the supply of fixers (Berenschot 2010). 
The erosion of caste- based power structures has likewise fuelled the 
emergence of a large number of lower caste fixers. In Uttar Pradesh such 
fixers are known as ‘new politicians’ (naya netas) (Jeffrey et al. 2008), 
and they have partially overtaken the mediating functions once monopo-
lised by members of the upper castes.
Among many other things, fixers help people gain access to credit, 
development schemes, electricity and water connections, caste certifi-
cates, land records, government jobs and even to gain access to the police 
when they are involved in a dispute. Fixers are a common feature of 
Indian villages and poorer urban neighbourhoods. While they may some-
times provide valued services, people have no way of determining the 
legitimacy of the fees they charge, and of the commissions that they take. 
An illustration of this can be found in the case of fixers who offered peo-
ple jobs in the state- owned Bhilai steel plant in exchange for a payment 
of between 30,000 and 50,000 Rupees (Parry 2000). The fixers claimed 
that much of this money was to pay officials in charge of recruitment. 
However Parry reports that it was in fact far from clear that officials were 
indeed taking money in exchange for jobs. It transpired that in many 
cases the fixers had managed to secure access to the shortlist of selected 
candidates, and had then offered jobs to those already being considered. 
If the candidates got the job, the fixers would take the credit for it, and if 
they didn’t, they would simply return some of the money (preferably as 
little as they could get away with).
Fixers essentially need people to believe that government officials 
are corrupt and that they take bribes in exchange for jobs, or services. 
They encourage this belief because otherwise people would think it futile 
to try to use them to bribe government officials. Thus it can be argued 
that fixers play a crucial role in magnifying the extent to which the Indian 
state is perceived as corrupt (Oldenburg 1987; Parry 2000) and as a con-
sequence, the Indian state is sapped of legitimacy. In turn, this notion 
feeds neoliberal agendas, which favour downsizing the state as the best 
way to reduce corruption (Parry 2000).
While it is undoubtedly true that fixers greatly contribute to the 
perception that the Indian state is corrupt, there is nevertheless a body 
of literature attesting to the real and systematic nature of corruption 



















irrigation and police departments – need to take bribes to pay senior 
officials and politicians in order to secure promotions and desirable 
postings (Wade 1985). Officials may prefer to take these bribes through 
intermediaries in order to avoid being seen taking them. Citizens them-
selves may also prefer to approach officials through brokers because 
they don’t know the procedures necessary to pay a bribe, and because 
they lack the contacts necessary to approach the particular official they 
wish to deal with.
Where fixers do indeed collude with government officials – rather 
than merely claim to do so – they form an integral part of unofficial 
power structures that subvert state functions and drain the state of 
resources. They may, for example, subvert state functions by helping 
their clients obtain jobs they do not merit, or subsidies they are not enti-
tled to. Moreover they may contribute to the depletion of state resources 
by taking a cut of funds destined for the construction of roads or main-
taining irrigation canals (Wade 1985). Harriss- White (2003) suggests 
that the informal assemblage of agents that includes fixers, advisors, 
political workers, crooks and contractors and formal state agents acting 
in an informal capacity constitute a ‘shadow state’ that deprives the poor 
majority of its fair share of government resources. The presence of this 
vast shadow state goes a long way towards explaining the fact that in 
1989 Rajiv Gandhi estimated that only 15 per cent of state subsidies ever 
reached their intended beneficiaries.
The Indian government has in recent years sought to curb corrup-
tion and fixing through the introduction of electronic technologies that 
simplify bureaucratic procedures. Citizens can now, for example, access 
their land records within minutes and for a fixed fee without the need to 
bribe officers (either directly or through fixers). However, simple surveys, 
questionnaires and ethnographic research all reveal the extent to which 
citizens continue to gain access to a number of state services through fix-
ers. On the other hand, to determine the extent to which fixers do in fact 
collude with corrupt state officials is more difficult, but can be researched 





Torpil is a widespread informal practice in Turkey that revolves around 





















bureaucracy. Torpil relations are formed in order to obtain benefits 
in a number of situations such as finding jobs for oneself or one’s rela-
tives, avoiding queues in hospitals and even obtaining free health care. 
Achieving an objective by means of torpil is common, however, to date 
there is a lack of systematic work that interprets how ordinary people 
make use of this practice in their daily lives.
There is little information on the origins of torpil exchanges. 
According to the most authoritative Turkish dictionary published by the 
Turkish Language Institute, one of the definitions of torpil is ‘favouring 
someone over others’ (kayırmacılık or iltimas). The term kayırmacılık 
derives from Arabic and originally means holding someone’s hand or the 
lower part of someone’s caftan, and asking for a favour or petitioning to 
obtain benefit.
In contemporary Turkey both torpil and kayırmacılık are widely 
used in the context of employment. Hiring and promotion decisions are 
commonly influenced by torpil networks. For example, state universities 
are required to announce vacancies through the state press agency Basin 
Ilan Kurumu. These announcements specify the ranks and the number 
of positions to be filled. In one reported case, a university uploaded a 
draft version of the required listing announcement for vacant positions 
that accidentally included the names of the academicians the univer-
sity intended to hire (Ozgenc and Gokce 2013). In another well- docu-
mented example, it was found that 85 close relatives of government 
ministers were appointed to senior posts in various ministries without 
being required to undergo competitive state examinations (Cumhuriyet.
com.tr 2015). These revelations caused little comment or public discon-
tent because most Turkish people are accustomed to the practice of torpil 
influencing their daily lives. The importance of knowing influential peo-
ple in Turkey’s capital is further confirmed by common sayings, such as 
‘do you have an uncle in Ankara?’ For example, in a popular Turkish song 
‘Mamudo’, about the loneliness and desperation of a nephew who has no 
support in life, the poet and folk singer Asik Mahzuni Serif reminds him 
of the hopelessness of his situation with the words: ‘you do not have an 
uncle in Ankara Mamudo, why did you come to this world?’
Torpil also implies influence and protection. The expression ‘the 
holder of this business/ calling card is my acquaintance’ (‘Kart Hamili 
Yakınımdır’) is commonly used to suggest protection. In particular, before 
mobile phones were in common usage, business leaders and Members 
of Parliament would give their contacts business cards printed with the 
above- mentioned words and their signatures on the reverse side. This 















during business transactions. In this way, the cardholders were able to 
obtain a range of benefits including price reductions, loans from banks 
and preferential treatment in job applications. This practice predated 
the practice of writing the name of a protector on examination papers. 
One respondent interviewed by the author took banking exams in the 
1960s. As part of the recruitment process, the candidates were required 
to declare the names of the senior members of the bank with whom they 
were closely associated. The respondent’s relative was the Chief Inspector 
of the Bank and unsurprisingly, she got the job.
The intervention of powerful people helps facilitate desired out-
comes. The close link between torpil and intervention makes this prac-
tice very similar to wasta, a practice widely employed in Arab societies 
(see wa st a, 6.8 in this volume). Literally, it means the middle and refers 
to bringing parties to ‘middle point or [a] compromise’ (Al- Rahimi 2008: 
37). This practice dates back to tribal times and was used as a prevention 
mechanism against inter- personal and inter- tribal conflicts (Cunningham 
and Sarayrah 1993). In Jordan, for example, this practice is still a part of 
the legal system and is designed to bring peaceful solution to conflict. 
There is, however, a second form of wasta known as intercessory wasta, 
which has become more pervasive in the Arab world. It is defined as ‘the 
intervention of a patron in favour of a client to obtain benefits and/ or 
resources from a third party’ (Mohammed and Hamdy 2008: 1). In most 
situations there is more than one benefactor and therefore the strongest 
among them achieves the desired outcome for the person on behalf of 
whom he intervenes.
The use of torpil is widely criticised in Turkish society and the initial 
attitudes of respondents interviewed by the author confirmed this nega-
tive connotation. However, in spite of this, it became apparent that most 
respondents solved their problems efficiently and helped others through 
torpil networks. Some respondents, who initially were highly critical of 
torpil, changed their attitude towards it after realising that their life sto-
ries revealed their use of personal ties to obtain services or help relatives 
in need. Alena Ledeneva refers to this anomaly as ‘misrecognition’ in her 
study on the use of blat ties in Russia, and cites it as the reason for ‘its 
pervasiveness, on the one hand, and the lack of attention to it, on the 
other’ (Ledeneva 1998: 59). Some respondents misrecognised torpil in 
such a way as to deny their involvement in the very practices in which 
they took part. They viewed their own torpil relations positively while 
being critical of the practice when describing the relationships of others. 

















The inefficiency of institutions is one of the main justifications 
Turkish citizens give for their adoption of torpil. Thus, the use of torpil 
is seen as a compensation for defects. Where the involvement of torpil 
networks is not denied, it is not uncommon among citizens to blame oth-
ers. The ‘rules of the game’ make people believe that torpil serves the 
interests of its seekers. It should be noted that the practice of torpil con-
tradicts Islamic religious principles related to fair treatment and hence, 
religious- minded people consider torpil a great sin, known as ‘kul hakkı 
yemek’, the violation of the equal rights granted by Allah to all humans.
6.11 Gestión (Mexico)
tina hilgers
department of Political science, Concordia University, Canada
Gestión (noun; plural: gestiones; verb: gestionar) can be translated as 
management, but is used informally in Mexico to refer to negotiations 
for, or the processing of, public goods or services in a private manner. 
A citizen or group of citizens negotiates with a politician or official to 
use their resources, knowledge or influence to help them access public 
resources or programmes rather than having to undergo lengthy formal 
processes with uncertain outcomes. This is done on the understanding 
that the citizen(s) will then be indebted to the agent.
The word gestión comes from the Latin gerere, meaning to man-
age or conduct. It translates as relating to management and administra-
tion, usually in business, but may also be used in the context of politics. 
Sometimes defined as paperwork or red tape, the term is generally asso-
ciated with business and political administration. Trámite (noun) or 
tramitar (verb) as the primary synonym means to process or to negotiate. 
The colloquial meaning of gestión cannot be found in a dictionary and 
rarely appears even in specialised publications. While gestión is found in 
Mexican media, English- language academic and mediatic treatments of 
the topic usually use the synonym clientelism. The compound ‘clientelis-
tic management’  – gestión clientelista  – is used in academic and media 
sources across the Spanish- speaking world, but in Mexico, the informal 
meaning of gestión (as discussed below) is common.
Gestión is, indeed, akin to clientelism and many other personal 
exchanges involving public resources. There are, however, important dif-
ferences. Gestión refers to any instance in which someone tries to nego-
tiate access to public resources, while clientelism is often understood 
as a long- term relationship involving a number of favours between a 





























(a one- time exchange of goods or money for the vote) and patronage 
(public sector job appointments in exchange for loyalty). These kinds of 
informal interactions exist worldwide, but with local variations in the 
vocabulary used, the norms governing the interactions and the degree 
of social acceptability. Similar phenomena are found in Russian blat, 
Chinese guanxi and Middle Eastern wa sta (see 1.1, 1.12  Volume 1 and 
6.8 in this volume). Mexicans use the term gestión to describe their day- 
to- day interactions with the state. Informal settlements may be required 
for a variety of needs. Examples found include roads needing to be paved 
or water to be supplied; peasant organisations seeking land rights; taxi 
drivers needing licences; public employees requiring pensions, and 
entrepreneurs requesting permits: all involve negotiating (gestionar) to 
obtain a result.
While the gestión permeates politics, in particular its use provides 
resolution for societal tensions experienced by the lower classes. Mexico’s 
wealthy are a hermetic elite, economic opportunities are scarce, and 
since the start of the economic restructuring and austerity of the 1980s, 
social mobility has moved as frequently downwards as upwards (Shefner 
2008). Resource redistribution is inadequate. Policies and programmes 
to improve access to decent nutrition, housing, health care and education 
are underfunded. It is particularly difficult for the poor – officially 46.2 
per cent of the population (CONEVAL 2014) – to meet their needs.
The poor know from experience that bureaucrats will be unrespon-
sive to their demands and are uncertain regarding their position vis- 
à- vis the state; therefore they try to create certainty through personal 
appeals. Instead of struggling with the red tape of bureaucratic proce-
dure and accepting interminable delays, they seek a person in a position 
of power with whom they can negotiate directly. For example, in one case 
a woman, who lived in a small self- built cinderblock house on an empty 
lot next to a low- rent apartment building in Mexico City, petitioned her 
municipality in vain for the installation of a street light in the alley con-
necting the property to the road (author interview 2004). When noth-
ing happened she asked a local politician to negotiate (gestionar) for 
her. Shortly thereafter, lighting was installed. The woman reciprocated 
by becoming the leader of a committee, formed to convince her neigh-
bours to be represented by the same politician in a politically lucrative 
bid involving the demolition of their homes as part of a plan to construct 
a new housing complex.
Although gestión meets immediate needs, it has negative conse-
quences. Gestiones undermine transparency, merit and equality. Citizens 






























decisions are made to benefit those from whom an obligation appears 
the most advantageous and there is no control over where and how 
resources are allocated. Democracy is perverted as the ability of citizens 
to hold elected and appointed officials accountable is countered by the 
capacity of officials to force citizens to support them (Stokes 2005). In 
addition, gestiones are exchanges that require the poor to show solidar-
ity with elites, rather than with other citizens facing similar political 
and economic problems. Citizens put aside their ideological convictions 
to negotiate with officials whose political views they find objection-
able, but whose intercession is necessary to satisfy an immediate goal. 
Holland and Palmer- Rubin (2012) report that peasant organisations, 
critical of the state and desirous of an alternative political order, are 
nevertheless forced to negotiate with the state in order to retain ben-
efits. The only way to maintain mobilisation is through direct benefits 
such as government subsidies. The same is true for urban organisations, 
which may have anti- system goals, but nevertheless find that they have 
to negotiate with officials to provide their members with the means for 
survival, which in turn allows the longer- term struggle for justice to con-
tinue (Shefner 2008). An unfortunate result of these processes is that 
horizontal networks and shared aims among citizens facing problems of 
inequality and marginalisation are undermined because of competition 
between them for access to officials (Montambeault 2015). The possi-
bilities for social mobilisation are reduced and non- egalitarian systems 
remain stable.
Because of the adverse effects of gestión, educated individuals, as 
well as savvy politicians and community leaders, disapprove of the word 
and the activities it denotes. Intellectuals and elites would prefer that 
the state and its agencies functioned on the basis of formal, transparent 
rules. Politicians and social leaders competing for votes at a local level 
are aware that the gestión is objectionable and not only avoid using the 
term, but may also go to great lengths in interviews to make clear that 
they shun the practice. Observation of their interactions with citizens, 
however, reveals that gestiones are central to politics. Measuring the inci-
dence of the phenomenon is thus difficult.
Individuals who are easily accessible for interviews and surveys – 
the middle and upper classes – may be highly critical of such exchanges, 
but unwilling to offer honest responses regarding their own behaviour as 
they are reluctant to appear in a negative light. People like those whose 
case is described above regularly resort to gestiones, but are typically 
more difficult to access. They may be distrustful of interviewers, and 
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privileges. Consequently, much available research on gestiones (and 
clientelism more generally) is based on ethnographic interviews and 
participant observation in particular locations. Researchers wanting 
to gather broader, survey- based data, try to avoid the sensitive ele-
ments of the issue by posing questions that do not target the respond-
ent as an active participant in the behaviour. Respondents might be 
asked whether they have been offered something in return for their 
vote (AmericasBarometer 2011) or how corrupt they perceive various 
political institutions and state agencies to be (Universidad del Valle 
de México 2014). The results of such questions provide little certainty 
regarding the extent of public goods distribution that occurs through 
gestiones. Nevertheless, the initiated hypothesise that little happens 
without a gestion in Mexican public services, particularly when the 
poor are involved (see Álvarez Prieto 2015).
6.12 Pulling strings (Uk/ Usa)
Peter B. smith
University of sussex, Uk
‘Pulling strings’ is a procedure for achieving a goal through the use of a 
more powerful intermediary. The phrase is most frequently used in rela-
tion to obtaining employment, or access to privileged treatment in ways 
that circumvent official or established bureaucratic procedures. Because 
of the prevalence of gender- based power relations, ‘pulling strings’ is 
often referred to as using the ‘old boys’ network’ (see 3.13 Volume 1). 
The implicit assumption behind the latter phrase is that powerful men 
will have established friendly relations with one another either during 
their education in British public schools (that is to say, expensive private 
schools), or at high- status universities such as Oxford or Cambridge. 
When they achieve positions of power later in life, they are likely to be 
able to accommodate favours requested of them by their peers on behalf 
of some more junior person.
A related but subtly different concept is that of ‘pulling the strings’, 
that is, with the inclusion of the definite article. While ‘pulling strings’ is 
an informal practice in which the ‘pulling’ is initiated or requested from 
below, ‘pulling the strings’ is a factual statement about who really holds 
power or is in control. To ask, ‘Who pulls the strings?’ is akin to asking, 
‘Who is really in control?’ For example, in 2012 the Northern Ireland 
branch of the environmental group Friends of the Earth launched a 
campaign called ‘Who Pulls the Strings?’, calling for donations to politi-



















Northern Ireland 2012). The logic was that when large, private dona-
tions were made to political parties by business interests, those interests 
thereby gained some form of hidden political power, and were thus ‘pull-
ing the strings’.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (Little et al. 1933/1973) 
provides two definitions of ‘pulling the strings’: ‘to control the state of 
affairs’, and ‘to be the concealed operator in what is ostensibly controlled 
by another’. The OED suggests that the phrase derives from marionette 
theatres such as Punch and Judy shows, where the puppets are con-
trolled by strings operated by a hidden puppeteer. The American Heritage 
Dictionary of Idioms (1997/2003) cites the following examples of usage 
of the term ‘pulling strings’: ‘By pulling strings he got us house seats to 
the opening’, and ‘His father pulled some wires and got him out of jail’, 
sourcing both from the nineteenth century.
Pulling strings is widely disparaged in contemporary Britain, 
being seen as more characteristic of times gone by, and not in accord-
ance with strongly felt norms about equality of opportunity and fairness 
(Fox 2004). It continues nonetheless to be a widespread phenomenon. 
For instance, during the economic recession that began in 2008, many 
UK university graduates found that the only way to obtain employment 
was first to take a temporary unpaid internship with an organisation 
(Baker 2003). Achieving an internship in an attractive organisation can 
rest upon using opportunities for pulling strings. As one 17- year- old 
put it: ‘If parents have a business, then they take on their child or their 
child’s friends. It is really hard because you might have the enthusi-
asm and the qualifications for it, but if someone else is related to them 
or knows them, they will have the upper hand on you’ (cited in Baker 
2003).
Two studies of attitudes towards pulling strings and related con-
cepts in other countries reveal interesting findings. The first study 
(Smith, Huang et al. 2012) sampled students from four countries – the 
UK, China, Brazil and Lebanon – while the second (Smith, Torres et 
al. 2012) sampled business managers from the UK, Singapore, Brazil, 
Saudi Arabia and Russia. In both studies, respondents were asked to 
react to a series of brief imaginary scenarios that represented pro-
cesses of informal influence. One of the scenarios used in the study 
with students was as follows:
John is a student who has a job in a restaurant four evenings a 
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has not worked in a restaurant before. Even though there are other 
candidates with more experience, David asks John to convince the 
owner of the restaurant that it would be best if he would take on his 
friend as extra cover for the times when the restaurant is very busy 
at the weekend.
One of the scenarios used in the business- manager study was as follows:
Dan’s father went to the same school as Ashley, who is now the 
chief executive of the local hospital. Dan needs to get some work 
experience before applying for an MBA programme. Dan’s father 
asked Ashley to hire him in a junior position for a year and Ashley 
was able to arrange this.
The scenarios were drawn from all the countries represented in the stud-
ies, but their specific origins were concealed from respondents, through 
translation into relevant languages and substitution of locally typical 
character names. In the first study, British respondents viewed 12 sce-
narios, of which only 3 were instances of pulling strings (the other 9 were 
instances of similar practices in the other 3 countries). They were asked 
to rate how representative each scenario was of pulling strings, how typi-
cal it was of what happens in the UK, and how much they liked this kind 
of behaviour. It was found that the British scenarios that involved pull-
ing strings were rated by British respondents as more representative of 
pulling strings than were the scenarios exemplifying Brazilian jeitinho, 
Chinese guanxi and Middle Eastern wast a (see 1.2, 1.12 Volume 1 and 
6.8 in this volume), which they also rated. In addition, British respond-
ents saw the ‘pulling strings’ scenarios as typical of what happens in the 
UK, but the respondents from Lebanon, China and Brazil actually rated 
them as even more typical of what happens in their countries. The results 
of the second study were similar, with pulling strings being seen as most 
typical by the Russian respondents.
Thus it appears that, while pulling strings is a recognisably 
British phenomenon, as a broad type of informal practice it is far from 
unique to the UK. Respondents from all the sampled countries rated all 
the informal influence processes portrayed in the scenarios negatively, 
but the ‘pulling strings’ scenarios were rated less negatively than the 
scenarios exemplifying guanxi, wa sta, jeitinho and Russian svyazi. This 
may however have been because the ‘pulling strings’ scenarios exem-













6.13 Kombinacja (alt. kombinacya, kombinowanie,   
kombinowac ) (Poland)
edyta Materka
Queen Mary University of London, Uk
Kombinacja is a colloquial Polish term used to describe the process 
of manipulating legal, political or cultural rules in order to access a 
resource. Food, commodities, labour, information and power can all be 
accessed via kombinacja. An individual, group, institution or state can 
exercise kombinacja and thus be called a kombinator, but the practice is 
most often transferred from one generation to the next among poor, mar-
ginalised families (Mazurek 2012: 306). Kusiak argues that historically, 
the practice has been seen in a positive light, as a survival tool in the face 
of oppressive regimes (2012: 296–7):
[Kombinacja] has been considered a skill which one should be 
proud of, as it allows the underprivileged to access otherwise inac-
cessible resources and trick the oppressor. It was the exceptional 
ability to kombinować that helped the majority of Poles to survive 
the Nazi occupation, the socialist shortages, and the shock of post- 
1989 inflation.
Kombinacja reflects Poles’ low levels of confidence in formal economic 
and political institutions. ‘Getting around the system’ is seen as a more 
effective survival strategy for both the family unit and nation. The ety-
mological roots of the word kombinacja likely originate from the Latin 
sociare (to combine) – the origin of the word ‘socialism’ (Bevir 2011: 
14). ‘Combinations’ were an early form of trade union in Europe dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution. Witnessing the industrialisation of par-
titioned Poland at the turn of the twentieth century, the Young Poland 
literary movement picked up on the term to critique Poles’ initiation into 
the ‘cycle’ of kombinacja (labour struggle). In Promised Land (1899), 
Władysław Reymont wrote: ‘Think, what is this strange kombinacya [sic.] 
that is unfolding today in the world: the human enslaved nature’s forces, 
discovered masses of strength – and went into his own shackles exactly 
into his own forces’ (Reymont 1899: 345). To counter this oppression, 
the Polish worker, ‘wandered around Łódź for entire days, submerged 
only in kombinacyas that sought to harm the manufacturer’ (Reymont 
1899: 355).
In the 1920s, Soviet literature reframed the kombinator as a bour-
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was the antihero of Ilia Ilf and Evgenii Petrov’s seminal novel The Twelve 
Chairs (1928/ 2011). Ostap, whose dream was to become a millionaire 
and move to Rio de Janeiro, ‘effortlessly squeezes information out of peo-
ple, slips in and out of roles, and penetrates through situations’ (Pesmen 
2000: 204). He was a chameleon who played by his own rules in a col-
lectivist landscape that attempted to assign class and economic function 
to each citizen. His transformations and ability to artistically manipu-
late language and political discourse made him an ‘economic wrecker’ 
of the Soviet command economy. Yet ironically, this form of kombinacja 
became ‘the prerequisite for understanding Soviet life’, because the com-
mand economy itself suffered from shortages, corruption and red tape, 
and individuals had to find innovative strategies in order to access basic 
resources (Pesmen 2000: 204).
Kombinacja as the everyday man’s strategy for basic survival 
became widespread during the Second World War. Polish peasants who 
were forced to meet agricultural quotas for the General Government 
under Nazi occupation found ways to sell their yields on the black mar-
ket. Polish doctors in Warsaw acquired Red Cross identification cards 
to give underground Polish hospitals immunity from Nazi surveillance 
(Tucker 2005: 283–4). German brigadiers colluded with Polish forced 
labourers on German estates to steal goods from Nazi warehouses 
and sell them on the black market in exchange for food and money. 
Kombinacja became an expression of solidarity across classes, ethnici-
ties and nations.
Holocaust literature also records this emerging ‘consciousness’ of 
kombinacja during the war. Primo Levi recalled in Survival in Auschwitz 
how Häftlings (prison inmates) used the practice to trade third- rate 
tobacco called Mahorca for a larger bread portion (1958: 80):
The traffic is an instance of a kind of ‘kombinacja’ frequently prac-
ticed: the Häftling, somehow saving a ration of bread, invests it in 
Mahorca; he cautiously gets in touch with a civilian addict who 
acquires the Mahorca, paying in cash with a portion of bread 
greater than that initially invested.
This practice was inmates’ only chance of survival: ‘Whosoever does not 
know how to become an “Organisator”, “Kombinator” … soon becomes 
a “musselman” – a walking cadaver’ (Levi 1958: 89). (‘Musselman’, the 
German word for a Muslim, was concentration camp slang for an inmate 
on the brink of death from starvation.) In Art Spiegelman’s Holocaust 




















favours from the German guards in the Sosnowiec ghetto (Spiegelman 
1973: 118):
‘Always Haskel was such a guy: a kombinator’.
‘A what?’
‘A guy what [sic] makes kombinacja, a schemer … a crook’.
The practice of kombinacja took on new dimensions under the 
socialist regime in Poland (1945– 89). It became a widespread strategy 
used by workers, peasants, the nomenklatura and the state to control the 
workplace, as well as to survive and/ or benefit from economic shortages. 
‘Good’ kombinacja served ‘my/ our’ interests; ‘bad’ kombinacja served the 
‘other’ (usually state or nomenklatura) interests; although such nuances 
were in the eye of the beholder and subject to political manipulation. One 
worker’s claim that, ‘The State robs me, I rob the State, and it all comes 
out even’ (Pawlik 1992: 89) neatly summarises the broader findings of 
this author’s research: that the state used kombinacja against the people, 
and the people in turn responded with kombinacja against the state. A 
number of mandatory unpaid labour obligations (corvées, Soviet subbot-
niks, etc.) were formalised by legislation passed by the Polish People’s 
Republic (PRL). Communes could impose these obligations on workers 
and peasants, using their unpaid labour towards state building projects 
or fulfilling production quotas. Rather than supplying the harvests and 
commodities back to the people, the state exported them for profit, 
resulting in material shortages.
To balance out this state kombinacja and its resultant shortages, 
workers without independent unions used kombinacja to ‘take out’ 
(wynosić) or ‘domesticate for oneself’ (przyswoić sobie) state property 
(Pawlik 1992: 79). Workers’ inner justification for their kombinacja 
was rooted in the idealised socialist ‘common goods’ philosophy, i.e. 
that the state owned all property, and that the people owned the state 
(Barcikowska 2004). Thus, the workers were only taking what was theirs 
anyway. ‘Zkombinowane’ resources were usually food, tools, commodities 
and building materials taken home from state workplaces. Peasants with-
held state agricultural quotas and diverted state property (meat, labour, 
technology, building materials) from the collective (kołchoz) and state 
farms (sovkhoz) into their farms to meet subsistence levels, or sold them 
to workers on the black market. Both workers and peasants manipulated 
this ‘paradoxical role as simultaneous employee and co- owner’ (Firlit and 
Chłopecki 1992: 100) by paying themselves ‘dividends’ from their fac-
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State officials and managers also exercised kombinacja, both 
to enable them to fulfil their official duties and to benefit privately. 
They ordered services from moonlighting repairmen who installed 
zkombinowane sinks into private homes; sold state- produced commodi-
ties on the black market for private gain; bought grain on the black mar-
ket to meet a state quota; organised field trips for workers to travel to 
other bloc countries and sell state commodities on the black markets 
to supplement wages; and even allowed entrepreneurial kombinators 
to divert capital from state- run to ‘private’ factories that sold products to 
locals. Some were punished: a director of a state- run meat warehouse 
in Warsaw who admitted to taking bribes from state- run meat stores 
was hanged for his ‘economic crime’ in 1956 (Newsweek.pl 2010). For 
the most part, however, the authorities sided with the ‘us’ and allowed 
kombinacja to be exercised ‘against’ the higher state apparatus – a strat-
egy that increased the nomenklatura’s private profits, helped them 
meet their ‘formal’ state obligations, and socially reproduced their 
local power.
Figure 6.13.1 Navigating the world through the double consciousness 
of kombinacja.











During the post- socialist transition, the nomenklatura privatised 
and liquidated state property for profit or entrepreneurial ventures. This 
led many Poles to regard entrepreneurialism as ‘bad’ kombinacja that 
contributed to their poverty. Post- socialist kombinacja, ‘has been given a 
new cut- throat “entrepreneurial” twist’, in that people, ‘think that there 
must be a trick to everything’ (Barcikowska 2004: 3). Conversely, entre-
preneurial Poles value kombinacja as fostering innovation in the new 
post- socialist economy. In 2012, Arkadius Hajduk – the founder of the 
‘Huge Thing’ accelerator – told the Wall Street Journal that Poland’s start- 
up scene has a competitive edge: ‘We have a word in Polish – kombinować 
– it’s not really translatable, but it sort of means finding a way to do some-
thing but without a lot of resources’ (Rooney 2012: 1).
Meanwhile, kombinacja as survival strategy has also flourished in 
the turmoil of the post- communist transition to a free market economy. 
Free movement of labour has opened up new avenues for the practice, 
with workers able to switch between countries to maximise their income. 
Migrant workers who engage in transnational kombinacja between 
Poland and Norway informed the author that kombinacja is untranslat-
able and invisible to Westerners, implying that the concept lacks paral-
lels in the West. White’s study showed how a village nurse relies upon 
kombinować (‘the idea of combining various assets’) to feed her fam-
ily: ‘Grandmother helps a bit … My husband works at the bus factory. 
He does overtime when it’s available. Those are the different ways we 
survive [Tak kombinujemy]’ (White 2011: 39). The urban poor use the 
practice to supplement their wages: they temporarily migrate overseas, 
grow their own food, squat, access electricity illegally, claim benefits 
while working, apply for credit on behalf of family members. Their ‘good’ 
kombinacja absorbs any organised call on politicians to enact welfare and 
workplace reform.
6.14 S vrutka (Bulgaria)
Lora koycheva
unaffiliated scholar
S vrutka is a rhetorical expression found in Bulgaria that literally means 
‘with a twist’ and appears in phrases such as ‘everything happens with a 
twist’ or ‘everything is achievable with a twist’ – ‘vsichko stava s vrutka’. 
S vrutka is sometimes substituted by other terms, for example, s fint, s 
trik, and s dalavera, which comes from the Turkish word dalavere, mean-
ing ‘deception, swindle, ploy or manoeuvre’. This colloquial figure of 
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networks and connections in order to achieve a goal. S vrutka is a part 
of the repertoire of linguistic means to communicate the intricate inter-
play between the formal and informal, legal and illegal, licit and illicit, 
legitimate and illegitimate modes of getting things done in contemporary 
Bulgarian society. It refers to practices across various normative domains 
and to activities that include both legal and illegal means of pursuing 
a goal.
In itself, ‘twisting’ suggests repositioning the existing elements in 
a system or re- arranging available resources. The introduction of new 
elements from outside and the use of expert knowledge can also be 
employed. Twisting can connote out- of- the- ordinary circumstances, an 
exceptional case, or an extraordinary effort necessary to conduct a trans-
action. The phrase s vrutka highlights several characteristics of everyday 
practices – it invokes creativity, fluidity and mastery of the social milieus 
and social and cultural knowledge, bordering on what Michael Herzfeld 
has called ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 2004). The phrase refers not to 
the repertoire of informal practices, but rather to the way in which infor-
mal practices can be conducted. It signals communicative creativity and 
cultural intimacy because only insiders in a culture are able to exploit the 
existing rules, norms, regulations and other available social and cultural 
resources in order to achieve the desired goal.
There are many other popular figures of speech and ways to denote 
corruption or informality in Bulgaria. Two other common examples of 
expressions used are ‘beer money’ (pari za edna bira; da pocherpya bira) 
and ‘coffee money’ (pari za kafe). It is worth noting that neither expres-
sion is exclusive to the Bulgarian case. The same terms are found in 
Africa (Blundo et al. 2006). In both cases, however, the expressions tend 
to be used in the context of situations involving low- level bureaucrats. 
For example, when paperwork needs to be expedited, it may necessitate 
‘beer money’ or ‘coffee money’ being paid. Unlike these popular figures of 
speech, however, s vrutka is not the same as discursive expressions ‘legiti-
mizing discourses about corruption’ (Znoj 2007: 59).
It is methodologically difficult to definitively date when and how 
such popular expressions enter or leave everyday language, and if s vrutka 
has replaced ‘coffee money’. It is worth noting that s vrutka appears to 
have been referred to in the media towards the end of the first decade 
of the 2000s. In the same time, observations of people casually leaving 
a small amount of money (not unlike a tip) for public officials, saying 
they were for ‘coffee’, were, in this author’s ethnographic work carried 
out intermittently between 2008 and 2011, non- existent – in contrast to 














There are two prevailing contexts in which the phrase s vrutka 
is used. In media coverage the phrase is often used to imply a scheme 
circumventing a legal obstacle, usually through the workings of hierar-
chy and informal power, or through the careful navigation of available 
legal loopholes. In this case, saying that something happens ‘s vrutka’ 
is usually embedded in a narrative about elites and power play. For 
example, in a highly critical editorial in the daily newspaper 24 chasa, 
chief editor Danka Vassileva used the term to question the way in which 
public funds are deposited in banks and for what reason. ‘For this twist 
[vrutka], Europe will not say congratulations … There is another ver-
sion, of course, concerning corruption, which we would not even voice 
out loud, let alone believe’ (Vassileva 2012; translation Koycheva). 
When used in such contexts, s vrutka is often accompanied by an expla-
nation of exactly how the manipulation takes place. In this usage, the 
term is another way of contributing to the visualisation of the mech-
anisms of power and the state through the deployment of narratives 
about it (Gupta 1995, 2005).
The second context is the vernacular one, encountered in daily 
usage, when usually no further explanation is given as to what the ‘twist-
ing’ involves, but rather a form of meaningful silence follows. Employing 
the term in this way covers a range of everyday practices and commu-
nicative tactics that are often overlooked both within the larger field of 
post-socialist studies and within the specialism of informality studies: 
namely, the indeterminacy that Ledeneva has referred to as ‘open secrets’ 
and ‘non- articulated knowledge that people prefer to leave ambiguous’ 
(Ledeneva 2011: 727). It requires from all participants ‘the complic-
ity to leave things unarticulated’ (Ledeneva 2011: 733), thus achiev-
ing through linguistic means what Blundo and Olivier de Sardan have 
termed, ‘an incessant alternation between condemnation and tolerance’ 
by actively engaging the ‘semantic fields of corruption’ (Blundo and 
Olivier de Sardan 2001: 110– 11).
In a similar vein, in an everyday context, as used verbally and 
among friends, the term is encountered when people give an account of 
how they overcome daily challenges, or ostensibly absurd situations aris-
ing from bureaucratic restructuring or a contradiction of rules. Unlike 
vruzki (see 1.9 Volume 1), which can in certain circumstances occupy 
the same broad semantic space, s vrutka is often used when paperwork 
is involved. For example, since kindergarten spaces in the capital are 
severely limited, a family may acknowledge securing a space for their 
child ‘with a twist’, but will not specify which means were used: whether 
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implies connections and a personal network. Thus, s vrutka does not nec-
essarily always imply using vruzki.
In sum, the usage of this term reveals several important aspects of 
informality, both in methodological and in theoretical terms and points 
to an area of research that has been under- explored in the scholarship 
on informality: language. The use of such a term raises methodological 
questions regarding the way in which social phenomena resist articula-
tion by local informants and make such phenomena elusive. This in turn 
leads to important theoretical preoccupations about the pragmatics not 
only of informal practices themselves, but also crucially of the pragmatics 
of the scholarship of informality. It presents a conundrum: how to name 
phenomena without a priori ascribing normative value to them, which 
may or may not be part of the way they are experienced in the world of 
formal and informal interactions (see Lucy 1993 on pragmatics).
6.15 Raccomandazione (Italy)
dorothy L. zinn
free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Italy
Raccomandazione (noun) is a widespread phenomenon in Italian culture 
that refers to the use of social connections in order to get things done. 
In English, it can loosely be translated in a more literal sense as ‘recom-
mendation’ or ‘reference’, but its connotation is more accurately that 
of clout, string- pulling, influence and morally dubious backscratching. 
Informal practices in numerous other societies bear strong analogies to 
raccomandazione: among these, we may consider French piston, Russian 
blat, Chinese guanxi, Spanish enchufismo, and German Vitamin B (‘B’ as 
in Beziehung, meaning relationship, see entries 1.1–1.21 Volume 1).
In Italian, raccomandazione has a colloquial synonym, ‘little push’, 
la spintarella. Other expressions associated with it include: ‘to grease the 
wheels’ (ungere le ruole), ‘a kick in the rear end’ (to propel someone for-
ward – il calcio nel sedere) and ‘the key’ (to open doors – la chiave). In 
spite of its common occurrence, a significant social stigma surrounds rac-
comandazione, and it is therefore often referred to with the euphemism 
segnalazione (‘put in a good word for someone’). In addition to its verb 
form, raccomandare, the key nouns deriving from raccomandazione are 
raccomandato and raccomandante. The raccomandato is a person who, 
bearing a raccomandazione, makes use of it to achieve some end. The 
term is derogatory, usually used to describe someone who has unjustly 
received some benefit, implying that he lacks merit or has violated proper 















enjoying a position of power, prestige or influential relations, recom-
mends the raccomandato. A third term of more recent usage (especially 
in the press) but less widely adopted, is raccomandatario, which denotes 
a person who is on the receiving end of a raccomandazione and who is 
presumably able to grant the request.
Among its wide- ranging implications, the term raccomandazione 
principally evokes the practice of using connections to find employment, 
especially in an attempt to secure a job in the public sector. This fact has 
led to the consolidation of an Italian cultural stereotype of the civil serv-
ant who, under- qualified and motivated primarily by the job security and 
benefits provided by public employment, has undeservingly managed to 
land such a job through his connections, and who performs his work in a 
lackadaisical manner. By association, raccomandazione is further linked 
to the overall perception of a bloated, Byzantine Italian bureaucracy. 
As a result, bureaucratic inefficiency itself begets the need for yet more 
raccomandazioni in order to speed things up or otherwise improve the 
delivery of services in the public sphere, including public hospitals. In the 
education sector, school and university students may become raccoman-
dati in order to obtain better marks, often thanks to the initiative taken by 
their parents. More generally, raccomandazione can come into play in vir-
tually every sphere of daily life: even in shopping or dining out, where a 
raccomandazione can be deployed to receive ‘special attention’ (un occhio 
di riguardo) or a discount.
Raccomandazione can encompass relatively innocuous interac-
tions, such as the performance of a small courtesy, as well as more bla-
tant forms of illegality. In the latter sense, it bears nuances that shade 
into bribes (tangenti, including the practice of bustarella, see 2.20 
Volume 1), corruption and organised crime (mafia) – all of which may 
well feature the use of raccomandazioni. As a form of patronage- clien-
telism, raccomandazione can easily become bound up with chains of 
illicit and/ or illegal exchanges for votes and other resources such as dis-
ability pensions, permits or jobs. On the other hand, raccomandazione 
can also be viewed in positive terms as a means of levelling the playing 
field in order to give an underdog a chance. The implication here is that 
because the well- to- do are automatically privileged, and others will be 
equipped with raccomandazioni, an otherwise deserving person may be 
unfairly penalised by the lack of a raccomandazione. We thus perceive 
the moral complexities surrounding raccomandazione, a phenomenon 
that Italians have often defined as a central negative feature of their own 
identity: associated with slyness, slighted as ‘a poor man’s making do’ 
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an expression of positive values of family, friendship, solidarity and reci-
procity (see Figure 6.15.1).
Early social science treatments of Italian raccomandazione from the 
1950s to the early 1970s framed the discussion in terms of patronage- 
clientelism issues that characterised a large part of the Mediterranean 
region, looking in particular at rural contexts. Such traditional clientelis-
tic relationships featured vertical, dyadic ties between the raccomandante 
and raccomandato. In urban settings, the use of raccomandazioni for 
electoral patronage and organised crime has received greater attention 
Figure 6.15.1 The sculpture by artist Donato Linzalata appears 
in the town of Bernalda, Italy and represents raccomandazione as a 
‘key’ (to open doors). The artist says he was inspired by the study of 
raccomandazione by Zinn (2001).






(Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Chubb 1982). In Italy and in many other 
Mediterranean settings, the literature also describes how the language 
and practice of god- parenthood consolidated such relations. Moreover, 
Jeremy Boissevain’s pioneering work in Sicily (1966) noted the homolo-
gies between raccomandazione in patronage- clientelism and the Catholic 
religion, in which the devout may recommend themselves to the saints in 
order to reach a purpose. More recent analyses (Zinn 2001, 2013) have 
traced continuity and change in raccomandazione with Italy’s moderni-
sation, underlining the way in which this cultural category and practice 
remains deeply entrenched. Post- war Italian society created the condi-
tions for a ‘democratisation’ of raccomandazione, allowing it to become 
consolidated in new spheres and among ever- wider segments of the 
population.
The post- war expansion of raccomandazione is visible in Italian 
popular culture: an extremely well- known cultural trope in Italian soci-
ety, raccomandazione has been depicted in numerous examples of Italian 
cultural production. One significant literary work is Alberto Moravia’s 
short story, La raccomandazione. The theme has also received attention 
periodically in cinematic representations, for example in classic films like 
I mostri (1963) and Mi manda Picone (1984), but also in more recent 
works such as C’è chi dice no (2011) and Quo Vado? (2015). With some 
irony (and self- irony), RAI public television used raccomandazione as the 
driving concept behind the television talent programme I raccomandati, 
which ran for nine seasons (2003– 11).
Raccomandazione is difficult to research empirically because of the 
embarrassment and stigma associated with the phenomenon; nonethe-
less, people are generally willing to discuss cases of raccomandazione 
involving others. Despite the challenge of quantifying instances of rac-
comandazione, surveys published in Italian newspapers routinely report 
that a substantial percentage of persons interviewed utilise raccoman-
dazioni when seeking employment. Quite apart from the empirical mani-
festations of raccomandazione, the ethnographic method employed in 
Zinn (2001) focused on the importance of its ideological dimensions. It 
was found that even in instances in which no actual raccomandazione had 
taken place, informants often assumed that one was involved. Moreover, 
the long- term, intimate approach of ethnography allows for the develop-
ment of relations of trust that favour data- gathering despite a tendency 
for secrecy, and it effectively probes the morally ambivalent stances that 
people maintain with regard to raccomandazione.
Commonplace though the practice is, there is nonetheless wide-
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2012 Anti- Corruption Law (No. 190) attempted to make it illegal by 
defining it as ‘traffic of illicit influences’. Yet from a strictly legal point of 
view, court decisions have continued to decree that it is not a crime in the 
context of putting in a good word for someone. If, however, raccoman-
dazione is supplemented with gifts or payment to a civil servant, it con-
stitutes bribery or corruption in a penal sense. Raccomandazione persists 
in Italy in its various forms, even though measures for accountability and 
transparency have been enacted in the public administration since the 
1990s. Simultaneously, the possible benefits made available through the 
public sector (especially jobs) have diminished through budget cuts and 
the shrinking of the welfare state. Moreover, a new cultural awareness 
emphasising meritocracy has gained increasing consensus among the 
younger generations of Italians: they often hesitate to ask for raccoman-
dazioni or will protest more readily when they find that an injustice or a 
crime has been committed through the use of connections.
6.16 Insider trading (Usa/ general)
Ilja Viktorov
department of economic history, stockholm University, sweden
‘Insider trading’ in financial markets refers to trading in securities such 
as equity and bonds by market participants who have access to exclusive 
information about the issuer of a particular security before such informa-
tion is released to the general public. This allows insiders to benefit from 
buying or selling shares before they fluctuate in price. The longest prison 
sentence for insider trading in the United States – 11 years – was handed 
down in 2011 to hedge- fund manager and billionaire Raj Rajaratnam. 
Following this case, in 2012 the American judiciary found Rajaratnam’s 
business partner Rajat K.  Gupta (former Goldman Sachs director and 
CEO of global consultancy firm McKinsey & Company) guilty of leaking 
non- public corporate information to Rajaratnam. Gupta was sentenced 
to two years in prison for conspiracy and securities fraud. Access to 
insider information had enabled Rajaratnam to make profits on trading 
stocks (and to avoid losses) to the tune of US$64 million, part of these 
gains resulting from Gupta’s tips (Raghavan 2013).
Insider trading has been present throughout the history of financial 
markets, and was particularly prevalent during periods of speculative 
stock market bubbles. Because of the strong influence of US anti- insider 
trading laws on other jurisdictions, the English word ‘insider’ is used 
in most languages. In most European Union (EU) member- states, a 





















Primary insiders gain access to information by virtue of their position, 
employment or responsibility. They include controlling shareholders, 
corporate executives and officers, as well as financial- market profes-
sionals who compile information on a firm’s operation. Government 
officials with access to insider information also fall into this category. 
Secondary insiders are friends or relatives of primary insiders, act-
ing on tips and referred to as ‘tippees’ in the American legal tradition 
(Alexander 2007).
Insider trading is closely associated with price manipulation in 
financial markets, such as the creation of special corporate events to 
influence price movements of specific securities with the aim of even-
tual profit- making (Engelen and Leiderkerke 2010). While the practices 
associated with insider trading are less aggressive and more widespread 
than price manipulation, they are considered dubious and unethical. 
Since trading in securities may be viewed as a zero- sum game between 
market participants, insiders’ profits mean losses for their counterpar-
ties, including small and institutional investors such as pension funds. 
Empirical studies from the US and UK found that insiders earned abnor-
mal profits above the average market- price fluctuations (Seyhun 2000; 
Friederich et al. 2002).
The US was the first country to ban insider trading. Since the 
nineteenth century, the American stock market had been the world’s 
largest, with broad popular involvement in securities trading, includ-
ing the investment of pension savings in equities. The Great Crash of 
the American stock market of 1929 provoked the development of a 
complex regulative framework against insider trading. Initially, this 
was based on legislation such as the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and on rules imposed by the pow-
erful Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which investigates 
insider dealings. However, in accordance with common law tradi-
tion, the subsequent evolution of the anti- insider legal framework 
came to depend more on judicial interpretations in particular cases 
and court decisions. Thus, the actual prohibition of insider trading 
in the US was delayed until the 1960s, and lacked codification in the 
form of a specific anti- insider law. This makes the American judicial 
anti- insider trading framework somewhat contradictory and incon-
sistent. At the same time, the lack of a specific legal code provides 
more flexibility for the implementation of legislation (Bewaji 2012; 
Bainbridge 2013).
To meet the requirements of the SEC, US investment banks 
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instituting ‘Chinese walls’. These information barriers are purely nor-
mative, though in some cases departments dealing with mergers and 
acquisitions or research are physically separated from the trading 
department. The purpose of a ‘Chinese wall’ is to restrict access to 
information by employees who are not directly involved in delivering 
services for the bank’s corporate customers. Otherwise, non- public 
information may leak beyond interdepartmental ‘walls’ and other 
bank employees may potentially use it for insider trading in securities 
(Bartos 2008: 187– 8).
Under the pressure of financial globalisation, the American 
experience of anti- insider legislation has spread to the rest of the 
world. Most advanced economies with developed financial markets 
have made insider trading illegal:  France in 1970, the UK in 1980, 
Japan in 1988, Italy and Denmark in 1991, Austria in 1993, Spain 
and Germany in 1994. In the EU, the implementation of anti- insider 
laws was driven mainly by the European Community Insider Dealing 
Directive of 1989. Criminalisation notwithstanding, legal definitions 
of insider trading vary substantially between jurisdictions (Alexander 
2007: 37– 81; Engelen and Leiderkerke 2010). There is no universal 
take on the type of securities or other financial instruments. For exam-
ple, UK insider- trading legislation exempts shares of public sector 
bodies while their debt securities are affected. In the US, courts have 
been reluctant to apply anti- insider laws to debt securities (Bewaji 
2012). In Japan, non- listed securities and treasury instruments are 
excluded from anti- insider legislation. Actual enforcement of insider- 
trading regulation also varies (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). So far, 
the US remains the jurisdiction with the strongest record for enforce-
ment. It has seen a significant number of legal cases where long prison 
sentences have been imposed on insiders found guilty of illegal trad-
ing, while enforcement tends to embrace a broader range of insiders 
(Bainbridge 2013).
Insider trading is common in developing countries, where it is prac-
tised by a wide range of market participants, corporate officers and regu-
lative authorities. Quantitative studies of this practice in the emerging 
markets are virtually absent because of a lack of reliable data and actual 
non- enforcement of anti- insider legislation. Interviewing market partici-
pants remains the main research method, making qualitative approaches 
of economic sociology and oral history an integral part of the few avail-
able studies in the field.
Despite evolving anti- insider legislation, there is a significant 

















anti- insider trading regulation in China is illustrative. China’s insider- 
trading legislation began to develop in the 1990s but its implementation 
was delayed until the late 2000s, the drawbacks including state regu-
lators’ lack of independence and accountability, selectiveness of legal 
enforcement and low levels of judicial expertise to hear difficult cases 
(Huang 2013).
Wunmi Bewaji’s (2012) empirical study of insider trading in 
Nigeria attests to the broad abuse of insider trading in domestic finan-
cial markets. The release of corporate news does not generally lead to a 
change in share prices, since potential profits have already been taken 
by insiders before any such information is made public. More import-
antly, the Nigerian practice of insider trading highlights the unrooted 
nature of anti- corruption legislation when forcefully imposed on emer-
ging markets. Few financial market professionals have an adequate 
understanding of insider trading or are aware of the existence of 
Nigeria’s anti- insider legislation.
In post- Soviet Russia, insider trading and market manipulation 
appeared with the emergence of the securities market in the 1990s. 
Foreign – mainly American – consultants played an active role in the for-
mation of financial market institutions, leading on several occasions to 
conflicts of interests (Wedel 2001). Ironically, Russia’s only case to date of 
insider trading and market manipulation was uncovered by the American 
judiciary as part of the ‘Harvard Affair’ (McClintick 2006). High- ranking 
Russian officials were also engaged in speculation in the government 
short- term bond GKO market (Viktorov 2015). Since the 2000s, insider 
trading has been practised mainly by Russian state bureaucrats and cor-
porate executives, who are well aware that their conduct is unethical. 
Such dealings are kept secret, though market participants usually know 
whose interests a particular stockbroker represents. Because of strong 
resistance by influential government ministers and oligarchs, the ban on 
insider trading was delayed until 2010, when a special anti- insider law 
was finally adopted, but its actual enforcement remains a task for the 
future.
Insider trading is internationally recognised as a serious problem 
by both financial market regulators and legislators. The evidence shows, 
however, that closing the gap between the introduction of a formal legis-
lative framework and its implementation takes time. There is no uniform 
legal interpretation of insider trading. In particular, attempts to trans-
plant the American model, grounded in the common law legal tradition, 
to countries with a civil law tradition makes implementation of legisla-
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6.17 Externe Personen (Germany)
andreas Maisch
author and journalist, Germany
In Germany, externe Personen (which literally means ‘external persons’) 
are individuals who work in the civil service, but do not officially have the 
status of civil servants. They maintain an external employment relation-
ship in the non- state sector while on temporary secondment in the civil ser-
vice. Externe Personen are seen as a potential gateway for lobbying. In the 
past, the European Commission also used external persons from private 
companies, but stopped this practice in 2009 following substantial criti-
cism by politicians, media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
The German administrative regulation on the use of externe 
Personen in the federal administration regulates the exchange of person-
nel between the public administration on the one side, and the private 
sector or institutions of science, culture and civil society on the other 
side. The first paragraph of this administrative regulation from 2008 
defines the term externe Personen as follows:  ‘Externe Personen is one 
who has an employment relationship outside the civil service and works 
temporarily in the federal administration, while maintaining his previ-
ous employment relationship’ (General administrative regulation 2008). 
In the media external persons are often called ‘externals’ (Externe) or 
‘external employees’ (externe Mitarbeiter). They work for a limited but 
sometimes extended period of time, usually for several months or some-
times a number of years.
The term externe Personen does not include those working on tem-
porary contracts or completing expert reports for the civil service. It 
includes only the use of personnel in the civil service who maintain their 
previous employment. For the purpose of the administrative regulation, 
‘civil servant’ is an occupation in the service of the state, a federal state, 
a municipal, or another public body. In this regard, public enterprises 
are considered to be part of the civil service. Hence, religious associa-
tions, which are usually organised as public corporations in Germany, 
are excluded.
In the eyes of some observers, external persons are a new type 
of lobbying. They argue that externe Personen serve two different 
organisations at the same time and can have conflicts of interests. For 
example, the anti- lobbying NGO LobbyControl argued that externe 
Personen serve two masters at the same time (Maisch 2014), while 

















In contrast to policy advisors, externe Personen work within the 
administration and have access to internal data. In this respect, externe 
Personen bear similarities to national seconded experts in the European 
Commission. The difference is that national seconded experts today do 
not work for companies, unions or the like: they are usually employees of 
a national or regional public administration. Yet, several years ago, before 
the Commission put an end to the practice, national seconded experts 
and temporary administrators (non- permanent officials) were allowed to 
come from private companies. For instance, an employee of the German 
chemical company BASF worked as a temporary administrator in the 
European Commission from 2001 to 2004. His work was concerned 
with the European Union directive REACH (Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals)  – a conflict of interests. 
Siim Kallas – the commissioner responsible for administrative affairs at 
that time – put an end to the practice in the European Commission as a 
response to criticism by Green politicians, media and NGOs. Kallas stated 
that the use of external persons was a ‘German idea’. According to the 
European Commission, no representatives from companies, associations 
or trade unions have worked for the European Commission since 2009 
(Adamek and Otto 2008: 197, 219; Röhrig 2008).
It is important to distinguish between the terms externe Personen 
and lobbyists. Some externe Personen may be perceived as lobbyists, 
because they are employees of private companies. Hence, in Germany 
most external persons’ original employers are public institutions or 
research centres like the German Aerospace Center. For instance, the 
Ministry of Justice feared that a planned exchange with a trade associa-
tion could be perceived as industry influence on the ministry’s policy, and 
cancelled its plans for the exchange (Maisch 2015: 27).
In 2004, the German government under Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder (comprised of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the 
Greens) introduced a new programme for the exchange of personnel 
in order to improve the mutual understanding of public administration 
and the economy, and improve the transfer of knowledge between the 
public and private sectors. The government makes use of the temporary 
need for the externals’ expert knowledge and also sends officials to the 
private sector. The initiative, which started in October 2004, was part of 
the state programme ‘Modern State – modern administration’. Although 
under this programme personnel exchange took on a new dimension 
and became more public, this was not the beginning of such efforts: the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development had 
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Industry (BDI) since 1997, while the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology has had an exchange with companies and associations for 
more than 30 years.
In 2006, German media reported cases of conflicts of interests 
and how externe Personen influenced laws affecting their companies. 
Lobbyists contributed to laws in several ministries. One externe Person 
even leaked internal government documents to his original employer. An 
employee of the car manufacturer Daimler copied Ministry of Transport 
internal documents and informed his company about plans for a lorry toll 
(Adamek and Otto 2008: 147ff.).
As a reaction to these disclosures and the resulting widespread 
criticism, the government passed an administrative regulation on the 
use of externe Personen in July 2008. Since then, the Federal Ministry 
of the Interior has had to report twice a year to two committees of the 
Bundestag, giving details of the use of externe Personen in government 
and the ministries they are working in. Although it is forbidden for exter-
nals to write laws or to assign public contracts, they remain a potential 
gateway for lobbying. Research has shown that the ministerial bureau-
cracy is the primary addressee for lobbyists (von Alemann 1987:  175; 
Sebaldt 1997:  29, 254ff.; Lösche 2007:  66– 70). One problem is that 
externals lack the legitimacy to work in the civil service, because they 
have not applied for a position in the civil service and are not officials. 
Hartmann (2014: 35f., 41) has criticised the use of external persons as 
unconstitutional, finding that neutral and effective control was missing.
In addition, externals reinforce the existing asymmetric access of 
big companies and associations to ministries. Some single organisations 
get privileged access to the civil service, while others lack these oppor-
tunities, which potentially adversely impacts marginalised groups and 
un- organisable interests. Research shows that the BDI has sent many 
externals to multiple ministries, while only one came from a trade union 
(Maisch 2015: 30ff.).
In general, there is surprisingly little research on the phenom-
enon of externe Personen. In principle, research may combine qualita-
tive and quantitative methods. It is possible to count how many externe 
Personen there are in each ministry, because the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior publishes annual reports on their use. Until the year 2015 the 
ministry produced biannual reports, but these were not published. Even 
though these older reports are not public, it is possible to obtain access 
to them (for instance, by using the Freedom of Information Act called 
Informationsfreiheitsgesetz). The number of externals can be compared 













content analysis and classify the external persons’ activities. Expert inter-
views are a further method to measure the impact of externals, although 
in practice most ministries involved seem to be unwilling to answer scien-
tists’ questions about this topic.
An analysis of the above- mentioned reports by the author shows 
that the number of external persons within the federal administration 
decreased from 61 in 2008 to 42 in 2014 (Maisch 2015: 24f.). It seems 
that increasing transparency and public criticism of the use of externals 
led to the decrease in their use.
6.18 Pantouflage (france)
frédérique alexandre- Bailly and Maral Muratbekova- touron
esCP europe, Paris, france
Pantouflage is the practice of leaving a civil service position to obtain 
work in the private sector in France. The civil servant is typically granted 
secondment to the private sector position in the first instance, and so 
reserves the option to return to his civil service position at the end of 
the secondment period, although a permanent move to the private sector 
is also known as pantouflage. The term pantouflage is derived from the 
word pantoufle (a slipper), which in the slang of students from the Ecole 
Polytechnique (a high- status military engineering school, popularly 
known as ‘X’ due to the school symbol of two crossed canons), means 
the price paid to the State to defray one’s obligations to it: education 
costs and the commitment to serve it for 10 years (Kessler 1986). In an 
American context, this practice is known as ‘revolving door’. There are 
several reasons why civil servants opt for pantouflage: the wage differ-
ential with the private sector; the attractiveness of new experiences in 
business where they can actually take risks and see their projects real-
ised; and the difficulty of access to the few most prestigious civil service 
positions (Rouban 2002).
The top management positions in the public sector (and indeed, 
frequently the private sector too) are held by corpsards: members of the 
Grands Corps de l’Etat, networks of civil servants that play a significant 
role in the government and business structure of France. It is a social 
group drawn from the dominant social classes, providing it with an aura 
of prestige and power (Kessler 1986). Having a pyramid structure, the 
grands corps require a significant fraction of their members to move on, 
because not everyone cannot attain the highest levels. Civil servants may 
be granted secondment from their job in the public sector to a private sec-


















6.18 pantouFlage  (franCe)
For its part, the industry ‘buys’ or hires corpsards from the State by 
offering them high- paying and prestigious job positions. The rationale 
is to gain personal access to government officials, obtain governmen-
tal inside information and seek favourable legislation and government 
contracts. Consequently, pantouflage raises ethical problems of duty and 
vested interests resulting from the boundary between public and private 
spheres becoming obscured. A number of legal safeguards are in place 
to try and prevent such conflicts of interest arising. For example, civil 
servants are prohibited from moving to a company they have supervised, 
advised or drawn up a contract with in the previous three years. A spe-
cial ethics commission (commission de déontologie de la fonction pub-
lique) is in charge of ruling on pantouflage secondments, although this 
has not always been sufficient to prevent perceived conflicts of interest. 
For example, in 2009 François Pérol was accused of a conflict of inter-
est when he became CEO of BPCE, France’s second- largest bank. BPCE 
had been created from the merger of two banks, Banque Populaire and 
Caisses d’Epargne. Pérol was said to have overseen the merger as an eco-
nomic advisor to President Nicolas Sarkozy, but did not inform the ethics 
commission of his move (The Economist 2014). Two members of the com-
mission resigned in protest and Pérol was prosecuted following formal 
complaints by anti- corruption pressure groups and banking trade unions 
(The Economist 2014). Nevertheless, the Paris Court acquitted François 
Pérol in September 2015.
Retro pantouflage refers to the practice of coming back from pan-
touflage to take a civil service position again. The corpsards who choose 
retro pantouflage may expect an important position in exchange for 
their financial ‘sacrifice’ in rejoining the public sector. One controver-
sial example of retro pantouflage concerns François Villeroy de Galhau, 
who held many prestigious civil service positions including Counsellor 
of the Prime Minister of France and Head of Cabinet of the Minister 
of the Economy. He opted for pantouflage from 2003 to 2015, his last 
position being at BNP Paribas, a French multinational bank and finan-
cial service company. When the French president proposed his candi-
dacy for the position of Governor of the Bank of France, 150 French 
economists denounced his nomination in an open letter published in 
Le Monde. They objected that his nomination posed a serious conflict of 
interests because, having served the banking industry, he could hardly 
be expected to monitor the banks with impartiality and independ-
ence just a few months later. However, his candidacy was approved 























To better understand why industry is so interested in attracting corp-
sards, it is important to understand how they are selected, trained and 
developed. Corpsards’ solidarity is rooted firmly in their sense of being part 
of an elite: members are very conscious of their common values forged 
during a tough entrance contest and a highly competitive learning pro-
cess (Kessler 1986). The members of the Grands Corps de l’Etat are mainly 
(although not exclusively) the top- ranking graduates from the French elite 
Grandes Ecoles (graduate schools): the Ecole Nationale d’Administration 
(ENA, National School of Administration), which produces entrants to the 
Grand Administrative Corps of the State; and the Ecole Polytechnique, 
which produces entrants to the Grand Technical Corps of the State. The 
Grandes Ecoles may be compared to Oxbridge (Oxford and Cambridge 
Universities) in the UK or to the Ivy League in the USA. Unlike French 
universities, which do not have the right to select their students, Grandes 
Ecoles select their students by means of a tough entrance contest focused 
on strong mathematical or cultural knowledge and skills (Barsoux and 
Lawrence 1991). In order to pass the contest, students enrol in two- year 
preparatory classes, known as classes préparatoires or simply prépas.
Top- ranking graduates can choose which grand corps they wish to 
join. As the ENA, Polytechnique and the Ecole normale superieure (ENS) 
are civil servant schools, their students are already technically civil serv-
ants during their studies and are obliged to give 10 years of service to the 
State. Corpsards receive challenging assignments and strategic responsi-
bilities within the civil service from the beginning of their careers. These 
elite state development opportunities together with the elite academic 
legitimacy enables corpsards to develop skills and networks that are cru-
cial for their careers (Bauer and Cohen 1981). Thus, the grands corps pos-
sess a form of ‘double capital’: social capital of relationships at the highest 
level and technical capital of knowledge and methods (Kessler 1986).
According to Bauer and Bertin- Mourot (1996), 44.5 per cent of top 
managers in major French firms had previous experience in the senior 
civil service, being recruited externally and appointed (‘helicoptered’ or 
‘parachuted’) to the top positions. As a consequence of the importance 
of pantouflage (and thus the grands corps and Grandes Ecoles) in French 
business networks, the number of self- educated executives among lead-
ers of large firms is particularly low in France (Roussillon and Bournois 
2002). Thus, some studies of Grand Corps de l’Etat are devoted to the 
careers of énarques (e.g. Bouzidi et al. 2010) or careers of top manag-
ers in general (e.g. Bauer and Bertin- Mourot 1996; Davoine and Ravasi 
2013). The former studied a sample of civil administrators who had grad-



















1960 to 1992. They found that pantouflage is a common practice: in a 
20- year career, 40 per cent of finance directors have at least one spell in 
the private sector, a percentage that rises to 60 per cent in the course of a 
30- year career (Bouzidi et al. 2010).
The career path of top managers in France is called the Latin model, 
and is characterised by high inter- functional and inter- company mobility. 
The Latin model relies on the selection of top managers in relation to their 
educational qualifications, i.e. corpsards or alumni of other elite Grandes 
Ecoles (Evans et al. 1989). More recent research by Davoine and Ravasi 
(2013) has shown that the model is still functioning in the same way. In 
France, one- fifth of top managers (and a third of CEOs) in the study sam-
ple had previous experience as a senior civil servant, while in Germany 
and the UK only 3 per cent of top managers had civil service experience. 
Moreover, 38 per cent of university- educated top managers in France are 
graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique, HEC or ENA. For comparison pur-
poses, only 14 per cent of university- educated top managers in the UK 
graduated from Oxford or Cambridge (Davoine and Ravasi 2013).
6.19 Stróman (hungary)
david Jancsics
school of Public affairs, san diego state University,   
Imperial Valley Campus, Usa
Stróman is a Hungarian colloquial term used for a person who acts on 
behalf of a principal. The literal English meaning of stróman is scarecrow 
or hay- man. The word is widely used in Hungary; it is almost universally 
known. When it appears in everyday conversations, it often has a negative 
connotation because somebody’s stróman is regarded as an inferior serv-
ant who loyally follows his/ her master’s orders. Moreover, there is also a 
common belief that the principal probably has an unethical or even ille-
gal reason to use a stróman instead of acting by him/ herself. Analogous 
practices exist in other countries. For example, the word strohmann is 
known and used in a similar way in Germany. Prestanome is the Italian 
version of stróman, while in Russian the words podstavnoe litso (literally 
‘dummy person’), or frontirovanie (‘fronting’) are used.
In Hungary the use of the term stróman can be traced back to the pre- 
Second-World-War years when the first (1938) and second (1939) ‘Jewish 
Law’ in Hungary significantly restricted the number of Jews in liberal profes-
sions, public administration, and in commercial and industrial businesses. 
As a result, about 90,000 Jewish people lost their jobs or businesses. Jewish 























corporations – to new Catholic owners, but many of them continued to 
control the company from behind the scenes (Kadar and Vagi 2004: 63). 
Hungarians started to use the word stróman to refer to these visible but 
fake Catholic business owners. In fact, the widespread stróman system 
helped many Jewish families to maintain some level of income during the 
hostile anti- Semitic political environment of the late 1930s.
New forms of the use of stróman emerged in Hungary in the 1990s 
and have become a ‘normal’ phenomenon in the daily life of the country’s 
post- socialist economy. Being a ‘paper’ owner of a company that provides 
fake receipts for fictitious services is the most typical role of a stróman 
in contemporary Hungary. Buying fake receipts from a stróman’s com-
pany is a response of entrepreneurs and many ordinary citizens to strong 
external constraints. For example, tax statistics indicate that more than 
one- third of the Hungarian labour force earns only the minimum wage 
(NAV 2013), yet in reality most of these employees are earning more, 
but declaring only a minimum wage. To avoid the tax burden on labour, 
companies often force their employees to obtain fake receipts for bogus 
services in order to receive the part of their salary that exceeds the mini-
mum wage.
The value- added tax (VAT) rate in Hungary is 27 per cent, the high-
est in the world. Hungarian companies routinely buy receipts from stró-
man companies in order to prove false costs for fictitious service and so 
reduce the VAT they need to pay. It is reported that stróman company 
schemes – chains of deliberately created and managed fake ‘receipt fac-
tories’ (számlagyár) – exist in Hungary, in which the final receipt giver 
often happens to be a foreign company in Ukraine or Serbia that can-
not be investigated by the Hungarian tax authority (Baka 2014). Many 
receipt schemes operate relatively securely because their shadow owners 
have good connections to political parties, to government officers and to 
the tax authority. Thus they are able to ‘turn off’ external controls of anti- 
corruption units, judicial authorities or prosecutors (Jancsics and Jávor 
2012).
Stróman relations constitute a hybrid informal institution. Although 
a stróman is a visible and legal member of a formal organisation, they 
fulfil the principal’s hidden, often illegal, agenda that may significantly 
deviate from the official organisational goals. On the surface a stróman 
follows formal rules, yet he also has to violate them to obey his boss’s 
orders. A stróman is thus an intriguing type of actor who belongs to the 
formal and the informal realms at the same time, acting as a broker to con-
nect the shadow principal with the outside world. According to a classifi-




























6.19 StrÓman  (hUnGary)
and Fernandez 1989), stróman falls into the category of ‘representative 
broker’, who is delegated by another actor or a group to represent the 
group’s interest and deal with outsiders on behalf of the real boss.
There are three functions that a stróman, sometimes simultane-
ously, performs: (1) fall guy, (2) hidden identity and (3) hidden owner-
ship. A stróman may fulfil a fall guy function that buffers risk between 
the outside world and his principal. Whenever a company gets involved 
in illicit practices such as bankruptcy fraud, tax evasion or embezzlement 
and when things go wrong, the stróman as the formal owner or executive 
of the company will be responsible for tax, salary or mortgage debts, while 
the authorities cannot reach the real owner since they are not officially 
affiliated with the company. In this way the use of a ‘representative bro-
ker’ reduces the transaction costs derived from high- risk illegal business 
activities (Della Porta and Vanucci 2012: 158; Lambsdorff 2007: 160).
Another function of stróman is to keep the identity of the real 
actors hidden in different deals. In the case of offshore schemes or trust 
ownership the right of the real owner is usually guaranteed by a private 
contract such as a declaration of trust. Here stróman is just a trusted indi-
vidual and there is not any formal relationship or contract between the 
fake and the real owner. The practice of some multinational companies in 
Hungary offers an example. In order to keep the price down, a stróman’s 
company is used to buy property that later will be bought and used by 
a foreign carmaker, bank or merchandise retailer. If a financially strong 
and a well- known brand negotiated directly with the seller, often a local 
government would set a much higher price for the property. A similar 
stróman function can also be found in corrupt procurement cases, when 
tender- winner principals try to hide the fact that they informally control 
all the subcontractors in a project. Hungarian oligarchs often use this 
arrangement. Here seemingly independent companies perform differ-
ent works while in fact all subcontractors are run by a stróman, and ulti-
mately every penny ends up in the principal’s pocket. This structure also 
allows the principal to control and manipulate the prices and resources 
at all levels of the project.
Principals may also use stróman when their ownership rights are lim-
ited or banned by law. For example, despite the fact that foreign citizens 
are prohibited from buying agricultural land in Hungary, German and 
Austrian farmers have bought large areas of land by using a Hungarian 
stróman. Public servants whose business activity is limited by law also 
hire stróman to run their companies. Such companies often receive big 
government contracts from the department where the shadow owner is 






























In most cases, there is an unequal power relationship between the 
stróman and the principal. Sometimes socially marginalised people, 
homeless or foreign refugees are chosen as company owners and CEOs 
(see Figure 6.19.1). They are willing to take huge risks for a relatively 
small amount of compensation. It is also typical that people who are 
unemployed or retired ‘on paper’ are owners of several companies and 
the stróman’s apartment in a poor residential area is the ‘headquarters’ 
of dozens or even hundreds of companies. However, since the global eco-
nomic crisis severely hit Hungary it is much harder to find good white- 
collar jobs and more well- educated young people are willing to take the 
risk and become visible but fake leaders of companies with suspicious 
activities. In cases when the ownership rights of the principal are limited 
but the company’s operation and assets are real, the shadow owner needs 
a reliable stróman to actually run the company. Here a socially closer 
Figure 6.19.1 The two homeless people pictured (László Kutrucz 
and László Baráth) were CEOs of several companies. The Hungarian 
subsidiary of Siemens received huge amounts of public money through 
procurement from Hungarian hospitals. These fake companies had 
consulting contracts with Siemens. The homeless CEOs’ job was to 
withdraw money from the fake companies’ bank accounts and give it 
back in cash to their shadow principals. This case was explored by an 
investigative journalist, Annett Sipos, and published in HVG (Hungarian 
economic magazine) in 2006.

















6.20 Bena mi ( IndIa)
stróman, such as a family member, friend, former colleague or classmate 
is chosen to be the visible representative of the company.
Although the stróman is usually in a subordinate position he still 
has some leverage with his boss. The fact that he knows a lot about the 
shadow principal’s illicit practices makes their relationship dynamic 
and complex. The actors become interdependent and capable of black-
mailing each other and this provides bargaining chips in negotiations 
between them.
6.20 Bena- mi (India)
kalindi kokal
Max Planck Institute for social anthropology,   
halle- saale, Germany
A bena mi transaction is one where a person purchases a property in the 
name of another without intending to transfer any beneficial interest in 
the property to the other person. The person in whose name the prop-
erty is bought is known as the bena mida r and the person who advanced 
the consideration for the property (and is the real owner) is described 
as the holder of beneficial interest in the property (Law Commission of 
India 1988; Mitra 2010: 448– 9). The term bena mi can be broken up to 
literally translate as ‘without name’ (be being ‘without’, and na m being 
‘name’). The origin of the expression ‘bena mi’ is also traced back to the 
Persian language, in which the term means ‘fictitious’ (Mitra 2010: 448). 
A bena mida r comes very close to the practice of stróman in Hungary (see 
6.19 in this volume), acting like the latter to conceal the identity of the 
true owner of the property, primarily from state agencies.
Prior to 1988, benami transactions were a part of Indian law. 
However, in May 1988 following recommendations made by the Law 
Commission of India, the President of India passed an Ordinance enti-
tled ‘Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) 
Ordinance, 1988’ whereby bena mi transactions ceased to be recognised 
as legal. A law entitled the ‘The Benami Transactions (Prohibitions) Act 
1988’ (‘The Act’) was brought into force soon thereafter. The Act defines 
benami transactions as ‘any transaction in which property is transferred 
to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person’ 
(Government of India 1988: sec. 2 (a)).
This definition in itself has been the basis of much debate (Bhaskaran 
Nambiar 1989; Joseph 1989), which has resulted in the nature of bena mi 
transactions and their validity being largely decided by case law. The 




























denote two classes of transactions, which differ from each other in their 
legal character and incidents.
Where a person buys a property with his own money but in the 
name of another person without any intention to benefit such 
other person, the transaction is called benami. In that case, the 
transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has 
contributed the purchase money, and he is the real owner. The sec-
ond case, which is loosely termed as a bena mi transaction is a case 
where a person conveys in favour of another without the intention 
of transferring the title to the property thereunder. In this case, the 
transferor continues to be the real owner.
(Supreme Court of India 1979)
The difference between the two kinds of benami transactions referred to 
above lies in the fact that in the first case there is an operative transfer 
from the transferor to the transferee, where the latter holds the property 
for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money. In 
the second situation there is no operative transfer at all and the title rests 
with the transferor despite the execution of conveyance. One common 
feature, however, in both of these cases is that the real title is divorced 
from the ostensible title and they are vested in different persons (Mitra 
2010: 448, 451).
While deciding whether a transaction is benami or not, the court 
considers the motive of the person taking the sale deed in the name of 
another, the custody of the sale deed, the passing of consideration and 
the possession of property. Additionally, the court also pays attention 
to the relationship between the parties, the reason for the transaction, 
the source of the consideration and the circumstances surrounding 
such a transaction. Benami transactions, however, have always been 
part of property ownership practices among both Hindus and Muslims 
in India, and particularly within the affluent class (Derrett and Duncan 
1962: 865). One reason why such transactions remain prominent is 
because of the customary belief that certain persons are ‘luckier’ than 
others (see also Law Commission of India 1988: 37) and therefore it is 
thought that properties bought in the names of such persons are more 
likely to remain secure and bring increased wealth. In such cases the 
nominated benamidar is often a female individual with close relations 
(sister, mother, wife or daughter) or a minor child. Simultaneously, such 
investments also act (albeit unintentionally) as a source of financial 
security for women who traditionally enjoy little other protection. Later 























6.20 Bena mi ( IndIa)
allows a person to buy property in the name of his wife or unmarried 
daughter, on the presumption that the property has been purchased 
for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter (Government of 
India 1988: sec. 3 (2)). The law applies the ‘doctrine of advancement’ as 
understood under English Law in this scenario, which prevents the father 
or husband from reclaiming the property on the grounds that either the 
wife or the unmarried daughter was a benamidar.
Apart from this exception, the Act proceeds on the basis that the 
whole purpose of benami transactions is to conceal from strangers, and 
from the Government in particular, the identity of the actual owner and 
beneficiary of the property. More specifically, as the Law Commission 
of India points out in their report, preceding the enactment of this Act 
benami transactions were always undertaken with the intention of either 
circumventing tax laws such as wealth tax, gift tax and income tax or to 
overcome socially beneficent legislation enacted by the state and central 
governments in India for an equitable redistribution of property (Law 
Commission of India 1988: 38).
For example, under section 35 of the Bombay Tenancy and 
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, it was provided that on ‘Tiller’s day’, on 
1 April 1957, all tenants of agricultural property should become eligible 
to become owners of the land. Subject to some provisions of the said Act, 
such transfer of title from landlord to tenant became inevitable. However, 
decades after the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was 
passed, a survey in Borsad Taluka of Kaira District in the state of Gujarat 
revealed thousands of concealed tenancies that had been retained under 
the guise of benami transactions; the then owners having transferred the 
property to the names of the then tenants, while continuing to retain a 
beneficial interest in the property (Law Commission of India 1988: 36). 
In recent times, it is not uncommon to find cases of bena mi transactions 
in the purchase of tribal land by non- tribal individuals. In this instance 
the objective is to overcome an order by the Supreme Court of India that 
made it unconstitutional to purchase land belonging to Scheduled Caste 
(SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) by members of communities who were 
neither SC or ST; companies were also included in this ruling (Indian 
Express 2012; Misra and Radhakrishnan 2012).
While benami transactions remain commonplace, very little 
research has been conducted into the nature and importance of such 
transactions in the present day. Recently, as the Government of India has 
set its focus on curtailing the flow of ‘black money’ (defined as income 
from undeclared illegally earned sources) into the country, benami trans-
























A  new Bill to limit the instances of such transactions and make them 
more visible was introduced by the Indian parliament in August 2015 
(Deshpande 2015; The Hindu 2015).
The new bill is unlikely to end the practice of bena mi as these 
transactions exist where customary beliefs and practical efficiency 
coincide, and at the same time are reinforced by the dynamics of social 
structures that actually facilitate such transactions. Section 24 of the 
new Bill on bena mi transaction provides for the appointment of an ‘ini-
tiating officer’, who is entitled to investigate transactions he suspects to 
be bena mi (Parliamentary Legislative Research 2016). The nature of 
bena mi transactions often makes them socially legitimate within com-
munities, thus making it very challenging to trace such transactions; in 
most instances they are carried out between people connected through 
close family relations or complex networks of reciprocities. As the mon-
etary value of land increases rapidly in India, the government needs to 
devise more strategic initiatives to regulate this practice rather than try-
ing to ban it completely.
6.21 No entry (India)
nikhilesh sinha




The term no entry refers to an informal system of land transfer that is 
prevalent within the urban limits of Hyderabad, India. While similar 
practices may exist in other parts of the country, the term is specific 
to Hyderabad, which is India’s fifth largest city, and the capital of the 
recently formed state of Telengana. The term itself derives from the 
English word ‘notary’ or ‘notary public’, through the agency of which 
the alienation and transfer of property rights is deemed to be ratified. 
A notary public of the common law is a public officer appointed by either 
the central or state government to serve the public in matters concerned 
with estates, deeds, powers of attorney and foreign and international 
business (SRO.324, The Notaries Rules 1956). No entry is a colloquialism 
that has passed into common use, and while its root may be an English 
word, it is used frequently and even predominantly by those who do not 
speak English. The term can relate to the land that is being informally 
transferred, to the informal way it has been transferred, or to the infor-
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No entry transactions are informal as they do not go through the 
State Revenue Department – the authority in charge of all matters per-
taining to urban and rural lands at the state level (sub- national), includ-
ing land expropriation, registration of transactions, determining terms 
of tenure, documenting title deeds etc. (Banerjee 2002a). Formal land 
transactions require approval by the State Revenue Department in addi-
tion to the signature and stamp of a Notary Public. In the case of a no 
entry transaction, the vital additional step of being approved by the State 
Revenue Department – and the resultant paying of land tax and stamp 
duty – is not taken. While the notary is a public officer, the ratification 
of property exchange without the State Revenue Department’s approval 
and formal registration constitutes an extra- legal act.
Sale and purchase of property via the no entry system is not entered 
in the land registry records, and none of the associated fees are paid 
to the state. These should include stamp duty (7 per cent of property 
value), transfer fee (2 per cent of property value) and registration fee 
(0.5 per cent of property value). Indian law requires the registration of 
all property transfers unless the value of the property under considera-
tion is less than one hundred rupees (Registration Act 1908), which is 
roughly equivalent to £1 in exchange value. Yet in practice, such registra-
tion is rarely carried out. No entry documents resemble formal property 
sale agreements, made in good faith (bona fide), but drawn up on non- 
judicial stamp paper. A large proportion of no entry transactions involve 
exchanges of property located within informal settlements, slums or 
spaces where there may be multiple or conflicting claims on land (Bartlett 
and Satterthwaite 1989: 2– 5).
The dual nature of the no entry system – not formal, but not wholly 
informal either, because it is structured and codified – is well suited 
to enabling transactions in cases where property rights are not clearly 
defined or deemed inalienable/ non- transferable under the existing 
legal constraints. In other words, the no entry system appears to have 
evolved as a tactic to enable transactions that would otherwise be impos-
sible under the law. Slums, spread across the country, create a massive 
demand for systems similar to no entry, based on a mélange of informal 
arrangements with the state, as well as those that emerge where the state 
is absent. Slums can be divided into notified, i.e. identified and recog-
nised by the state, and non- notified slums. Notification is essential for 
slums to receive municipal services such as piped water, sanitation ser-
vices and electricity, yet half of all slums in India are estimated to be non- 
notified (Subbaraman et al. 2012). The reasons for non- notification are 














Notification is possible if the land belongs to the city government, but 
several slums in the Hyderabad area are located on government land that 
does not belong to the city government (Banerjee 2002a). For example, 
there are slums on land that belongs to the Central Defence Ministry, 
Ministry of Railways, and on private lands where there is some ambigu-
ity about legal ownership.
In practical terms, for residents in notified slums on city govern-
ment land, or in low- income housing colonies built under government 
schemes, notification opens the possibility of being granted a patta. 
Pattas are documents issued by the State Revenue Department, which 
bestow an inalienable property right under certain conditions and for 
a certain time period (Banerjee 2002b:  37– 58). The conditions of the 
patta reflect the underlying objectives of the state and often aim at grant-
ing tenurial security, while restricting sale or marketisation (Banerjee 
2002b: 37– 58). Thus, the patta- holder may hold the right to live on the 
property and bequest it, but is not allowed to transfer or lease the prop-
erty to a third party.
Against the backdrop of such limited property rights, the no entry 
system serves as an instrument for trading the officially non- tradable 
pattas. If a patta- holder decides to sell the land specified in the patta, a 
no entry document is drawn up and then notarised by the public notary 
office. The original patta along with the no entry document then con-
stitutes a proof of ownership – with the understood limitation – for the 
new owner. With each subsequent sale, the original patta along with all 
of the no entry documents from each of the previous transactions gets 
passed on to the new owner. No entry land is not normally built over by 
the de facto owners or used as collateral, but it is often leased out either 
partially or wholly.
The nearest equivalent to the no entry system can be found in squat-
ter settlements in Bogota, Colombia. Here, illegally subdivided plots are 
transferred via a private agreement, which is drawn up on ordinary paper, 
usually handwritten and not even registered by a notary (Aristizabel and 
Gomez 2002:  100– 13). Interestingly, the seller may employ the use of 
a ‘figurehead’ (testaferro) – someone over 60 – to act as a co- signatory 
and nominal owner as ‘cover’ for the real owner, because senior citizens 
cannot be prosecuted under Colombian law (Aristizabel and Gomez 
2002: 100– 13). The no entry system can also be likened to the transfer 
system of properties through aurfi (roughly translatable as ‘hand claims’) 
contracts in Cairo, Egypt. The aurfi contract requires signatures of the 
buyer and the seller, as well as those of two male witnesses of their hand-
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simple and inexpensive procedure in a local court (the dawa saha wa 
towqia), though such formalisation does not give any legal status to the 
property transaction itself (Sims 2002: 79– 87). In other words, while the 
procedure fomalises the exchange of certain limited rights to the land, 
it does not acknowledge legal ownership of the land by the seller – and 
by extension the buyer. Like no entry, the aurfi contractual system is not 
recognised by the state as a legitimate means of property transfer. There 
is, however, an important difference between the two system: the aurfi 
contract infers liability to pay aawayid (property tax), and thus implies a 
tacit acknowledgement of the informal system of property transfer by the 
Egyptian authorities, while in India there is no recognition of the no entry 
system. Comparable yet distinct informal land transfer practices have 
been reported to exist in Benin (Durand- Lasserve et al. 2002: 114– 35), 
Burkina Faso (Mathieu et al. 2002: 109– 28), North- West Rwanda (Andre 
2002: 153– 72), as well as some other parts of Africa (Rakodi 2004).
While the no entry system is specific to Hyderabad, most of the infor-
mal systems of land property transfer mentioned above perform similar 
functions in rural as well as urban contexts in developing countries. In 
rural contexts, they provide a low- cost means of enabling free market 
transactions that brings land to its most productive use (Deininger and 
Feder 2001: 288– 331). For instance, land that is not being cultivated 
may be brought under cultivation by the new owners, especially where 
certain investments are required that would be uneconomical under a 
short- term lease. These informal mechanisms of transfer may also be 
recognised by informal lenders, allowing access to capital, where formal 
systems may be cumbersome or unavailable. Most significantly, these 
systems are more accessible to a wider set of potential buyers and sellers, 
providing greater equity in land markets. In urban settings, the issue of 
access to land is often intimately linked to access to housing or shelter 
and associated benefits such as livelihood opportunities, public services 
and credit (Payne 2002: 3– 22). In countries like India where one in four 
city dwellers can be classified as poor, informal systems like no entry pro-
vide access to basic services for a vast number of people.
6.22 Repetitorstvo (russia and fsU)
eduard klein
research Centre for east european studies, University of Bremen, 
Germany
Repetitorstvo is a Russian/ Ukrainian term used across much of the for-
























korepetycje) to describe supplementary private tutoring. The origin of the 
word is the Latin repetere, which stems from re (‘again’) and petere (‘to 
seek, beg, beseech’) and means to repeat, revise or reread. Repetitorstvo 
means that students are taught individually or in small groups on a paid 
basis in addition to their official school curriculum. Usually a school or 
university teacher is hired, who is then called the repetitor.
Private tutoring is a common practice all around the world, but 
repetitorstvo has its own peculiarities. While many parents hire private 
tutors to help their children to earn better grades, in the post- Soviet 
states repetitorstvo is seen as part of a wider shadow education system 
(Bray 2007) with both positive and negative consequences. On the one 
hand, it is a means to improve learning and increase human capital. 
It provides an additional source of income for education workers and 
compensates for the fall in their official wages, which, for example, in 
Russia in the 1990s fell by up to three- quarters in real terms (Kuzminov 
2012: 334). It is also profitable for the state since it enables the govern-
ment to save spending on education. On the other hand, repetitorstvo 
may distort teachers’ performance, foster unethical behaviour and cor-
ruption, and waste financial resources that might be used more effec-
tively (Bray 2007: 18). It penalises the poor, by creating and expanding 
social inequalities. Hiring private tutors is costly, so repetitorstvo dis-
criminates against students whose families cannot afford it. It under-
mines equal access to universities and increases social stratification and 
inequality.
Repetitorstvo is a common practice in all the post- Soviet states 
but its nature, costs and scale vary from country to country. During 
the Soviet period, repetitorstvo was not widespread. Tutors were hired 
to improve foreign- language skills, but this involved only a small num-
ber of students. But after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, repetitorstvo 
experienced dramatic growth when the state lost its monopoly over edu-
cation and a private education industry emerged (Büdiene et al. 2006: 
8). According to a comparative survey conducted among freshmen in 
2004– 5, 93 per cent of Azerbaijani students had received private tutoring 
in their final secondary school year. In Georgia the number was 80 per 
cent, Ukraine 79 per cent, Mongolia 71 per cent, Poland 66 per cent and 
Lithuania 62 per cent (Büdiene et al. 2006: 14). An Internet search for 
the term repetitorstvo comes up with over 8 million results on the popular 
Russian search engine yandex.ru, most of which are professional private 
tutoring services.
Silova (2010) identifies a chain of circumstances explaining 
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teachers’ salaries (Biswal 1999: 238). After the break- up of the Soviet 
Union, state spending on education fell dramatically across the successor 
states. Teachers and lecturers at all levels faced heavy wage cuts, often to 
below subsistence level. This forced them to seek supplementary income 
in the private economy, developing private education sector or shadow 
education system. Repetitorstvo was the most convenient alternative, as 
teachers kept their workplaces, but earned extra income without great 
effort. This ‘service’ was tolerated and even demanded by a growing mid-
dle class, who increasingly spent money on education to invest in their 
children’s futures (Bray 2013).
In the post- Soviet states, repetitorstvo often resembles petty cor-
ruption in the sense that citizens pay for a service that, according to 
law, should be provided for free. Biswal even applies Klitgaard’s (1988) 
famous formula, ‘Corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus 
accountability’, to private tutoring and concludes (Biswal 1999: 223),
Klitgaard’s definition of corruption closely resembles the school 
teachers’ tutoring practice … They are the monopoly suppliers of 
their services to the students, they have the full discretion in what 
they supply, and they are hardly held accountable for their actions. 
This gives rise to a situation where the teachers try to extract stu-
dents’ consumer surplus by shirking at school and supplying tutor-
ing outside the school for a fee.
In the Central Asian states in particular, teachers create ‘artificial 
demand’ (Johnson 2011) to compel their students to take private lessons 
according to the logic that ‘You need to know X, Y, and Z to pass the exam. 
We’ll cover X and Y in class. If you want to learn Z, come to tutoring’ 
(Jayachandran 2013: 222), making tutoring virtually compulsory. Most 
citizens in the former USSR believe that schoolteachers treat pupils who 
receive private tutoring from them better than they do those who do not 
(Silova 2010: 334).
On a broader scale, repetitorstvo leads to a decline in quality of sec-
ondary education, because private tutoring is financially more attrac-
tive. ‘When schools offer for- profit tutoring, teachers teach less during 
the regular school day’ (Jayachandran 2013:  14). As a result, the gap 
between the secondary and tertiary education curriculums increases. At 
the same time, the demand for higher education increased rapidly in the 
region in the 1990s, heightening competition for university places and 
boosting the demand for repetitors to help aspiring students prepare for 
the entrance exams. Tutors with access to or membership of university 





















high demand. They used their influence to secure admission in return for 
higher remuneration than a normal repetitor would request.
This form of repetitorstvo was common in the 1990s and early 
2000s, until most post- Soviet states reformed their university admission 
systems to prevent such forms of corruption (Gabrscek 2010). The new 
admission systems withdrew responsibility for university entrance exam-
inations from admission boards and replaced them with unified and 
centrally state- administered examinations. As a result, the special repeti-
tors lost their means of influence. Surprisingly, however, the practice of 
repetitorstvo increased further after the reforms: parents now no longer 
secure university access through bribes, but instead oblige their children 
to study with private tutors (Gabrscek 2010: 55).
Private supplementary tutoring is also widespread and highly 
institutionalised in East Asia (Zhang 2011). In Japan, two- thirds of 
students take supplementary classes at juku cram schools after their 
regular school lessons. In South Korea, more than 70,000 Hagwon cram 
schools teach the vast majority of Korean students. The amount of pri-
vate money spent on private tutoring in Korea in 1996 equalled 150 per 
cent of the government’s education budget (Bray 2007:  27). Private 
tutoring is common both in developing countries in Africa (Paviot et al. 
2008) and in developed countries such as the USA (Gordon et al. 2005) 
and Germany (Schneider 2005). It is rare, however, in most of these 
countries for private supplementary tutoring to have connotations of 
unethical behaviour or corruption, unlike the case of the post- Soviet 
countries. This makes repetitorstvo a specific informal phenomenon in 
the post- Soviet region.




John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of new york 
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Originating from criminal and law enforcement jargon, the term kry-
sha, literally meaning ‘roof’ in Russian, is now broadly used to refer to 
individuals or organisations that provide a range of services, predomi-
nantly illicit and informal, ranging from protection and patronage, 
to the enforcement of contracts and settlement of disputes. The term 
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In Russian, it has a number of different forms: kryshevaniye (noun) 
meaning ‘protection racket’; kryshevat’ (verb) meaning ‘to provide pro-
tection or patronage’; and kryshuyushchiy (participle) meaning ‘an indi-
vidual or a group that provides protection or patronage’. In Ukrainian 
and Belorussian, the terms kryshuvannya and kryšavańnie correspond to 
the Russian kryshevaniye and relate to the same phenomenon. No sin-
gle English word can fully incorporate the multiple meanings and forms 
of krysha, but the term ‘protection racket’ roughly conveys the general 
meaning.
The term krysha became widely used in the post- Soviet republics 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union when a series of sweeping 
political and socio- economic reforms, mainly concerned with the pri-
vatisation of state property, created a conducive environment for the 
empowerment of criminal organisations. Therefore, the earliest and most 
common usage of krysha relates to extortion by criminal organisations 
and gangs through the threat of violence or actual violence. ‘In many 
cases, the business will have to pay from 10 to 60 per cent of its pre- tax 
income for protection regardless of who provides it. … If the criminals 
find a business particularly attractive, they will demand an ownership 
share of it’ (CSIS 1997: 29).
Although extortion rackets are often indistinguishable in practice 
from protection rackets since, for the former, there will always be an 
implied threat that the racketeers themselves may attack the business if it 
fails or refuses to pay, krysha may turn into a mutually beneficial arrange-
ment between organised crime and business owners. In such a case, a 
criminal organisation will not only promise not to attack the business, 
but it would also defend from other racketeers, corrupt law enforcement, 
debt collection, and would assist with customs clearance and help it to 
compete with actual or potential enemies and competitors. A threat of 
violence or actual violence as a means of collecting money or property 
from businesses is therefore not an inherent feature of krysha (Siegel 
2012). Galeotti (2005: 57) writes that
[a] ‘good’ krysha provided by the more entrepreneurial gangs will 
not only protect you from other criminals, it will also provide a 
range of other services, from debt recovery (handled far more 
quickly and efficiently than Russia’s corrupt and inefficient courts) 
to an inside track on whom to bribe within the local authorities 
to get things done. This explains why an estimated 70– 80 per 



















Although Russian organised crime groups have been known to run 
krysha, public officials have also sought to offer such protective services and 
extract the same kind of informal payments as criminal organisations. Law 
enforcement agencies have been reported to operate a de facto protection 
racket for criminal organisations (Volkov 2002a). Dishonest public serv-
ants would need neither violence nor threat of violence to establish krysha 
but will manipulate the law and bureaucratic procedures. Such abuses of 
public office undermine the competitive market system, especially in the 
case of small and medium- sized businesses, making them dependent on 
informal arrangements between state officials and criminal organisations. 
McCarthy (2011:  64)  argues that the involvement of public servants in 
protection rackets makes krysha in Russia strikingly different from analo-
gous informal practices in other national contexts, such as pizzo (extortion 
money) levied by mafia organisations in Italy. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of a criminal krysha often depends on the power it has, relative to other 
protective ‘roofs’, including those provided by state institutions (Volkov 
2002a). ‘Less powerful criminal groups would seek to align themselves 
with more powerful criminal groups, who in turn … obtain their own kry-
sha from corrupt government officials’ (von Lampe 2015: 275).
Private security companies are another major player in the market 
of private protection. They are often run by criminal organisations that 
partially or fully legalise protection services (Volkov 2002b; Taylor 2011). 
Russian private security companies may thus engage in extra-legal activi-
ties, such as ‘sophisticated intelligence- gathering … and the informal 
use of blackmail files (kompromat), including copies of bank statements, 
currency transfers, business and real estate transactions and other offi-
cial documents as well as general correspondence, personal information 
and unofficial transcripts of telephone conversations of a compromising 
nature’ (Ledeneva 2004: 138). These informal practices go far beyond 
the services that security companies are licensed to perform and clearly 
reflect the risks and uncertainties of doing business in Russia.
Moreover, since the police and the military personnel were largely 
underfunded after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they actively sought a 
share of the legal market in private protection (Cox 2001). While in some 
cases, criminal organisations would run private security firms, Taylor 
(2011: 164) notes that the police may often control the legal market in 
private security:  ‘for example, the head of the municipal militia in St. 
Petersburg in the early 2000s reportedly oversaw roofing operations in 
the city, partially by controlling licenses for private security companies’.
Summing up, the types of krysha distinguished in post- Soviet soci-
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‘combined’) krysha provided by criminal organisations and public officials 
working hand in hand, and government krysha, involving public officials 
of various state institutions. Having emerged in the 1990s, krysha prac-
tices remain a characteristic feature of the business culture in post- Soviet 
countries. Despite the efforts of post- Soviet governments to tackle these 
informal practices, foreign investors have continuously raised concerns 
about the troublesome reputation these states have when it comes to 
anti- competitive behaviour, extortion and bribery.
Creating façades (partial compliance with the  
rules by visible camouflage)
6.24 Window dressing (general)
david Leung
Coventry University, Uk
‘Window dressing’ describes a pretence or a façade, a showy misrepresen-
tation of an idea or policy in an attempt to disguise an undesirable reality. 
The term is derived from the retail sector, where it means decorating a 
shop window with goods and trimmings in order to attract customers. 
In the financial sector, it denotes the deliberately misleading manipula-
tion of a company’s income statement and balance sheet in order to cre-
ate a falsely attractive image and thereby conceal poor performance or 
monetary losses; it may also refer to an excessively negative presenta-
tion of such figures. In the financial context, ‘window dressing’ is syn-
onymous with ‘cooking the books’, ‘creative accounting’, ‘Enronomics’ (a 
reference to the accounting fraud carried out by US energy giant Enron, 
bankrupted in 2001), and the more euphemistic ‘earnings management’, 
which is used by accounting regulators and the academic community.
There are many reasons why companies engage in ‘window dressing’. 
Manipulating earnings upwards may help executives to hide poor deci-
sions (such as value- destroying acquisitions), mitigate potential breaches 
of debt covenants (such as interest cover), meet analysts’ forecasts and 
boost share prices as a way of attracting investors. Managing earnings 
downwards may on the other hand help companies to secure govern-
ment subsidies or relief, avoid or evade taxation, and pre- empt regulatory 
interference (such as anti- trust regulation). Meanwhile all these forms of 
manipulation can, of course, help to boost managers’ remuneration.
Window dressing is accordingly a global phenomenon that per-
vades all types of organisations, large and small, public and private, 




















accused of dressing up, for example, their gross domestic product and 
unemployment rate statistics. Window dressing is widely reported in 
the international media, especially its most extreme form – accounting 
fraud (see, for example, the cases relating not only to Enron but also to 
Polly Peck, WorldCom, Tyco, Parmalat, American International Group, 
Satyam, Olympus and Tesco). Comparable cases in academia have 
included fraudulent statistical studies (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) 
and case- study ethnographies (Leung 2011). ‘Creative accounting’ has 
also entered popular culture, for example, in Mel Brooks’ satirical film 
The Producers (1967) and its Broadway musical version (2001).
From the legal perspective, window dressing is an ambiguous 
concept. While it is widely considered to be unethical – since it involves 
an element of deception  – window dressing is not necessarily illegal. 
Accountants are expected to follow the spirit as well as the letter of 
the law and to observe the economic substance of a transaction rather 
than its legal form (ASB 1994). However, there is a jurisdictional con-
test between accountants and lawyers that undermines the authority of 
accounting standards (Pong 1999). There are also ‘finitist’ and interpre-
tation problems in the application of accounting rules (Hatherly et  al. 
2008; MacKenzie 2008; Leung 2011). The debate about arguably the 
most important UK accounting term, ‘true and fair view’, is a case in 
point. Legislation and official accounting and auditing pronouncements 
require financial statements to give a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of 
affairs of a company. Yet there is no formal definition of the term and no 
universal agreement as to its meaning. In practice, the term is merely the 
opinion of a group of purported experts, the auditors. It is moreover gen-
erally acknowledged that there is more than one true and fair view that 
faithfully reflects a company’s position.
So how does one cook the books? Depending on one’s motive (to 
increase or decrease earnings and to hide debt), the practice involves 
overstating or understating the key elements of the financial state-
ments: revenue, expenses, assets and liabilities. Examples of techniques 
that overstate revenue include recognising income early, before the prod-
uct is delivered to the customer (treating sales orders as completed sales); 
‘channel stuffing’ or ‘trade loading’, where excess products are dumped 
onto a distributor to inflate sales; and ‘round tripping’, where the same 
amounts of sales and cost of sales are recognised, for instance, from the 
reciprocal sales of identical assets between two companies.
There are myriad ways to manipulate expenses, such as changing 
the depreciation method (from reducing balance to straight line, extend-
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which involves making unrealistically large charges in the current period 
in order to decrease expenses in later periods, not writing down assets 
that have declined in value (such as obsolete inventories, damaged good-
will, bad debts) and capitalising expenses (such as classifying scientific 
research as assets rather than as expenses).
To remove debt or liabilities from the balance sheet – and thereby 
improve a company’s risk profile or creditworthiness – various ‘off- balance 
sheet’ tricks are employed. These include the sale and leaseback of assets, 
where finance leases are dubiously classified as operating leases, and the 
use of ‘special purpose entities’. In the latter case, various types of entities 
such as partnerships, joint ventures and trusts are excluded from the bal-
ance sheet because of their ‘materiality’, that is, their insignificant impact 
on investors (IASB 2010).
These techniques are well known, yet little has been done about 
them. In the UK, regulators and the accounting profession have revised 
the corporate governance and ethics codes, issued reporting standards 
that focus on the economic substance of transactions (ASB 1994, 2003) 
and consulted widely on the quality of auditing practice (APB 2001, 2010, 
2012). In response to the Enron, WorldCom and other accounting frauds, 
US regulators created the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, which imposed 
stricter requirements on auditors and senior executives as regards the 
accuracy and completeness of financial reports.
As the 2008 banking crisis showed, however, such regulatory meas-
ures have had little or no impact on window dressing. As Arthur Levitt 
(1998) observed during his tenure as Chairman of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the culture of the financial community and the 
structure of the capitalist system seem to demand that all listed corpora-
tions engage in earnings management. Participants in this market play a 
self- serving game of ‘nods and winks’: as used- car dealers spin stories to 
sell vehicles, corporate accountants concoct ‘bullshit’ to satisfy the needs 
of investors and analysts (Macintosh 2006, 2009) while auditors, who 
have long deserted their duties (House of Lords 2011), continue to be 




Pripiski (‘add- ons’) is a Russian word denoting plan fraud – a form of 
accounting fraud that was specific to command economies under commu-





















the ownership of business assets from their management, so that man-
agers must report performance to the owner or to superior officers. By 
falsely overstating performance, the manager is able to extract a benefit 
from the enterprise – directly, through a performance- based incentive, 
or indirectly, by creating a cover for some other criminal activity. The vic-
tim of accounting fraud is the owner or shareholder, whose true residual 
income from the enterprise is less than reported in the accounts. Because 
the fraud is not victimless, there is generally someone who has an incen-
tive to expose it.
In communist command economies, accounting fraud had specific 
features. First of these was the form of the fraud. Under the command 
system, managers’ performance was evaluated by the degree of fulfil-
ment of a plan, which specified the quota of output to be delivered to 
the state. Plan fraud involved falsely claiming fulfilment of the quota, 
and pripiski denoted the non- existent output ‘added on’ to true output to 
make up the false claim. By overstating performance, the manager could 
obtain promotion, or a bonus, or reduced oversight. Such gains were 
generally shared with others: the management team, and sometimes the 
entire workforce, would enjoy public recognition or private rewards.
Plan fraud came to light if a victim or someone with inside knowl-
edge blew the whistle. In principle the enterprise was state- owned, so 
the state was the legal victim, but this does not tell us who suffered 
directly. Suppose the plan required 100 tons of steel. When the enter-
prise claimed to have produced 100 tons, but delivered only 70, the 
immediate victim was the state purchaser, now short of 30 for use or 
further distribution. Downstream were more victims:  the steel- users 
that would be short of steel and who therefore shared an incentive to 
expose the crime.
This indicates another feature of plan fraud: it relied on informal 
networks. A strong network based on mutual obligation and collective 
responsibility (see krugovaia poruka, 3.10 Volume 1) was needed to 
co- opt victims and silence whistle- blowers. Such networks were easily 
formed. Inside the enterprise, colleagues and subordinates stood to gain 
from the manager’s deception. Ministerial superiors could also share the 
credit. Outside the enterprise were the victims, who would suffer losses. 
Therefore, the victims also had to be brought into the venture because, if 
left outside, they might expose it.
During the communist period, evidence on plan fraud was anecdo-
tal, based on press reports and the recorded impressions of emigrants. 
The Soviet press offered selective reporting of particular cases. Expert 
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Nove 1957; Grossman 1960; Shenfield 1983; Shenfield and Hanson 
1986; Linz 1988; Gregory 1990). Beneath the waterline lay undetected 
(but probably minor) offending on a wide scale.
Since then, more evidence has come from former Soviet archives 
(Harrison 2011; Harrison and Markevich 2015). The core evidence com-
prises records of 59 trials involving 163 defendants convicted on charges 
of plan fraud between 1943 and 1947, and 88 Communist Party inves-
tigations of 454 party members involving proven cases of plan fraud 
between 1943 and 1962. The archival records differ from Soviet- era 
press reports in that they are uncensored: they were selected as typical, 
for the information of Party leaders, whereas press reports were limited 
to what was thought suitable for public education.
Archival documents reveal a range of offenders. The most organised 
fraudsters systematically hid poor results to show loyalty, win reputation, 
and obtain bonus payments. Some managers did the same in order to 
be left alone while they carried out other crimes, for example, embez-
zlement or asset- stripping. In a third category were managers promoted 
above their capability, whose work was so chaotic that they were unable 
to do anything without breaking rules. These engaged in plan fraud to 
postpone the discovery of their other shortcomings.
The more common methods of plan fraud may be ranked in order 
of increasing risk of exposure. The safest method was to meet the plan by 
running down inventories, keeping the planner in ignorance. This was 
the only method that did not require the collusion of outsiders. Typically 
it came to light only when the plan fraud was used to cover crimes such as 
asset- stripping that others with inside knowledge found to be too risky.
Next was reporting work in progress as finished output. This strata-
gem required the collusion of the buyer, who had to sign for products 
not yet delivered. In effect the buyer ‘loaned’ the missing products to 
the seller, trusting the latter to make the arrears up in the next period. 
The buyer’s incentive was usually the need to keep the seller’s goodwill, 
backed by the seller’s implicit threat to treat the buyer even worse in 
future. Such threats and promises could work for a while, but fell apart 
if arrears accumulated, so that downstream plans were threatened. 
Another scam, widely practised in industry, construction and agricul-
ture, was ‘quality shading’. The seller met the quota, but with products 
made from inferior materials or to inferior standards. Here the buyer’s 
cooperation was based on their inability to prove a deficiency or, again, 
fear of yet worse treatment in future.
The largest frauds took place in agriculture, where local party 
















harvests fell short, everyone in the local administration was under pres-
sure to hide the shortfall ‘for the good of the cause’. To make up the 
quota, farms sold crops that were allegedly standing in the field to state 
distributors based on a promise to deliver the harvest later in the year. 
When the harvest failed, they would quietly buy the missing produce 
back. They also sold produce to the state, then bought it back and sold 
it to the state again; on occasion they recycled produce that they bought 
back from their own members. In this way, farms, distribution agencies 
and retail stores could count the same grain and butter against the plan 
several times over. Such scams were particularly risky because, when 
the harvest failed across a region, many agencies were trying to do the 
same thing in competition with each other, making concealment more 
difficult.
Economists seeking to measure the real growth of command econo-
mies were interested in whether the incidence of plan fraud varied over 
time. Optimistically, Alec Nove (1956) proposed a law of ‘equal cheat-
ing’: if fraud was equal over time, measures of real year- on- year growth 
would be unaffected. Stephen Shenfield (1983) took a gloomier view, 
suggesting that fraud was likely to rise and fall with plan tension. On the 
archival evidence, Shenfield was on the right track. The distribution of 
party investigations from 1943 to 1962 (the only continuous period for 
which we have data) shows several waves. A positive correlation between 
the annual value of cheating and the number of reported offences sug-
gests that the waves were caused by variations in the level of crime, not 
of policing. On that basis, the extent of plan fraud rose and fell from year 





Kupona is a system of tax evasion found in Kosovo and refers to the prac-
tice of commercial businesses not registering transactions or printing 
receipts in order to avoid paying value- added tax (VAT). It is distinct from 
fraud as it is a consequence of ‘protection racketeering’, which is endemic 
in Kosovo, allegedly perpetrated by former guerrilla fighters and war-
lords of the Kosovo War (1998– 9) who have now established themselves 
as the country’s political elite. Kupona is a practice that allows commer-
cial businesses to generate enough revenue to survive, classifying it as a 























singular kuponi fiskal, the Albanian word for ‘receipt’, which literally 
translates as ‘fiscal coupon’. However, the term is mostly associated with 
the informal practice.
The practice of kupona seems to be prevalent in the new states 
emerging from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in part resulting from their 
inefficient bureaucracies. It is therefore likely that there are, or previ-
ously were, similar practices throughout the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia exacerbated by their recent statehood. Other analogous prac-
tices can be found in the Far East as indicated by the countermeasures 
employed there, and include the practices of ‘fapiao’ in China and the 
‘Uniform Invoice Lottery’ in Taiwan (Wan 2010). In the Taiwanese case, in 
order to prevent this specific form of tax evasion, the state prints lottery 
numbers for the state lottery on receipts, thus effectively transforming 
the receipt into a lottery ticket. This has the desired effect of increasing 
the likelihood of a customer not only requesting a receipt, but also retain-
ing it.
According to the typologies of formal– informal institutional inter-
actions (Helmke and Levistky 2004), the kupona practice can be consid-
ered as a competing practice, although not an institution in itself. Kupona 
is competing against the formal institutions of the state, specifically the 
tax authorities, in trying to ensure that the businesses retain as much of 
the income they generate as possible, which in turn then enables them 
to cover the hidden cost of ‘protection racketeering’. The development 
of such informality can be traced to the current economic situation of 
Kosovo and its development in the immediate post- war period (1999– 
2008). In terms of its economy, the Province of Kosovo was the poorest 
province of Yugoslavia because of its lack of significant natural resources. 
It was therefore heavily reliant upon Yugoslav federal subsidies. The dis-
solution of Yugoslavia brought an end to the subsidies and the ensuing 
war destroyed most of the pre- existing industry, of which there was lit-
tle. With a lack of natural resources, it was inevitable that the economy 
would be driven primarily by small commercial businesses. As a result of 
the development of the commercial services sector as the primary busi-
ness, it was natural for illegal activities and practices to develop along-
side and within them. It is estimated that $200 million per year (Phillips 
2010: 8) is generated through such practices, much of it through ‘protec-
tion racketeering’.
The illegal practice of racketeering remains one of the primary 
factors influencing the economy, fuelling practices such as kupona 
as a necessary reaction. Although establishing and conducting busi-











‘protection racketeering’ presents an additional ‘hidden’ cost to the 
business process. Furthermore, Kosovo remains one of the poorest 
countries in Europe with an average gross national income (GNI) per 
capita of $3,990 as of 2014 (World Bank 2014). Youth (18– 24) unem-
ployment is very high at 61 per cent, with an overall unemployment 
rate standing at 35 per cent. Those in employment report an average 
net salary between €300 to €400 a month (Agjencia e Statistikave të 
Kosovës 2015). Given these statistics, it is unlikely that the running of 
a commercial business can be considered a very profitable venture, a 
fact that is irrelevant to the protection racketeers.
The practice of kupona was devised in order to cover the hidden 
cost of business demanded by the ‘protection racket’; this distinction 
separates it from ordinary fraud and classifies it as a functional practice. 
The practice is a way of generating additional profit that otherwise would 
prove impossible for a business that is unable to sustain itself financially 
through commercial demands alone. As it is a case of tax evasion, kupona 
is similar in nature to traditional tax evasion schemes (Iakovlev 1999), 
which require certain criteria to be fulfilled. The common features are 
that: (1) the transaction is completed in cash (currency); (2) traditional 
tax evasion is common for self- employed people or small, non- corporate 
businesses; (3) part of the operation of the business with customers is 
illegal; (4) tax evasion is strongly linked to underreporting total revenue 
in order to conceal the profits of the business before tax; and (5) all trans-
actions are real (Iakovlev 1999: 6).
While Kosovo has a high number of credit and debit card users, the 
majority of transactions are still cash-based due to the limited adoption of 
point- of- sale terminals necessary to process credit and debit card trans-
actions. This is especially marked in the services sector of the economy, 
which is mainly comprised of small, non- corporate businesses. In 2015, 
the overall value of all transactions in Kosovo amounted to €3.6 bil-
lion, of which only €18 million were through card transactions; the rest 
consisted of payments in cash (Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo 
2016). This allows a widespread informal economy to exist in the coun-
try, containing within it a large number of different informal practices, 
including that of kupona. As of 2014, the informal economy is estimated 
to represent 30 to 35 per cent of the country’s $7.8 billion gross domestic 
product (GDP) – this amounts to a total of approximately $2.5 billion 
(European Commission 2014).
Currently, VAT represents 49 per cent of Kosovo’s tax revenue 




















6.26 Kupona  (kosoVo)
income for the government. It can be assumed (although it is in no way 
corroborated), that VAT evasion generates the majority of the estimated 
wealth of the informal economy through practices like kupona. It is likely 
that such practices make up a large percentage of the informal economy. 
Not only do black market transactions form a large part of the informal 
economy, but also the simplicity of the practice makes it widespread and 
functional in a struggling economy.
Non- cash transactions are generally immune to the basic versions 
of tax evasion, such as the kupona practice, because the records created 
by the transactions are kept by third parties. Tax evasion on cash transac-
tions, on the other hand, is elusive, especially in cases where indirect tax-
ation is involved and in instances where tax is collected by the business, 
such as VAT. For the government to collect indirect taxes themselves and 
in essence transform them into direct taxes would require access to all 
transaction records, which would be costly in terms of implementation, 
as well as in terms of control and general supervision (Wan 2010). Given 
the unlikelihood of such a system being adopted, asymmetrical informa-
tion in regards to indirect taxes will always exist between the govern-
mental tax authorities and businesses, with the asymmetry favouring the 
latter.
The current monitoring system for indirect tax collection is through 
random tax inspections at the place of business. As a result of these ran-
dom tax inspections, the kupona practice has shown certain flexibilities 
in its application that allow successful evasion of these formal inquiries. 
During the tax inspectors’ normal working hours in the day, when activity 
in commercial businesses such as restaurants or cafés is usually slow, it 
is more difficult for businesses to avoid invoicing transactions or printing 
receipts. In order to circumvent this obstacle, transactions are invoiced 
and given a receipt, but show only one item on an order containing multi-
ple goods. During peak hours of business, the sheer number of customers 
and orders provide the business with enough cover to avoid the need to 
resort to subtle deception. Furthermore, the night hours when business 
is at its peak in restaurants and cafés are outside the working hours of the 
tax inspectors.
The implications of the kupona practice and its effect on society is 
evident by its development as a functional form of ambivalence and a 
survival practice. It is a product of the economic environment of a coun-
try facing a growing trade imbalance, high unemployment and a low 
average wage – factors exacerbated by the corruption from the informal 






















6.27 Alga aploksne (Latvia)
klavs sedlenieks
riga stradins University, Latvia
The Latvian terms alga aploksne  (‘salary in an envelope’) and aplokšņu 
alga (‘envelope wage’) refer to an undeclared part of a regular wage, con-
cealed to allow the employer to evade a proportion of compulsory labour 
and social security taxes. The term derives from the widespread practice 
of handing over such salaries in envelopes, rather than by bank trans-
fer or in an open, over- the- counter manner. This practice can be seen as 
part of a wider family of practices whereby the income of an employee 
or contractor is completely or partly concealed from the authorities 
(for instance, moonlighting, tips in service industries or outright illegal 
employment – see Fudge et al. 2012 for a detailed description of varied 
informal work practices).
Alga aploksne  refers mostly to the regular but officially unrecorded 
payments of salary that is paid alongside official payments. Part of the 
salary is indicated in the employment contract, signed for and officially 
reported. The other part of the salary does not feature in official books, 
is paid unofficially and concealed from tax authorities. The ratio of the 
officially declared wage versus the alga aploksne is estimated to be 50 per 
cent in Latvia (Williams 2013: 331). The official part of the salary is often 
levelled down to the minimum wage that is required by law (360 EUR per 
month in 2015). The money is paid by the official employer, thus making 
it different from various tipping arrangements (e.g. in bars or hotels, see 
O’Connor 1971) and illegal private entrepreneurship where the money is 
paid directly by the customer and on an irregular basis (e.g. ‘cash in hand’ 
in the UK (see 6.1 in this volume) and various other countries).
Both the employer and employees often perceive alga aploksne  as 
mutually beneficial. The employer has the opportunity to attract work-
force at less expense, while employees receive more cash immediately 
and directly, rather than through benefits redistributed by the state. The 
difference between the formally and informally paid salary is normally 
discussed in job negotiations, so it is clear what will be received ‘on paper’ 
and what ‘in hand’ (uz rokas).
Using the system of alga aploksne  does also incur drawbacks for 
both employer and employee. In addition to the legal consequences, the 
employer needs to maintain a constant supply of ready cash that is not 
accounted for in the official books. This requires careful manipulation of 
the electronic cash register and/ or dealing with criminals who provide 

























6.27 alga aploKSne   (LatVIa)
aploksne means significantly reduced social benefits, such as job security 
and pensions.
A survey by Putniņš and Sauka concludes that in the period 2009– 
14 the percentage of underreported salaries in the Baltic states fluctu-
ated from 35.5 (in Latvia, 2010) to as low as 12.2 (in Lithuania, 2014). In 
Latvia and Lithuania the underreported part amounts to 11– 30 per cent 
of the total salary while in Estonia the most frequently used proportion 
falls within the interval of 1– 10 per cent. Only just over 10 per cent of the 
surveyed company representatives in Estonia and Latvia and 24 per cent 
in Lithuania declare that they pay all social taxes as required by law 
(Putniņš and Sauka 2015: 16).
The alga aploksne payments in Latvia are so omnipresent and 
socially acceptable that credit institutions are reported to have accepted 
declarations of informal income as proof of the creditworthiness of cli-
ents. Allegedly such banking practices were widespread before the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 and credits issued on the basis of such information 
contributed to the economic meltdown. Banks supposedly learnt their 
lesson and stopped the practice, but one case was reported as late as 
2015 (LETA 2015), though the bank officially denied the practice. The 
practice of alga aploksne  is only a semi- open secret when it comes to 
identifying concrete employers who use it. As a social practice, though, 
it is widely acknowledged by the public, representatives of government 
and non- governmental organisations, in particular when tax policies are 
discussed.
Practices similar to alga aploksne can be observed elsewhere 
in the world. ‘Envelope wages’ are well- researched in the European 
Union (Woolfson 2007; Williams 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). A 2007 
Eurobarometer survey indicates that envelope wages can be found 
throughout the European Union (EU); however, the practice is most 
widespread in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and least wide-
spread in Scandinavia. While in Central and Eastern Europe 10 per cent 
of employees have received a wage in an envelope, it is only 4 per cent in 
Southern Europe and 2 per cent in Western Europe and Nordic countries 
(Williams 2013: 330). About 50 per cent of all envelope wage payments 
in the EU happen in five countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania Poland, 
Romania (Williams 2013: 330). Moreover it is possible that Western 
European and Nordic respondents by envelope wages understood income 
that they earned for doing an irregular, part- time job (in contrast to East 
Europeans for whom it is a part of a regular job arrangement).
All neighbouring countries of Latvia have terms and practices that 


























Lithuania (alga vokeliose), Russia (zarplata v konverte), Belarus (zarplata 
ŭ kanvertse). Similar terms also exist in Ukraine (zarplata v konverti), 
Moldova and Romania (salariu într- un plic) and Bulgaria (pari v plik). All 
of these terms literally mean ‘salary in an envelope’, and refer specifically 
to the arrangement of concealing a given part of the regular salary (as 
opposed to undeclared earnings in general). Other societies may have 
similar practices but lack a particular term (see rad na  crno, 5.24 in this 
volume). However, it seems that neither the term nor the practice goes 
beyond the area of post- socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and Russia.
Alga aploksne is a phenomenon that only developed after the dis-
mantling of the Soviet economic system. During the Soviet period either 
all salary was paid according to the books or the employment was off 
the record altogether (hence the term ‘second economy’, see for example 
Grossman 1985/ 1992). Thus alga aploksne has no direct precedent in 
the Soviet heritage. Woolfson (2007: 552), speaking of salaries in an 
envelope argues that the ‘informalization in the post- communist tran-
sition period … derives less from the legacy of Soviet times than from 
the predatory nature of the neo- liberal capitalism’. Fudge (2012) simi-
larly argues that the recent proliferation of informal work practices in all 
kinds of societies is due to globalisation and deregulation stemming from 
neo- liberal policies. Contesting the view that traces the roots of infor-
mality to features of Soviet citizenship, Sedlenieks (2013) and Mühlfried 
(2014) argue that the tendency of citizens to treat rules lightly and avoid 
regulations is not a result of Soviet heritage but an adaptation of citizens 
to the instability of state policies over a much longer period. The afore-
mentioned Eurobarometer survey indicates that in Western Europe and 
Nordic countries envelope wages are paid almost exclusively for jobs per-
formed outside one’s regular employment, similar to what used to be the 
case in Central and East European countries during the socialist period, 
while currently alga aploksne and similar practices in CEE are part of the 
regular employment.
According to quantitative comparative research, the spread of enve-
lope wages negatively correlates with the level of regulation. Testing the 
hypothesis of correlation with over- regulation/ under- regulation, Colin 
Williams finds that the practice is least widespread in countries with 
strong welfare systems and effective re distribution of wealth, whereas 
in countries that have a more neo liberal orientation with less state inter-
vention in the labour market and weaker redistribution, envelope wages 
are more prevalent (Williams 2013: 325). The qualitative evidence 























is linked (apart from monetary gains) to the lack of trust in state social 
security systems and the perception that tax money is often wasted by 
corrupt officials and politicians (Sedlenieks 2003: 45). Accordingly, alga 
aploksne and related practices become rationalised and reproduced at 
the expense of paying taxes to an unreliable state.
6.28 Vzaimozachety (russia)
Caroline dufy
Centre emile durkheim, sciences Po Bordeaux, and Centre 
national de la recherche scientifique (Cnrs), france
Vzaimnyi zachet (also known as vzaimozachety, zachetnaya skhema 
and zachet vzaimnykh trebovanii) is a Russian term meaning ‘bilateral 
exchange in kind’. When used in the plural (vzaimnye zachety), it refers to 
a specific type of inter- firm exchange, whereby a commodity transferred 
to a partner is paid for by non- monetary means. In this sense, vzaimnye 
zachety are part of a wider concept of transactions- in- kind described 
in Russian as barter, which in turn is derived from the English ‘barter’, 
meaning the exchange of goods or services for other goods or services 
without the use of money.
Non- monetary transactions are commonplace in international 
trade. Under the Soviet economic system, such transactions enabled 
socialist states such as the Soviet Union, which lacked access to foreign- 
currency reserves, to pay for imported goods. Trade between the 
member- states of the Soviet- led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), for example, was mostly handled through countertrade 
or bilateral clearing agreements. For instance, the German Democratic 
Republic supplied the USSR with machinery and in exchange the USSR 
supplied it with oil.
Following the collapse of the USSR, vzaimnye zachety came in the 
1990s to be seen by Russian economists as a specific feature of domes-
tic barter in the context of a dire financial and monetary crisis during 
which money surrogates and inter- enterprise arrears were widespread 
(Yakovlev 1999). Massive arrears in wages, pensions and welfare ben-
efits paralysed the economy at every level. Demonetisation and the dis-
rupted role of money as a universal means of exchange made vzaimnye 
zachety an alternative means of enabling goods to circulate in the econ-
omy (Marin 2002).
While vzaimnye zachety took many different forms, two major 
types may be identified. The first denoted successive bilateral exchanges, 


















successive bilateral transactions with several partners until the desired 
commodity was attained. This strategy allowed holders of low- value 
goods, who were excluded from the hard- money circuit, to distribute 
and sell their goods on alternative circuits, using non- monetary means 
of exchange (Yakovlev 2000). The second denoted a complex chain of 
exchanges, mixing commodity transfers and debt schemes, whereby party 
A transferred a commodity to party B, who thereby became indebted to 
party A.  The commodity was then transferred to party C, who in turn 
became indebted to party B, and so on. The chain might involve five, six 
or even more parties in debt and delayed payment chains (Ledeneva and 
Seabright 2000). While the first type described above referred to demon-
etisation, the second often involved tax evasion and the bypassing of legal 
regulations. In the illegal and criminal transactions described by many 
experts as Russia’s ‘virtual economy’ (Gaddy and Ickes 1998; Tompson 
1999; Woodruff 1999a), intermediate firms were often artificially bank-
rupted; this meant that, while the original supplier went unpaid, the final 
recipient took possession of a commodity that had no owner needing to 
be paid for it.
High negative moral value was accordingly attributed to vzaim-
nye zachety by economists, officials and experts from international eco-
nomic and financial organisations – such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development  – which monitored the transition of the former social-
ist countries to a market- based economy. In his annual address to the 
Russian parliament in 1998, President Boris Yeltsin declared that ‘The 
Russian market is still cluttered with barter. It is in the stranglehold of 
mutual debt defaults; enterprises live on debt and have no intention of 
repaying their debts … This practice cannot be continued. It is useless 
and dangerous to try to cheat the economy’ (Yeltsin 1998).
Vzaimnye zachety have been criticised by economists and officials on 
several grounds. The first concerns the discrepancy between barter and 
economic norms in modern capitalism, while the second relates to a loop-
hole in the legal conditions of exchange. Anthropologists have also noted 
the phenomenon of ‘shadow barter’, that is, the close association between 
the ingenuous schemes of barter exchanges justified by economic neces-
sity and the illegal workings of the shadow economy (Ledeneva 2000). 
The dramatic rise of the practice of barter in Russia in the 1990s surprised 
Russian observers as well as many experts from international organisa-
tions (Commander and Mumssen 1998; Commander et  al. 2000). Up 
until then, the socialist economy had entailed fixed prices that generated 






















when Russia began its transition to a market economy, prices started fluc-
tuating, thereby reflecting the volatile desirability of goods. Pro- market 
advocates see the monetisation of transactions in the economy as encour-
aging efficiency, favouring the emergence of interest- based behaviour 
and, more generally, paving the way for further structural changes. This 
was not, however, the case in Russia. Far from declining as expected in 
the new market conditions, the share of barter in commodity exchanges 
grew dramatically. In 1993, barter was estimated to account for a mere 
9 per cent of the volume of industrial sales in Russia. Within three years, 
however, its share nearly quadrupled, reaching 35 per cent in 1996, 
42 per cent in 1997 and 51 per cent in 1998 (Aukutsionek 2001; Russian 
Economic Barometer 2001).
The financial crisis of August 1998, the sharp devaluation of the 
rouble and Russia’s default on its external debt led however to a dra-
matic drop in barter, which in 2001 and 2002 fell to a low of 16 per 
cent of industrial sales (Russian Economic Barometer 2003). Following 
the 1998 crisis, the Russian government tasked the State Statistics 
Committee with measuring the various means of transaction used by 
businesses. Their findings revealed a steady decline in barter. In 1999, 
47.4 per cent of all transactions were based on non- monetary means of 
payment, 24.5 per cent of which were vzaimnye  zachety. In 2000, bar-
ter accounted for only 30.2 per cent of all transactions, 15.5 per cent of 
which were vzaimnye  zachety. The massive devaluation of the rouble in 
1998 had reduced arrears in the economy and remonetised transactions. 
Russia’s competitiveness increased, easing exports and reducing the flow 
of imports. In the 2000s, a process of legislation and accounting regula-
tion effectively banned barter in Russia, leaving only bilateral exchanges 
in kind (Efimova 1997; Dufy 2011).
Classic economic anthropology highlights the moral value of trans-
actions (Parry and Bloch 1989; Humphrey and Hugh- Jones 1992). This 
provides a basis with which to explain the negative appraisal in relation 
to the norms and models implemented by society. The British economist 
William Stanley Jevons defined barter as a situation requiring a ‘dou-
ble coincidence of wants’ (Jevons 1875). In support of his argument, 
multiple testimonies collected in fieldwork in Russia in the early 2000s 
depicted barter as a less than optimal situation, requiring additional 
work to negotiate which commodities were to be accepted as means of 
payment. Furthermore, barter generated an imbalance between parties, 
uncertainty as to the quality of the goods received, and confusion over 
the return deadline (Dufy 2008). As shown by the history of the rise and 














economic and social design. For, as the cornerstones are being laid in 
the burgeoning market, these definitions make a clear- cut distinction 
between those types of transactions that are considered desirable, and 
those that are not.
6.29 Otkat (russia)
alexandra Vasileva
University of amsterdam, netherlands
Otkat is a colloquial term used to describe a form of corruption in Russia. 
It literally means ‘rolling back’ and is the equivalent of the English term 
‘kickback’. Otkat is the diversion of part of the money allocated for a 
purchase to the person responsible for the purchase, for example, to an 
employee of a state administration or a company. As the result of col-
lusion between a person in charge of a purchase and a supplier, otkat 
implies embezzlement and results in the overpricing of goods and ser-
vices. Otkat emerged as a practice in the 1990s following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, and proliferated in Russia during the 2000s as the 
state’s role in the economy expanded, resulting in the creation of state 
corporations. The practice grew further as a result of the general eco-
nomic upturn and the respective increase in resources associated with 
the oil boom.
Otkat is widely used in public procurement: the state allows 
itself to be overcharged, and the bureaucrats responsible for the pur-
chase pocket the difference between the actual price and the stated 
price. As a result, part of the public funds gets diverted for private 
gain. According to the Russian law on public procurement, state pur-
chases must be conducted via transparent competitive tenders accord-
ing to the principle of obtaining the ‘best quality for the lowest price’. 
However, in reality, numerous techniques are employed to evade the 
procedure, thus undermining honest competition and allowing the 
practice of otkat to flourish. During the tender process a company 
affiliated to the bureaucrat often makes the winning bid. In 2013, the 
Russian Court of Auditors concluded that 70 per cent of the largest 
tenders were awarded without any competitive process (Zamakhina 
2013). Moreover, otkat is a widespread practice in the procurement 
procedures of big state- owned conglomerates and by monopolies. 
Similarly, the suppliers of goods and services involved in the kickback 
schemes may be affiliated to the conglomerate and, in some instances, 

























As a result of an otkat scheme, the resources of the state or a state- 
owned company get embezzled: the contractor returns a certain percent-
age of the deal to the client – in most cases, in cash. Unaccounted ‘black 
cash’ is generated through encashment (obnalichivanie) – an illicit infor-
mal practice that involves bogus companies, often affiliated with banks 
(Yakovlev 2001: 38f.). For a certain ‘fee’ (around 7 per cent of the total 
sum) these sham companies generate both the cash and the respective 
paperwork necessary to cover up the illicit scheme. In some cases, otkat 
takes more sophisticated forms: rather than a straightforward cash pay-
ment, money is transferred for imaginary consultancy work or ‘market 
research’ to a shell company owned by the person responsible for making 
the order.
Otkat is also widespread in Russian inter- business relations, where 
it causes a typical agency problem as rank and file managers cheat the 
company by pocketing some of its resources. For example, managers of 
purchasing departments buy overpriced goods or services, charging the 
supplier an illicit ‘commission’. In some sectors, such as corporate insur-
ance, otkat is widely used to make corporate clients pay higher premiums 
than the market price (Grigorieva 2007). As a rule, otkat is negotiated 
clandestinely between the representatives of the two firms in advance 
and paid as a ‘gratitude fee’ by the contractor to the person represent-
ing the purchasing company. Vague language is used during otkat nego-
tiations (the Russian internet in fact is full of ‘instructions’ for using the 
practice):  an otkat- giver might suggest ‘being ready to make conces-
sions’, ‘making a very good offer’, ‘giving you a personal discount’ or ‘pay-
ing particular attention to your needs, whereby “you” is deliberately used 
ambiguously to refer both to the company and to the person in charge’ 
(Lonkila 2011: 66f.).
Along with other forms of corruption, otkat is openly acknowledged 
as a problem by the Russian leadership. For example, in his 2010 annual 
address, President Medvedev condemned the embezzlement of state 
funds, including the practice of otkat, and estimated losses at 1 trillion 
roubles annually, which corresponds to about 15 per cent of state pur-
chases (Medvedev 2010). Similarly, President Putin regularly declares 
the fight against corruption a priority, and has acknowledged that otkat, 
as a percentage of contract volume, reached 50 per cent of public pro-
curement contracts (NTV 2013). Otkat is also a widely discussed topic in 
the Russian media, deemed to negatively affect both business and public 
procurement. Using the Integrum database, Markku Lonkila examined 
the frequency of the term ‘otkat’ in printed media in Russia since the early 



















the 2000s (Lonkila 2011: 68). On the Internet, websites and blogs dedi-
cated to the techniques, advantages and disadvantages of otkat schemes 
abound. The term otkat sometimes seems to be used in a broader sense 
in these sources, and is often (falsely) used as a synonym for bribe, if the 
size of the bribe is fixed as a percentage of a deal. However, as a form of 
corruption, otkat differs from bribery. While a bribe represents an illicit 
money flow to agent A from agent B, otkat involves a formal legal pay-
ment from a budget overseen by agent A (but not owned by him person-
ally) to agent B, and a subsequent illegal, private re payment of part of 
that sum back to agent A. Therefore, for example, a payment received by 
a supermarket manager from a wine supplier for displaying the produce 
prominently is a bribe rather than an otkat. But if the supermarket man-
ager colludes with the supplier of wine and receives in return an informal 
‘personal bonus’ in cash of some 10 per cent of the ‘on- paper’ purchase 
sum, the correct name for the informal practice is otkat.
Another practice related to otkat is raspil (literally meaning ‘saw-
ing through’), which refers to the theft of budget money through hugely 
overpriced state purchases, with those in charge of procurement ‘sawing 
off’ a cut of the money for themselves and disguising it through creative 
accounting (Ledeneva 2013: 277). Raspil is a broader and simpler con-
cept than otkat as it implies only one agent (the bureaucrat who embez-
zles state funds from a public project), whereas otkat necessarily involves 
two agents working in different organisations.
Otkat has several adverse implications for the economy and soci-
ety. In public procurement, the spread of otkat implies private appro-
priation of public funds:  as a result, the total amount expended for 
public purpose diminishes (Bayley 1966:  725). Interestingly, although 
business- to- business otkat falls under article 204 of the Criminal Code 
as a ‘commercial bribe’, the practice of otkat in public procurement is not 
directly specified in the legislation, which makes it hard to prosecute cor-
rupt bureaucrats. Another adverse effect of otkat is inflated prices: goods, 
services and equipment procured with otkat become more expensive 
than they would have been without it. The consumer often ends up pay-
ing an excessive price. Examples include increased tariffs for monopoly 
services, such as electricity, or having to pay inflated prices for wine in a 
supermarket. Moreover, by defrauding fair competition and promoting 
businesses affiliated with the bureaucracy, otkat disadvantages outsid-
ers, especially smaller firms. The 2005/ 6 reform of the law on public pro-
curement in Russia required an increase in the share of state purchases 
to be made from small and medium- sized firms. However, according to 

























impact (Yakovlev 2009). Finally, otkat can result in the provider cutting 
corners or sacrificing quality in order to finance the otkat payment, which 
in itself can be more costly for society in the long run. For example, in the 
case of a company using otkat to secure a road building contract, lower 
quality materials may be used, with the result that the road will have to 
be repaired more often and may even result in accidents.
Otkat is typically measured as a percentage of the contract volume. 
Researching the scope and average size of otkat is difficult given the 
informal nature of the practice; however, several methods may be used. 
The first method is to establish the use of the practice through a business 
survey: company managers are asked about the occurrence of kickbacks 
in their business practice. For example, surveys by the Higher School of 
Economics show that the share of firms encountering otkat increased 
between 2005 and 2009 from 34 to 40 per cent (Yakovlev 2009). The 
World Bank’s business surveys found that between 2008 and 2011 the 
average sum of otkat increased from 11 to 15 per cent of the contract 
volume (BEEPS 2013: 7).
Another method used to research the scope of otkat in the 
sphere of public procurement is estimation based on expert opinion, 
used in conjunction with a comparison of market prices with actual 
expenditure. For example, the head of the National Anticorruption 
Committee, Kirill Kabanov, estimates the scope of otkat in public pro-
curement at 30– 40 per cent of the contract volume, while in particu-
larly non- transparent cases, such as purchases made by the Ministry 
of Defence, it is estimated to reach at least 60 per cent (Makarov 2011; 
see Ledeneva 2013: 100f.). According to the late Boris Nemtsov, at 
least half of the $51 billion USD cost of the notoriously expensive 
2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi can be attributed to corruption, 
and in particular to otkat (Nemtsov 2013). Many lucrative contracts 
for building the Olympic facilities were won by close friends and asso-
ciates of President Putin: for example, his friend Arkady Rotenberg 
alone procured construction contracts worth USD7 billion – more 
than the entire budget of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics (Arkhipov and 
Meyer 2013).
Finally, in- depth interviews with entrepreneurs may be useful for 
gaining a better understanding of specific otkat schemes and their mech-
anisms. Interviews conducted by the author with small and medium- 
sized entrepreneurs in Russia revealed two otkat scenarios: some 
contractors were paid from lavishly inflated public procurement budg-
ets and thus had no difficulty in completing the work while also meet-













cuts and struggled to stay profitable as a result of paying otkat. In one 
instance, a company in St Petersburg won a tender for building a road. 
The successful bid was for 18 million roubles; however, the state officials 
responsible for the project offered to pay 28 million roubles, with spe-
cific instructions to the company that ‘eight [million] you will bring back 
– in cash. We are not interested in how you are going to do the “encash-
ment” (obnalichivanie), but all the documents need to be waterproof!’ 
(author interview 2014). Conversely, a Moscow construction company 
that had been undertaking works for the upper chamber of the Russian 
Parliament for years reported difficulties in dealing with budget cuts: ‘A 
new team arrived, new guys, a hungry lot. They summoned all contrac-
tors one by one: “Roll back 20 per cent”. They said it in plain text. The 
budgets are being slashed. But we want to have a profit’ (author inter-
view 2014). Filing a formal complaint was not an option, as it would 
have resulted in the company being ‘blacklisted’ and being debarred 
from future bid-making opportunities.
Otkat remains an under- researched practice both because of its 
informal character and due to the involvement of state bureaucracy. 
However, it has implications for the political economy as a whole: by par-
ticipating in otkat schemes, firms not only need to generate illicit black 
cash, but they also have to deal with an inevitable mismatch between the 
actual and ‘on- paper’ transactions, which in turn requires further illicit 
operations and concealment techniques. Viewed from this perspective, 
otkat deserves more scholarly attention, as its prevalence may be key to 
understanding the endurance of the shadow economy in Russia and in 
other emerging economies.
6.30 Potemkin villages (russia)
Jessica t. Pisano
new school for social research, new york, Usa
A Potemkin village is a simulation: a façade meant to fool the viewer into 
thinking that he or she is seeing the real thing. The concept is used in 
the Russian- speaking world as well as in English and in other languages. 
Potemkin village belongs to a genus of phenomena that proliferate in 
post- Soviet space. Those phenomena describe gaps between external 
appearances and underlying realities. In the Russian language, the genus 
includes species such as pokazukha (window  dressing, see Radio Maiak 
2010; Pisano 2014), imitatsiia (mimicry – a loan word from English, in 
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images or reports), as well as a rich vocabulary describing various sub-
species of shell companies: roga i kopyta (Ilf and Petrov 1998/ 1931), 
firma- odnodnevka, fonar’, pomoika, ezhik and many others.
Potemkin villages bear a family resemblance to the phantasms of 
capitalist reproduction that Baudrillard (1985) described as simula-
cra (Epstein 1995), but they arguably express a different ontological 
orientation. Some understand Potemkin villages as imaginaries rather 
than illusions (Clowes 1995; Seifrid 2001). In such interpretations, 
Potemkin villages are aspirational, rather than deceptive, and they 
are only meaningful insofar as their referent exists somewhere in the 
world. In Russia, Seifrid writes, the ‘prolific construction of simulacra’ 
is ‘not a sham culture suspended over reality’s absence, but one ener-
getically cycling, responding to, and transforming into hard cultural 
currency the fabricated signs that it appropriates, magpie- like, from 
abroad – sustained by a hope in the referent’s eventual advent’ (Seifrid 
2001: 214).
The original Potemkin villages were said to be eighteenth- cen-
tury façades constructed by Prince Potemkin to impress Empress 
Catherine II as she traveled in Crimea following its annexation from 
the Ottoman Empire. Historians now agree that this legend is likely 
an exaggeration (Panchenko 1999). But debates about the veracity of 
the original story crystallise frictions embodied in the concept: Where 
should the lines be drawn between artifice and embellishment, and 
between embellishment and mere decoration? Wherein lies the dis-
tinction between deception and aspiration? And where artifice is per-
suasive, how do we know what it is that we are seeing? These questions 
have become particularly salient during the current period, in which 
Potemkin villages and related concepts are frequently used to describe 
political institutions, including electoral practices and elite- led and 
elite- captured social movements (Wilson 2005; Pisano 2010; Radnitz 
2012; Gabowitsch 2015). Increasingly, politicians and others across 
the political spectrum refer to Potemkin villages, or some variation 
on the concept, to accuse their opponents of inauthenticity (Grigor’ev 
2007; Orbán 2014).
Potemkin villages appear in numerous guises in nineteenth- and 
twentieth- century literature, as well as in Soviet- era political economy. 
In the nineteenth- century literary and political imagination, façade and 
theatrical tropes surface most famously in Gogol’s Revisor (1836) and 
with greatest present- day resonance in Mertvye dushi (1842), in which 











recently deceased serfs (upon whose head landowners continued to 
owe taxes) and using their names as collateral. Writing in reaction to 
liberalisation later in the century, Aksakov (1863) bemoaned the ubiq-
uity of mere appearances. Among the most infamous statements about 
Potemkin villages are the observations of the Marquis de Custine, who 
described Russia as an ‘empire of catalogues’ (1893).
Soviet- era Potemkin villages included performances of economic 
development: presentations of model farms, factories, schools and 
other institutions were staples of visits by delegations from Moscow and 
abroad. In 1988, Mikhail Zadornov published a widely read satirical 
essay about the practice. Post- Soviet literature likewise contains numer-
ous references to a variety of types of Potemkin village. For example, in 
the world of Viktor Pelevin’s Omon Ra (1992), humans dress as game to 
entertain hunting parties of party elite and millions of political prisoners 
simultaneously jump up and down in order to simulate tests of nuclear 
warheads.
The concept plays a central role in The Post- Soviet Potemkin Village 
(Pisano 2008), which analyses the political economy of villages along 
the present day Russia- Ukraine border. In it, Jessica Pisano drew on 
long- term field research in rural communities to show how post- Soviet 
privatisation of land in Russia and Ukraine produced widespread rural 
dispossession and consolidation of state and corporate control, all con-
cealed by a paper record of rural ownership. In contrast to many other 
examples, Potemkin villages in the post- Soviet countryside were not 
entirely intentional charades. Instead, they were produced by a conflu-
ence of economic policy choices at the national level and local actors’ 
responses to those choices.
Beyond the Russian- speaking world, variations on Potemkin vil-
lages can be found in most contemporary polities and in many vernacu-
lars (e.g. Goffman 1959; Debord 1992/1967). These ‘experience near 
concepts’ (Geertz 1985) most often are used to describe political phe-
nomena. In Lusophone Africa and Brazil, people speak of laws that are 
‘só para inglês ver’ (‘just for the English to see’), originally in reference 
to nineteenth- century pro- forma Portuguese efforts to stamp out the 
slave trade in the face of British criticism (Penvenne 2000; Ashcroft 
2015). In Francophone Africa, Emmanuel Terray (1986) writes of la 
véranda (front) and le climatiseur (air-conditioner) (1986). Journalism 
and scholarly research in and about Latin America has long referred to 
the ‘democratic façade’ (fachada democrática). And in politics in the 
United States, ‘Astroturf’ lobbyists pay PR firms to create campaigns 

























‘Astroturfing’ refers to the practice of artificially creating the impression 
of widespread public support for a policy, cause, organisation, individual 
or product, where little or no support in fact exists. Such practices exist 
globally, but the term itself predominates in English- language political 
and media discourse, particularly in the USA and UK. Etymologically, the 
term derives from AstroTurf, a brand of artificial turf that, when spelt in 
lower case, is commonly used to refer to artificial grass in general. The 
metaphorical adaption of the term is commonly attributed to US Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen, who in 1985 complained about the large volume of letters 
he received, ostensibly from members of the public, which he viewed as 
part of a hidden organised campaign by insurance companies to protect 
their interests. ‘A fellow from Texas can tell the difference between grass-
roots and astroturf’, Bentsen stated (Sager 2009). The concept of ‘astro-
turfing’ is thus intrinsically bound up with the concepts of ‘grassroots 
support’ and ‘grassroots activity’. ‘Grassroots activity’ refers to coordi-
nated political or social activity spontaneously generated and organised 
from the ‘bottom up’ by ordinary citizens. The use of the term ‘grass-
roots’ in this sense can be traced back to the US Senator Albert Jeremiah 
Beverege, who in 1912 referred to the Progressive Party as the party that 
‘has come from the grass roots. It has grown from the soil of people’s hard 
necessities’ (Samoilenko 2014: 189). In the case of astroturfing, the con-
notation is that genuine grass roots support does not exist but has been 
artificially replicated, just as astroturf replicates real grass.
A typical pre- Internet form of astroturfing was paid- for letter writ-
ing campaigns, such as that referred to by Bentsen when he coined 
the term. Such campaigns were used by corporate clients as a lobby-
ing tool, with the aim of convincing political representatives that their 
cause enjoyed greater public support than was in fact the case (Lyon and 
Maxwell 2004: 563– 4). However, the growth of Internet use, in particu-
lar social media and crowdsourcing platforms, has dramatically increased 
the range and scope of astroturfing behaviours. The cloak of anonymity 
makes the Internet a highly effective platform for astroturfing, while the 
growing importance of online and crowdsourced information provides a 












The core type of deception involved in astroturfing is identity- based 
deceit – a false representation of the identity of the author or supporter. 
However, some forms of astroturfing also involve message- based deceit 
– the delivery of false or misleading information (Zhang et al. 2013: 3). 
The latter is the case, for example, in fake product reviews and other 
forms of disinformation. Astroturfing involving message- based deceit is 
often employed in a corporate context, for example, to generate positive 
consumer reviews for one’s own product or service, or to generate nega-
tive reviews for that of a rival. One recent study found that nearly one in 
five reviews on the business review website Yelp were suspected of being 
fake (Luca and Zervas 2016). Some major companies use sophisticated 
personal management software to create entire astroturfing ‘armies’ of 
authentic- looking but nevertheless fake social media accounts, which 
can be deployed as and when needed (Bienkov 2012).
Astroturfing has been the subject of increasing political and media 
attention in the twenty- first century, as the growth of Internet and social 
media usage has led to these platforms being exploited by governments 
and their supporters as tools of information warfare. Some national gov-
ernments are alleged to employ large armies of hidden paid agents to 
troll online discussion forums with pro- government views. For example, 
the Chinese state employs an army of paid online commentators (dubbed 
the ‘50- cent army’ after the amount they are supposedly paid per post) 
to spread pro- regime propaganda on online forums (Han 2015). State- 
sponsored trolling is by no means confined to authoritarian regimes, but 
is also employed by Western democracies. For example, the United States 
Central Command (Centcom), which oversees US armed operations in 
the Middle East and Central Asia, has awarded contracts to companies to 
develop persona management software that will allow its military per-
sonnel to secretly propagate pro- American propaganda on social media 
sites via fake online personas (Fielding and Cobain 2011).
Another form of astroturfing that has received increased atten-
tion in recent years is the phenomenon of ‘sock puppeting’. In its literal 
meaning, a sock puppet is a simple form of puppet made by wearing a 
sock on one’s hand. The gap between fingers and thumb give the impres-
sion of a mouth, and the addition of simple details like eyes make the 
sock resemble a face. In political and media discourse, a ‘sock puppet’ 
refers to an organisation that has the façade of independence, but whose 
existence is in fact dependent on often concealed funding from another 
source, thus compromising its independence. The term can also refer to 




















Sock puppets typically champion policies that do not enjoy signifi-
cant public support, but that are favoured by a government ministry or 
bureaucratic department. The government can then justify the adoption 
of these policies by claiming that they are responding to external pres-
sure from civil society. This is by no means a new phenomenon: the 1960s 
and 1970s saw the rise of single- issue health pressure groups in the UK 
– ostensibly independent but funded by the government – campaigning 
on such issues as smoking and alcohol (Berridge 2007: 164). For exam-
ple, the foundation of the anti- tobacco lobby group Action on Smoking 
and Health (ASH) in 1971 was actively encouraged by the Department of 
Health, which also provided the bulk of its funding in its first two decades. 
ASH provided a source of external pressure for policies the Department of 
Health itself favoured, and in practice they often worked collaboratively 
Berridge 2007: 167– 77). At the other end of the spectrum, tobacco com-
panies have responded by creating sock puppets of their own to counter- 
lobby. For example, in 1993 several major tobacco companies funded the 
foundation of the National Smokers Alliance (NSA), which purported to 
be a grassroots organisation representing smokers’ rights (Givel 2007).
In the UK, the charitable sector as a whole has been criticised for 
becoming increasingly dependent on state funding, and thus risking 
turning itself into an entire sector of sock puppets (Snowdon 2012). Sock 
puppeting has even been criticised from within the state itself. The UK’s 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) called for 
other government departments to ‘cease funding “sock puppets” and 
“fake charities” ’ in order to reduce wasteful government spending. The 
DCLG stated:  ‘Many pressure groups – which do not deliver services or 
help the vulnerable – are now funded by state bodies. In turn, these nom-
inally “independent” groups lobby and call for more state regulation and 
more state funding’ (DCLG 2012: 11).
It is possible that, with the increased trend towards Freedom of 
Information (FOI) legislation in Western polities, sock puppeting will 
become increasingly subject to public exposure as covert funding streams 
are revealed. However, whether exposure alone is sufficient to curb such 
an entrenched practice is another matter.
Political campaigns in the future will be progressively threatened 
by online astroturfing in the form of social bots and other imposters pos-
ing as autonomous individuals on the Internet, with the intent of promot-
ing a specific agenda. As astroturfing technology develops it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to distinguish fake personas from real individuals 
(Bienkov 2012), which poses a threat to open democratic debate as 













websites. There is a very real danger, in both politics and business, that 
participants will be forced to spend money on astroturfing just to remain 
competitive with their rivals. In game theory terminology astroturfing is 
thus a form of non- optimal behaviour known as a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, 
since money is sunk on rival disinformation that effectively cancels out 
both sides. It also represents a ‘social loss’ (Simmons 2011: 187– 8), as 
resources are spent on non- productive uses rather than those that gener-
ate wealth or add value.
6.32 Dzhinsa (russia)
françoise daucé
Centre d’étude des mondes russe, caucasien et centre- européen 
ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, Paris, france
Dzhinsa (derived from the English word ‘jeans’) is a term used in Russian 
journalistic jargon to refer to paid- for material presented in the media as 
ordinary news. It is a form of ‘hidden advertising’, a practice that is both 
cheaper for advertisers and lucrative for journalists. According to Irina 
Petrovskaya, a television journalist in Moscow, this term was first used in 
the 1990s when a firm selling jeans in Moscow asked journalists from the 
television station Pervyi Kanal (‘First Channel’) to promote its activities. 
It paid the journalists ‘in kind’ with jeans. This kind of practice has been 
known as dzhinsa ever since (Petrovskaya 2005).
The term is widespread in journalists’ milieu in Russia – as shown 
by the numerous press articles on the practice – but the term is not widely 
recognised by the general public. The term is also used in other former 
Soviet republics, for example, by Ukrainian journalists (Iwanski 2012). 
The verbal form dzhinsit’ expresses the act of receiving money for the 
publication of paid materials in the media. It is one of a range of infor-
mal practices known collectively as chernyi piar (literally ‘black PR’) or 
chernukha, which developed after the fall of the Soviet Union (Ledeneva 
2006; see chernukha, 8.5 in this volume). Dzhinsa can be used as a tool 
to both promote (also known as zakazukha), or to discredit (see kom-
promat, 8.4 in this volume) (Iwanski 2012). Academic works on the 
Russian media make little reference to dzhinsa, despite the term’s com-
mon use in journalistic circles. Lack of sources makes empirical analysis 
difficult. Journalists speak of it as a widespread phenomenon, but are 
reluctant to provide concrete details about it, such as information about 
prices, frequency and the actors involved. Nevertheless, Koltsova (2006) 
succeeded in gathering and analysing data about dzhinsa in the Russian 



















In Russia, the emergence of dzhinsa is intimately linked with the 
marketisation of economic relations in the media. It results from the com-
modification of media products, which began in the late 1980s. The prac-
tice of publishing dzhinsa developed in the 1990s, during the economic 
reforms of the ‘shock therapy’ period. It allowed newly privatised firms to 
promote their products and work in a novel way, via journalistic articles. 
At the same time, the use of dzhinsa also came to be of great significance 
in the political sphere. From the early 1990s, politicians in their election 
campaigns used public relations (PR) strategies based on the publication 
of covert political advertisements in the media. The privatisation of the 
media was the catalyst for this marketisation of journalism. The lack 
Figure 6.32.1 Moscow in April 2016. 









of resistance by journalists to dzhinsa was the result of economic dif-
ficulties encountered in the media business. As Australian scholar Brian 
McNair noted, during the 1990s, ‘those who work in the Russian media 
have struggled for survival in an environment characterised by chronic 
resource shortages, political instability and the ever- present threat of 
criminal interference’ (McNair 2000: 69). According to Russian aca-
demic Olessia Koltsova, ‘in some extremely badly off publications, jour-
nalists lived almost entirely on ordered articles. Thus, dzhinsa is a form 
of latent privatisation of media organisations by individual journalists’ 
(Koltsova 2006).
Dzhinsa is just one aspect of the informalities, oligarchism and 
‘black PR’, which are often considered as the main features of the ‘wild 
1990s’ in Russia (Ledeneva 1998). However, this practice did not cease 
during the 2000s. In the Russian media today dzhinsa remains a wide-
spread informal practice, which is periodically denounced by journalists 
not involved in the practice. According to The Insider, an independent 
website, the leading Russian newspapers Komsomolskaia Pravda, Izvestia 
and Rossijskaia Gazeta continue to publish dzhinsa (The Insider, 2014). 
This was confirmed in 2014 by hackers from the ‘Shaltaj- Boltaj’ Internet 
site who published documents showing that government authori-
ties in Moscow paid for the placement of articles in the main Russian 
newspapers. According to these documents, the newspaper Izvestia 
received 935,000 rubles, Nezavisimaia Gazeta – 760,000 rubles and 
Komsomolskaia Pravda – 645,000 rubles to promote the polities of the 
government (Okrest 2014). Journalists report that the development of 
the Internet in the 2000s has not diminished the appearance of dzhinsa in 
the media sphere and paid- for content in newspapers remains a common 
practice to the present day. Economic difficulties have not disappeared 
with the web economy; on the contrary, growing competition for finan-
cial resources between Internet sites and traditional newspapers has cre-
ated further economic difficulties for journalists.
According to journalists, dzhinsa is a malady of post- Soviet media 
practices (Iwanski 2012), which goes against journalistic ideals of inde-
pendence and objectivity. Russian textbooks for students in media facul-
ties condemn the practice and underline its negative effect on the public 
sphere. Dzhinsa contributes to the decline of public trust in the media in 
general, and to a growth in mistrust of journalists’ work. From a political 
point of view, the ideal of a Habermassian public space based on civic 
grammars is opposed to the mercantile practices of dzhinsa, which per-
vert public debates. From an economic point of view, dzhinsa runs con-


















of this informal practice is often considered by media scholars to be the 
result of the lack of judicial regulation of media activities. McNair con-
sidered that the problem in the 1990s was that ‘No effective regulation 
of the changing broadcast economy was put in place and transparency 
in financial matters was absent’ (McNair 2000: 75). At the beginning 
of the 2010s administrative measures to regulate dzhinsa were adopted 
by the Federal Directorate of the Anti- Monopoly Service of the Russian 
Federation, which has the power to punish media editors for the pub-
lication of PR texts not presented as advertisements. However, because 
of the informal practices sustaining dzhinsa and the difficulty of prov-
ing monetary exchange between a journalist and a client, the attempted 
clampdown on dzhinsa through federal regulation looks unlikely to suc-
ceed. Furthermore, in the context of growing political pressure on inde-
pendent journalists, some fear that regulations may be abused and used 
as a repressive and arbitrary tool against them.
6.33 Shpargalka (russia)
elena denisova- schmidt
University of st Gallen, switzerland
Shpargalka (shpora) (English: crib sheet or pony, German: Spickzettel) 
are unauthorised materials used by students during tests and exams 
at school, university and other educational institutions. They may be 
divided into traditional and innovative.
A traditional shpargalka is a handwritten or typed sheet of paper 
that is small enough to be hidden in the palm of the hand, up a sleeve or 
in a pocket, and that can be used surreptitiously during exams. This is not 
easy to do, however: one needs ‘dexterity’ (snorovka) – a particular kind 
of social skill in itself. Students do not even need to produce their own 
shpargalki: paper shpargalki can be purchased in almost every bookshop 
and online. Many books or booklets can be cut up and used during exams.
The spread of mobile phones, smartphones and other devices has 
created new opportunities. Answers to likely exam questions, complex for-
mulas and even entire essays can be uploaded onto a mobile device prior 
to the examination. Students only have to find a way of using their device 
without being detected. Alternatively, they can send a text message to an 
‘assistant’, who will in turn dictate the correct answer via an earpiece hid-
den in the student’s hair. Some students may adapt their bodies for cheat-
ing: their nails, hands or legs might be inscribed with formulas, data 
and other important information. Female students may have an advan-













progress, paper shpargalki remain the most popular form of cheating 
among Russian students.
As with other academic cheating techniques, the reaction of the 
professors is crucial. Do they notice it or not? Or do they pretend not to 
notice? As often as not, professors see all the traditional as well as the 
innovative and exotic cheating tools used during exams. Their reactions 
may differ, however: they may or may not act on what they have seen. If 
a professor picks up on a case of cheating, they might lower the student’s 
mark and/ or set additional questions. The reasons for ignoring cheating 
vary: if a student worked very hard during a semester and attended all 
the lectures, this small ‘sin’ may be forgiven. Some professors may even 
judge ‘self- made’ shpargalki positively, arguing that, by summarising the 
course materials, the student has critically reflected on the topic.
The Russian educational system is still oriented more towards provid-
ing knowledge than fostering competencies. This trend forces students to 
memorise a lot of information without critically reflecting on it. In addition, 
students often justify their use of shpargalki in classes that they consider 
‘unnecessary’. Science students, for example, are also required to study 
philosophy and sociology, while literature students must pass exams in 
mathematics and ecology. Knowledge of these disciplines is by no means 
essential to working in their chosen professions; as a result, students usually 
consider such courses superfluous. Using shpargalki during exams is also 
seen as less reprehensible by students who lack time to study, such as part- 
time students, zaochniki, who are usually adults with families and full- time 
jobs. They might not secure promotion without a higher education qualifi-
cation, even though this is often viewed as a merely formal requirement. At 
the same time, many students believe that using shpargalki is immoral, and 
may not be proud of themselves for passing exams in such a way.
The use of shpargalki is widespread in Russia; many young Russians 
learn how to do so at school and perfect the skill during their time at uni-
versity. Shpargalki are, however, violations of academic integrity linked 
to plagiarism, ghost- writing, manipulation of accreditation, degree mills 
and other forms of monetary and non- monetary corruption in academia. 
Sometimes students use shpargalki because they find it hard to study to 
such a high level. At the same time, they feel compelled to enter higher 
education because it is seen as the only way to secure a professional 
future. About 80 per cent of young Russians enrol in some form of higher 
education, and almost all of them complete their studies within the allot-
ted time frame. One reason why students feel pressured to act in this way 
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Ponies have a long history and tradition not only in Russia, but also in 
other countries. In 2009, the School Museum in Nürnberg in Germany 
organised an exhibition of around a thousand ponies from the past 
100  years. The exhibits came from all over the world and were dis-
played together with students’ success stories about their use of ponies. 
One such story was by Germany’s first post- war chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer (1876– 1967). In 2014, a similar exhibition opened in Russia’s 
Ekaterinburg, showcasing more than 80 items dating back to the 1980s. 
One of the exhibits was a 100 ruble banknote with math formulas written 
on it. This was a pony no teacher would have dared to confiscate, given 
the potential risk of being accused of having extorted a bribe!
6.34 Pyramid schemes (general)
Leonie schiffauer
department of social anthropology, University of Cambridge, Uk
Pyramid schemes are a type of financial fraud. Operators recruit unsus-
pecting investors with the promise of high returns. They claim to run 
successful business projects, but in fact early investors are paid with the 
money collected from later investors (a practice also known as ‘robbing 
Figure 6.33.1 Pony from Poland.
Source: Author Pöhlein, Erlangen. © Schulgeschichtliche Sammlung 














Peter to pay Paul’). Products and services may be presented in order to 
mask the pyramid structure (Figure 6.34.1), but sales play only a mar-
ginal role, if any at all, in the schemes’ compensation formula. Essentially, 
pyramid schemes are money- transfer schemes that benefit a small num-
ber of people at the top of the pyramid while resulting in an eventual loss 
of money for the majority of investors. The rules regarding recruitment 
and recoupment of money vary, but whether or not one makes money 
depends almost entirely on one’s position in the pyramid. A  pyramid 
scheme may survive for several years but, sooner or later, when growth 
stagnates, it will collapse. Pyramid schemes are a global phenomenon 
and have been observed for at least several decades. Though they are 
illegal in most countries, pyramid schemes keep appearing in political 
economies as diverse as those of the United States, China, Colombia and 
Lesotho. New technologies such as the Internet appear to have facilitated 
and accelerated the recent worldwide proliferation of pyramid schemes 
(Valentine 1998).
Pyramid schemes are sometimes confused with Ponzi schemes, 
which share the same underlying logic. The term Ponzi scheme goes back 
Figure 6.34.1 Structure of a multilevel pyramid scheme.
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to Charles Ponzi, an Italian immigrant to the United States who in 1919 ini-
tiated a fraudulent scheme by promising investors that they make massive 
profits by purchasing international reply coupons and redeeming them in 
the US for postage stamps. Ponzi’s scheme was not sustainable over the long 
term, but for a while he managed to deceive his investors by paying early 
ones with the money he collected from later ones, while pocketing millions 
of dollars himself. Eventually, the fraud was detected and the scheme col-
lapsed. In 1920, Ponzi was arrested, charged with fraud and imprisoned.
In both pyramid and Ponzi schemes, existing investors are finan-
cially compensated from the contributions made by new investors. But 
while investors in Ponzi schemes are (misleadingly) informed that they 
are earning returns simply from their investments, participants in pyra-
mid schemes are usually aware that their income is dependent on the 
recruitment of new investors and that they themselves must recruit addi-
tional investors, who will themselves recruit new investors, and so on. 
This may at first sight seem an insignificant detail, but in fact it is impor-
tant because the multilevel structure resulting from the recruitment 
strategy of many pyramid schemes makes them difficult to distinguish 
from a business model that is legal in many parts or the world, that is, 
multilevel marketing (MLM).
MLM is a huge industry. Worldwide, it involves more than one hun-
dred million individuals who represent direct- selling companies. The 
companies built on this model do not have retail outlets for their mainly 
beauty- and health- related products but sell them directly to the cus-
tomer via independent salespeople. The salespeople do not receive a sal-
ary, but are paid a commission on their own sales as well as on the sales 
of any subcontractors they succeed in recruiting. While some direct- sell-
ing companies have been accused of operating illegal pyramid schemes, 
many pyramid schemes claim to be direct- selling companies (Keep and 
Vander Nat 2014).
Pyramid schemes can have devastating consequences, not only for 
investors but also for their families and whole communities. Participation 
may lead to financial ruin because people may invest their live savings 
and even sell their homes in order to invest in the schemes. Moreover, 
the schemes often provoke social conflict because investors are encour-
aged to put pressure on their friends and relatives to recruit them into the 
schemes. When the schemes collapse – as sooner or later they inevitably 
do – questions arise as to who bears responsibility for the disaster. Not 
only the initiators but also those who promoted the schemes locally – and 














Contrary to popular assumptions, participation in pyramid schemes 
is not always related to low education or financial illiteracy. Krige (2012: 
73– 4), for example, draws attention to the fact that in South Africa people 
from various social backgrounds including doctors, lawyers and company 
managers have participated in pyramid schemes that were operated from 
prestigious business addresses and that claimed to be prosperous, global 
business projects legally registered with the authorities. Newly emerging 
market economies appear particularly vulnerable to pyramid and Ponzi 
schemes. For example, a wave of schemes swept the former communist 
countries during their transition from socialism in the 1990s. Some of 
these schemes were huge in scale, such as the Caritas scheme launched 
in Romania in 1992; Caritas affected at least one in every five Romanian 
households and involved sums of money that came close to the coun-
try’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) (Verdery 1996: 174). Similar 
schemes in Albania reached such a scale that their collapse provoked a 
recession in the national economy (Musaraj 2011: 85– 6). Russia’s MMM 
scheme – the most spectacular Ponzi scheme in any post- communist coun-
try so far – attracted 15 million investors over a period of six months; its 
collapse provoked a wave of suicides by despairing investors (Krechetnikov 
2009).
A number of anthropologists have suggested that the proliferation 
of pyramid schemes should be understood in the context of larger global 
developments. Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) argue that while high- risk 
finance and banking have reduced the international financial system to 
a virtual casino, speculation and gambling have emerged as powerful 
sources of value creation. This is an unsettling experience for people both 
at the margins of the global economy and in developed countries, but 
in particular in societies that have recently undergone significant eco-
nomic change. Disrupted lives and increasing inequality lead to feelings 
of exclusion from global prosperity; this may in turn enhance the attrac-
tion of economic structures such as pyramid schemes. Elaborating on 
this argument, Krige (2012) emphasises that risk- taking in the context 
of pyramid schemes not only corresponds to what is happening in global 
financial markets, but also fits a neoliberal discourse that celebrates 
entrepreneurship and self- empowerment.
While the post- socialist surge of pyramid and Ponzi schemes pro-
vides a strong case in point, it is difficult to assess the impact of large- scale 
economic developments on the proliferation of pyramid schemes, in par-
ticular because little is known about their history. The study of pyramid 
schemes might benefit from approaches that take account of histori-
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factors in order to understand the appeal of such schemes in different 
times and different places.




In the context of UK politics, ‘flipping’ refers to the practice of Members 
of Parliament (MPs) manipulating the classification of their second home 
to maximise their parliamentary allowance. By designating a property 
as a second home, money can be claimed for it through Parliament’s 
Additional Costs Allowance (ACA) system, which allows second homes to 
be financed and renovated through the expenses system. The system also 
exempts second- home sales from capital gains tax. In cases of ‘flipping’, 
an MP changes which of their homes is registered as their official ‘second 
home’ with the apparent aim of maximising financial gain.
The etymology of the term ‘flipping’ is the English- language verb 
‘flip’, which can mean to put something into motion, and also to turn 
something over (Oxford English Dictionary 2015). This second meaning 
is implied in the practice of flipping because MPs changed, or ‘flipped’, 
the status of a particular home for the purpose of claiming expenses. 
Flipping also has a specific business definition and refers to the practice 
of purchasing an asset with the intent of quickly reselling the asset at 
a higher price (Depken et al. 2009: 249). This definition is relevant to 
the accusations levelled at some MPs, who were alleged to have made 
substantial profit by selling taxpayer- funded second homes at the market 
rate and exempting any profit from capital gains tax.
The practice of flipping came to prominence with the so- called 
‘expenses scandal’ that broke in 2009. The Daily Telegraph first brought 
the expenses scandal into the public eye and in doing so, focused heav-
ily on flipping as one of the most financially significant and unethical 
abuses of the parliamentary expenses system (The Daily Telegraph 2009). 
As the expenses scandal gained public notoriety by mid- 2009, particu-
lar attention was placed on flipping as one of the most deviant abuses 
of the expenses system. Many high- profile MPs including cabinet minis-
ters were accused of flipping. Perhaps the most high- profile resignation 
to result from the scandal was that of the Secretary for Communities 
and Local Government, Hazel Blears. Blears bought a property in 





















(BBC 2009). Because the property was designated as a second home, it 
was exempt from capital gains tax and mortgage repayments, leading to 
widespread criticism that the property had been bought with the inten-
tion of making a profit by ‘flipping’ it under the second- home allowances 
system (see Figure 6.35.1).
A nuanced analysis of parliamentary procedure is necessary to 
understand how and why flipping has developed as an informal prac-
tice. Historically parliamentarians were from the upper classes of society. 
Because of this, they viewed their job as a civic duty and were opposed to 
sullying their work with the application of a formal salary. Therefore, MPs 
did not receive any kind of pay or allowances until 1911 (Kelso 2009: 330). 
The payment of an ‘allowance’ (a fixed sum that was effectively a salary) 
began in 1911 and enabled increasing numbers of non- aristocratic mem-
bers to enter parliament. In 2015 an MP’s salary was £74,000 (Independent 
Figure 6.35.1 The practice of flipping was intertwined heavily with 
the much larger ‘expenses scandal’. The public outrage in reaction to 
the expenses scandal manifested itself in many forms. This image shows 
a satirical effigy representing the expenses scandal being paraded at 
Lewes Guy Fawkes night.
Source: http:// www.geograph.org.uk/ reuse.php?id=1570166. © Peter 
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Parliamentary Standards Authority 2015) – significantly higher than the 
average UK salary, but significantly lower than that of many senior civil 
servants and comparable professionals. The Additional Costs Allowance 
(ACA) was introduced in 1972, to cover the additional accommodation 
expenses incurred by MPs with constituencies outside of London when 
sitting for long hours in Parliament. From 1985, MPs could claim for 
mortgage repayments under the ACA, which soon gave rise to the phe-
nomenon of MPs outside of London owning properties substantially paid 
for through public funds (Kelso 2009: 331). By 2009, the funds that could 
be drawn on to support second homes stood at £24,222 per annum and 
included mortgage interest payments, furniture, fixtures and utility bills.
As the allowance system relied heavily on trust and was subject to 
light auditing, it became easy to systematically abuse the system. A weak 
system of auditing in combination with the comparatively low rate of pay 
offered to MPs resulted in many MPs viewing the expenses system as a 
supplement to their salary. Consequently, allowances were understood 
as an entitlement and MPs sought to gain financially from practices such 
as flipping. While the media has widely represented flipping as a ‘corrupt’ 
practice, many MPs believed their behaviour was legitimate within the 
context of Parliamentary culture (Kelso 2009: 330– 1).
In spite of the complex systemic origin of flipping, the British 
media has overwhelmingly portrayed the practice as unethical and even 
immoral, with little attention given to the institutional mechanisms that 
have allowed MPs to take advantage of the system. Although the prac-
tice is technically legal and within Parliamentary rules, it is commonly 
presented as a form of corruption. The issue of flipping has further been 
problematised in the context of a perceived decline in the integrity of 
British politics (see cash for access, 2.18 Volume 1). In 2015 public trust 
in politicians stood at just 22 per cent and at the height of the expenses 
scandal it reached an all- time low of 13 per cent (IPSOS Mori 2015a).
Few solutions to eliminate the practice of flipping have been pre-
sented, despite an extensive review of the Parliamentary expenses sys-
tem being promised. To reduce the occurrence of flipping, one solution 
may lie in recognising the resources needed by MPs to serve in a modern 
democracy, as well as the salaries typically available to such individuals 
in other professions. By failing to significantly provide these resources 
on a personal level through a competitive salary and attempting to 
supplement pay through a poorly regulated expenses scheme, flipping 
became a parliamentary norm (Kelso 2009: 335). As a consequence, a 
review has recommended that the salaries of MPs increase while the 
















Parliamentary Standards Authority 2015). However, increasing MPs’ 
salaries is also unpopular with the public. In 2015, 72 per cent of peo-
ple thought that MPs should refuse the 10 per cent pay increase that 
had been recommended by the Independent Parliamentary Standards 
Authority (IPSOS Mori 2015b).
Although a reform process of the expenses system is taking place 
that may curb the continued occurrence of flipping, the damage done 
to Parliament’s reputation by the practice may be difficult to repair. 
Understanding the institutional dynamics that caused flipping to emerge 
is necessary to explain its occurrence and provide solutions for prevent-
ing further abuse of the Parliamentary allowance system.
6.36 Reiderstvo (russia and fsU)
Michael Mesquita
West sands advisory Limited, Uk
The Russian word reiderstvo, derived from the English term ‘corporate 
raiding’, is an attempt by an investor or group of investors to purchase 
a majority or significant minority stake in a publicly traded or privately 
held company. Once a raider acquires a controlling interest, they may 
replace the current management team or implement cost- saving meas-
ures in an attempt to increase the company’s overall share value (Salinger 
2013). Unlike corporate raiding in the West, reiderstvo is designed for 
short- term gain rather than long- term investment, often for the purpose 
of stripping the business of its assets. The acquisition of the company may 
be technically in accordance with the law, but the methods by which the 
transfer is achieved are often semi- legal or outright illegal, including the 
use of physical force or corrupt collusion with state institutions.
Much of the research on reiderstvo focuses primarily on Russia and 
Ukraine; however, this tactic with its various forms can be found in other 
post- Soviet countries, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
While the practice may vary slightly by country, common characteristics 
of reiderstvo include fraud, blackmail, manipulation or distortion of the 
law and actual or threatened physical violence. Reiderstvo is the result 
of uncertainty stemming from the privatisation of formerly state- owned 
industries, corrupt officials, poor corporate governance and an insuffi-
cient criminal code (Firestone 2008). The practice threatens both foreign 
investors and domestic business owners and undermines the develop-
ment of market economies.
Reiderstvo dates back to the late Soviet era when organised crime 
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(this process is referred to in Russian as krysha, which means ‘roof’, see 
6.23 in this volume). Not only did this provide safeguards against busi-
ness rivals and competing criminal groups, but a krysha could also be 
used to attack a competitor’s business (Rojansky 2014). Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent privatisations, raider tac-
tics shifted from small- scale protection and confiscation of minor assets 
to large- scale theft and seizure of state property. For instance, ‘black’ or 
‘bandit’ raiding explicitly involved illegal activity and the use of force or 
intimidation whereby organised criminal groups would send armed men 
to the premises of a business to physically remove assets including cash, 
computers and machinery (Rojansky 2014).
By the late 1990s, raiding had evolved from the use of force to more 
sophisticated methods of coercion, including the manipulation of legal 
and political institutions. Although the use of force could still be pre-
sent, it was commonly applied in conjunction with a variety of legal and 
administrative tools and was often used to facilitate or expedite a judicial 
ruling. Additionally, criminal figures no longer held a monopoly on force; 
private entrepreneurs and government officials actively participated in 
reiderstvo with the assistance of a vast network of judges, law enforce-
ment, lawyers, accountants, journalists and others (Viktorov 2013). 
One of the more profound changes that precipitated the evolution of rei-
derstvo was the active assistance of regional and federal agencies. Such 
connections (through informal networks of influence or bribery) grant 
access to the security services, customs, courts and regulatory agencies, 
which can be manipulated to acquire, for instance, corporate documents 
or favourable judgments. For example, raiders across the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) commonly employ their connections to tax officials to open 
investigations into target companies, which can be used to initiate a state 
or private takeover. Indeed, the use of the state apparatus plays such a 
significant role in corporate raiding that the consensus among academ-
ics is that it is nearly impossible to conduct a raid without government 
assistance (Rochlitz 2014).
Academic research has identified four primary raiding schemes: 
forced bankruptcies/ business crises, shareholder attacks, extortion and 
litigation (Firestone 2008). Although they may vary slightly by country 
or the specific tools applied (i.e. government agencies used), a variation 
of each scheme is present across the FSU. Although conceptually distinct, 
raiders often employ these tactics in conjunction with one another rather 
than as separate raiding tools.
The practice of ‘bankruptcy to order’ (see zakaznoe bankrotstvo, 

























early 2000s at a time when Russia’s bankruptcy laws were ineffective. 
However, similar schemes are still used today, either to force a com-
pany into bankruptcy to enable a raider to acquire it, or to drive down 
the share price of a given company for a raider to purchase a stake at a 
significantly lower cost. One tactic involves a state agency (such as the 
tax police or environmental regulator) affiliated with the raider issuing 
fines or penalties, which may either increase the cost of doing business 
or lead to bankruptcy. For example, between 2005 and 2009 Russian 
law enforcement agencies opened an investigation into the mobile 
phone retailer Yevroset, accusing the company of illegally importing 
mobile phones and extortion. Prior to the investigation, Yevroset was in 
discussion to sell the company for an estimated $3– 5 billion; however, 
following the investigation, the company was sold for approximately a 
third of its original value (Moscow Times 2010). A government agency 
cancelling a state contract that the business relies on has a similar effect. 
Finally, the media may be used in a ‘black PR’ campaign (see chernukha, 
8.5 in this volume). A media outlet (likely owned by the raider) accuses 
the company of various violations damaging to its reputation, again 
with the purpose of driving down the company’s share price or pushing 
it into bankruptcy. This tactic was used by Ukrainian oligarchs to seize 
a refined foods and oil company based in Dnipropetrovsk in the mid- 
2000s (Rojansky 2014).
The tactic of corporate or minority shareholder attacks is an attempt 
to seize a business from within, typically through the manipulation of 
shareholder rights. In this case, a raider buys out a minority shareholder 
(possibly through bribery or intimidation) to acquire a small stake in a 
target company. As a shareholder, a raider gains access to company regis-
ters that can then be manipulated or used to investigate any weakness in 
the company’s legal status (questionable privatisation deals, licence dis-
crepancies, etc.). If discovered, the raider files a criminal case, which may 
lead to bankruptcy proceedings or a business crisis as described above. 
Another tactic is the continual acquisition of minority shares to influence 
board decisions. Once a raider is in this position, they may convene a 
shareholders’ meeting but systematically exclude other shareholders. 
This can be achieved by holding the meeting in a remote location, or sim-
ply by arranging the meeting at short notice. Once a meeting is convened 
the raider can replace the board with more favourable allies, or sell off 
the company’s assets to third parties (often affiliated with the raider). 
A  shareholders’ meeting may also provide opportunities to issue more 
shares (sold to the raider or an affiliated party), effectively diluting the 




















6.36 reiderStvo (rUssIa and fsU)
In the ‘extortion’ scenario, a raider or affiliated party disguised as 
an investor approaches a company, suggesting a new business partner-
ship. If the company refuses, the raider leverages contacts in state agen-
cies to apply pressure on the company by increasing the cost of doing 
businesses (such as fines, arbitrary investigations, environmental viola-
tions, etc.). The company is then compelled to sell a stake in the com-
pany for the attacks to stop. This process is repeated until it becomes too 
costly for the company to continue; thus it is forced to sell to the raider. 
Extortion may also be used to guarantee the target company receives 
the necessary state licences or government contracts to operate. Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara, who allegedly received 
bribes from Russian and Finnish telecoms companies, reportedly used 
this practice to exact bribes and increase her stake in the local telecoms 
market (Patrucic 2015).
Courts play an integral role in the raiding process and are com-
monly used to legitimise forged documents, freeze company assets and 
accounts, or sanction the use of private security forces (owned by the 
raider) to enforce court orders. Legal systems across the FSU tend to suf-
fer from institutional weakness and are highly susceptible to corruption 
and elite interests. This provides opportunities for raiders to manipu-
late the courts and use litigation schemes to take control of companies. 
Judges may be bribed or directed to rule on false criminal charges against 
the management or owners of a target company. The victim is then 
arrested, but can buy their freedom by selling the company at a reduced 
price. Alternatively, a raider may employ the ‘shareholder scheme’ to 
seize company assets while the victim is in custody. According to the 
Moscow- based non-governmental organisation (NGO) Liberal Mission 
Foundation (Open Democracy 2013), between 2000 and 2010 over 15 
per cent of all Russian business entities were subject to groundless crimi-
nal proceedings, of which over 100,000 resulted in convictions.
While intimidation and violence has decreased since the early 
2000s, corporate raiders may still hire private security firms to seize a 
company building or headquarters based on an injunction that has been 
granted by a bribed judicial figure. While any corporate raid is usually 
reliant on the support of a legal or political actor, intimidation is still used 
to facilitate or expedite the process. A recent public instance of hiring 
armed men to seize company property was the case of Ukrainian oligarch 
and former Mayor of Dnepropetrovsk, Ihor Kolomoysky, in March 2015. 
Following the passing of legislation that limited his influence over state 
oil company UkrTransNafta, Kolomoysky, who owned a minority stake 



















was unsuccessful; Kolomoysky was unable to exert greater influence 
over the company and lost his position in Dnepropetrovsk shortly after. 
Nonetheless, the event highlights how intimidation can still be a useful 
tool for corporate raiding.
6.37 Zakaznoe bankrotstvo (russia)
yuko adachi
sophia University, tokyo, Japan
In general, bankruptcy proceedings usually function as a mechanism for 
liquidating or rescuing distressed companies and protecting creditors’ 
rights. However, in post- Soviet Russia, bankruptcy proceedings have 
often served as a mechanism to enable hostile takeovers, or as a means 
of attacking a rival company (see reiderstvo, 6.36 in this volume). The 
manipulation of bankruptcy proceedings is known as zakaznoe bank-
rotstvo, which literally means ‘bankruptcy to order’: zakaznoe is the 
adjectival form of the noun zakaz, which means an order, contract or 
commission. Zakaznoe bankrotstvo is made possible through the exploi-
tation of legal weaknesses and informal networks. One expert noted in 
2004 that, ‘[b] ankruptcies “to order” have become a major business, 
often combining strategies for exploiting weaknesses in the law with 
political intervention and outright corruption’ (Tompson 2004: 1).
The practice became widespread in the late 1990s and was closely 
linked to the Federal law ‘On insolvency (bankruptcy)’ of 1998 (hence-
forth ‘the bankruptcy law’). The number of bankruptcy cases soared after 
the 1998 law came into force, rising from 4,200 in January 1998, to 
15,200 in January 2000, and 52,500 in January 2002 (Simachev 2003). 
According to the Federal Service for Financial Rehabilitation (FSFO), 
which had been responsible for supervising bankruptcy proceedings, 
in approximately 30 per cent of cases creditors were more interested in 
bringing about a change of ownership in a particular company than in 
recovering the debt (Golovachev 2001).
One of the most high- profile cases of zakaznoe bankrotstvo was 
that of Chernogorneft, a subsidiary of the oil company Sidanko, which 
was artificially bankrupted in 1999 by Tyumen Oil Company (TNK), 
another major Russian oil company at the time. TNK acquired debts from 
Chernogorneft’s creditors and instigated bankruptcy proceedings to 
obtain control over the company. BP Amoco (which had paid $571 mil-
lion USD for a 10 per cent share of Sidanko in 1997) along with other 
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of intimidating judges and journalists to pull off the successful raid (The 
Economist 1999).
The main reason the 1998 version of the bankruptcy law triggered 
the practice of zakaznoe bankrotstvo is that it set a very low threshold for 
filing a bankruptcy suit. For example, a bankruptcy proceeding could be 
initiated against a company if the outstanding debts exceeded an amount 
500 times the minimum wage (i.e. a relatively small sum in the context 
of corporate finance), and if the company failed to meet payment obliga-
tions within three months of the due date. In addition to overdue debts, 
bankruptcy proceedings could be started on the basis of tax arrears or 
unpaid utility bills. The 1998 law was intended to rectify the defects of 
the 1992 law, which allowed debtor companies to continue accumulating 
debts and unpaid bills. However, the 1998 law set the threshold so low 
that not only truly insolvent companies but also those capable of servic-
ing debts were forced into bankruptcy (Tavernise 2000; Volkov 2004).
Another weakness of the 1998 bankruptcy law was that it granted 
court- appointed (temporary and external) administrators considerable 
power over bankruptcy proceedings. Once bankruptcy proceedings were 
started, a temporary administrator took charge of the debtor company. 
The creditors who had filed the application for the initiation of bank-
ruptcy proceedings often influenced temporary administrator appoint-
ments, effectively installing someone to serve their own interests rather 
than the interests of the company subject to the bankruptcy proceedings. 
For example, in the aforementioned Chernogorneft case, the adminis-
trator was allegedly allied to TNK (The Economist 1999). The temporary 
administrator had the authority to grant or withhold approval for many 
of the transactions carried out by incumbent managers, including dis-
posal of assets or taking out of loans. They also had the power to control 
creditors’ registers, which enabled them to exclude or undervalue the 
claims of some legitimate but ‘undesirable’ creditors, and to inflate the 
claims of others. In addition, the temporary administrator was respon-
sible for organising the first creditors’ meeting where it was decided 
whether to appoint an external administrator, or whether company liq-
uidation and asset disposal should be initiated immediately. If the deci-
sion favoured external administration, then the external administrator 
candidate would be decided at this meeting (Oda 2001; Tompson 2004; 
Volkov 2004). The external administrator, who was given substantial 
authority, would then take over the management of the entire bank-
ruptcy process, with the director of the debtor company removed from 





















administrator had the power to make changes to the company’s manage-
ment, to dispose of company assets and to take control of the debtor com-
pany’s financial flow (Volkov 2004).
When launching a hostile takeover or an attack against a bankrupt 
debtor, the key to success was obtaining as much debt as possible as a 
creditor and then appointing ‘one’s own’ (svoi) person as bankruptcy 
administrator. Through this bankruptcy administrator, a creditor could 
control the entire procedure. If a creditor could manage to appoint a 
closely connected administrator, bankruptcy was a cheaper and some-
times more reliable means of company takeover than obtaining shares 
in that company (Afanasiev 1998; Bashkinskas 2000). For this practice 
to succeed, the initiating party was required to coordinate and mobilise 
an informal network of various actors such as external administrators, 
courts, the regional governor, the regional representative of the FSFO, 
law enforcement agencies, etc. (Novaya gazeta 2000). Also, some alliance 
was required between the court- appointed bankruptcy administrator and 
the judges, as well as some political intervention for its enforcement. The 
cooperation of – or at least non- interference from – regional authorities 
was important in bankruptcy proceedings, since arbitration courts were 
often dependent on the regional authorities.
The 1998 bankruptcy law was amended in 2002 in an attempt to 
bring to an end the excesses of zakaznoe bankrotstvo. The amendment 
raised the threshold to initiate bankruptcy and made it more difficult 
for creditors to apply for bankruptcy proceedings. Moreover, the powers 
granted to bankruptcy administrators, which had been seriously abused 
through the practice of zakaznoe bankrotstvo, were also substantially 
curbed. For example, the administrator’s power to dispose of debtors’ 
assets was brought under the strict control of the creditors’ meeting (Oda 
2007). Following the 2002 amendment, the previously typical phenom-
enon of using or ‘ordering’ a particular administrator in launching zaka-
znoe bankrotsvo became less common (Iukhin 2006).
Although the practice of zakaznoe bankrotsvo has decreased fol-
lowing the 2002 amendment of the bankruptcy law, it has not been 
eliminated altogether. For example, the tactic was used since to bring 
about the de facto privatisation of state- owned vodka producers. One 
example concerns the vodka factory Yarich, which in 2006 (when it 
was owned by the federal state alcohol holding company Rosspirtprom) 
took out a 10 million rouble bank loan, with its property as the guar-
antee. The debt was purchased by the trading house SDS- Alko in April 
2009, which then demanded its repayment. When Yarich was una-
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Yarich. A few months later a new company began operating at the Yarich 
site, owned by SDS- Alko. The case was described by national newspaper 
Vedomosti as ‘a clear example of how bankruptcy is becoming an instru-
ment of privatisation’ (Bailey 2018).
In terms of linguistic usage, it seems that the term zakaznoe bank-
rotstvo has become less common since the early 2000s. This may be 
partly due to the practice itself becoming less widespread since the 
bankruptcy law was tightened up in 2002, but also due to the term 
reiderstvo gaining wider currency from this time (Sakwa 2011; Sagova 
2012). Reiderstvo is a broader concept than zakaznoe bankrotstvo, with 
its meaning encompassing a range of informal tactics used to execute 
hostile takeovers. Zakaznoe bankrotstvo is one of those tactics, but 
others can include the use of contacts in the judiciary, in state agen-
cies (who can, for example, impose fines or revoke licences), and even 
physical force and violence.
6.38 Dangou/ Dango (Japan)
shuwei Qian
UCL, Uk
Dangou (sometimes spelt Dango) consists of two Japanese kanji char-
acters, dan meaning ‘dialogue’ and gou meaning harmony. Originally, 
the meaning of dangou was consultation or conference, but the mean-
ing has changed and come to refer to a practice of cartel – a mutually 
agreed position to pre determine the successful bid for a contract within 
the Japanese procurement system. Thus, its equivalent English term is 
bid rigging.
Dangou has a long history dating back 500 years to the Edo era, 
and as such it may be argued there is no other case in the world that has 
such a pervasive and codified system as is found today in the Japanese 
public construction system (Woodall 1993: 297). Japanese citizens were 
so accustomed to this practice that it was not until after the end of the 
Second World War, with America’s intervention in the Japanese domes-
tic market, that scandals relating to dangou were publicly acknowledged 
and reported by the press (McMillan 1991: 201).
One illustration of how dangou practices work is found in the exam-
ple from the late 1980s of an American company who decided to sub-
mit a bid for constructing toilet facilities at the US Yokosuka Navy Base. 
The American company participated in the bidding process, unaware 
that over 100 national and local contracting projects were in place at the 
















surprised that all the other companies bid at highly inflated levels and 
that there was little variation in the levels at which they bid. As the only 
foreign bidding company they won the contract with a reasonable bid 
price, which was half that of the bids made by the Japanese companies. 
Without the American company’s bid, the Yokosuka ‘teahouse group’ (an 
informal network of Japanese contractors) would have won the contract, 
but more importantly, at a highly inflated price. After the bidding pro-
cess was concluded, the Americans overheard the Japanese complaining 
about letting a gaijin (an outsider) interfere with their internal rules of 
bidding. The Americans feared harassment and vandalism by the losing 
group, but some months later a raid on the offices of the Yokosuka ‘tea-
house’ group, known as the ‘Star Friendship Club’, produced evidence of 
dangou and endemic bid rigging.
Over time, dangou has been viewed as part of the unique political 
culture and history of Japan. For this reason the Japanese mode of doing 
business is simply explained to Westerners by the word ‘dangou shakai’ 
meaning ‘society’. In the first instance it is necessary to explain dangou’s 
embedment with Japanese society throughout history as part of the ‘iron 
triangle’. The ‘iron triangle’ here represents the relationship between pol-
iticians, government bureaucrats and business. The triangle functions in 
the following way: businesses take it in turns to win competitive bids, oper-
ating from a position of strength because they are armed with the prior 
knowledge of the ceiling price of the bid, which has been leaked to them 
in advance by government bureaucrats. In return for the information, the 
bureaucrats are guaranteed a high- profile position in the company after 
retirement. Meanwhile the politicians who are responsible for the pub-
lic construction programmes receive a kickback (Black 2004: 603). The 
retired bureaucrats are called amakudari (‘descents from heaven’). This 
‘iron triangle’ has its origins in ancient Japanese culture, but was also 
influenced by behaviours found in the centralised Soviet style of manage-
ment (Ross 1994: 64). A second reason for dangou’s popularity is the fact 
that with the exception of big firms and tycoons, the major part of the 
Japanese economy consists of small and medium- sized businesses – often 
family businesses – that have endured from one generation to another. 
Apart from being part of a personal network, dangou embodies a benign 
practice for the purpose of helping small firms survive harsh competition 
from business giants. Another contributory factor that explains dangou’s 
unshakable position in society is the age of globalisation. In the process 
of globalisation, traditional Japanese businesses perceive themselves to 
be under constant attack from international corporations, thus practising 




















6.38 dangou/dango  ( JaPan)
of dangou participants, dangou has saved the Japanese economic envi-
ronment from being polluted by outsiders and prevented unpredictabil-
ity and instability in the global market (Ross 1994: 65).
Considered from the socio-economic perspective, dangou can be 
regarded as a rational corollary of the specific economic environment of 
post-war Japan (Woodall 1993: 298). First, as understood literally, the 
process of dangou requires consultations taking place among partici-
pants. The optimum number of dialogues is considered to be N(N- 1)/ 2. 
Since the tendering system designed by the procurement department 
of government normally regulates the number (N) of participants in the 
bidding pool to a range from 10 to 12, the actual number of dialogues 
taking place in the process of dangou is limited to a manageable number 
(Woodall 1993: 301). Second, as mentioned above, this tendering system 
is designed by the government to guarantee the quality of participating 
businesses, and to provide a natural barrier against opportunistic outsid-
ers who might be attracted by the potential profit created in the collusion 
process (Woodall 1993: 302). Third, to stabilise the illegal group behav-
iour, mechanisms of punishment were developed. Thus to ensure loyalty, 
if one of the conspirators broke the dangou (dangou yaburi), they were 
automatically ostracised from all trade associations as they had lost the 
confidence of the group (Woodall 1993: 303). These informal devices 
elicit compliance since in Japanese society no business can survive with-
out close associations, nor survive the loss of social capital. Another layer 
of protection for dangou participants are the disincentives for whistle- 
blowing (Woodall 1993: 303– 4). In Japan, a pension is paid according to 
one’s longest length of service. Hence, no one can afford to change jobs 
frequently or to suffer the loss of their social network; therefore the price 
of opportunistic bidding is too high.
Dangou not only inflates government expenses, causing government 
deficit and wasting taxpayers’ money, but it also avoids fair competition 
and encourages particularism and corruption, which could eventually 
hurt the development of the Japanese economy. It is estimated that dan-
gou is responsible for inflating government expenditure by between 30 
per cent and 50 per cent (McMillan 1991: 209). The inflation of govern-
ment expenses can be used as one of the measurements of dangou. The 
second method of estimating the extent of the practice is to evaluate the 
number of scandals reported in the media. Third, it is possible to estimate 
levels of dangou according to the extent of legislation passed to prohibit 
this crime. Since the legal reforms of the early 2000s, laws such as the 
anti- monopoly law, and a law against kansei dangou have been passed, yet 

















and Park 2014: 144). Research on dangou also heavily depends on the 
findings of investigations of suspect companies and subsequent convic-
tions, but the networks of participants are extremely hard to break.
Another informal practice related to dangou is ten no koe (‘voice 
from heaven’). This term is used as a metaphor to describe a practice 
whereby before a bidding process starts, a government official claims to 
have heard a voice from the Gods urging him to use a particular company. 
As a result the bidding process is ignored and the ‘recommended’ com-
pany is automatically appointed (Logan 1994). On one hand, the absence 
of any competition makes this informal practice even more suspect than 
dangou. On the other hand, on certain occasions it may be explicable, 
for instance, if specific technologies, skills or patents are required that 
only the chosen company is in possession of, it may be considered ethi-
cal. However in practice, ten no koe is usually seen as an excuse invoked 
when the dangou process has broken down and an emergency solution is 
needed to obtain the ‘right’ result.
In China, dangou is known as Weibiao. Literally, it means ‘bidding 
being surrounded by companies in a union’. Weibiao and dangou share 
cultural similarities. Thanks to the same influences of Confucian culture, 
the tradition of gift- giving is widely used not only in weibiao but also in 
the infamous informal practice called guanxi (see 1.12 Volume 1). The 
starting point of gift- giving, in both cases, is to maintain and strengthen 
jinmyaku (Japanese for personal networks, see 1.18 Volume 1), which 
is directly translated as guanxi in Mandarin. However, there are signifi-
cant differences between the two informal practices of weibiao and dan-
gou, which may be explained by crucial differences in the economic and 
political environment of the two countries. First, although both China 
and Japan passed anti- bid- rigging laws, in neither case has the legisla-
tion made a significant difference in prohibiting the practices. Yet, the 
problem of the Japanese anti- Kansei dangou law is in its enforcement, 
while the problem in China is that the law itself is less detailed, leav-
ing loopholes for people to continue practising weibiao (Weishaar 2010: 
409). Second, as a socialist country, a huge percentage of the Chinese 
economy is taken by state- run businesses. However, state- run companies 
are eliminated from the anti- Weibiao law thanks to complicated meas-
ures in force to protect national reserves. As a consequence, this encour-
ages a certain level of bid rigging because state- run companies cannot be 
prosecuted (Jingshifaxun 2009). In the Chinese case, bid rigging often 
happens in less- developed states along with other traditional informal 
practices, while in Japan the practice occurs within a well- established, 
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although defined as illegal by the government and outdated, dangou is 
both traditional and habitual within the Japanese economy.
6.39 Vzyatkoemkost’ (russia)
Christian timm
Private University Göttingen/ German Institute for International 
and security affairs, Germany
Vzyatkoemkost’ expresses, in a narrow sense, the potential of a piece of 
legislation to create opportunities for bribery. In a broader sense, it refers 
to a legal framework that grants state officials discretionary power to 
extort bribes, obedience or other forms of benefits. The term ‘corrupto-
genic potential’ has been given as the standard translation of vzyatkoem-
kost’ into English (akademik.ru 2011). This Russian neologism is made 
up of two words: vzyatka for ‘bribe’ and emkost’ for ‘capacity’ or ‘poten-
tial’. The term first appeared in 1996 in an article in a leading Russian 
newspaper on ways in which regulations imposed on car drivers might 
be exploited as an opportunity to demand bribes (Sokolov 1996). It was 
picked up again in another journal article, this time in 2000, which gen-
erated considerable interest and contributed significantly to the term’s 
popularity (Privalov 2000). In 2003 and 2005, the term found its way 
into two Russian dictionaries (Mochenov et al. 2003; Pogrebnyak 2005).
Law is commonly seen as a power resource because of its ability 
to constrain options for action by making certain behaviour more costly 
than others. Vzyatkoemkost’, by contrast, relies on another characteris-
tic of the law: the capacity to create or prevent predictability. Following 
the basic definition of law as ‘a prediction of ... what an official will do’ 
(D’Amato ‎1983), the quality of legislation determines the predictability 
vis- à- vis the discretion of official action. The more discretion is granted to 
state officials and the less predictable the law becomes, the more citizens 
are forced to seek predictability by informal means. Bribery is an infor-
mal answer to administrative discretion created by formal law.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Anticorruption 
Assessment Guide identifies four major legal corruptogenic sources (UNDP 
2013). First, if a law is vaguely formulated, that allows officials flexibility both 
in evaluating the legal facts and in deciding what actions to take with respect 
to procedure, term, sequence, delegation and punishment. A second source 
is legal gaps within a law or with regard to other regulations that may emerge 
as a result of the non- existence, non- enactment or invalidation of a law. 
Third, conflicts of rules within one law or with other laws may also prevent 

















discretion. Fourth, the corruptogenic potential increases with the admin-
istrative obligations of a law, which may establish an undue burden or 
even make law- abiding behaviour impossible. In addition, a fifth source 
of vzyatkoemkost’ may arise from the volatility of law, which occurs when 
regulations are frequently changed. In all instances, the specific character 
of legislation may increase the costs of compliance or prevent law- abiding 
behaviour and thereby enhance the discretionary power of state officials. 
Vzyatkoemkost’ may emerge unintentionally as the result of a rushed or 
careless legislative process; it may then be maintained once the corrupto-
genic potential of the law becomes apparent. Vzyatkoemkost’ may also be 
created deliberately by a targeted interference in the law- making process.
Vzyatkoemkost’ is not only relevant for the extraction of bribes 
and kickbacks (otkat, see 6.29 in this volume) but is also constituent 
with the formation of a new type of political order. In the Soviet period, 
partly repressive legislation was applied selectively and demonstratively. 
The deterrence function of law served to ensure obedience within the 
Communist Party and the state, thereby maintaining the given political 
order. In the post- Soviet era, by contrast, a political order emerged that 
was based on the irresolvable contradiction between formal rules and 
informal practices. Vzyatkoemkost’ was its central institutional prerequi-
site. Officials were equipped with sufficient legal opportunities to collect 
bribes, which had to be shared with superiors. The corruption pyramids 
created thereby extended through all levels of the state administration.
The prevention of legal predictability helps to establish regular 
routines and patterns of informal interaction between state and soci-
ety. Vzyatkoemkost’ may become a dominant feature to the extent that 
the intended content of a law is virtually eliminated and the distinction 
between tax, fine and bribe becomes blurred (Paneyakh 2008). In such 
cases, a law may become a mere shell facilitating the emergence of spe-
cific informal institutions and practices. Another crucial component was 
that the collection of bribes was comprehensively monitored. The data 
gathered (kompromat, see 8.5 in this volume) on wrongdoings could 
be used against state officials at any time, thereby ensuring their loyalty 
to the regime. The result was de facto criminalisation of wide ranges of 
state and society. Darden has called this form of political domination, 
which was paradigmatic for the first decade of the post- Soviet transition, 
a ‘blackmail state’ (Darden 2001). Vzyatkoemkost’ contributed to this 
fragile socio- political order in two ways: first, it turned the state into a 
vehicle for the extraction and distribution of rents (state capture), and 



















The character and purpose of applied legal vzyatkoemkost’ may 
change over time. As more capable and assertive states began to emerge 
in the post- Soviet space, the law’s corruptogenic potential did not 
become redundant but helped to facilitate ‘business capture’, that is, 
the informal or de facto takeover of firms and markets by political elites. 
This provided politics with a powerful informal management instru-
ment for steering private investments in areas of national interest.
Changes in the legal framework may also affect the functioning of 
vzyatkoemkost’. Russia, for example, introduced anti-corruption legisla-
tion in 2009, which among other measures established a parliamentary 
commission to review draft laws for their corruptogenic potential. Law 
has become increasingly important for the efficient organisation of state 
administration and promotion of economic development.
Increasing juridification of state– society relations and greater reli-
ance on legislation does not necessarily, however, lead to the develop-
ment of the rule of law. In fact, greater transparency and availability 
of information for state officials may increase the likelihood that entre-
preneurs will be targeted by state officials (Paneyakh 2008). Moreover, 
given the prevalence of vzyatkoemkost’ at regional and secondary law 
level, increased stress on formal rules increases the conflict between for-
mal rules and informal practices. In this respect, it may turn law and its 
corruptogenic potential from a background facilitator of informal rela-
tions into a more direct threat for political, economic and societal entre-
preneurs, since wrongdoing becomes more likely to be punished.
Various taxonomies have been developed (Tihomirov 2004; 
Krasnov et al. 2005; UNDP 2013) to analyse the vzyatkoemkost’ of legal 
regulations. The specific extortion potential depends on various factors 
such as the type and density of relevant corruptogenic rules, the scale 
of the penalties imposed, the degree of independence (or lack of it) of 
the judiciary, and the financial dimension of the respective legal area.
Conclusion: methods of researching part- time crime 
and illicit economic activity
Gerald Mars
UCL, Uk
‘Part- time crime’ is an intrinsically ambivalent concept. Many occu-
pational practices that are defined as illegal by the wider society are 
accepted as legitimate within most occupations. Pilferage or ‘fiddling’ 


















feature of employment ever since employment was invented, and is 
generally regarded as ‘different’ from regular crime (Ditton 1977). An 
Egyptian papyrus of 1500 BC records a collective scam at a Pharaoh’s 
farm (Peet 1924) that closely mirrors the ‘firm within a firm’ practices 
recorded in a Soviet biscuit factory in the 1980s, where output pro-
duced above the central plan was sold on to the private market (Mars 
and Altman 1987a, 1987b). The organised pilferage and distribution 
of cargo from Newfoundland docks (Mars 1974) echoed the pilferage 
from London’s docks in the eighteenth century. Nor are the professions 
immune. Charles Dickens’ notorious, albeit fictional, account of legal 
delays and the profits amassed by independent nineteenth- century 
lawyers can still be found today (Business Insider 2015). Such practices 
are evident to all who hire employees paid by time. Delivery people are 
similarly prone, while garage servicing is notorious in this respect. And 
everyone has had experience of ‘Oops, sorry!’ short- changing cashiers.
These occupations have not been identified randomly: they typify 
wide differences within a field long treated as homogeneous. Given their 
variation, one cannot apply the same research methods. Methods devel-
oped to examine, say, regular pilferage in the docks, or irregular ‘leakage’ 
from a factory, are not suitable to examine the deviance of roundsmen, 
bankers or shop assistants. These varying occupations, however, all offer 
additional illicit earnings and often the building and maintaining of 
social bonds inside and outside the workplace. And all foster ambiguities 
as both a shield and a means to their ends.
Because the wider society and the law classify illicit earnings as 
deviant and often as criminal, practising fiddlers naturally attempt to con-
ceal their activities. To determine their likely incidence however, it is often 
useful to adopt a basic police mantra to identify if and how a particular 
situation reveals three characteristics: whether it offers the incumbents 
the MEANS, the METHODS and the OPPORTUNITY to practise illicitly. 
Since all illicit activity is subject to moral assessments, a prime 
requirement for any researcher is to suspend (without necessarily aban-
doning) their own moral standpoint: impartial understandings can be 
achieved only if, like anthropologists, one lays one’s own values aside. Only 
then can the field be assessed from the standpoint of the actors involved.
The next requirement is access to a system of classification with cat-
egories that are both exclusive and exhaustive and that therefore allow 
effective comparison. Alternative systems of classifying jobs or their 
fiddles based on income, class, skill or prestige have not satisfied these 
requirements. But without classification and comparison there can be no 














devised by the anthropologist Mary Douglas and originally termed ‘Grid/ 
Group Theory’ (Douglas 1970). As applied to the study of work, it posits 
four archetypal (‘ideal type’) work cultures based on how jobs are organ-
ised (Mars 1982/ 1994).
The allocation to work cultures is determined by two structural 
principles – rules and relationships – considered here as continua. The 
first, ‘Grid’, assesses jobs where constraining rules are imposed on incum-
bents at one extreme (strong grid) to where, at the other, an absence 
of rules (weak grid) permits a degree of worker autonomy. The second, 
‘Group’, assesses the degree to which workers are integrated into a group, 
as part of a team or gang (strong group) at one extreme and extends to 
whether they work in isolation (weak group), at the other.
These two continua, when arranged as a 2 x 2 matrix, provide four 
archetypal cultures – sometimes termed ‘ways of life’ (see Figure 6.40.1). 














































values, attitudes and behaviours, though not their individual psychologi-
cal orientations. This is a sociological, not a psychological, theory.
A. Hawks. Where constraints are minimal and opportunities are ‘up 
for grabs’, Hawks (weak group and weak grid) operate competitively and 
independently. Here we find entrepreneurs, those in innovative, autono-
mous, risk- taking jobs, and employees operating in ‘their own’ territories. 
Here too are the time- based fiddles of professionals: lawyers, accountants 
and industrial consultants who not infrequently fiddle to excess. Hawk 
fiddlers are prone to ‘bending time’ and they similarly ‘bend’ rules, prece-
dents and sometimes laws. Seeking to extend their networks is a constant 
activity with a tendency to impress via conspicuous consumption and 
fashion. Their perceptions and strategies are short- term: bonus- earning 
bankers are archetypal Hawks (Mars 2013b: ch. 9). Their fiddled incomes 
tend to provide a high and expected proportion of their total rewards. 
And, since archetypal Hawks are not subject to constraints from groups 
of colleagues or historical precedence, they are likely to follow existing 
trends to excess. For example, they are unlikely to anticipate changes 
in market conditions or economic downturns. Sources of data on Hawk 
fiddlers, which vary widely according to the context, include whistle- 
blowing by former employees, media reporting and the results of official 
enquiries. Active fiddlers are, of course, unlikely to provide data. Cross- 
checking data is essential.
B. Donkeys (weak group and strong grid) are employed in highly 
constrained and isolating jobs such as in call centres, and include many 
of those who work from home and some shop assistants. Lacking group 
support they tend to be passive yet capable of short- changing and occa-
sional excessive pilfering. As one headline put it: ‘Shop Assistant’s Home 
was an Aladdin’s Cave – Police Report’. If the grid is strongly asserted – 
especially when mechanised – donkeys may well respond with sabotage.
There is normally no shortage of donkey data from people who 
have worked or continue to work. Again, cross- checking is valuable. In 
‘one- to- one’ service dealings, such as customer to sales assistant, close 
observation is a fruitful data source. Obscured measuring scales and 
till windows placed out of sight can be a sign – appear careless and look 
around. If male, shop where the usual customers are female. Check the 
change against the receipt (if any). Often, the control systems that might 
be effective are not in place, either because of the expense of installation 
or as a result of managerial collusion to incentivise workers and allow the 
cost to be borne by the customers. Incentive coupons issued by stores and 
petrol stations are not infrequently retained by staff to be later redeemed 






















long been the basis of illicit activity, and is so even more with increasing 
globalisation and the complexity of technological developments.
C. Wolf packs (strong group and strong grid) are noted for hierar-
chic divisions of labour that coordinate different functions to a common 
task and that typically ‘adapt’ legitimate work roles to illegitimate ends. 
Mutual support and loyalties are firm and consistent. Wolf packs were 
found among the ancient Egyptian farm scammers, eighteenth- century 
dockworkers and Soviet factory managers (who in that case were allied 
to Hawks). Wolf packs typically exert collective controls over their mem-
bers – especially over the amounts pilfered – and apply sanctions against 
those who exceed them. But they also work to maintain minimum levels. In 
effect, Wolf packs operate a quantitative morality: taking above the speci-
fied limits is unjustified and sanctioned, while achieving lower levels is 
justified and creditable. The effective maintenance of this morality reflects 
adherence to long- time perceptions, overall risk  aversion and a clear dis-
tinction between insiders and outsiders. Among Wolf packs there is usually 
a strong intermesh of work and community that supplies the basis of team 
recruitment, moral support and a conduit for fiddled goods (Mars 2013a).
Wolf packs are hard to research. The intricacies of their internal 
controls; the complexity of intermeshing roles and the created ambi-
guities that conceal their deviance; their means of recruitment and typi-
cally the tightness of their boundaries against outsiders, all tend to limit 
communication with them. Ideally, participant observation would be 
the most effective research method. But, in the absence of a researcher 
who has actually worked in the context, the next most effective method 
is to use, as informants, former Wolf- pack members who preferably have 
physically moved from the community (Mars and Altman 1987a, 1987b). 
Retrospective studies are easier, and people tend to talk more readily and 
to be less apprehensive of publication when there have been subsequent 
changes in technology or organisation. Approaching the subject obliquely, 
without a focus on deviance, identifying several informants to cross- check 
accounts, and, if possible, raising examples of personal experience as a 
participant in occupational deviance can help build rapport.
D. Vultures (strong group and weak grid) are found where individ-
uals fiddle for themselves but are subject to the constraints of a common 
employer. Examples are roundsmen, garage mechanics and waiting staff 
in hotels and restaurants. Like real- life vultures, they work together, but 
are independently competitive ‘at the kill’. They value group involve-
ment and embrace egalitarianism, but reject group- sourced constraints 
and do not validate arbitrators – thereby contributing to group instabil-























strong than those of Wolf packs, their ability to control recruitment and 
maintain group controls is weaker. Their labour turnover tends to be 
higher – many Vulture jobs are seasonal – so bonding within Vulture 
groups is less intense and their defences against outsiders are weaker. 
Because Vulture groups, unlike Wolf packs, are unable to sustain any 
group- based consistency about levels of pilferage, there is a tendency 
for them to agree collusive levels with overall supervisors who often use 
access to fiddles to reward extra effort differentially. This partiality fur-
ther weakens the consistency and stability of Vulture groups. Suggested 
research methods for this category include participant observation – by 
far the most effective research method – or finding informants. Provisos 
about the need for multiple informants and the cross- checking of data 
stand.
Ambiguity is often fostered where a good’s quality, quantity or exact 
category can readily be ‘fudged’. It is not easy to compute the quantity of 
drink consumed at a wedding, the extent of a car’s servicing, the number 
of bricks delivered to a site, the thickness of concrete once it is laid, the 
amount of copper in a building or the gauge of zinc on a roof. Since these 
fiddles often require collective, co operative support they are the particular 
but not the exclusive province of Wolf packs or Vulture groups. At busy 
times, especially in a sellers’ market, ambiguity is likely to be deliberately 
increased – as at the New Year sales and when drinks are served during 
intervals at crowded theatre bars. This is when price lists go missing; cash- 
register windows become obscured and short- changing increases.
Globalisation – the free and rapid movement of capital, labour and 
ideas – facilitates increase in the centralisation and scale of enterprises. 
Managers grow increasingly distant from their workforces both socially 
and physically. Despite central controls, planned targeting, transparency 
and accountability measures, local managers enjoy greater autonomy and 
this in turn facilitates Wolf pack and Hawk fiddles. Through larger and 
more ‘distant’ units, they gain not only economies of scale, but also 
greater anonymity, lack of worker identification and more opportunities 
for theft (Smigel 1956). Because of the increased competition, globalisa-
tion involves, it also encourages an extension of information technology 
(IT) and technical complexity. 
Ambiguity is fostered when gaps widen between levels of practi-
tioner expertise and the relative ignorance of customers. John Adams 
(2000) has pointed to the ‘hypermobility’ of Western society that, 
together with globalisation, involves people travelling over steadily 
increasing distances with a growing proportion of people living in urban 

























Four contexts that facilitate fiddling and have intensified with glo-
balisation can be distinguished; often they operate simultaneously. First, 
‘passing trade’ typically occurs where two sides to a transaction transact 
only once, precluding a build- up of goodwill. It also operates when the 
fiddler is mobile relative to the customer: the ‘relief hand’, ‘the filler- in’ 
and ‘the temporary replacement’ are more fiddle- prone than the regular 
jobholders they replace. This is a particularly common feature of Vulture 
operations, where the public ‘pass through’ as in holiday resorts, pilgrim-
age centres, or airport and railway snack counters.
Second, ‘triadic occupations’ enable service workers directly 
involved with customers to play off two of the trio (employers, staff 
and customers) to their own advantage and against the interests of 
the third party. For example, a sales assistant or café- staffer sells items 
to friends at below cost, or an employer tells an employee to mark up 
prices to customers in anticipation of a stocktaking shortfall. With glo-
balisation, increasing urbanism and hypermobility, burgeoning travel 
and tourism all increase both passing trade and triadic occupational 
deviance.
Third, ‘exploiting expertise’ is found where a relative imbalance of 
customer knowledge can be presumed – as in garage services, domestic 
repairs and many professions. Globalisation, together with increasingly 
complex technical developments, offers Hawks greater opportunities to 
exploit their expertise, since they can more easily insulate their activi-
ties and gain multiple payments for the same time – a common fiddle of 
consultants.
Fourth, ‘gatekeepers’ are found where there is an imbalance 
between the supply and demand for goods or information. Typically 
Hawks, gatekeepers feature both in command economies – such as the 
case of the Soviet biscuit factory – and in competitive economies when 
there is a surplus of suppliers relative to demand. This facilitates a pro-
pensity to bribe buyers, as in municipal purchasing and, notoriously, 
the international arms trade. Globalisation has, with the spread of IT, 
reduced monopolistic control of this factor and increased the number of 
gatekeepers.
To sum up: the various types of part- time crime cannot be treated 
homogeneously, though all require a suspension of the researcher’s own 
moral judgement. The various types must first be identified, and will 
then demand very different methods of research. This in turn requires 
an effective means of classifying them. Any effective classification must 
be both exclusive and exhaustive, and the method suggested is a devel-



















When we applied this approach to part- time crime, we deduced 
four broad types with different principles applicable to each of the four 
work cultures. These were discussed and then considered in the context 
of change – particularly technical change and change arising from the 
increasing pace of globalisation.
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The motivational ambivalence: the blurring of the public 
and the private in the workings of informal power
Preface
Alena Ledeneva
Part IV aims to characterise the working of informal power and its moti-
vational ambivalence. Informal power is often envisaged as parallel to, 
or hiding behind, the pyramid of formal power. However, as the entries 
in this part show, the complexity of informal practices in the domina-
tion mode does not fit the model of a shadow pyramid. Informal power 
is not merely about informal influence, associated with personal attrib-
utes such as family, class, capital, skills, patronage and connections not 
directly linked to one’s formal position in the hierarchy. Rather, infor-
mal power resides in the grey zones between the public and the private 
domains. Most entries dwell on the blurring of the boundaries between 
the public and the private and thus present the case for the inadequacy of 
the public/ private dichotomy for grasping symbiotic patterns and com-
plex constellations in present- day societies (such as vertical crowdsourc-
ing, use of semi- state agencies in cyberattacks, or publicising people’s 
private lives on the Internet).
Informal power works through both incentives (carrots) and dis-
incentives (sticks) that are not exercised exclusively top- down or bot-
tom- up. Practices of co- optation, co- dependence and informal control 
are often diffuse. They may be exercised through provision of access to 
material resources (privileges, allowances or loans) or to more symbolic 
resources (such as access to decision makers). They may also be exercised 
by the application of pressure or uncertainty, the threat of suspended 
punishment, and the destabilisation of private lives (see Zerzentung, 8.9 
in this volume). Informal power may also be applied by the direct misuse 

























courts). In most cases, however, informal power is exercised in less vio-
lent and more nuanced forms of indirect pressure that result in compli-
ance and even self- censorship. Peer pressure and informal checks and 
balances are the instruments of informal governance but are also exam-
ples of motivational ambivalence.
Similar to the order of entries in the other parts of this volume – 
from social to instrumental in redistribution, from us to them in solidar-
ity, from need to greed in market behaviour – the entries in Part IV are 
arranged according to the incentives used for domination: from ‘more of 
a carrot’ to ‘more of a stick’. ‘Carrots’ (albeit with strings attached) are 
aimed at informal co- optation into the system of domination by satisfy-
ing someone’s needs whatever they might be: from a financial loan to a 
certain degree of impunity. ‘Sticks’ illustrate how the system can punish 
people informally by using formal institutions selectively, as ammunition 
(Russia’s telefonnoe pravo in courts and kompromat in the media are far 
from being exclusively Russian phenomena), or by using informal lever-
age in formal contexts. Motivational ambivalence is a central theme in 
this part: whatever the declared motivation in a legal case or an anti- 
corruption campaign, some hidden interests may also be served in the 
process. In most cases, it is impossible to establish with certainty whether 
the public motive takes precedence over the private, or the private over 
the public.
Chapter 7, ‘Co- optation: recruiting clients and patrons’, deals with 
the ways in which resources are allocated in order to create manageabil-
ity and control. In his introduction, Paul Heywood provides a fascinating 
typology of the forms of co- optation into patron– client networks: top- 
down and bottom- up (reverse co- optation); parallel systems of recruit-
ment and governance associated with criminal groups and their mergers 
with charities; and the role of political parties in organising resource allo-
cation and maintaining informal networks. ‘Carrots’ are essential to co- 
opt those with the required skills or influence, to integrate weaker groups 
or individuals, and to neutralise potential opponents. The trade- off is: 
the loss of independence – for the gain of privileges (that may include 
immunity) on condition of loyalty and compliance with the party line. 
In conclusion, Elena Semenova questions the theoretical conceptualisa-
tion of patron– client relationships in historical perspective and discusses 
the ways in which the fundamental patterns of patron– client relations – 
reciprocity, hierarchy and repetition – adapt to the workings of complex 
societies. Semenova’s take on the themes of timing, symmetry and sta-
tus in patron– client relationships in modern societies resonate with the 


























in Florence Weber’s conclusion to Chapter 2. However, political scien-
tists, as Semenova points out, tend to emphasise the detrimental effects 
of patron– client relations for resource mobilisation, democratic account-
ability, party formation and institutional development.
Chapter 8, ‘Control: instruments of informal governance’, con-
tinues the theme of compliance and maintaining order by controlling 
people and getting them to follow the party line. In his introduction, 
‘Politics of fear’, Vladimir Gelman explains domination as setting 
incentives in such a way so that actors will be encouraged to observe 
the existing rules and be deterred from violating them or, on the con-
trary, so that they can be persuaded to violate rules that are seen as 
contradicting the interests of the ruling groups. The ‘politics of fear’ 
centres on the state’s use of oppressive instruments for the preserva-
tion of an authoritarian regime, but this does not necessarily involve 
direct violence. Most of the instruments described in this chapter 
involve selective use of the law, manipulative use of state institutions 
(courts, hospitals), and invasion of personal privacy (dirt books in 
the UK, kompromat in Russia, songbun in North Korea, Zerzentung 
in the German Democratic Republic). Just as the mechanisms of co- 
optation target individual independence, the control mechanisms 
described here aim to destabilise individuals, undermine their inde-
pendence and, in the final analysis, create a ‘personality’ suited for 
totalitarianism (Arendt 1973). In conclusion, Scott Newton explores 
the conditions under which practices of circumventing the formal sys-
tem become the rules, or ‘hidden constitutions’, according to which 
system operates. He argues that in Central Asian states formal institu-
tions effectively serve and advance hidden interests, and emphasises 
the corrupt incentives that underpin the workings of ‘hidden’ institu-
tions. Together, Gelman’s focus on disincentives and Newton’s focus 
on the institutionalisation of corrupt practices, highlight the condi-
tions under which the dissent can be kept quiescent and speak to the 
themes of co- optation, accommodation, ambiguity and the ‘weapon 
of the weak’ discussed by Jan Kubik in Part II and Scott Radnitz in 
Part III. Just as the political implications of the weapon of the weak 
stem from the strategies of survival or gaming the system practices, 
political co- optation is a by- product of economic co- optation, both 
material and immaterial. Meanwhile, those excluded from economic 
and political co- optation are likely to engage in ‘gaming the system’ 
by camouflage, simulation, cynicism, cultural resistance and other 



































Co- optation: recruiting clients and 
patrons




Co- optation in many ways represents the very essence of the ambiva-
lence that is so characteristic of informal practices. In a political context, 
the term properly refers to a standard practice of filling a vacancy on a 
committee or board via the votes of existing members, as reflected in its 
Latin origin, cooptare (to elect). Indeed, co- opted members of a body are 
often selected for their particular skills or attributes. At the same time, 
however, co- optation has a more negative connotation, seen as a process 
through which smaller or weaker groups and individuals are subsumed 
or acculturated by larger bodies, or else potential opponents are neutral-
ised by being brought into the dominant group. That latter sense is very 
much in line with the idea developed by Philip Selznick (1949) in his 
classic study on the Tennessee Valley Authority, in which he described 
formal ‘coöptation’ (sic.) as a mechanism to manage opposition by incor-
porating potentially threatening outsiders into the organisation.
It is therefore unsurprising that some of the entries in this chapter 
share that same ambivalent nature. For instance, the name of the padrino 
system in the Philippines derives from the Spanish word for ‘patron’, one 
half of the patron– client dyad that underpins the kinds of informality 
that this chapter seeks to explore. Padrino in Spanish also means ‘god-
father’ – in the positive ecclesiastical sense as well as the more sinister 













a wedding. A patron of the arts, familiar from English- language usage, 
is almost universally seen as a good thing, yet the verb ‘to patronise’ has 
both a positive meaning, in the sense of offering support, and a negative 
one, in the sense of treating someone as if they are inferior. This ambiva-
lence is repeated in a number of the entries, such as tazkia (Kurdistan 
region of Iraq), trafika (Czech Republic and Slovakia) or l’gota (Russia), 
which have different meanings according to context and are not neces-
sarily always seen as things that should be condemned.
In essence, most of the entries in this section deal with mechanisms 
for distributing and allocating resource, while protecting the privilege of 
those in positions of authority. It is striking how often the metaphor of 
food occurs in descriptions of informal practices: kormlenie (Russia) liter-
ally means feeding, kula (Tanzania) means eating, uhljeb (Croatia) derives 
from the pre- Slavic word for bread. These informal mechanisms are about 
providing as well as protecting. Ultimately, they describe systems designed 
to ensure that a given informal network maintains its position of privilege.
There are several dimensions to how a network might do this. At 
a basic level, a distinction can be drawn between incentives (carrots) 
and compliance (sticks). Alternatively, we could talk about horizontal 
versus top- down mechanisms. Thus, a classic example of a horizontal, 
incentives- based approach is the Seilschaft in Germany, meaning liter-
ally a ‘rope- team’ in reference to mountaineers tying themselves together 
for collective protection. In practice, Seilschaft refers to small cliques 
in companies, bureaucracies or political parties that work together 
to advance their collective interests. Similarly, the system known as 
Parteibuchwirtschaft in Austria refers to the party political distribution of 
opportunities and was originally designed to foster cohesion.
Top- down approaches, on the other hand, often have a sense of 
threat attached to them. Thus, famously, political machines in the USA 
were associated with strong party leaders, often known as bosses, who 
imposed discipline through force by working alongside organised crimi-
nal gangs. In line with the ambivalence that characterises such practices, 
while political machines were primarily concerned with keeping their 
own hold on power, arguably they were also responsible for restructur-
ing city governments in ways that improved facilities, helped assimilate 
immigrant groups and supported economic growth (Ehrenhalt 2015). 
Mafia Raj or Goonda Raj in India refers more overtly to the link between 
criminal activity and politics, described graphically by Lucia Michelutti in 
this chapter as an example of ‘muscular systems of economic and political 
governance’. So- called ‘criminal politicians’ in India have been accused 
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US political machines, however, Mafia Raj in India operates as a system of 
governance alongside, rather than in opposition to, the legal state appa-
ratus. Much the same could be said for the practice of tamozhennye l’goty 
in post- Soviet Russia, where the federal government allowed ‘privileged’ 
charitable organisations to import products without paying excise duties, 
an advantage that unsurprisingly led to infiltration by mafiya groups.
Given that co- optation depends on access to resources in order to be 
able to operate effectively, we need to explore where power lies if we are 
to understand the resilience of these informal networks. It is noteworthy 
that there has been a shift from the elite- dominated ‘old corruption’ that 
operated in the United Kingdom, or the kormlenie practice in pre- Soviet 
Russia that originated with the court elite, towards systems that are 
typically operated through political parties. So- called ‘old corruption’, 
like kormlenie, was designed to ensure that the aristocratic classes were 
able to secure an ongoing source of income, whether through sinecure 
appointments or by extracting ‘tributes’ from given territories. Over time, 
as political and administrative structures modernised, such practices 
were gradually legislated out of existence. In their place emerged new 
forms of rent extraction and distribution, often very closely linked to the 
political parties that became the bedrock of organised power in modern 
states, both democratic and non- democratic.
Perhaps the most emblematic form of such distribution is ‘pork 
barreling’, the practice in the USA of securing spending on projects and 
programmes to benefit specific party constituents. Similar distributive 
practices operate elsewhere in the democratic world, characterised by 
the desire to maintain electoral advantage for incumbents. Several of the 
entries in this chapter refer to the role of political parties in organising 
and maintaining informal networks, notably the Parteibuchwirtschaft 
system in Austria, or tazkia in Kurdistan and uhljeb in Croatia that allow 
members of ruling parties privileged access to public sector positions.
So long as political parties remain the principal mechanism of 
organising resource distribution in societies, we can expect the kinds of 
informal mechanisms described in this chapter to continue operating. 
However, changes in the nature and functioning of power in the con-
temporary world are likely to pose challenges not only to our traditional 
understanding of how nation-states function, but also how informal net-
works develop. Of particular note is how the disaggregation of power 
from its traditional locus of the nation-state has seen the rise of what 
some refer to as a ‘network model’ of governance, in which private enter-
prise takes on an increasingly important and influential role in public sec-























who operate within new forms of social network and manoeuvre seam-
lessly between a range of different roles: government advisors, think 
tank employees, business consultants, media pundits and so forth. The 
growing opportunities for private actors to make governing and policy 
decisions that effectively bypass government involvement and monitor-





Kormlenie, literally meaning ‘feeding’, comes from the old East Slavic 
word kormiti (to maintain, to feed) and refers to the practice in pre- 
modern Russia of maintaining local officials at the expense of those they 
governed. Kormlenie entitled members of the court elite to receive three 
types of revenue and benefits from the local community. First, it was 
maintenance (korm) consisting of a small annual assessment per house-
hold; labour service in the local official’s household; and holiday supply 
of food and fodder presented to the official on Christmas, Easter and St 
Peter’s Day (29 June). Second, the officials received fees for administer-
ing justice, the branding and registration of horses, the registration of 
visitors, tolls on shops, custom duties and marriage fees. Third, the local 
community gave the officials gratuities as tokens of respect.
Kormlenie originated from the ancient practice of the prince and 
his retinue going on tribute- gathering rounds. During these journeys the 
prince dispensed justice in local communities, but heavily relied on those 
communities’ supplies to sustain the itinerant royal court. The prince 
gradually delegated to prominent members of his court the privilege to 
administer justice, together with entitlement to associated fees and ben-
efits, in some of his towns. The tenure of a particular office granted to a 
courtier on the basis of the kormlenie system varied depending on his 
rank and service record, as well as the wealth and prestige of the town 
given to him. Originally such tenures could last as long as 17 years. By the 
end of the fifteenth century a typical tenure had contracted to one year as 
the prince sought to reward as many servitors as possible with kormlenie 
(extensions to this period were possible as a token of royal favour). For 
the same reason the crown significantly reduced the size of territories 
distributed in accordance with the kormlenie practice.
The social status of kormlenie holders ranged from top- level boyars 




















behalf of the prince) in large prosperous cities like Novgorod, Kostroma 
and Vladimir to cavalrymen who were entitled to collect certain fees in 
small rural communities, which were often situated far away from the 
cavalrymen’s home towns. In some instances the cost of visiting such 
remote territories was higher than the amount of due income, a situation 
that caused some cavalrymen to farm out their kormlenie revenues.
As for the general nature of kormlenie, Marxist scholars see it as a 
form of feudal rent (Enin 2000: 315). Revisionist studies treat kormle-
nie in the context of anthropological theories of generalised exchange 
in traditional societies like kula in Papua New Guinea (see kula, 7.2 in 
this volume) and dan in Northern India. These theories assume that gift 
presentation and exchange established solidarities and mutual obliga-
tions (Mauss 1966: 71– 2). Kormlenie was therefore similar to assigning 
fiefs and fee benefices in pre- bureaucratic societies (Davies 1997: 39). 
Kormlenie was originally anything but a sinecure, since kormlenie hold-
ers were the only local agents of princely power charged with responsible 
Figure 7.1.1 The Town Governor (Voevoda) Arrives to a Provincial 
Town, by Sergei Vasilievich Ivanov (1864– 1910).
Source: Wikimedia Commons. https:// commons.wikimedia.org/ 













administrative, fiscal and military duties, but did not receive any salary 
for their work (Veselovskii 1947: 267).
The relationship among the central authorities, the kormlenie hold-
ers and the local community is a matter of scholarly debate. Traditional 
scholarship emphasised the abuse of power by the vicegerents who tended 
to extract excessive payments from the local population. According to 
this interpretation, by the middle of the sixteenth century the corruption 
of local officials became so intolerable that in 1555/ 6 the central authori-
ties abolished kormlenie and replaced it with a fixed sum of money that 
the locals paid not to the vicegerent, but to central fiscal bodies (Nosov 
1986: 37– 8; Nosov and Paneiakh 1987: 27– 35). However, kormlenie sur-
vived as an informal practice, which led to the corruption of local offi-
cials; hence anachronistic parallels between kormlenie and corruption in 
Imperial Russia (Pipes 1974: 282).
Revisionist studies argue that the central authorities did not attempt 
to abolish kormlenie in the sixteenth century. Rather, they adjusted the 
system with the aim of increasing the crown’s revenues and systematising 
the military service of the court elite. In addition to the abuse of power by 
the vicegerents, there were other serious reasons for the revision of the 
kormlenie system in the mid- 1550s. These included the growing dissat-
isfaction of kormlenie holders with the income assigned to them (appar-
ently a response to the crown’s increasing demand for their military 
service), the disobedience of local population and the fiscal inefficiency 
of smaller kormlenie allocations (Veselovskii 1947: 277; Vernadsky 1972: 
141; Nosov and Paneiakh 1987: 31). This is why in 1555/ 6 the central 
authorities commuted maintenance to a tax payable directly to the cen-
tral treasury. This reform was implemented not across the country, but 
only in those territories where it was fiscally and military expedient or 
where the local population was particularly restless and where the cen-
tral authorities did not trust individual vicegerents (Davies 1997: 48). 
Instead of their kormlenie revenues, the vicegerents in affected territories 
now received cash payments from the central treasury. In practical terms 
the authorities abolished the inefficient smaller ‘feedings’ held by caval-
rymen and a few of the large- scale ‘feedings’ of some magnates who had 
lost royal favour. In many other territories the vicegerent administration 
continued to function on the basis of the kormlenie system.
The practice of granting generous ‘feedings’ to influential courti-
ers received a new impulse during the reign of Fedor Ivanovich (1584– 
98). In the seventeenth century the authorities replaced the vicegerents 
with town governors (gorodovye voevody) who existed until 1775 (see 














chancelleries, but still received no remuneration for their administra-
tive duties, which might have significantly increased the officials’ travel 
expenses and the maintenance of their staff and agents, who were often 
the governors’ relatives (Enin 2000: 311– 12). Town governors thus con-
tinued extracting kormlenie remuneration from the local communities, 
some of which were forced to pay the officials over a quarter of annual 
communal income. The early Romanovs were reluctant to formalise 
the kormlenie of town governors and never issued a comprehensive law 
regulating their maintenance by the local population, apparently fear-
ing open resistance from the taxpayers (Davies 1997: 53). Sporadic 
attempts to ban or legalise unofficial extortions and bribes under the 
early Romanovs (1620, 1661, 1679), Peter I (1713, 1714, 1720) and his 
successors (1726) were abortive and inefficient.
The practice of kormlenie originally provided local communi-
ties with various means of safeguarding their interests. From the late 
fifteenth century the central authorities regulated kormlenie through 
ordinance charters (ustavnye gramoty) issued to particular communi-
ties, through revenue entitlement lists issued to the kormlenie holders 
and through the Law Codes of 1497 and 1551 (Davies 1997: 45). The 
ordinance charters specified the amount of maintenance in kind due 
to the vicegerent and his agents and allowed the locals to define the 
amount of unregulated offerings of gifts or service. Should the officials 
be displeased with the provided maintenance, they could substitute it 
with payments in cash, the amounts of which were also stipulated in 
the charters. As ordinance charters fixed the amount of cash payment 
without taking inflation into account, private and church landowners 
tended to commute maintenance in kind to cash payments. In return 
for maintaining the local administration, members of the community 
were entitled to participate in court hearings held by the vicegerent. The 
charters also protected the community from the local officials attending 
communal celebrations without invitation and from unpaid requisitions 
of provision by the prince’s agents lodging with the locals (Vernadsky 
1972: 132).
The dismantling of the legal basis of kormlenie in the 1550s left the 
taxpayers with very few formal instruments for protecting their interests. 
Local communities recorded their ‘feeding’ payments in expenditure 
books, which served as a documentary evidence for petitioning Moscow 
against the extraordinary extortions levied by individual town governors. 
Deprived of its legal foundations, kormlenie became a matter of private 
arrangement between the official and the locals based on traditions and 















the town governor his impersonal status of a bureaucrat and involved 
him in generalised exchange with the local community. Maintenance 
also performed an informal regulatory function by establishing prices 
for certain services rendered by the official for the community. For these 
reasons a community could even mutiny against a town governor who 
rejected communal maintenance and gratuities, as the locals saw such 
an attitude as reluctance to enter into informal reciprocal agreement 
(Davies 1997: 57).
Kormlenie was not corruption in our modern sense and should be 
distinguished from later practices of bribery. Kormlenie was a practice 
typical of the pre- modern administration that struggled with limited 
financial and logistic resources. The central authorities saved on pay-
ments to its local officials by involving taxpayer communities in main-
taining local government through a combination of legal and informal 
mechanisms. In return for their kormlenie contributions, communities 
gained access to justice through local officials who acted as extensions 
of royal power. The withdrawal of the state from the legal regulation of 
kormlenie undermined the community’s position in dealings with the 
local officials as they increasingly entered into reciprocal exchange with 
individuals or specific interest groups within the community (Enin 2000: 
312). Kormlenie gradually gave way to recognisably modern forms of 




University of dar- es- salaam, tanzania
The literal meaning of the word kula in Kiswahili (also known as Swahili) 
is ‘eating’, that is, one of the basic requirements for human survival. This 
may include getting access not only to food but also to other such basic 
needs as shelter and clothing. However, kula may also be used figura-
tively to denote ways of gaining access to resources that allow people to 
satisfy other needs and aspirations, including the use of corrupt prac-
tices. Indeed, in Tanzania the word is commonly used in order to normal-
ise or justify corruption.
The frequency with which the word kula is used in Tanzania reflects 
the extent to which corruption has permeated everyday life in the coun-
try. It also sheds light on how individuals and groups strive to accommo-
date corrupt practices regardless of ongoing anti- corruption initiatives at 



















7.2 Kula  (tanzanIa)
are seen as denying people the opportunity to eat (kula), in which case 
people complain about being hungry (njaa). This is especially true of 
those who benefit from corrupt practices, since their livelihood and 
efforts to realise their aspirations depend on such activity. But the term is 
also used by members of the elite not only to describe ways of satisfying 
their own desires, but also to justify distributing benefits to their clients 
and supporters.
The ways in which kula is used in everyday discourse in Tanzania 
can be divided into two broad categories. The first entails expressions that 
justify taking bribes or engaging in dubious deals in order to gain wealth 
or access to opportunities and resources. This first category includes but 
is not limited to the following:
1(a) Kupata/ kupewa ulaji (to get or to be given the opportunity to 
eat). These expressions refer to gaining access to opportunities 
and resources pertinent to the fulfilment of one’s aspirations 
and desires. They may, for example, be used when someone is 
appointed to a position in the public or private sector that allows 
easy access to resources. They may also denote securing a lucra-
tive job, tender or business. In anti- corruption discourse, the 
expressions are used to describe people who use public office sim-
ply ‘to eat’ (kula tu), that is, to exploit public resources for their 
own personal interest. A similar practice, whereby those in power 
control appointments to posts at both central and local level, is 
known in Nigeria as ‘stomach infrastructure’ (Baez- Camargo and 
Ledeneva 2016), while Jean- François Bayart used a Cameroonian 
expression, ‘the politics of the belly’, in his classic study of the rela-
tionship between clientelism, corruption and power in African 
politics (Bayart 1993).
1(b) Kula maisha (to enjoy life). This is a powerful discourse that 
frames corruption as a means to enjoy life in the sense of allow-
ing people to gain access to resources and wealth. ‘Enjoying life’ 
is often expressed in images of ‘a better life’ (maisha mazuri) that 
highlight material possessions and the culture of consumerism. 
The accumulation of wealth, regardless of its source, is portrayed 
as something to be admired and desired. This in turn justifies and 
normalises corruption.
1(c) Tukale wapi/ tutakula wapi/ tutakula nini? (where/ what should 
we eat?). In this discourse, corruption is depicted as a means of 
eking out a living. In this case, eating is not limited to gaining 















while corruption is presented as an essential mechanism for cop-
ing with life’s challenges. This is consistent with literature on the 
causes of corruption that suggests that low and inadequate sala-
ries paid to public servants exacerbate the practice of corruption 
(Mookherjee 1997; Chand and Moene 1999; Ferrinho et al. 2004; 
cited in Andvig et al. 2000). Proponents of this view acknowledge 
the fact that, when confronted with pressing needs, people resort 
to all possibilities in order to satisfy them.
The second category includes expressions that justify giving a bribe 
in order to gain access to certain services, resources or opportunities. 
These expressions emphasise a sense of reciprocity grounded in the idea 
that nothing is for free:  if you need something, you should give some-
thing in return (hakuna cha bure). This second category of expressions 
includes but is not limited to the following:
2(a) Kula uliwe (in order to eat you should allow others to eat from 
you). This expression is frequently used to justify giving a bribe 
in exchange for a particular opportunity, favour or right. It is 
common when people are seeking to secure a tender, job or 
political position. Political corruption is taken for granted even 
by voters, who see state elections as ‘eating times’ or ‘harvesting 
sessions’ when aspirant politicians seek votes (kura) in order to 
obtain opportunities to eat (kula). While politicians bribe vot-
ers in order to get an opportunity to eat (kupata ulaji), voters 
take the opportunity to ‘eat’ from the politicians in return for 
their votes. Politicians will accordingly be allowed to ‘eat’ with 
impunity and guaranteed immunity from prosecution for cor-
ruption as long as they remain politically influential and con-
tinue to defend their voters.
2(b) Wakale wapi/ wanakula humohumo? (this is where they eat/ 
where should they eat?). This reflects the third expression in the 
first category above, where officials in low- paid jobs ask, ‘where 
and what should we eat?’ It justifies giving a bribe on the grounds 
that the bribe enables the official to eke out a living.
As seen above, the notion of eating (kula) represents corruption as a 
means to realise multiple ends. Those who solicit bribes and those who 
give them justify their actions by reference to ‘eating’ in the sense of gain-
ing access to basic, even essential needs. As a result, corrupt practices 
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In their comparison of informal practices in Tanzania, Mexico 
and Russia, Baez- Camargo and Ledeneva explore patterns of informal 
governance that work effectively in all three countries, enabling mem-
bers of the elite to maintain their grip on power while at the same time 
allowing ordinary citizens access to scarce services and resources. They 
argue that the resilience of corrupt behaviour across all three countries 
can be explained by the fact that informal governance norms are perme-
ated with ambivalent meanings. In Tanzania, for example, they found 
that corrupt behaviour is both publicly condemned and privately toler-
ated since it provides effective alternative means of access to essential 
resources that are needed not only by the elite but also by the general 
population. Regimes with systemic corruption declare wars against cor-
ruption, they conclude, but in fact are also dependent on existing corrupt 
practices for the purpose of reproduction and legitimacy (Baez- Camargo 
and Ledeneva 2017: 49–72).
7.3 Old corruption (Uk historical)
William rubinstein
emeritus Professor of history, University of aberystwyth and 
adjunct Professor, Monash University, Melbourne, australia
‘Old corruption’ referred to the system of highly paid government offices, 
pensions, sinecure positions and income streams secured by members 
of the British aristocracy and upper classes during the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. The phenomenon was an all- pervasive fea-
ture of British upper class life in this period. The term was famously used 
by William Cobbett (1763– 1835), the radical reformer and enemy of the 
British aristocracy (Rubinstein 1983; Harling 1995). Probably the most 
important characteristic of ‘old corruption’ was that it was a parasitical 
but entirely legal system. Despite its name, it was not comparable to what 
is traditionally regarded as ‘corruption’ today: illegal or at the very least 
unethical abuses of office such as bribery, embezzlement and fraud.
‘Old corruption’ consisted of the appointment of an aristocrat, his 
relatives, or a political ally to an official position with a high income 
attached. Normally the income attached to this position was extraordi-
narily high and manifestly in excess of what a legitimate, non- aristocratic 
holder of the position would be paid. Hundreds of examples of ‘old cor-
ruption’ in the early nineteenth century were collected in John Wade’s 
Black Book, or Corruption Unmasked, originally published in 1816 and in 
subsequent editions. For example, in 1832 Lord Bathurst, an aristocrat of 
























at a time when there was no income tax) as the holder of the offices of 
Clerk of the Crown Court of Chancery, Secretary at War, Commissary of 
the Affairs of India, Teller of the Exchequer and from an office entitled 
Clerk of Dispensations and Faculties. Furthermore, according to Wade, 
two of Bathurst’s relatives received £6,400 per year (over £700,000 
today) from three other offices they held. If any of these posts actually 
required work to fulfil their duties, this was done by clerks who were paid 
a tiny fraction of what Lord Bathurst received. According to Cobbett, 
Wade and other critics of the British aristocracy of the time, there were 
literally hundreds of similar positions with similarly grandiose titles, 
enormous incomes and few duties that were held by aristocrats and for-
tunate placemen.
Many positions held under ‘old corruption’ were hereditary, being 
inherited upon the death of their holder by his chief heir. In addition, 
many positions were ludicrous and absurd in nature. The Black Book, 
for example, noted the case of Lord Auckland, who received £1,400 per 
year (over £150,000 today) as ‘Vendue- Master at Demerara’ (in British 
Guiana) ‘where he had never been’, and £1,900 per year (over £200,000 
today) as ‘Auditor at Greenwich Hospital’, ‘for doing nothing’. In 1830, 
when many of these offices had been abolished or reformed, it was found 
that Lord Henry Seymour received £1,251 per year (over £130,000 today) 
as ‘Craner and Wharfinger of Dublin Harbour’. The Duke of St.  Albans 
received £2,000 per year (over £200,000 today) as ‘Hereditary Grand 
Falconer and Hereditary Registrar of the Court of Chancery’ – offices that 
required no work on the part of the Duke, since the legitimate activities 
of the Court Registrar were done by poorly paid clerks.
Although ‘old corruption’ involved the granting of underserved 
high incomes to the aristocracy and its associates, it did not entail the 
granting of other modes of power or authority, or any legal privileges 
such as continental aristocrats often enjoyed at this time. The granting 
of special privileges not held by ordinary Englishmen would have been 
regarded as unconstitutional even by those who benefitted financially 
under ‘old corruption’. Britain’s aristocracy can be distinguished from 
continental aristocracies in having no legal privileges of any kind, apart 
from the right (in most but not all cases) to sit in the House of Lords. 
They obeyed the same laws as did labourers and shopkeepers and, in par-
ticular, were not exempted from the payment of any taxes – unlike, say, 
the pre- 1789 French aristocracy. It should also be noted that there were 
few traces of the absurd features of ‘old corruption’ in the vital aspects of 
British national life. For instance, although it initially helped the career 
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as a patron, promotion to the top was based on merit and seniority, and 
the British Admiralty sought out naval officers like Nelson who were 
extremely talented as well as being well connected. Britain could simply 
not tolerate incompetence in a sphere vital to its national existence.
The scope of ‘old corruption’ was gradually reduced and ultimately 
ended by successive reforming British governments, including Tory gov-
ernments, from the late eighteenth century through the ‘Age of Reform’ 
in the 1830s and 1840s. Much of the pressure for reform came from 
middle- class activists and politicians who regarded the astronomical 
salaries of ‘old corruption’ as a colossal waste of the taxpayers’ money. 
Aristocrats eventually acquiesced in the ending of ‘old corruption’, in 
part because it was increasingly indefensible and in part because, with 
the Industrial Revolution, they became wealthier through ‘legitimate’ 
sources of income: from their rent rolls, exploiting mineral deposits like 
coal on their land and from investments in railways and other businesses. 
By the 1850s ‘old corruption’ in its previous sense had ended, and was not 
replaced by any form of overt corruption. Indeed, late Victorian British 
politicians and, in particular, the British civil service were renowned for 
their honesty and probity, and, apparently, few if any financial scandals 
involving them have ever come to light.
‘Old corruption’ severely contradicted Max Weber’s theories of 
modernity and bureaucracy, which saw modern bureaucracies as based 
on the accord of effort and duty, promotion through merit or seniority 
and the actual performance of significant and clearly stated duties by the 
holders of an office (Weber 1947). Weber’s distinction between income, 
status and power as separate modes of social standing was also violated 
by ‘old corruption’, with status, income and power being often transmis-
sible into one another. Aristocratic status, for instance, entitled one to 
hold an office with an undeservedly high income – just as, at the time, it 
was possible to ‘buy’ a seat in the unreformed House of Commons.
Analyses of corruption have traditionally focused on illegal abuses 
such as bribery and misuse of public funds. However, in recent years 
increasing academic attention has been paid to the notion of ‘legal cor-
ruption’, as developed by Kaufmann and Vicente (2011). Legal corruption 
involves the ‘abuse of office for private gain’ that is central to traditional 
notions of corruption, but where the ‘abuse’ is able to take place legally 
due to its perpetrators possessing political and legal control. While ‘old 
corruption’ was closely bound up with a titled aristocracy that no longer 
exists in modern European nations, in essence it may still be regarded 
as an early form of ‘legal corruption’. It is thus interesting to note that 

















‘legal corruption’ has roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century British 
political discourse.
7.4 Political machineries (Usa historical)
fran osrecki
University of osnabrück, Germany
Political machineries (from machine – device, engine, instrument) were 
informal practices for organising political parties in urban centres in the 
USA in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (synonymous 
expressions: machine politics, political machines). The term ‘machinery’ 
refers to the perceived efficiency of this kind of political party organisa-
tion. This efficiency was attributed to strong party leaders (commonly 
known as ‘bosses’) who were able to impose ‘measures of discipline on 
party members’ and ‘to maintain and use political power on a regular, 
predictable basis’ (Mayer 2001: 11678).
Its discipline, efficiency and predictability notwithstanding, the 
term has largely negative connotations, since these features were 
enabled by gaining voter support by means of ‘patronage jobs, gov-
ernment contracts, and special favors to individual voters’ (Mayer 
2001:  11678)  as well as to voter groups, while excluding non- 
supporters. Thus, on the most general level, political machineries built 
their power on a form of organisation that traded specific material 
rewards to loyal segments of the electorate in return for political sup-
port. As a result, political machineries violated the norms of a univer-
salist discharge of duties associated with public roles and substituted 
the ideological formation of political will for a system of smoothly 
interlocking economic exchanges:  resources bought votes, votes 
bought offices, offices bought influence, influence bought resources 
and resources bought votes.
The rise of political machineries is explained by a combination of 
interrelated factors that were specific to urban American politics and 
bureaucracy towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth centuries. First, the American political system of that time 
consisted of countless electoral offices with relatively short mandates. 
This practice was rooted in the radical democratic tradition of American 
politics that aimed to prevent the development of the centralised, hier-
archical and often authoritarian bureaucracies commonly found at that 
time in Continental Europe (Lesoff 1994). However, an unintended side 
effect of democratic bureaucracy and elected offices was that their short- 
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attracted persons who regarded public offices as instruments for personal 
enrichment, sinecures and patronage (Welskopp 2010: 224).
Second, the large- scale buying of votes and trading of material 
inducements for political support were reinforced by a massive influx of 
immigrants who (a) were dependent on local networks for support and 
mutual help; (b) were given the right to vote comparatively quickly; and 
(c) were willing, since they lacked a supportive welfare state and experi-
ence of democratic processes, to trade their votes for more tangible ben-
efits (food, housing and jobs).
Third, immigration encouraged the extremely fast growth of urban 
centres and the need for massive investment in urban infrastructure. 
American cities, however, were not able to coordinate such complex pro-
jects centrally, mainly because the democratic structure of local admin-
istrations imposed strong checks and balances between administrative 
units. The resultant deadlocks in decision- making had to be solved infor-
mally and on a personal level.
Fourth, the small and ineffective US public sector had to outsource 
most large- scale investments to the private sector, while leaving this 
relationship largely unregulated. For politicians and bureaucrats, this 
created an incentive for personal enrichment by means of insider  trad-
ing and commissions, especially in the real estate and construction busi-
nesses, where ‘political bosses’ often acted as both buyers and sellers of 
services. This was the resource base for the supply of material rewards 
for loyal voters.
Fifth, in American cities electoral constituencies and administrative 
units mostly overlapped, so politicians and bureaucrats could trade bene-
fits for political support locally, that is, with people they knew personally 
and who were directly dependent on their help (Welskopp 2010: 225).
Sixth, the often puritanical standards of the American legal system 
(especially regarding gambling, prostitution and alcohol consumption) 
created a market for ‘protection’ against police forces who, because of the 
ubiquity of deviant behaviour, often acted selectively and unpredictably. 
Politicians and bureaucrats often bribed police officers to look the other 
way in order to protect their clientele when they were engaged in semi- 
legal or criminal activities.
All these factors intertwined to create complex networks of infor-
mal relationships with ‘political bosses’ and the higher echelons of party 
organisations at their heart. Around them there emerged a tight web of 
loyal voters, corrupt administrators and law enforcers, businesspeople, 
criminals and racketeers. In popular culture, the structure of political 





















‘bosses’ such as William Tweed (‘boss’ of Tammany Hall, the Democratic 
Party political machine in nineteenth- century New  York) were graphi-
cally depicted in Martin Scorsese’s 2002 film, Gangs of New York.
The longevity of political machineries in such cities as New York, 
Philadelphia or Chicago is usually explained by their latent functions. 
According to Robert Merton’s (1968: 128 ff.) classic and widely accepted 
analysis, political machineries latently (that is, unintentionally) cen-
tralised power and authority that had previously been dispersed among 
many antagonistic administrative units. Also, as mentioned above, politi-
cal machineries acted as a personalised and direct proto- welfare system 
for immigrants and other economically deprived groups and helped to 
integrate them into the political system. For disadvantaged groups, polit-
ical machineries were vehicles for upward mobility at a time when there 
were few legitimate channels for such advancement. Through favourit-
ism, moreover, political machineries created a protected and thereby pre-
dictable (that is, non- competitive) market for large and small businesses 
loyal to the machine. 
These functions came at a high price, however. Political machiner-
ies primarily served the needs of the bosses and their cronies who not 
only centralised but in fact monopolised political power. While the politi-
cal bosses’ cooperation with the business world helped to build infra-
structure, it did so at unreasonably high rates that drained city budgets 
and left cities heavily indebted for decades. Political machineries not 
only excluded non- supporters but actively terrorised them, often with 
the help of organised crime groups, while cash flows from the protection 
business turned political machineries into organised crime groups them-
selves (see Figure 7.4.1). Finally, political machineries, by having their 
power base in local immigrant populations, contributed to racial divisions 
in American cities – political support was traded for help for ‘their’ people 
only. This spurred racist and isolationist positions in American politics, as 
immigration came to be associated with political decay, organised crime 
and private vice.
Political machineries were a specifically American phenomenon of 
the industrial age. The practice had largely died out by the middle of the 
twentieth century, as local administrations became professionalised, as 
the US developed a universalist welfare state (President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal) and as second- and third- generation immigrants were absorbed 
into a functioning labour market that made local, personal and mutual 
help largely obsolete (Mayer 2001: 11679 ff.). While the combination is 
historically specific, however, some aspects of political machineries can 
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but with otherwise dysfunctional welfare systems or labour markets. 
Tina Hilgers (2011: 580) argues that political machineries consisted of a 
complex combination of several informal and illegitimate practices and 
that ‘clientelism’ was among the most important. Party organisations 
Figure 7.4.1 Why Our Cities Are Badly Governed (1899). Political boss 
(the playing card and pistol in his pocket identifying him as a saloon 
owner and/ or associating him with organised crime) dragging loyal 
businessman and bagger/ immigrant to the voting place.







that today most clearly resemble political machineries are based on a cli-
entelistic exchange of political support for direct and face- to- face forms 
of goods and services that are also characterised by a lack of ideological 
orientations of the parties themselves and of their voters. Classic exam-
ples are the Peronist Party in Argentina (Auyero 2000), the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, or the traditional parties in modern 
Greece.
However, the roots and sources of durability of contemporary clien-
telistic parties around the world often differ from those of their American 
counterparts. In Latin America and Asia, for example, they are often 
rural rather than urban, while immigration plays a less decisive role 
than traditional ethnic, regional, religious, occupational and clan loyal-
ties. Often, too, such parties monopolise the national political landscape 
more effectively than local machineries in the USA could do. A possible 
explanation is that strong countervailing powers (the Republican Party, 
independent mass media, established capitalists), the pronounced fed-
eralism of US politics and the concentration of immigrant populations in 





Seilschaft (plural Seilschaften) is a German term denoting an informal 
network. Literally, it means ‘rope- team’ – a small group of Alpine moun-
taineers who, when scaling a mountain, tie themselves together with a 
single rope in order to support and secure one another against falling 
off the rock- face. Used in its informal sense, however, the term carries 
highly negative connotations of cronyism, unfair advantage and undue 
influence, typically with the purpose of advancing the careers of the net-
work members. While the term originated in Germany, it has spread to 
the English- language academic literature to denote corruption, patron-
age and the abuse of informal political networks.
The early, figurative use of the term can be observed in German 
scholarship, media and everyday language, primarily to describe small 
cliques in companies, bureaucracies or political parties whose members 
seek jointly to advance their careers, often by corrupt means. Seilschaften 
gained prominence in the wake of regime changes such as the defeat 






















Democratic Republic. In both cases, the term was used to describe the 
tenacious persistence of old boy networks in public administration, poli-
tics and business and the efforts of such networks both to carry over some 
of their clout into the new regime, and to protect one another from being 
ousted or indicted as a result of the roles they had played under the old 
order (Häusserman 1998; Karsten and von Thiessen 2006; Asch 2007; 
Wikipedia.de 2016). In German academia, the concept has also found 
some traction in studies of post- Soviet transition countries, for example, 
in relation to Russia, Poland, Romania and Ukraine (Pleines 2005, 2006), 
and in some instances with regard to manifestations of machine politics 
in the USA (Welskopp 2010) or of corruption in China (Heberer 2013).
Use of the term remains common in the mass media in contempo-
rary Germany. A  popular Danish TV drama (Borgen), that documents 
the rise and political machinations of a Danish prime minster, is for 
example distributed in Germany with the subtitle Gefährliche (danger-
ous) Seilschaften. In real life, too, certain networks of highly ambitious 
German politicians have been dubbed the Andenpakt (Andean Pact) 
and the Zugspitzkreis (Zugspitz Circle). Both of these much discussed 
Seilschaften follow the mountaineering metaphor and are named after a 
particular mountain range or mountain. In both cases, too, it is notewor-
thy that the reference to a rope party is not only ascribed by the media, 
but is also promoted by the groups’ own founders and members, perhaps 
to reflect some of the mythological aura of ambition and risk- taking of 
Seilschaften in a competitive political landscape.
Perhaps the most prominent German manifestation is the 
‘Similauner’, a select network of top German business managers who meet 
twice a year on mountain trips that serve as bonding events (Manager 
Magazin 2012). Outside German- speaking countries the notion of 
Seilschaften has also found some, albeit as yet limited, use in the political 
science literature, particularly with regard to the organisation of politi-
cal and economic power in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
(McCauley and Carter 1986; Albrecht 2000: 225). The first use of the term 
in the English- speaking political science literature is commonly attributed 
to T. H. Rigby and his colleagues in their work on the organisation of polit-
ical leadership and power in the former USSR (Rigby 1981, 1986; Jözsa 
1983: 135; Albrecht 2000: 225; Ledeneva 2013: 33).
Specific definitions in the literature on governance vary, but com-
mon attributes that are typically associated with Seilschaften (e.g. Emrich 














• Small:  unlike most informal networks, Seilschaften are typically 
small in size, as are the related mountaineering groups.
• The aim is the way to the top: climbing the mountain and climbing 
the career ladder.
• Powerful leadership and trusting followers are key resources: a charis-
matic leader abuses his official position to dish out special favours, 
protection and career promotions to network members in exchange 
for loyal following and support that validate his own power, much 
as a rope- leader takes responsibility for his climbing team.
• Interdependent alliance of fate:  members are tied to one another 
since collusion in corrupt activities such as undeserved promo-
tion makes everyone vulnerable to being called out and everyone a 
potentially dangerous traitor. So on the mountain: if a single mem-
ber acts recklessly, he or she can drag down the entire party.
• Conspiratorial, secretive character:  Seilschaften are typically 
shrouded in secrecy, their power and influence are rumoured to 
be considerable and at times imbued with legendary qualities, yet 
they operate behind the scenes, much as a small group of climbers 
whose heroic race to the summit takes place in the loneliness of the 
mountain far from public view.
• More than an interest- based alliance:  Seilschaften are usually 
believed to be underpinned by a strong collective identity, bonding 
experience and friendship often based on a shared geographic ori-
gin (the same city or region) and/ or a shared educational or profes-
sional background (same alma mater, business school or military 
training). These are reinforced by initiation rites and tests of cour-
age just like those endured by a group of mountaineers whose risky, 
heroic ambitions and joint exposure to extreme mental and physical 
challenges forge a strong group identity and bonding experience.
From the perspective of practical governance, the term Seilschaft 
has a contemporary and important ring. Its metaphorical quality lies in 
its denotation of a set of corrupt practices that are much more subtle, 
reciprocal and multi- dimensional than the transactional bribery prac-
tices that have traditionally been the focus of most anti- corruption work. 
The concept of Seilschaft grants intuitive access to many elements in the 
bricolage of shared ideas and identities, interlocking social relations, con-
ducive organisational dynamics, aligned political calculus and economic 
(inter)dependencies that combine to imbue small bands of economic and 
political elite networks with outsize influence on policy- making at both 
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to issues of kleptocracy, policy and regulatory capture – structural and 
transformational corruption risks that are rapidly assuming a central 
focus in both practical and scholarly work on political and economic 
governance.
7.6 Parteibuchwirtschaft (austria and Germany)
roland arbesleitner
UCL, Uk
The term Parteibuchwirtschaft is a compound word formed from 
Parteibuch (‘party membership book’) and Wirtschaft, which in this con-
text translate as ‘economy’ or ‘enterprise’. The Demokratiezentrum Wien 
(2015a) describes Parteibuchwirtschaft as a means of improving an indi-
vidual’s chances of access to employment, housing or career opportuni-
ties. Thus, this party political distribution of opportunities is designed to 
foster the cohesion of a political camp, but habitually neglects the prin-
ciple of objectivity.
This practice has its origins in the early days of the Austrian Second 
Republic of the 1950s. At that time, identifying with a political party was 
not only an expression of a person’s political standpoint, but often the 
only way to be granted access to employment in public administration or 
in the important sector of state enterprises (Sickinger 2011). Allegedly, 
the practice of Parteibuchwirtschaft was deemed so important that teach-
ers were said to have routinely possessed not one, but two membership 
books – one for the conservative party (ÖVP) and one for the socialist party 
(SPÖ) (Parsons 2014). The practice of boosting one’s chances of access 
to relatively cheap cooperative or council flats by becoming a member of 
a certain party was well established in Austria up until the 1980s. This 
informal practice was not only restricted to economic or administrative 
managerial positions (in which it still plays a vital role today), but also 
encompassed subordinated elements such as the distribution of housing 
space. Consequently, not being a member of or associated with one of the 
major Austrian parties resulted in severely diminished social prospects 
and limited career opportunities in the public sector and in state- owned 
companies. In the late 1980s Parteibuchwirtschaft attracted considerable 
public criticism and as a result was partly abandoned by the nationalised 
industries (Sickinger 2011).
Parteibuchwirtschaft, however, is not limited to Austria. Von Arnim 
(2008) points out that political parties in Germany not only make staff-
ing decisions concerning parliament and the cabinet in this way, but 














administration and the public service sectors in which party- affiliated 
persons are frequently placed. Von Arnim also identified other arenas 
in which membership of, or association with, a political party can open 
otherwise locked doors. Examples included state- owned enterprises 
such as electric power stations, savings banks and public transporta-
tion services. According to him all enterprises in Germany in public 
ownership, or operating in the public sphere, offer employment oppor-
tunities for party- affiliated persons (von Arnim 2008). Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that practices such as Parteibuchwirtschaft are still 
more pronounced in Austria than in Germany, even though the overall 
level of corruption appears to be similar in both countries (Sickinger 
2006).
The economic consequences of practices such as Parteibuch-
wirtschaft have been much commented upon both by authors and jour-
nalists: Poosch (2010) questions whether these practices are ethically 
correct and economically optimal. Based on a critique by Transparency 
International, the German newspaper Handelsblatt (2009) reported that 
the Austrian government makes independent bank supervision exceed-
ingly difficult. It drew attention to the fact that the two top positions of 
the Austrian Financial Market Authority (the body entrusted with bank 
supervision) are filled by persons affiliated to two major Austrian politi-
cal parties.
The above- mentioned case is not the only incidence of Parteibuch-
wirtschaft reported in the Austrian media. In 2013, the Austrian news-
paper Der Standard reported a disagreement between political parties 
about appointments within the local public sector, following the elec-
tion of the government of Carinthia (the southernmost Austrian state) 
earlier that year. In Germany, the newspaper Stuttgarter Nachrichten 
(2012) reported a debate on similar lines in the newly formed state par-
liament of Baden- Württemberg after elections in the previous year. In 
general, debates among parties over the appointment of persons affiliated 
to a party in one way or another are a recurrent source of conflict, espe-
cially in Austria (Schmidt 2010). This explains why Parteibuchwirtschaft 
and similar practices are frequently discussed in both Austrian and 
German media.
The greatest problem in countering these practices is that they are 
difficult to quantify, even though there appears to be no general doubt that 
the ownership of a favourable party membership book plays an impor-
tant role in human resource decisions (Röhl 2007). Ennser- Jedenastik 
(2012) attempted a quantitative analysis of the effects of changes in par-
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enterprises in Austria. He examined the political affiliation of top- level 
managers in these companies between 1995 and 2010, and examined 
possible correlations with the composition of the Austrian govern-
ment coalitions during the same time period. Among other findings, 
the results of the study show that the composition of the government 
had a major influence on appointments to high- level vacancies in state- 
owned enterprises. The study shows that vacancies in larger companies 
were more likely to be filled by party- affiliated persons than vacancies in 
smaller companies. Furthermore, the study showed that positions on the 
boards of directors of companies were in greater demand by the party-
affiliated applicants than executive positions (Ennser- Jedenastik 2012). 
Indications are that Parteibuchwirtschaft is not a thing of the past. On the 
contrary, it still plays a major role in today’s publicly owned industries 
and in the public sector in general.
Previously observed and in part linked to Parteibuchwirtschaft was 
an increase of political apathy among all social groups and across all 
political camps in Austria. This was a contributing factor to the rise of 
Jörg Haider, leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) and later of the 
BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria) in the years between 1986 and 
2008. Jörg Haider became well known throughout Europe for his pop-
ulist rhetoric and political programmes on which the fight against cor-
ruption, privilege, Parteibuchwirtschaft and similar practices was based 
(Neurieser 2008).
The question of how Parteibuchwirtschaft has endured for such a 
long time is pertinent. It appears to be advantageous for political parties 
to employ a system in which they promote and place party- affiliated per-
sons in important positions, rather than making human resource deci-
sions based solely on the professional skills of candidates. Von Armin 
(1995) argues that parties often assign functions and awards to people 
who have some degree of influence over the public, thereby making them 
indebted to the political establishment. Consequently, it can be argued 
that Parteibuchwirtschaft is a tool for power and influence.
An analogous practice to Parteibuchwirtschaft is Parteipatronage, 
also referred to as Ämterpatronage. Both terms describe the preferen-
tial treatment of fellow party members or party- affiliated persons over 
others (Rechtslexikon 2014). Other practices such as Vetternwirtschaft 
have widely been used synonymously, even though this term refers to 
the nomination or promotion of people based on personal bonds such as 
kinship rather than party affiliation. Synonyms for Vetternwirtschaft are 
Nepotismus (‘nepotism’) (Politik- Lexikon 2008) and Freunderlwirtschaft, 
























2015). Proporz is another term often used synonymously, even though it 
has a slightly different meaning. Proporz is an abbreviation for ‘propor-
tionality’. In politics this term refers to the proportional representation 
of parties in political bodies and public functions (Demokratiezentrum 
Wien 2015b), thus this term has a more official connotation than 
Parteibuchwirtschaft. Other expressions worthy of mention include 
Klientelpolitik or Klientelismus (‘clientelism’): although a number of defi-
nitions have been designated to this particular term, common usage of 
Klientelpolitik is not necessarily limited to persons associated with a par-
ticular party, but is generally used to imply a broader network (Muno 
2013). All of the above terms are frequently used synonymously in the 
media as well as in public and private discussions, even though most of 
them have slightly different connotations. What these terms have in com-
mon, however, is the tendency to place interpersonal over performance 
criteria when it comes to human resource decisions and the granting of 
other benefits.
7.7 Tazkia (Iraqi kurdistan)
hemn namiq Jameel
University of Leicester, Uk
Tazkia is an Arabic word, which has a number of different meanings 
according to context. For instance, it can refer to a person who won an 
election without having any competitors, or to someone being confirmed 
as a successful candidate for a party position without any other con-
tenders being considered (Omar 2008). In the context of the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq (KRI), the term has a political nuance and refers to a let-
ter of support issued to the membership of the two ruling parties in the 
KRI, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK). This letter grants members exclusive access to positions 
within the public service sector. It represents an informal practice that 
has developed since the mid-1990s to selectively distribute public ser-
vices among supporters of the KDP and PUK (Figure 7.7.1)
A general introduction to the KRI governance experience is nec-
essary to understand how tazkia works in the public sector arena. The 
1994– 8 KDP and PUK civil war resulted in the division of the KRI institu-
tions into two geographically divided administrations (Stansfield 2004). 
This had a noticeable impact on the KRI governance model. The KDP 
Zone became known as the Yellow Zone, after the colour of the KDP 
flag, and the PUK Zone was identified as the Green Zone, after the col-
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the aftermath of the civil war, and officially ended with the unification 
process of both partisan Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRG) in 2005 
(Ala’Aldeen 2013). However, the repercussions of the civil war continue 
to influence events. Both ruling parties acted independently in the pro-
cess of empowering their armed forces, building their security forces 
and in developing their bureaucracies in their respective zones on the 
basis of political affiliation (Knights and Metz 2014). This, in turn, pro-
vided fertile ground for tazkia to develop and expand within KRI public 
institutions.
Since the administrative division of 2005, the provision of most 
public services in the KRI institutions has taken place through these polit-
icised procedures. Both parties have provided a wide range of opportuni-
ties for their members with regard to the way in which public institutions 
selectively reward them with services and positions. The KDP favoured 
its members with a tazkia letter, which enabled its members to enjoy a 
variety of public services in the Yellow Zone; the PUK acted similarly in 
assisting its own members in the Green Zone. Despite the unification 
process of 2005, the two parties maintained their own influence within 
their respective zones and domination of key areas, including security 
and the military, as well as public finance, which has remained almost 
unchanged (Mala Baxtyar 2015).
Figure 7.7.1 Caricature depicting the application of tazkia by public 
office holders.













Since the mid-1990s the KDP and PUK have enjoyed nearly abso-
lute control over the Yellow Zone and Green Zone respectively, and taz-
kia has continued to be the most common method used by both parties 
to strengthen their organisational bases in the KRI and to widen their 
circle of support among the people. In both zones officials have issued 
tazkia letters to their members to enable them to gain a variety of pub-
lic services. Both parties have interfered in governmental institutions in 
order to provide public jobs, public positions, pensions and land to their 
supporters (Ameen 2009). The tazkia letter has been the key to providing 
access to these services. How does it work?
After unification, the key decision makers of both the former zones 
were the key leaders of the KRG’s cabinets. They continued to generate 
informal procedures through which only people with tazkia could access 
a number of public services. Observers who investigated the example 
of public appointments noted that tazkia has been the only method by 
which people could gain access to the public sector to obtain any kind 
of public job. Although there is a lack of accurate data concerning the 
numbers of people who obtain public jobs through tazkia, it is reported 
that during the electoral campaign of 2009, the PUK alone provided pub-
lic jobs to more than 20,000 people within its former Green Zone using 
this informal practice. Furthermore, in 2010, at the request of the KDP 
and PUK, more than 20,000 new employees were appointed to different 
government institutions on the basis of partisanship, family loyalty and 
localism (Ala’Aldeen 2013: 210).
The intervention of both ruling parties in public affairs through 
tazkia has caused a number of problems for the KRG. For instance, offi-
cials admitted that by the end of 1992, the KRG paid salaries to around 
130,000 people; today, this figure has increased to approximately 
1,344,000 (Rudaw 2015). According to this evaluation, the huge increase 
in the number of people in receipt of public salaries, together with the 
lack of institutionalised recruitment procedures, suggest that tazkia 
has contributed greatly to the high overstaffing levels within the KRG. 
Although the KRG established a system for appointments in 2011, the 
system proved to be unsustainable and was applied for a limited period 
only between 2011 and 2012. In 2013 the new KRG cabinet appointed 
more than 15,000 new employees, in direct contravention of the regu-
lations of newly formed systems, and without advertising job vacancies 
(Sadiq 2014). The remarkable appointment procedure of 2013 showed 
that the domination of the KDP and PUK prevents KRG institutions from 
functioning impartially and from providing public services without polit-
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The intervention of political parties in public institutions, which has 
been obvious and absolute, has damaged the KRI model of governance. 
People outside the KDP and PUK feel alienated by the privileged access 
to key public services given to tazkia holders. It is a serious challenge 
for the governance of the KRI, acknowledged even by the executive lead-
ers of the KDP and PUK (Kurdistani Nwe 2008; KRP 2012). Although the 
current situation appears to have improved compared with the 2000s, 
the dominance of the KDP and PUK over public bodies is apparent and 
tazkia is still required for access to a large number of public institutions. 
Comprehensive political and administrative reform is required to insti-
tutionalise public bodies in the KRI and to pave the way for the applica-
tion of universal norms, which may eventually reduce the power of tazkia 




faculty of Law, University of zagreb, Croatia
An uhljeb is a person who has become a public sector employee through a 
nepotistic relationship or political party affiliation, normally without the 
required skills or qualifications for that position. The verbal noun uhlje-
bljenje refers to the general phenomenon of employing uhljebs. There is 
also a verbal form, uhljebiti, which means earning money from a state 
position (usually irrespective of competence), or from selling overpriced 
supplies to the state. The former usually refers to a job position (often 
lifelong) at a ministry, state agency, local administration body or state- 
owned company. The latter involves securing a contract with one of the 
aforementioned bodies that enables an entrepreneur to prosper by rely-
ing on his network and party memberships. According to linguists, the 
noun uhljeb and verb uhljebiti have roots in the pre- Slavic word for bread 
(xlěbъ). In Russian there are terms with similar meanings that derive 
from this root: a job that feeds but does not require much work (khleb-
noe mesto); someone who has to be ‘fed’ despite lack of real entitlement 
(nakhlebnik) (see kormlenie, 7.1 in this volume). In Bosnia- Herzegovina 
and Serbia the derivatives of uhljeb are also used but not as commonly as 
in Croatia.
Uhljebljenje is associated with the Croatian post- socialist ‘economy 
of favours’ and its crony capitalism, whereby it is common to place a cli-
ent relative into a position of responsibility that ‘feeds’ his family while 




















transitional societies (see trafika, 7.9 in this volume). One notorious case 
of uhljebljenje concerns a member of the Social Democratic Party and 
former managing director of the National Park, who employed a relative 
of the Prime Minister (PM) who had been retired for 23 years prior to 
his questionable employment. Subsequently, the SDP member was pro-
moted to an Assistant Minister position (Forum 2014). When considered 
against Ledeneva’s four- part network- based typology of favours, uhlje-
bljenje is best categorised as a ‘favour as commodity’: public resources 
provided to the recipient that result mostly (although not exclusively) in 
material gain (Ledeneva 2014: 5). Nevertheless, there may be ambiva-
lence in the precise nature of the uhljebljenje ‘favour’ depending on the 
circumstances of the individual case and the subjective perceptions of 
the individuals concerned regarding motivations and expectations. The 
nature of the favour can become redefined with time and circumstances 
(say, if the appointee becomes an elected leader), but they are most 
certainly reserved for those who are ‘one of us’, be it family members, 
relatives, friends, acquaintances and/ or fellow political party members. 
In the previous example the exchange of favours can be seen at several 
levels: a managing director position as a reward for party membership; 
returning the favour by employing the PM’s relative; and finally, the job 
promotion as an additional in- group benefit. It also illustrates the way in 
which the circle of uhljebs reproduces itself and expands. The ambiva-
lence of uhljebljenje is grounded in the elusive nature of favours but also 
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Technically, most uhljebs obtain their jobs by formally applying for 
an advertised position. But it is an open secret that many positions are 
‘reserved’ for internal candidates. Such advertised vacancies used to be 
in the public administration or state- owned enterprises, where an uhljeb 
rather than the best qualified competitor would get the job. A novel trend 
is that a position can be specially created on request in order to employ 
a certain person. The ambiguous, if not non- existent, duties of an uhljeb 
are reflected in their job titles: a ‘Senior associate for energy management 
in the division for systematic energy management in the department for 
supply and systematic energy management that belongs to the office for 
energetics, environment protection and sustainable development of the 
city of Zagreb’ is but one example. There is a joke that an uhljeb needs to 
fold his business card three times if he wants to put it in his wallet (Glas 
Slavonije 2015), and that an uhljeb needs additional training to memo-
rise his job title.
Not only new job positions, but also new divisions, subdivisions, 
departments and agencies are reportedly established in order to absorb 
requests for employment based on network affiliations, but for which 
there is no real need. There are many examples of public agencies, insti-
tutes and departments within ministries with overlapping duties that 
mainly serve as a mecca for uhljebs. This appears to be a transition-driven 
extension of Parkinson’s Law on bureaucratisation, which states that 
bureaucracy naturally expands and perpetuates itself even when the 
tasks it is required to fulfil have not increased.
One policy response to the pervasiveness of uhljebljenje at a corpo-
rate level has been to legalise nepotism. Thus, Zagreb Public Transport 
Company’s Trade Union and Management Board concluded an agree-
ment on giving priority to their employees’ close family members 
when recruiting. They have already started implementing this agree-
ment and stand by the scheme, despite criticism (Večernji list 2015). 
Although the examples from the Croatian capital of Zagreb are the 
most visible (and are probably the most costly for public expenditure), 
similar practices are spread all over Croatia. The recruiting pool for 
potential uhljebs derives from: 128 mayors and 213 deputy mayors and 
their offices; 20 counties plus the City of Zagreb with their adminis-
trations; 428 municipalities with their offices. In addition, there are 
1,420 companies that are either fully, predominantly or partly state- 
owned (831 of which are fully state- owned), plus 44 state agencies 
and numerous other state institutions (new ones appear to be emerg-
ing on an ongoing basis). There are ministries with their departments, 

















sector jobs in such areas as the education and health systems are also 
sometimes viewed as places for uhljebs. This apparently inexhaustible 
list of potential employers for uhljebs does not mean that all of them 
have an ethically and legally questionable employment policy, but does 
give a sense of the systemic nature of nepotistic practices and the cul-
ture of informal affiliation and influence.
The culture of double standards for insiders and outsiders is both 
the cause and the consequence of the overly bureaucratised system. 
It continues the legacy of ‘hidden unemployment’ inherited from the 
socialist era (when people were employed in needless positions in order 
to maintain the illusion of full employment), but also maintains social 
peace and sustains tolerance towards politicians who ensure, if not pri-
oritise, gains for their families and friends in a Machiavellian way. Thus, 
the informal practices of uhljebljenje function to undermine but also 
to support the existing system. Although incidents of uhljebljenje are 
extensively covered in the media (see, for example, the popular Croatian 
tabloid 24 sata’s list of ‘Top 10 uhljebs’ (24 sata 2015)), they are under- 
researched in the academic literature, which has not yet acknowledged 
the practice as a systemic phenomenon. Nevertheless, research explor-
ing the contextual factors underlying uhljebljenje do support anecdotal 
claims that it is an omnipresent practice. State agencies, for instance, 
have been found to operate in a non- transparent way, with strategies 
and action plans that are mostly façades; they continually increase their 
number of employees and related costs; they do not present their results 
or financial reports in a satisfactory form (Bajo and Kolarec 2014).
In terms of material gain for the employee, state agency jobs are 
in great demand, as they offer better salaries and working conditions 
than the ministries. Public enterprises are another highly sought- after 
employer in the public sector as their average net salaries are about 40 
per cent higher than in private enterprises, despite their productivity 
being approximately 30 per cent lower (Vizek 2015). It is estimated that 
in public enterprises alone, incumbent politicians through their influ-
ence employ approximately 20,000 people during one four- year term in 
office (Vizek 2015). When the public sector as a whole is considered, 
unofficial estimates (Slobodna Dalmacija 2015) suggest that 40,000 new 
public employees with appropriate political party/ network affiliations 
are appointed in a four- year term. For the sake of comparison, at the 
time of writing there are about 390,000 public sector employees and 
only about 1 million private sector employees in Croatia. Regardless of 
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does not make sense to change the incumbent as the taxpayer will then 
need to provide for a new wave of uhljebs. These numbers are addition-
ally worrisome as an uhljeb is not usually associated with professional-
ism or competence. This lack of competence facilitates dependence on 
protection, group affiliation, contacts and ‘jobs for life’. Uhljebs are seen 
as a major reason for the inefficiency of the public sector and an obsta-
cle to the prosperity of the Croatian economy. In effect, the best- placed 
uhljebs usually negotiate lucrative contracts with options equivalent to 
‘golden parachutes’ in the private sector.
There are further, long- term consequences of every uhljeb being 
employed. An uhljeb at any position in the hierarchy repays the favour 
by his inclination and/ or obligation to cooperate primarily with his 
in-groups. The reciprocity of the relationships proves an uhljeb’s loyalty, 
but also expands uhljebljenje as a practice with its accompanying mate-
rial gains. Newly recruited uhljebs contribute to the systemic nature of 
uhljebljenje as well as the hypocrisy flourishing in Croatian society, dwell-
ing on what Ledeneva describes as ‘attitudinal ambivalence on the part 
of both individuals and governments, relying on economies of favours, 
but also denying engagement, criticising economies of favours but also 
accepting them’ (2014: 5– 6).  One of the rare examples of expressed 
disapproval and uhljeb- related non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
activism is the website www.uhljeb.info dedicated to raising awareness 
about this issue by highlighting all the aspects of the problem and provid-
ing updates on uhljeb cases.
7.9 Trafika (Czech republic)
alzbeta semsch
UCL, Uk
Trafika is a term used in the Czech Republic and Slovakia describing an 
office in the public sector – most often on boards of state- owned compa-
nies, embassies and consulates – assigned to a fellow politician in return 
for certain favours such as political support or covering up. A person ben-
efitting from trafika is called a trafikant. Such a post typically requires no 
or very little work, but provides a significant salary. A trafikant can simul-
taneously be a member of many supervisory boards of state companies as 
well as running their own business. In this respect trafika differs from the 
other forms of party patronage, such as the contemporary spoils system 
















of the winning party, but unlike trafika these handouts require actual 
work and a suitable skill set (McLean and McMillan 2009).
Trafika is one of the traditional forms of party patronage in which 
state resources are traded for political support (Hopkin 2006). Kopecký 
(2012) argues that this form of patronage, which he calls patronage as 
an electoral resource, has declined. It is being replaced by a practice of 
patronage as an organisational resource: using power to appoint people 
to certain positions, ensuring parties’ survival and success by appointing 
ideologically friendly and loyal individuals.
The word trafika originates in Arabic and came to Czech and Slovak 
through the Italian traffico (to trade). Its original meaning in Czech and 
Slovak is a small kiosk selling tobacco, newspapers and other small 
goods. The second meaning, denoting a practice of handing out state 
jobs to politicians for their services, originates from a tradition under the 
Austro- Hungarian Empire, where the state granted licences to run trafika 
kiosks and sell tobacco to war veterans in recognition of their service. 
This tradition continued in newly established Czechoslovakia after the 
First World War.
Party patronage, of which trafika is a form, exists in many forms 
across the globe in both democratic and non- democratic regimes. What 
varies is the degree of acceptance of it in each society. While in the Czech 
Republic trafika is mostly accepted as part of the everyday give and 
take of political life, in other countries, such as Norway (Allern 2012) 
such a practice is considered a form of corruption. Some countries have 
restrictions on who may become a member of a supervisory board or 
to be appointed to a post in a state- owned company. In Finland, min-
isters, Members of Parliament (MPs) and senior public officers cannot 
be appointed to supervisory boards. In Austria, there is a restriction on 
how many boards one person can be a member of. In Poland, members 
of boards have to complete an exam held by the Ministry of Finance. In 
Greece, there is no salary provided for being a member of a supervisory 
board.
Czech politicians are aware of the potential impact of cases of 
trafika on their popularity, and some have presented proposals to curb 
the practice. One of the latest measures is the establishment of a nomi-
nation committee, which assesses candidates for the supervisory boards 
of state- owned companies. However, Czech anti- corruption campaign-
ers have argued that the nomination committee has not made any real 
impact on the practice of trafika. Trafika cases are well covered by the 
media, but as traditional forms of party patronage are declining and 
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is becoming less identifiable (Kopecký 2012). Elsewhere, Kopecký has 
argued that the spread of party patronage in Czech politics, and that of 
clientelism to a lesser degree, is overestimated in the media and public 
debate (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008).
How deeply trafika is embedded in Czech politics is well illus-
trated by the long drawn out passage of the law on the civil service, 
aimed at making handing out offices in this way more difficult. The 
Czech Republic pledged to adopt a package of legislation on civil ser-
vice reform as part of its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004. 
A Civil Service Act was passed in 2002, but Czech politicians from 
across the political spectrum repeatedly delayed the implementation 
of the law. A new, replacement law was only eventually implemented 
in 2015, 11 years after the Czech Republic had originally pledged to 
do so.
The most high- profile case of trafika in Czech politics is that of for-
mer Prime Minister Petr Nečas, who was accused of bribing three depu-
ties of his own party to resign their parliamentary mandates and thus 
allow the legislation they opposed to pass, by promising them lucrative 
posts in state- owned companies. The three MPs involved also faced pros-
ecution for accepting bribes. Although the scandal forced Mr Nečas to 
resign in 2013, it is revealing that he did not deny his actions as such, but 
denied any wrongdoing by claiming that such deals are part of standard 
political conduct. There was a fierce public debate in the media about 
whether or not this case of trafika should be regarded as corruption, with 
politicians fiercely divided on the issue. The case went to the court on the 
very question of whether an act of corruption had taken place. However, 
the court ruled that nothing illegal had taken place, despite the fact that 
society considered it immoral, and Nečas as well as the trio of MPs were 
acquitted.
Similar practices to trafika have existed in various political systems 
and at numerous points in history. Eighteenth- and early nineteenth- 
century British politics was characterised by the widespread practice 
of sinecures – official salaried positions that required little or no work – 
which were used to reward political loyalty and provided a substantial 
source of income for members of the political elite at public expense. 
Contemporary Radical critics branded the all- pervasive system of sine-
cures, patronage and influence ‘old corruption’ (Rubinstein 1983). In 
France, a practice of emploi fictif – fictitious employment of party activ-
ists or supporters, where a person is granted a position in exchange for 
support – still takes place. Such a person effectively does no work, but 

























of fictitious jobs that required little or no work was common, mostly to 
maintain the 0 per cent unemployment rate (Urban 1988: 3) or to pro-
vide professional sportsmen with a prestigious job title (often in the 
military) and enable them to retain their status of ‘amateur’ athletes 
(Riordan 1991: 4– 5).
7.10 Padrino system/ balimbing (Philippines)
Pak nung Wong
University of Bath, Uk
and
kristine a. Joyce Lara-de-Leon 
Cagayan state University, the Philippines
In the Christian Philippines, the Spanish word padrino literally means 
patron. The padrino system refers to the network of symbiotic relation-
ships between a patron (godfather or godmother) and a client (godchild) 
within the context of Catholic values and interpersonal bonds. Although 
such relationships may be formalised by religious rituals such as wed-
ding ceremonies and baptism in church, they may also be forged outside 
the religious realm, as an exchange relationship between a more power-
ful and resourceful patron and a recipient- client of the patron’s favours. 
While it is safe to say that the padrino system is a network of patron–   
client relations, its instrumental ‘interest- coordinating’ aspect is insep-
arable from its emotive- moral contents. In other words, social transac-
tions are both constrained and enabled by such Filipino  cultural codes 
as the ethics of ‘debt of gratitude’ (Filipino: utang na loob) and the 
psycho- social notion of ‘shame’ (Filipino: hiya). These cultural codes 
constitute the local knowledge system informing how insiders should 
interact with each other and manoeuvre social relations. Thus, the 
padrino system is a tacit knowledge system governing the self and oth-
ers (Wong 2010).
The padrino system also encompasses the Filipino bilateral kinship 
system within which patron– client relations often take place. The padrino 
system highlights the importance of the Filipino idea of the ‘family’, espe-
cially in the making of political decisions. Within the radiating bilateral 
networks of kinsmen and ritual- kinsmen, an individual Filipino necessar-
ily forges selective personal alliances to negotiate his or her way through 
the complexities of intra- familial and inter- familial politics. Reinforcing 
this social fluidity, actual kinship relations are often superseded by the 
influences of personal alliances and antipathies. In political terms, the 
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nor does it only mean blood- tie kinship. The political- economic role 
of ‘family’ is better understood as a combination of blood- tie kinship 
and ritual- kinship networks. A kinship network is a working coalition 
drawn from a larger group related by blood ties, marriage and ritual kin-
ship as well as friendship. As elite families bring such flexible kinship 
ties into the political arena, elections often assume a kaleidoscopic com-
plexity of coalition and conflict, making Filipino politics appear volatile 
(McCoy 2002).
In terms of etymology, the padrino system traces its roots to the 
Spanish colonisation (1521– 1898) of the Philippine archipelago. 
Similar to its Malayo- Polynesian neighbours in maritime South East 
Asia (e.g. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Timor- Leste), the Philippine 
archipelago prior to Spanish colonisation was ruled by a constella-
tion of competing tribal chieftains, who were generally known as the 
‘headman’ (Filipino: datu). Datu- ship operated (and continues to oper-
ate to the present day at the political level) very much in line with the 
Polynesian ‘big- man’ system. The headman as big- man forges patron– 
client relationships with multiple small- men to form a local patrimonial 
polity (Sahlins 1963). Moreover, the pre- colonial business community 
was already dominated by the Chinese, who were ethnically Hokkien 
from Fujian province, China. The ethnic Chinese operated a compat-
ible patron– client system called the ring- leader or boss (Hokkien: tow-
kay). The Spanish relied on and therefore absorbed the native datus 
and Chinese towkays into the colonial governance system as local 
political and economic elites. Gradually, the Spanish evangelised the 
Malayo- Polynesian natives and the Chinese merchants into Christians, 
and Filipino chieftainship and Chinese ring- leadership were absorbed 
into the Catholicised padrino system. In the post- colonial Philippines, 
the padrino system combines the essences of the Malayo- Polynesian 
datu- ship, Chinese ring- leadership and Spanish patronage, forming 
a hybridised practice in present- day Philippine politics and business 
(Wong 2011).
It is important to note that the padrino system has a two- faced char-
acteristic. On the one hand, a padrino is expected to act benevolently to 
the protectorates/ clients in order to win and sustain their loyalty. On the 
other hand, a padrino must act competitively and sometimes coercively 
to the rivals/ enemies in order to protect one’s own turf. As competitions 
often lead to versatile political dynamics, a padrino can easily turn him/ 
herself into a turncoat (Filipino: balimbing), who may seek flexible tacti-
cal alliance with rivals and rivals’ rivals according to strategic necessity 















Balimbing/ belimbing literally means the star- fruit in Malayo- 
Polynesian languages. The shape of a star- fruit signifies a person who pos-
sesses multiple faces/ personalities and often flexibly changes allegiance. 
One may need to change face or assume another personality in order to 
suit the need of a different interactional context, changing political cir-
cumstance and interest- alliance. Apart from the Philippines, such Janus- 
faced performative versatility is also found in Indonesian political culture, 
much reflected by the Javanese practice of double- faced politics (Bahasa 
Indonesian: mukadua) (Wong 2014). In Thailand, the godfather- like local 
power- broker- cum- politician – boss (Thai: jaopho) is another regional vari-
ation that performs similar functions (Chantornvong 2000). Beyond South 
East Asia, the padrino has analogous practices in Europe such as patronage 
in Italy (Boissevain 1966), the caciquismo in Latin America (Kern 1973) and 
‘warlord politics’ in Africa and Asia (Wong 2008, 2012). Methodologically, 
the padrino system and its associated practice of balimbing are best studied 
by qualitative research methods such as extended case studies, discourse 
analysis, ethnography and comparative historical sociology.
The padrino system has three major implications for the study of 
Philippine society, politics and foreign relations. First, the padrino sys-
tem is key to explaining the rise and endurance of the Chinese mestizo 
oligarchs from the colonial to the post- colonial Philippines. For example, 
presidents Corazon Aquino (1986– 92) and Benigno Aquino III (2010– 16) 
are the mother and son respectively from a powerful Chinese mestizo oli-
garchy, the Cojuangco- Aquino clan of central Luzon. While other Chinese 
mestizo oligarchs such as the Osmeña family of Cebu have managed to 
occupy state offices from local to national levels across the Spanish, US 
and post- colonial regimes up to the present, the family patriarch, the 
former Philippine Commonwealth President Sergio Osmeña Sr (1878– 
1961) is already a showcase padrino. When Sergio changed his original 
Chinese surname ‘Go’ to his Spanish godfather’s family name ‘Osmeña’, 
he had already paved the solid path for his successors to practise the 
padrino system all the way up to state power. By conflating economic 
power (Chinese capital) with political power (political connections), one 
of the most enduring locally hailed oligarchies in the Philippines was 
forged (Wong 2009: 60– 4).
Second, the padrino system serves as a key informal institution of 
reciprocal political brokerage in Philippine statecraft. On the one hand, 
local power holders are able to broker economic interests and political 
authority from the centralising state power as the representatives of fron-
tier/ local societies. On the other hand, through the padrino system, state 
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the ways of counter- insurgency, the institutionalisation of the local gov-
ernment, electoral politics and the rule of law (Wong 2013).
Finally, the balimbing aspect of the padrino system is key to under-
standing the Philippines’ approach to international relations. The Aquino 
III regime (2010– 16) has boldly adopted a balimbing- style strategy to 
hedge its relations between the two competing patrons of the Philippines, 
China and the United States. While the Philippines intends to continue to 
enjoy flourishing economic and trade relations with China, Manila also 
successfully invited the US to re- open its military base in the Philippines 
as a strategy to deter China’s growing assertiveness in the disputed 
South China Sea. As Manila continued to profit from its relations with 
both China and the US, the balimbing- style hedging strategy has served 
as an exemplar for how a small Asian power could thrive in the midst 
of global geopolitical competition between the great powers (Wong and 
Kieh 2014).
7.11 Mafia Raj/ Goonda Raj (India/ south asia)
Lucia Michelutti
UCL, Uk
Mafia Raj (or Goonda Raj) is a complex term. It is often employed to make 
moral assessments of the political and economic environments in which 
every day Indians live, to express frustrations concerning the paucity 
of jobs, the absence of meritocracy and the state’s insufficient service 
delivery and accountability. It is also used to articulate systems of politi-
cal and economic governance in which politics, money and crime have 
developed symbiotic relations. As the Hindi word raj (rule, reign, govern-
ment) in Mafia Raj suggests, this is a system in which ‘criminal- political’ 
formations aspire to rule. As such Mafia Raj started to be used widely in 
the Northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the late 1990s. Today 
the term may be applied to a political system as a whole or to sub- systems 
within it. It may apply to a particular area or to particular populations, 
and so we can have ‘pockets’ of Mafia Raj. Such systems of power whose 
modus operandi is so vividly described by fiction, press and social media 
remain mostly absent and abstract in academia. This entry relies on new 
material collected by a collaborative anthropological project on muscular 
systems of economic and political governance in South Asia (Michelutti 
et al. 2016: Introduction).
In India, 34 per cent of current elected Members of Parliament (MPs) 
are said to have criminal histories (see dataset ADR). Public concern with ‘the 



















transcend anxieties about endemic nepotism or the mismanagement of pub-
lic funds. Many ‘criminal politicians’ are accused not just of embezzlement, 
but of burglary, kidnapping and murder; the observed political and eco-
nomic landscapes emerge not only as a ‘corrupt’, but also as a highly 
violent, sphere. Referred to by the names ‘goonda’, ‘dabang’, ‘badmash’, 
‘mafia don’ or ‘godfather’, these individuals are an integral part of eve-
ryday social, political and economic life in the region. Alongside the 
manipulation of later forms of capitalism, competitive electoral politics 
(and their rising costs) are the pillars of the construction of decentralised 
fiefdoms headed by Mafia- esque bosses (see, for example, Brass 1997; 
Hansen 2001; Jaffrelot 2002; Harriss- White 2003; Michelutti 2008; 
Vaishnav 2010; Berenschot 2011; Kumar 2014; Sanchez 2015). Thus 
Mafia Raj are hybrid systems where ‘criminal organisations, politicians, 
police, and bureaucrats – are entangled in a relationship of collusion and 
divestment, sharing control over spaces and population’ (Jaffe 2013; see 
also Bayart et al. 1999). Such systems, which use force to accelerate the 
path towards power and wealth, share similarities with the Caciques and 
Caudillos of Latin America (Arias and Goldstein 2010), the Mafiosi in 
Italy (Blok 1972; Schneider and Schneider 2011; Pine 2012), the sis-
tema in Russia (Ledeneva 2013), urban political machines in the United 
States and today’s gangster politicians in Indonesia, Jamaica, Thailand, 
Philippines, Bulgaria, Turkey and Brazil (see Sidel 1999; Jaffe 2013). 
India’s Mafia Raj are, however, distinctively shaped by a local unique 
passion for ‘the political’ and have some of the highest rates of partici-
pation and contestation in the world (Michelutti 2008). Indisputably, 
‘South Asian sistemas’ represent a unique amalgam. Cases of direct 
reconversion of violent entrepreneurs into political actors are reported 
as fairly rare in other parts of the globe (on this point, see Briquet and 
Faravel- Garrigues 2010). Beside the profit involved in adopting a politi-
cal career path, and the impunity that such careers grant, there is also 
a particular ‘aura’ of prestige and status that goes hand in hand with 
political public posts in South Asia. Such an ‘aura’ is hardly comparable 
with other places such as Italy, Russia or Brazil. In South Asia, ‘When 
you are an MP or City Mayor you are a Raja (a king), you are like a 
god and rich’, (Karim, informant quote). Comparatively, Italian and 
Russian Mafiosi do not seem to have the same ‘cultural’ motivations to 
enter directly into politics, preferring instead to be ‘king makers’ rather 
than ‘kings’.
Mafia has indeed become a South Asian term and a ‘folk concept’. 
In South Asia the Italian words mafia or mafioso are increasingly used 
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such its meaning should not be separated from the socio- cultural con-
texts in which it is used and talked about in everyday life and in public 
discourse (including the discourse of the state). The South Asian term 
mafia is employed to refer to organised crime in general, and also to 
business enterprises that seek to monopolise particular trades through 
extra- legal and violent means (‘alcohol mafia’, ‘water mafia’, ‘oil mafia’, 
‘coal mafia’ or the ‘criminal mafia’ or a variety of ‘land- grabbing’ prac-
tices known as ‘land mafia’). Local expressions such as ‘company’, ‘lobby’, 
‘firm’ or ‘racket/ cartel’ (in Hindi English), ‘parivar’ (family) or ‘groups’ 
or ‘rings’ can describe anything from a protection racket to a power syn-
dicate, a violent lobby/ interest group or handful of ambitious criminals 
working as part of a team. It should be noted that contrary to the Italian 
Sicilian ‘mafia’, the local ‘desi mafias’ are neither hierarchically institu-
tionalised nor do they have long- running histories. These are often new 
entities that make strategic use of caste and community kinship connec-
tions and cultural idioms but are not necessarily structured by them. 
‘Companies’ and ‘groups’ are not appendices to coherent and centralised 
criminal organisations; rather, they are part of broader systems of boss-
ism, as explored by Michelutti et al. (2016). These are ultimately systems 
of governance, which are embedded simultaneously in predatory and 
democratic logics. Local bosses often present themselves as Robin Hoods 
without hiding their collusion with the state (or co existence with the 
state). In fact, ‘being part’ of the state is what provides them with appeal 
and power; thus bosses are often not anti- status quo characters or part 
of ‘parallel states’ (Leeds 1996). They are not part of ‘shadow networks’ 
with distinctive forms of authority and politico- economic organisation 
(Nordstrom 2000: 36). They do not present themselves as alternatives to 
the state but as ‘the state’.
7.12 Pork barreling (Usa)
andrew h. sidman
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of 
new york, Usa
In the United States, ‘pork barreling’ refers to a process whereby members 
of the legislative branch secure spending on projects and programmes, 
often called ‘distributive spending’, for their constituents. Pork barreling 
is practised at all levels of government. At the federal level, the pork bar-
rel is comprised of thousands of projects and programmes, payments 
through which can be targeted to particular geographic areas, such as 















of salted pork from which rations were distributed to slaves on planta-
tions (Rawson 2007) and its original use is meant to inspire the image 
of legislators rushing to secure as much spending as possible for their 
districts (Maxey 1919).
The concept of the pork barrel was born in the US Congress on 
20 May 1826 with the passage of the first omnibus appropriations bill for 
the improvement of rivers and harbours (Maxey 1919). That first omni-
bus bill included all of the river and harbour appropriations desired by 
members. With nearly every member receiving an appropriation, major-
ity support was guaranteed for passage of the bill. The practice lends 
itself to universalism in that it enables most, if not all, legislators to secure 
benefits for their districts. Universalism is thought to be easier to achieve 
in pork barreling because of the legislature’s desire for sizable majority 
coalitions in these matters and the diffusion of the costs of individual 
programmes (Weingast et al. 1981). Despite the majoritarian nature 
of the US House of Representatives, universalism may also result from 
the  majority party at least partially supporting the distributive desires 
of the minority party in order to avoid criticism from the minority (Balla 
et al. 2002).
In modern practice, Congress creates programmes that are then 
administrated by agencies of the executive branch. Once the pro-
grammes have been created, members of Congress and their staff help 
their constituents to secure benefits by advertising the existence of the 
programmes and assisting with various aspects of the selection pro-
cess. In addition to these permanent programmes, Congress has rou-
tinely allowed the practice of ‘earmarking’, which permits a member 
to request funds for particular projects. These requests are typically 
added to the appropriations bills that collectively comprise the fed-
eral budget, but they can be added to any legislation. Earmarking has 
been banned in Congress since 2010, but this ban has had little effect 
on overall spending since earmarks comprise a small share of overall 
pork- barrel spending, and funding can continue through other estab-
lished programmes (Harrington 2015).
While most academic research on the pork barrel has focused on the 
United States, the practice is found in several other countries. Theoretical 
work on distributive benefits suggests that legislators prefer these types 
of benefits in countries with first- past- the- post elections/ single- member- 
plurality district representation; this is because of the diffuse costs and 
the possibility of targeting benefits geographically (Weingast et  al. 
1981). In Germany, for example, legislators elected under the first- past- 
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them better opportunities to address the needs of their geographic con-
stituencies. Legislators elected through proportional representation are, 
by contrast, more likely to sit on committees that serve the constituencies 
of the broader party (Stratmann and Baur 2002).
Legislators’ desires for pork stem from the electoral consequences 
of these benefits. Distributive benefits are assumed to be an important 
source of incumbency advantage in that they afford opportunities for 
credit claiming (Mayhew 1974). More spending, for example, tends to 
flow to districts represented by electorally vulnerable House incumbents 
(Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2009). Establishing a solid link between pork- 
barrel spending and election outcomes has, however, been difficult. Early 
studies of the relationship between the pork barrel and electoral out-
comes tend to report null findings at the district level (Stein and Bickers 
1994). These null aggregate effects are likely caused by the electoral 
effects of benefits being conditioned by other factors.
Much research has emphasised the conditioning effects of incum-
bent partisanship. These studies tend to report significant electoral ben-
efits from traditional pork barreling, but only for Democratic incumbents 
(Alvarez and Saving 1997; Levitt and Snyder 1997). In explaining parti-
san differences, Bickers and Stein (2000) suggest that these differential 
partisan effects could result from the type of benefits being received by 
the district. They distinguish between ‘Democratic pork’, which includes 
what is traditionally thought of as the pork barrel, and ‘Republican pork’, 
which includes federal loan and insurance programmes.
Because of these electoral benefits, party leaders in Congress are 
thought to use pork- barrel spending to support the legislative process 
and encourage behaviour that is beneficial to the party. Evans (2004) 
finds that pork is frequently added to legislation by leaders to build 
majority coalitions. In an op- ed published in the Los Angeles Times, two 
former members of Congress argue that reinstating the practice of ear-
marking could help to reduce the recent gridlock in Congress (Frost and 
Davis 2015). Cann and Sidman (2011) show that increases in pork- barrel 
spending tend to flow to districts represented by members who have 
voted more often with their party leaders and who have donated to the 
campaigns of their co- partisans.
Given the research, one might expect partisan or ideological divi-
sions in the public over support for the pork barrel. Sellers (1997), 
for example, finds that voters are less likely to vote for pork- barreling 
incumbents who are expected to be fiscally conservative. Sidman and 
Mak (2006) find that self- identified conservatives are less likely to 














spending. Despite these ideological divisions, there seems to be agree-
ment in the public regarding earmarking, which has tended to be the 
most visible aspect of the pork barrel, even though it was a minor part. 
A recent survey from the Economist Group/ YouGov finds that a major-
ity of Americans support the earmark ban (Egger 2016). Such gauges 
of public opinion with respect to the pork barrel are, unfortunately, 
rare. The pork barrel is rarely an issue that is salient enough to gener-
ate significant reaction from the electorate. It is more likely that the 
pork barrel contributes to public opinion on government spending 
generally. Given public support for many forms of government spend-
ing (Ellis and Stimson 2012), the incentives from the single- member 
plurality district system and the history of the pork barrel, it is a prac-
tice that will likely continue unabated.
7.13 Tamozhennye l’goty (russia)
anna Bailey
UCL, Uk
Tamozhennye l’goty refers to a practice in 1990s post- Soviet Russia, 
whereby certain privileged charitable organisations were awarded the 
right by the federal government to import products – typically alcohol 
and tobacco – without paying excise duty. The practice can be seen as 
an instance of the ‘state capture’ that plagued Russian state institutions 
in the 1990s: the ability of private individuals and firms to extract pref-
erential treatment from the state for little or nothing in return (Frye 
2002). The word l’goty (singular form: l’gota) literally means ‘benefits’ or 
‘privileges’, while tamozhennye is the plural adjectival form of the noun 
tamozhnya (customs). The term l’gota can be used in a wide range of 
contexts, for example sotsial’naya l’gota (‘social benefit’, such as veterans’ 
entitlement to free public transport), and nalogoviye l’goty (tax breaks). 
Often when the context of use is clear, the term l’gota is simply used, 
without an adjective.
The phenomenon of tamozhennye l’goty began with Presidential 
Decree No. 1973 of 22 November 1993, which granted the National 
Sports Federation (NSF) exemption from customs payments on goods 
imported for international sports tournaments. An executive order of 
13 May 1994 then extended the exemption to all goods purchased by the 
Federation, including vodka, which was the preferred good imported by 
the NSF, mainly because of the super profits it generated (despite the 














3897.13 tamozhennye l ’goty (rUssIa)
389
Russia). Such privileges were later extended to other charitable organi-
sations – including the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) – all of which 
took advantage of the enormous profits to be made by importing excise- 
free vodka and cigarettes (Bailey 2018).
Inevitably, the super revenues that tamozhennye l’goty offered to 
the charitable foundations meant that the mafiya was quick to infiltrate 
the practice. Some mafiya groups posed as qualified charities and foun-
dations, and they ultimately took control of the customs privileges owned 
by the genuine foundations too. Mafiya groups have been described as 
‘functionally integrated’ into the Russian market at this time (Volkov 
2000), and they bought themselves well- connected ‘roofs’ (kryshi, 
meaning ‘protection’), either through the law enforcement agencies or 
politicians and government officials (Galeotti 1998: 424). In short, the 
mafiya effectively infiltrated both state and civil society organisations in 
this period (Ledeneva 2000: 4).
Infighting between mafiya gangs competing to secure control of 
the wealth generated by tamozhennye l’goty led to a string of success-
ful and attempted assassinations of prominent members of charitable 
foundations in the 1990s. The chairman of the Russian Foundation 
for Invalids of the War in Afghanistan (RFIVA), Mikhail Likhodey, was 
killed in 1994 by a bomb outside his apartment. In 1997 mourners 
were gathered at the Kotlyakovskoye cemetery on the anniversary of 
Likhodey’s death for a memorial service when a bomb went off, claim-
ing 14 victims including the RFIVA’s new president, Sergey Trakhirov. 
This bombing was apparently connected to a struggle between warring 
mafiya factions over control of the Foundation’s vast fortune accumu-
lated from tamozhennye l’goty, valued at $200 million USD (Harper 
1999: 232). Altogether the RFIVA suffered 34 killings and 62 wound-
ings in such violent incidents. The president of the Russian Ice Hockey 
Federation, Valentin Sych, was shot dead, while the first deputy presi-
dent of the NSF, Fedorov, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. 
According to the Prosecutor General’s Office, the murder of Sych was 
a result of an internal struggle in the Federation relating to control by 
organised crime groups over its finances (Fituni 2000: 18).
Tamozhennye l’goty represented just one manifestation of a general 
trend of ‘state capture’ in 1990s Russia (Frye 2002). There was, however, 
resistance from within the state to the ‘capture’ of l’goty: the Ministry of 
Finance (Minfin) soon proposed a decree annulling all such l’goty. Yet 
even Minfin was not strong enough to withstand the forces of state cap-

















expiration of the l’goty, the bulk of which were only eventually brought to 
an end in 1996 (Nemtsov 2009: 102).
The use of tamozhennye l’goty led to the so- called ‘Tobacco scan-
dal’ that engulfed the ROC. The ROC’s benefits were introduced –  
apparently at the request of Patriarch Alexy II – in 1996, and were 
cancelled in November of the same year by presidential decree (No. 
1363). The affair was exposed in 1997 by the journalist Sergei 
Bychkov in a series of articles published in the Moskovsky Komsomolets 
newspaper. The Church’s import business was conducted through 
its Department of External Relations, dealing mainly in the import 
of duty- free cigarettes, but also vodka. The Department of External 
Relations was headed at this time by Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk 
and Kaliningrad. Bychkov dubbed him the ‘tobacco metropolitan’ (a 
headline from one of his articles) – a nickname that stuck. Kirill went 
on to become Patriarch of the ROC in 2009, and while the ‘Tobacco 
scandal’ does not seem to have harmed his career, critics have not 
allowed the affair to be forgotten. The sociologist Mitrokhin estimated 
the profits the Church made from its tamozhennye l’goty operation at 
$1.5 billion USD, while journalists suggested a much higher figure of 
$4 billion USD (Ofitserov 2008).
Charitable foundations and mafiya groupings were not the only 
actors who benefitted from tamozhennye l’goty. The practice provided 
a means for broker companies involved in importing alcohol to avoid 
excise duty: they could simply pay a foundation or charity a fee to 
import the alcohol on their behalf, the fee being a fraction of the duty 
avoided. The scope for super profits was much less in the beer market 
than for hard spirits, due to higher production costs per gram of pure 
alcohol. Nevertheless, even some beer importers made use of charita-
ble foundations’ customs privileges to avoid excise duty. This was at a 
time when domestic beer production in Russia had not yet taken off, 
and the novelty of imported foreign beer provided a lucrative niche 
market, especially in Moscow (Harper 1999: 162– 3). Thus, the impact 
of state capture in the form of customs privileges reached far beyond 
the official beneficiaries (the funds and charities). It transformed the 
entire structure of the alcohol market: even legally operating firms 
were forced to resort to informal grey practices just to remain competi-
tive (Bailey 2018). It is difficult to estimate the total loss to the Russian 
budget of tamozhennye l’goty in the 1990s. One estimate puts the cost of 
lost excise revenues at 4 trillion roubles in 1994 alone (Nemtsov 2009: 
101). According to the vice chairman of the Accounting Chamber, just 














3917.14 KumoterStwo  and KoleSioStwo  (PoLand)
391
billion USD to buy off the remaining contracts the foundations had in 
place (Nemtsov 2009: 102).
The practice of tamozhennye l’goty illustrates the ambivalence of 
the concept of ‘informal’. In what sense should the l’goty be considered 
an informal practice if they had a formal legal basis? On the one hand, 
the practice was instituted by government decrees and associated with 
formal organisations. On the other hand, this legislation was brought 
about through non- transparent processes at a time of widespread state 
capture. At best, the practice was camouflaged by the rhetoric of sup-
port for organisations such as war veterans; at worst, it was secretive and 
corrupt, in the sense that the formal state mechanisms of government 
and law were hijacked by individual private interests for personal gain. 
The practice had the aura of an open secret that was officially decreed, 
yet needed to be concealed, as evidenced by the fact that the exposure 
of the ROC’s l’goty led to the ‘Tobacco scandal’. Moreover, the practice 
effectively became a cover- up for mafiya enrichment – an informal means 
of diverting revenues that were due to the state treasury into the hands 
of criminal structures. Tamozhennye l’goty therefore represented a some-
what paradoxical phenomenon: an informal practice being perfectly 
legal yet ethically dubious, using the formal instruments of the state yet 
serving private, if not criminal, elite interests, thus fitting the concept of 
legal corruption (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011).
7.14 Kumoterstwo and Kolesiostwo (Poland)
Piotr korys and Maciej tyminski
faculty of economic sciences and Institute of social research, 
University of Warsaw, Poland
Kumoterstwo and kolesiostwo describe similar but not identical practices 
commonly found in Poland. Kumoterstwo derives from the old Polish 
noun kum that, while rarely heard today, was once commonly used to 
mean a close friend or neighbour. It describes an informal practice that 
is widely practised in many countries:  that is, a mutual exchange of 
favours between relatives, friends or colleagues. In the English- speaking 
world it is known as cronyism, nepotism or favouritism, whereas in 
French- speaking countries it is called copinage or favoritisme. While such 
relations are usually enacted between partners on a horizontal basis, 
hierarchical relations are also possible, for example in patron– client rela-
tions between relatives, friends or colleagues.
Kolesiostwo also describes a non- market exchange of favours 





















and is therefore more narrowly focused than kumoterstwo. Derived from 
the Polish noun koleś – an informal term meaning ‘colleague’ (kolega in 
more formal Polish) – the term came into use only after 1989. It is similar 
in meaning to the English term ‘old boys’ network’ (see 3.13 Volume 1) or 
to what in Spanish and Italian is known as amiguismo (see amici, amigos, 
1.21 Volume 1). In Polish, however, it has a broader meaning than the 
English ‘old boy’. It also includes relations with neighbours and contacts 
established through public activities such as social movements, political 
parties or religious organisations.
Forms of non- market exchange have deep historical roots and were 
widely practised and accepted in pre- industrial societies. From the point 
of view of the modern world, however, governed as it is by the principles 
of the market economy, practices such as kumoterstwo and kolesiostwo 
are frowned upon since they lead to an unjust and inefficient allocation 
of material resources and social status. That is because benefits are dis-
tributed between the members of a closed social network on the basis 
not of an individual’s skills or achievements, but of his or her personal 
connections.
Kumoterstwo’s origins can be traced back to the Polish- Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Favouritism 
and cronyism were key drivers of the political system of the time, known 
as Nobles’ Democracy. Under that system, the nobility enjoyed extensive 
legal rights and privileges; in particular, they controlled the legislature 
and elected the king of the Commonwealth (Mączak 2003). Kumoterstwo 
survived the successive partitions that divided Poland in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries between Russia, Prussia and Habsburg Austria, 
and proved especially resilient in the Russian part of Poland (Chwalba 
1995). Various forms of kumoterstwo remained common in the period 
between the two World Wars.
Following the Second World War, when Poland came under com-
munist rule and a command economy was installed, kumoterstwo became 
even more widespread. Informal networks of friends, colleagues and 
family – known as koterie, kliki or sitwy (cliques) – played a vital role in 
helping people to survive in a non- market economy plagued by constant 
shortages. In such an environment, networks formed an essential compo-
nent of social capital, mostly in its binding (as opposed to bridging) form 
(Tarkowski 1991; Tymiński 2002; Kochanowski 2010).
The following example illustrates how small- scale cronyism worked 
in the 1960s. As leader of the trade union in a factory in Pruszków (a 
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trade- union officials but also the leaders of the factory’s branch of the 
ruling Polish United Workers’ Party. Together, the clique exploited their 
positions to secure higher incomes for themselves, to control the factory’s 
social funds, and to marginalise anyone who opposed them. When excur-
sions were planned for the workers, Jan J. declared that, as a reward for 
their activities, members of the clique would travel for free. Thus the 
records state that, ‘The following are not required to pay for the July 
1966 trip to Gdansk, Gdynia and Malbork: Jan J. and his wife Stanisława; 
Krystyna, daughter of Comrade Mieczysław G. and her partner Zbigniew 
W’. Similarly, ‘Trade- union treasurer Krystyna B. and her daughter Anna; 
Halina, daughter of Comrade Jan J.; Comrade Mieczysław G. and his 
wife Halina’ were not required to pay for a trip to Kraków, Zakopane and 
Czechoslovakia (Tymiński 2005).
Poland’s transition to the market in 1989 saw a gradual decline 
in the importance of kumoterstwo in the market sector of the economy. 
However, informal networks laid the groundwork for the rise of state 
and regulatory capture (Łoś and Zybertowicz 2000; Staniszkis 2001; 
Gadowska 2005; Zybertowicz and Sojak 2008). In the public sector as 
well as in many spheres where the public sector interacts with the mar-
ket, informal networks remain important, as many analyses show (Jarosz 
2004; Koryś and Tymiński 2005; Rosicki 2012). They are important, for 
example, in the health care system. As one young medical doctor (quoted 
in Suchodolska 2015), reported,
I have colleagues who got residency in this specialisation (urology), 
and now they regret it. They were people ‘off the street’, lacking 
the support of well- connected friends or colleagues. So, in order to 
discourage them, they are not allowed to examine the patients or 
to participate in the surgeries. All they are allowed to do is fill out 
documents.
Kumoterstwo continued to play a role even after Poland’s transi-
tion to democracy and the market was seen from Rywingate, a corruption 
scandal that erupted in 2002. Award- winning film producer Lew Rywin 
allegedly visited Adam Michnik, chief editor of the Gazeta Wyborcza 
newspaper, to solicit a bribe of US$17.5 million. In return, Rywin offered 
to use his political connections to lobby for legislative changes that would 
allow the newspaper’s parent company to enter the television business. 
Rywin claimed to be speaking on behalf of ‘a group of people in power’, 
by implication, an unidentified clique of senior politicians. Rywin subse-





















guilty and sentenced to prison. Numerous parliamentary investigations 
only added to the public impression of ‘an impenetrable network of 
social friendships, mutual obligations, business interests and plain old- 
fashioned nepotism’ (Repa 2003).
Similarly emblematic of kumoterstwo was an SMS sent in March 
2003 by an official from the National Broadcasting Council (the body 
responsible for supervising Poland’s TV and radio stations) to the head 
of TVP, Poland’s public broadcasting corporation. In it, the official pro-
moted a member of his old boys’ network for a highly paid position in 
public television: ‘Think about U. He is superb guy, loyal and hardwork-
ing, I like him. […] Glory to us and our colleagues’ (Koryś and Tymiński 
2004, 2005).
Cronyism remains widespread, even in developed market econo-
mies (Begley et al. 2006, 2010). Post- communist Poland is no exception, 
as the above examples illustrate. Such practices are generally disap-
proved of and legislated against, as Poland did in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Nevertheless, the practices continue.
7.15 Quàn jiu (China)
nan zhao
UCL, Uk
In the Chinese tradition, quàn jiǔ is the practice of toasting during a ban-
quet, using kind, praising and appreciative words to welcome guests (see 
sadghregrdzelo, 7.16 in this volume). A typical practice in guanxi net-
works (see 1.12 Volume 1), quàn jiǔ is usually performed on formal occa-
sions. It facilitates social interaction by acting as a conversation starter 
between both strangers and old acquaintances.
Quàn jiǔ is a well- established practice with a long tradition, which 
has clear rules that distinguish it from other simple drinking practices. 
It does not only revolve around alcohol as a social lubricant, but brings 
together forms of social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986), enabling 
the person invited to participate with prestige. Refusing to participate 
would be a form of irreverence, and would temporarily exclude the per-
son from the sociability of the guanxi network. The etiquette of quàn 
jiǔ is an essential part of Chinese drinking culture, being taught in the 
family. Education involves teaching how to urge others to drink, what to 
say when toasting, and the appropriate techniques to make people drink 
more when attending official engagements.
The Chinese usually practise quàn jiǔ with bai jiu, a type of strong, 
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and rice. To a non- trained, Western person, bai jiu might seem similar 
to vodka. In fact, there are fundamental differences. Bai jiu is stronger 
(it is typically between 40– 60 per cent alcohol). A Chinese proverb met-
aphorically compares the two traditional liquors, saying that two shots 
of vodka are enough to see the devil, but a single shot of bai jiu is more 
than enough. While vodka is distilled from grain, bai jiu has a more 
complex manufacturing process, which makes it more ‘natural’ than the 
‘chemical’ vodka. Bai jiu’s quality is essential; participants evaluate it 
according to various criteria ranging from strength, flavour and ‘natu-
ral- ness’. Failing to meet the standards on any account reflects badly on 
the host.
Bai jiu helps people to release their emotions. Confucianism, with 
its fairly conservative and remissive culture inhibits open discussion and 
displays of feelings, compelling the Chinese to find alternative forms of 
emotional expression. In this context, bai jiu is not merely an alcoholic 
beverage, but a cultural and poetic lubricant that can release melancholy 
or trigger happiness. Li Bai, a well- known poet in the Tang Dynasty (AD 
618– 907) said that, ‘releasing your melancholy through bai jiu may add 
more sadness to you’. Conversely, an old Chinese saying supports the 
exact opposite view – ‘a thousand cups of bai jiu are not enough when 
bosom friends gather together’.
The process of quàn jiǔ is divided into several steps. After serv-
ing the cold appetisers, the hosts are expected to make a toast, follow-
ing certain etiquette. First, the hosts stand up; the guests follow their 
lead. Everyone raises their glass and keeps it at midair in front of their 
chest. Second, the host toasts the guest of honour followed by the other 
guests. The order of toasting is of great importance – it is in descend-
ing order according to the guests’ social status. The language of toasting 
involves praising that goes beyond the traditional Western ‘thank you’. 
For example, ‘your presence makes my house resplendent and magnifi-
cent’ is a commonly used phrase. Historically, the language of toasting 
was even more elaborate. Over a century ago, Empress Dowager Tzu- His 
gave a banquet to celebrate her sixtieth birthday, serving royal alcohol 
to her ministers. In turn they toasted her, saying: ‘may your fortune be 
as  boundless as the East Sea and may you live a long and happy life’ 
(Chang 2013).
After the toasting, diners are likely to start drinking challenges that 
require them to perform ganbei (‘drying the cup/ glass’). Glasses are filled 
with bai jiu, and the guests have to drink several shots in order to show 
their respect for the hosts. The toasting practice and the nature of bai jiu 














stigma attached. For their part, diners need to toast everyone who might 
outrank them. This practice is called jing jiu, which literally translates as 
‘respectfully proposing a drink to someone else’. The etiquette of quàn jiǔ 
dictates that the person who initiates the toast is in an inferior position 
and needs to show respect. This requires standing up, holding the glass 
with both hands and drinking up the bai jiu in one shot. The person who 
receives the toast may remain seated and drink only a little. Typically 
though, in order to show respect, the receiver of the toast would also 
empty their glass.
More generally, in the drinking process everyone is expected to 
slightly touch on each other’s glass. People hold their glasses according 
to their status; younger guests and those in subordinate positions are 
required to keep them lower than their elders or superiors. Accordingly, 
elders and superiors should be served first. After drinking, younger 
guests might tip their glasses towards the seniors, to show that no bai jiu 
is left. This is a form of politeness and respect.
The practice of quàn jiǔ is gendered. Women are not expected 
to drink as much. Nevertheless, northern regions of China such as 
the Liaoning Province, Xijiang Province and Inner Mongolia are well 
known for female heavy drinkers. The practice of quàn jiǔ involves 
‘urging others to drink’. This can be interpreted as a challenge among 
equals with symbolic consequences for both competitors. Refusing to 
drink leads to a ‘loss of face’ for the person who proposed it, while 
accepting preserves or increases the reputation of the proponent. A 
generally accepted winning strategy during business banquets is that 
everybody should be drinking. Successful businesspeople are usually 
proficient drinking partners, as a lack of such skills could easily affect 
the company’s reputation.
Quàn jiǔ is a way to express trust and build social relationships. The 
language used in toasting is positive, praising and appreciative of the per-
son or their work. Such language reduces the social distance, while alco-
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I have a problem understanding someone whom I know really well 
when suddenly [at a banquet this person] begins to behave com-





















like a ‘blurring of the borders’. … The borders between the real me 
and this imagined me, which I want to play, become so blurred that 
you don’t know who you are. And the people with whom you inter-
act are also lost.
The confusion expressed in the interview above by a young Georgian 
activist relates to the identity of her acquaintances and is provoked by a 
fundamental personal transformation that takes place in the process of 
proposing a toast (sadghegrdzelo) at a festive meal (supra) in Georgia 
(Tbilisi, 2004). A toast should come ‘from the heart’, which is why, 
sometimes, Georgians place their left hand on their heart while holding 
a glass of wine, vodka or cognac in their right hand. Underlying this dis-
play of emotional veracity is a rigid behavioural and linguistic code. A 
toast may be proposed only to shared values – dissent must be avoided 
at all cost – and should be phrased in a specific, grammatically complex 
manner. This mixture of authenticity and strictly formalised behaviour 
may cause confusion (as expressed in the quotation above). The borders 
between ‘me’ and ‘not me’ (or ‘real me’ and ‘imagined me’, as in the quo-
tation) become so blurred that they are indistinguishable (Schechner 
1983). It is this ambivalence that lies at the heart of toasting.
The term sadghegrdzelo is a compound of the words dghe (day) 
and ghrdzeli (long). In this form, sadghegrdzelo means ‘to a long life’, a 
wish that is expressed in the form of a toast. In the context of a festive 
meal presided over by a toastmaster (tamada), the toasts follow a gen-
erally uniform, yet not entirely fixed, structure. The tamada raises the 
first toast in each of the many rounds of toasting and introduces a topic 
that is then taken up and elaborated on by the other participants in the 
ritual. Certain topics are obligatory, such as toasts to the family and the 
deceased, and a certain pattern is prescribed, such as following a toast 
to the deceased by proposing a toast to life, often presented as a toast 
to children. In addition, toasts to attributed identity (such as family or 
gender) are commonly proposed before toasts to acquired identity (such 
as profession or hobbies) (Chatwin 1997).
Some toasts reinforce national values (especially the toast to the 
motherland, also more subtly expressed in toasts to culture, song and 
history); gender identity (particularly the obligatory toast to women); 
family values; and peer- group identity. The toasts should express hon-
our to the addressee or the topic in question and should not contain any 
colloquial expressions, let alone swear words, gossip or criticism. Each 


















One should not, however, merely repeat formulas in a toast; that 
would be considered poor performance. The challenge is to improvise 
and propose toasts in an original, personalised way. Thus, the topics of 
the main toasts and the overall structure are given, but the transmitted 
factors, or ‘tradition’, must be acquired and integrated into personal, 
intentional behaviour in order to complete the performance and make 
it successful. Consequently, a ‘correct’ performance of the supra is based 
not on a faithful reproduction of an ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ procedure, but 
on the willingness and ability of the performer to adjust the formulas to 
their personality.
It is not possible at a Georgian banquet to drink alcohol without 
relating it to a toast. Merely sipping wine is a deadly sin. The ritual con-
sumption of wine and its connection to food has obvious parallels in the 
Christian Holy Communion. But wine in the context of the Georgian 
banquet is not exclusively attributed to the blood of Christ. Since many 
Georgians believe Georgia to be the birthplace of wine, and since there 
are many traces in Georgian culture that indicate the primary importance 
of wine for Georgian identity, wine becomes a metaphor for Georgian 
blood, and those who share wine at a supra become virtual kinsmen.
The rules of etiquette at the supra are strict and serve as a formal-
ised process for attributing honour. Everybody should be included in the 
process, but a hierarchy based on social structures must also be observed. 
Who is addressed by the toastmaster, when and how, who speaks after 
whom and for how long, who drinks when and how much – all these 
factors may be considered part of a performance of status. Boys show 
that they have become men when they stand during a toast to women or 
the deceased, while women and children remain seated. Men who have 
stopped actively participating in the process of drinking and toasting are 
most likely no longer considered the head of their family. Hence, toasting 
in the Georgian way encompasses both competition and solidarity (see 
quàn jiǔ, 7.15 in this volume).
The supra is a mainstream representation of Georgian tradition, 
said to be too old to be dated accurately. Historical sources suggest, how-
ever, that the supra in its current form is a product of the nineteenth 
century, and that it is closely related to the rise of bourgeois and aris-
tocratic culture in Tbilisi as well as to the formation of a national move-
ment. Western travelogues from the fiftheenth to eighteenth centuries 
(von Busbeck 1589/ 1926; Lamberti 1654; Chardin 1686; Contarini 
1837)  describe the long and vivid history of ritualised drinking, but 
the Georgian words for toastmaster and toast cannot be found in these 
















concepts. According to the travelogues, moreover, wine was frequently 
drunk without any ritual framing.
These observations are supported by Georgian literature and his-
toriography. Feasts have been a common topic in Georgian sources ever 
since the ‘Golden Age’ of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, but no 
mention of toasting or toastmastership can be found. As late as in the 
nineteenth century, the poet Akaki C’ereteli (1989 [1884]: 24– 82, in par-
ticular p. 25), wrote that the ‘ancestors’ did not propose toasts at the table 
and would have been ashamed to have witnessed the present- day phe-
nomenon. There is no mention of ‘toast’ or ‘toastmaster’ in the dictionary 
compiled in the early eighteenth century by Sulxan Saba Orbeliani (1991 
[1716]), an omission that would be hard to explain had the Georgian 
banquet at that time been the same as today’s.
The word sadghegrdzelo first appears in written form in 1827 in a 
cycle of poems by the Georgian aristocrat Grigol Orbeliani (1959), often 
considered one of the fathers of the national liberation movement (Ram 
2014). The poems are written in the form of toasts and recall national 
heroes as well as their deeds. This genre quickly became popular at ban-
quets. Remembering the past as a toast had become a form of national 
education following Tsarist Russia’s annexation of Georgia in 1801 and 
the consequent suppression of national sovereignty. In this context, the 
verbal evocation of the past turns at the table into a patriotic mission. It 
also becomes a way of relocating national sovereignty from the realm of 
the official (from where it had disappeared following the Russian annex-
ation) to the sphere of informality.
This sphere of informality proved of crucial importance during 
the twentieth century, when Georgia was part of the USSR. During the 
Soviet period, the supra provided space for informally addressing the 
shortages of the Soviet economy and the problems of making a living; 
it was here that networks were forged, information traded, deals made 
and scarce resources exchanged. In other words, it was here that blat 
(exchange of favours) blossomed (Ledeneva 1998). Occasionally, too, 
a supra would be used for undercover meetings of political dissidents. 
No wonder, then, that the supra aroused the suspicion of the authori-
ties in the late Soviet period. On 15 November 1975, the Central 
Committee of the Georgian Communist Party issued a decree entitled 
‘Measures to increase the fight against harmful traditions and customs’ 
(Gerber 1997:  261). This denounced large banquets associated with 
important events such as births, marriages or deaths as public displays 



















In the chaotic, post- Soviet 1990s, when many Georgian citizens 
became impoverished, the supra remained a primary venue of dealing 
with (or compensating for) social and economic problems. Following 
the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the coming of power of Mikheil 
Saakashvili, however, the supra became associated with Soviet men-
tality and waste of time (Mühlfried 2014). Once again, toasts became 
associated with ‘harmful customs’. In today’s independent Georgia, the 
supra is a less common phenomenon than during the preceding dec-
ades, especially in the towns and cities. Even so, the supra remains for 
many people an essential means of dealing with social shortcomings 
(this time mostly emotional in nature), as it provides a counterpoint to 
the logics of neoliberal time- management, body politics and sociability 
(Curro 2017). In diasporic circles, the art of toasting and feasting in the 
Georgian way continues to act as a major signifier of belonging to the 
Georgian nation.
7.17 Goudui and Yingchou (China)
John osburg
University of rochester, Usa
The formal dictionary definition of goudui refers to the mixing of differ-
ent types of wine or spirits to alter the taste of liquor (ABC Chinese- English 
Dictionary 2003). For most speakers of standard Mandarin Chinese this 
is what the word connotes. But in south- western dialects of Mandarin 
Chinese spoken in the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei 
and Chongqing, goudui refers to the practice of courting someone, often 
in a position of power, for an instrumental purpose. Instead of altering 
the taste or alcohol content of liquor, through goudui one seeks to alter 
a relationship with a distant or casual acquaintance into a ‘thicker’ bond 
held together with both sentiment and mutual interest. Once the rela-
tionship has been altered through goudui practices, asking for favours, 
solidifying partnerships or securing a deal or promotion are thought to 
be easier to achieve.
No simple English equivalent exists for goudui. Depending on 
the context, to ‘charm’, ‘court’ or ‘wine and dine’ could be substi-
tuted in its place. The term ‘condition’ used to describe the Sicilian 
mafia (Schneider and Schneider 2003) perhaps most accurately 
serves to explain goudui practices. As noted by Peter and Jane 
Schneider, the Sicilian mafia strove to create ‘many stranded rela-
tionships of intertwined interest and affect’ that ‘transcend quid pro 














7.17 goudui and  y ingchou (ChIna)
captures the key element of goudui: one doesn’t simply endeavour to 
create a relationship of indebtedness in the intended target of goudui 
but rather to render the relationship ‘thick’, durable and imbued with 
affect. Through goudui techniques, which include banqueting, drinking, 
gift- giving and various forms of entertaining, one seeks to transcend the 
transactional, interested nature of the relationship and embed it in social 
norms, reciprocity and morality. Even though the term goudui is limited 
to the south- west, goudui practices are found throughout China.
Since the introduction of economic reforms in China beginning in 
the late 1970s, goudui practices have been most prevalent in the con-
text of business, where entrepreneurs deploy goudui to win the favour 
of clients, partners and important officials. Because of the power and 
influence government officials exert over many facets of the Chinese 
economy, goudui practices are most closely associated with the wining 
and dining of government officials with a purpose to obtain permits, 
contracts and insider access to state- controlled land and assets for busi-
nesses (Zhang 2001). In the 1990s and 2000s the most common goudui 
repertoire included dinner in an exclusive restaurant featuring extensive 
drinking, followed by a trip to a nightclub for karaoke singing, followed 
by more drinking in the company of paid female hostesses. Sometimes 
one of these hostesses would accompany the recipient of goudui for sex 
as well, or the group would collectively visit a brothel or sauna at the end 
of the evening (Zheng 2009). Because many businesses compete for the 
patronage of a few powerful officials, goudui practices have been subject 
to inflationary pressure over the past few decades, resulting in entertain-
ment venues offering ever more expensive and elaborate services. In 
addition to these forms of entertaining, goudui practices also include gift- 
giving, forms of flattery and the strategic invocation of kinship terms. 
Supplicants sometimes refer to their goudui targets with fictive kin terms 
such as ‘elder brother’ (dage) or ‘brother’ (xiongdi), attempting to frame 
their relationship around mutual care and concern. While women can 
serve as both initiators and recipients of goudui, many of the practices 
(drinking and commercial sex) and spaces (nightclubs and saunas) asso-
ciated with goudui are implicitly masculine, and women (other than staff 
or hostesses) are largely excluded. The importance of the informal net-
works established through masculinised goudui practices has thus served 
to help perpetuate the marginalisation of women in certain arenas of 
business and government in China (Osburg 2013).
Goudui is closely associated with two other more widespread 
Chinese terms: guanxi and yingchou. Guanxi (see 1.12 Volume 1) 
























accomplish various tasks (Yang 1994; Gold et al. 2002). Goudui can be 
understood as the work and techniques one employs to establish a mutu-
ally beneficial guanxi- type relationship. When successfully employed, 
goudui techniques imbue a relationship with a modicum of affect and 
ethics, thus priming it for a reciprocal guanxi exchange. Without the 
work of goudui, the favour- seeker would be likely to appear too interested 
in a short- term benefit, and the relationship would run the risk of being 
reduced to a mere transaction. Outside of south- west China, where the 
term goudui is well established, Mandarin speakers would probably use 
the phrase ‘gao guanxi’ (‘to do or to establish guanxi’) in its place.
The parallel practice of yingchou refers to the ritualised entertain-
ing that is an integral component of workplace, business and bureau-
cratic relationships in China. Unlike goudui, the term yingchou is used 
throughout China. The forms of yingchou are largely analogous to those 
of goudui and involve banqueting, drinking, karaoke singing and occa-
sionally commercial sex. Yingchou is often used to refer to any work or 
career- related social engagement and thus may include instances of 
goudui. What distinguishes goudui from yingchou is that goudui implies 
a narrow focus on deepening a particular relationship for an instrumen-
tal end, whereas evenings of yingchou may simply involve maintaining 
good relationships with one’s colleagues, partners, clients or superiors 
without a specific person or favour in mind. Despite the appearance of 
leisure or fun to an outside observer, yingchou is considered an essential 
component of work. One entrepreneur memorably remarked (Author’s 
interview) that, as a businessman, ‘Yingchou is my job’ (‘yingchou jiushi 
wode gongzuo’). Given the importance of yingchou to career advancement 
and business deals, entrepreneurs and government officials often have 
nightly yingchou obligations. Elanah Uretsky (2016) has documented the 
toll this constant drinking, eating, smoking and commercial sex has taken 
on elite men’s health, resulting in a high incidence of chronic and sexu-
ally transmitted diseases among this group. In addition to the physical 
impact of yingchou and goudui, many businessmen (author interviews) 
in the early 2000s complained of feeling overburdened by nightly social 
obligations that kept them away from their families and left them devoid 
of leisure time (Osburg 2013).
While goudui practices undergird the majority of relationships 
and exchanges largely thought of as corruption in China, goudui 
should be distinguished from bribery. While a bribe is typically an 
impersonal transaction, goudui techniques are an attempt to trans-
form a relationship into one imbued with affect and governed by the 




















early 2000s entrepreneurs stressed that engaging in goudui was often 
the precondition for offering a bribe: only when a relationship of trust 
and friendship was established through goudui could one frame a 
bribe in a tactful manner, as a ‘gift’ or a token of friendship (see Smart 
and Hsu 2007). While commodified forms of expenditure – dinners, 
bribes, gifts, etc. – are available to all, only those who can successfully 
marshal these objects in service of deepening ties have succeeded in 
goudui.
Shortly after assuming the presidency of China in 2012, Xi Jinping 
launched an extensive official austerity and anti- corruption campaign. 
This campaign targeted the very practices  – banqueting, drinking, gift 
exchange – at the core of goudui and yingchou. Soon after the start of the 
campaign, many entrepreneurs complained (author interviews) that offi-
cials will no longer accept dinner invitations and have even returned gifts 
out of fear of being targeted in the crackdown. Thus, goudui and yingchou 
practices appear to be in decline (perhaps temporarily) in officialdom, 
but they continue to constitute a key means of forging and maintain-
ing informal networks in business and other bureaucratic organisations 
throughout China.
Conclusion: do patron– client relationships affect 
complex societies?
elena semenova
Institute of Political science, free University of Berlin, Germany
The theoretical understanding of patron– client relations has changed 
over time. In early studies based on sociological and anthropological tra-
ditions, researchers highlighted three main features of the phenomenon: 
personal communication; the direct exchange of resources and a certain 
degree of loyalty; and inequality between patron and client (Eisenstadt 
and Roniger 1980: 42– 3, 49– 50). All three criteria were found in small 
communities and tribal settings (Fortes 1969/ 2004), in small groups 
(Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), and in bureaucracies and political machines 
(Banfield and Wilson 1963). These early studies focused on patron–   
client relations in various geographical locations (Europe, Latin America 
and Africa) as well as in various social spheres such as economics and 
politics.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the modernisation approach 
became popular, according to which some types of patron– client 



















1960)  – were seen as playing an integral role in traditional societies. 
Theorists argued that, since modernisation is based on the transition 
from particularism to universalism, modern societies would lack such 
types of relations (LaPalombara 1963).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, researchers discov-
ered that traditional forms of particularism based on caste, clan or 
ethnicity do not disappear in developing societies but rather adapt 
themselves to the new environment. In particular, societal changes 
(democratisation, economic development, bureaucratisation; Shefter 
1977) challenged the idea that personal patron– client relations are 
to be found only in small or medium- to- large territorial contexts. 
What was, however, found to change was that direct personal com-
munication between patron and client became less common. In order 
to provide more resources for their clients, patrons became reliant on 
intermediary agents (or brokers) such as ‘friends of friends’ (Weingrod 
1968; Boissevain 1974; Roniger 1994:  12; Stokes et  al. 2013). This 
form of patron– client relations is highly complex, with the exchange 
of resources, goods and obligations reaching from the national to 
the local level and involving many intermediary brokers and clients 
(Scott 1969: 1158). The role of broker is commonly played by some-
one possessing both power and prestige (Moerman 1969; Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007) and embedded in the local context (government offi-
cials, heads of villages or entrepreneurs).
Current research on patron– client relations (Brun and Diamond 
2014) suggests that, as a result of democratic, economic and societal 
developments in modern societies, some forms of patron– client relations 
(e.g. those based on primordial characteristics) will disappear, while the 
general form of these relations will adjust to new conditions.
reciprocity, hierarchy and repetitive character
Every definition of patron– client relations underlines the exchange of 
resources, services and goods between patron and client (Scott 1969). 
These goods and resources may be material, such as cash, food or cloth-
ing (Bratton 2008: 624). They may also be non-material, including jobs 
(Gilmore 1977: 453; Piattoni 2001), access to public services such as 
education or housing (Hicken 2011), physical protection (Flap 1990: 
236; Challier 2010: 54) or bureaucratic or legal intervention (Chubb 
1982: 211– 9). Patron– client exchanges are not, however, restricted to 
goods and resources. First of all, they involve the exchange of promises 



















as when a politician promises goods to his supporters in exchange for 
their votes (Nichter 2008; Kopecký et al. 2012; Stokes et al. 2013). Other 
patron– client relations are based on long- term (sometimes, even life-
time) obligations, as for, example, when relations are based on religious 
or kinship values (Ledeneva 2008).
Second, patron– client relations are typically hierarchical, with the 
patron possessing more power, resources and reputation than the client. 
Essentially, therefore, they are based on a strong element of inequality 
(Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980). Most research indicates that it is the 
patron who decides on what terms goods and resources will be exchanged 
(Wolf 1966). The asymmetry of the relationship usually means that the 
costs will be higher for a client who wishes to end the relationship than 
for the patron (Roniger 1994). Democratisation and economic develop-
ment have, however, increased the range of exit options for clients and 
strengthened their bargaining power vis- à- vis their patrons (Piattoni 
2001: 7, 12). In a situation where a patron has many clients, the clients 
may even in some cases be able to organise together to punish the patron 
(Lyne 2007).
Some researchers argue that patron– client relations are also 
possible between groups such as political parties or trade unions 
(Weingrod 1968; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), though there is disa-
greement over who in such cases is the patron and who the client. Stokes 
(2007) argues that, as patrons, political parties and politicians hold 
voters accountable, whereas Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 7) argue 
that politicians are agents and that electoral constituencies are the 
patrons.
The third feature is the repetitive character of patron– client rela-
tions. The patron delivers (or promises to deliver) goods or services in 
exchange for a reciprocal exchange (or the promise thereof) of goods and 
services by the client. This aspect of promising something in exchange 
for goods or services highlights the crucial importance of monitoring and 
sanctioning (Lewis 2010; Kopecký et  al. 2012). Both patron and client 
expect to interact in the future, which means that a high level of specific 
trust is required from both sides. These expectations about the repetitive 
character of patron– client interactions are based on – and reinforce – the 
norms of reciprocity (Lebra 1975). Moreover, the repetitive nature of 
patron– client relations allows both patron and client to anticipate the 
actions of the other. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 13) stress two pos-
sible expectations of the patron with respect to the client’s behaviour. 
A politician needs to be confident that the client will deliver the service 




















must identify the constituencies with ‘strong effective “elasticity” in vot-
ers’ electoral conduct’ and concentrate resources (that is, promises of ser-
vices and benefits) there in order to ensure the clients’ support. Through 
repetitive patron– client relations, politicians accumulate knowledge of 
their clients, which enables them better to target potential support groups 
and fine- tune the amount of promised benefits (Stokes 2007: 611).
With regard to the bonds underlying patron– client relations, it is 
necessary to distinguish between power and obligations, both of which 
may assume different forms depending on the specific context, type of 
the society and historical period under consideration. Power bonds may, 
for example, take two different forms. The first is power as coercion. 
According to this interpretation, patron– client relations are maintained 
by force or the threat of force employed by the patron against the client. 
Sicilian mafia, Russian krysha and Mexican caciquismo are examples of 
patron– client relations based on power as coercion, which is particularly 
strong when the client’s status is far below that of the patron. When cli-
ent and patron have equal or comparable status, however, their relations 
are likely to be linked by power as co-optation. This type of bond has been 
commonly used in the political context, such as when Russia’s tsars co-
opted the nobility of conquered territory by strategically relating them to 
the Russian nobility (Tsygankov 2014) or when the ruling elite co-opts 
oppositional politicians or members of underrepresented societal groups 
in order to appease protests or increase support (Snyder 1992; Ang 
2016). The corrupt use of the law in order to reduce the elite’s account-
ability to the population is another example of power as a co-optation 
bond (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011).
Patron– client relations may also be underlined by two types of 
obligation bonds. The first emerges from kinship values and is main-
tained by value- based obligations (uruuchuluk in Kyrgyzstan), religious 
values (guanxi in China; oyabun- kobun in Japan) or a mixture of both 
(compadrazgo in Spanish America, padrino in the Philippines, kumstvo 
in Montenegro). Such bonds are hard to terminate, particularly in small 
communities. The second type of obligation bond is structurally based, 
an example being vassalage in medieval Europe (Bloch 1962/ 2014). This 
type of patron– client relationship is based on homage and/ or fealty (Blok 
1969: 367). Its emergence is directly related to the structure of feudal 
society, where central authority is weak. Structurally based obligations 
may also be found in societies where the economy is underdeveloped, 
when the client needs the patron in order to access material resources and 
goods (agashka in Kazakhstan and blat in the Soviet Union). However, 



















between patron and client. For example, Roniger (1983: 83) described 
traditional patron– client relations in ancient Rome as coercive. However, 
the coercive character of traditional patron– client relations was con-
strained by specific norms, according to which the patron was expected 
to take care of the client. As Piattoni (2001: 12) points out, ‘a sense of 
obligation and even affection could colour patron– client relations’.
timing in patron– client relations
In the 1950s and 1960s, studies of developing societies found that, as 
a result of the modernisation of traditional societies, fresh conflicts 
emerged between and within social groups. These conflicts, many of 
which were based on kinship or ethnicity, led in turn to the emergence 
of brokers. Interestingly, conflicts tended to continue in societies where 
brokerage was established. This seemed to be because the resolution of 
conflicts eliminated the need for brokers, meaning in turn that brokers 
had an interest in maintaining tensions (Weingrod 1968; Blok 1969). In 
the 1970s and 1980s, research highlighted the importance of institutional 
arrangements for establishing patron– client relations. Shefter (1977) 
stresses the importance of two major institutional arrangements on the 
development of party patronage: the existence of a bureaucratised state 
and the introduction of (male) suffrage. In the United States, for exam-
ple, patronage was democratised prior to the development of a bureau-
cratic state; parties therefore use patronage strategies to attract voters. In 
Canada, by contrast, where the bureaucratic state was professionalised 
early on (Roniger 1994: 14), the patronage potential of political parties 
was low, and decreased further with the introduction of suffrage.
Shefter’s ideas were developed by Piattoni in a range of studies of 
political clientelism in Europe in historical and comparative perspective. 
Piattoni argues, however, that the development of patron– client rela-
tions ‘is connected with, yet not determined by’ the emergence of specific 
institutional arrangements. Piattoni’s major argument is that patronage 
and clientelism may alter the social environment, thereby allowing the 
development of patron– client relations (2001). The major challenge is 
therefore to explain the resilience of patronage practices as they adapt to 
new institutional environments.
Taking into account the major features of patron– client relations 
described above, we may distinguish between these relations and other 
forms of particularistic practices (Hicken 2011: 296). The feature of con-
tingent reciprocity for patron– client relations distinguishes these relations 
























organised crime (Piattoni 2001: 8). The repetitive and contingent nature 
of patron– client relations also sets them apart from other forms of particu-
larism such as pork politics (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:  13). Finally, 
patron– client relations describe a wider variety of societal interactions than 
the term ‘patronage’. The latter is often used to describe the exchange of 
electoral support for positions in the public system (Kopecký et al. 2012).
societal consequences of patron– client relations
Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980: 70) highlight the fact that patron– client 
relations have negative societal consequences. One result is a low level of 
social trust, given the small number of those who are part of the patron– 
 client relationship. Patron– client relations also generate a high degree of 
competition among all groups, particularly among patrons. This competi-
tion for resources is particularly strong when a society is undergoing mod-
ernisation because, in the new situation, all resources potentially become 
available to many groups (Wolf 1966; Blok 1969). Moreover, widespread 
patron– client relations distort the system of democratic accountability 
(Stokes et al. 2013) and impede the professionalisation of bureaucracy 
(Shefter 1977; Cruz and Keefer 2015). In clientelistic countries, program-
matic political parties are rare, while electoral volatility and party- system 
fragmentation are high (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Clientelism is asso-
ciated with the growth of public sector and larger public deficits (Grzymala- 
Busse 2007). Appointments to leadership positions thanks to patron– client 
relations may also result in lower efficacy of public agencies (Lewis 2010).
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‘The politics of fear’ refers to a set of strategies used to ensure political 
control by authoritarian regimes. Unlike bloody dictatorships, which use 
mass repression of societies at large and/ or major social groups (such as 
those in the Soviet Union under Stalin, Nazi Germany or Cambodia under 
the Khmer Rouge regime), authoritarian regimes rely upon selective 
repression against those who dare to raise their voice against the regime 
or those capable of doing so at the earliest opportunity. Selective repres-
sion is often demonstrative. Examples include politically driven criminal 
cases, arrests, forced emigration and exile, torture, the disappearance of 
people and political assassinations. The repression is used illicitly in the 
surveillance both of persons and of private correspondence, use of provo-
cateurs, public discrediting and isolation (see Zersetzung, 8.9 in this vol-
ume). Such strategies are not intended primarily to punish the regime’s 
enemies (although this motivation is also present), but to prevent the 
spread of oppositional activism beyond the relatively narrow and con-
trollable circle of the regime’s staunch opponents. ‘The politics of fear’ 
performs the political function of preventive signalling: it demonstrates 
to the elite and ordinary citizens that manifestations of disloyalty may 
result in tears, loss and harm. This approach is more cost efficient for 
the preservation of authoritarian regimes than mass repression, but it 



















IntrodUCtIon: polit icS oF Fear
The degree, frequency and extent to which authoritarian regimes 
use ‘the politics of fear’ depend on specific context. Although commonly 
‘the authoritarian equilibrium rests on lies, fear, or economic prosper-
ity’ (Przeworski, 1991: 58– 9); the specific configuration is determined 
by circumstance. The weakening of one of these three political pillars 
prompts autocrats to shift their centre of gravity to the two others. The 
degree of repression in modern authoritarian regimes is reversely cor-
related with economic growth. When economic growth is rapid and sus-
tainable, the preference of autocrats is to rely upon co-optation of their 
real or potential challengers, and to buy the loyalty of elites and fellow 
citizens. Under such circumstances there may be room for contentious 
politics on certain issues, but there is no leeway for open displays of dis-
content towards leaders or regimes as such. However, in circumstances 
of economic decline, stagnation or recession, autocrats have to replace 
carrots with sticks and rely upon the weapons of large- scale propaganda 
(lies) alongside those of selective repression (fear). The choice of strate-
gies of repression is driven by autocrats’ perceptions of threats to their 
regimes. Threats can be defined both by the overall level of discontent 
and also by their unpredictability. Moreover, threats are perceived more 
seriously if they arise from multiple sources, if the opposition presents 
a number of diverse strategies and includes a variety of forms of pro-
test (especially if the protest involves both peaceful and violent means). 
However, the most important factor affecting the choice of strategies of 
repression in authoritarian regimes is the previous successful outcomes 
of those repressive policies. If in the past repressive measures served as 
an efficient tool for diminishing threats to the regime’s survival, then the 
probability of their use in the future increases, as does their scope and 
intensity.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, the communist regime ceased to 
employ a policy of mass repression in the Soviet Union. As a result, it suf-
fered not only the emergence of a dissident movement, but also numer-
ous instances of mass riots, occurring spontaneously in different parts 
of the country. The extensive use of force for the oppression of the latter 
(the most well- known case was the Novocherkassk massacre of 1962) 
was risky for the Soviet political leadership. Consequently, repressive 
policies underwent certain adjustment and transformed into a model, 
based upon ‘preventive work’ (profilakticheskaya rabota), designed to 
prevent the spread of protest movements. The Soviet coercive appara-
tus established an efficient mechanism of monitoring and intimidation of 
disloyal citizens. The arsenal of the coercive apparatus included not only 



















co-optation, which included promises of career advancement, material 
benefits and other rewards for loyalty to the regime.
Soviet citizens perceived the risk of punishment for open anti- 
regime activism to be high and even those who were critical of the regime 
preferred to avoid direct confrontation with the authorities. In addi-
tion, the Soviet regime used a wide range of ‘active measures’ (aktivnye 
meropriyatiya) to punish its loudest and most dangerous critics, ranging 
from expulsion from jobs and de facto bans on professional activity, to 
the political abuse of psychiatry and forced emigration. Even though the 
number of political prisoners in the late- Soviet period was relatively low, 
selective repression and other coercive techniques became pervasive. 
Thus, Soviet citizens received clear signals that being involved in organ-
ised dissent would lead to trouble. Despite a large number of potential 
sympathisers and the rising disillusionment with the regime among both 
the Soviet establishment and society at large, the narrow circle of com-
mitted dissidents found it hard to broaden their ranks. Dissident tenden-
cies did not lead to a rise in mass protest activism thanks to ‘the politics of 
fear’, which was reinforced by the memory of the previous Soviet experi-
ence of purges and mass repressions. Dissatisfaction with the late Soviet 
system was expressed in forms other than organised protests, and did 
not present any major challenge to the communist regime until the late 
1980s. During this period, ‘the politics of fear’ enabled rulers to postpone 
the risk of mass discontent and to bequeath the emerging problem to 
their successors.
In post- Soviet Belarus, ‘the politics of fear’ pursued by the coercive 
apparatus of the state is demonstrated foremost in its continuity under 
the presidency of Lukashenko (1994– present). Belarusian opposition 
figures disappeared without a trace, civil activists came under attack by 
the state; foreign donors and initiatives aiming to promote democracy 
and civil society were pushed out of the country; control over business 
prevented it from financing opposition; and restrictive legislation forced 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) into closure or self- censorship. 
The independent European Humanities University was forced to relocate 
from Minsk to Vilnius in Lithuania. The regime used an array of tools 
against its rivals, ranging from the prohibition of anonymous access to the 
Internet, to threats of job losses for displays of political disloyalty. Recent 
criminalisation of ‘social parasitism’ in Belarus is the logical extension of 
these tactics – Social parasitism has its roots in a Soviet- era legal concept 
of tuneyadstvo, which was active between 1936 and 1991. It was based 
on the socialist doctrine that every able- bodied person had an obligation 

























IntrodUCtIon: polit icS oF Fear
A further example of the use of the strategy of ‘the politics of fear’ can be 
found in the use of provocateurs in opposition rallies in which subsequent 
arrests have borne fruit for the regime. Unlike post- Soviet states where 
mass protests were an issue, Belarus remains an island of authoritarian 
stability, while the opposition is discredited, disintegrated and disabled. 
The lack of viable alternatives strengthened Lukashenko’s position and 
has helped preserve his power.
In the early 2000s the Russian authoritarian regime demonstrated 
low levels of repression. Annual economic growth contributed to the over-
all rise in a feeling of well- being and consequently led to a major increase 
in loyalty towards the leadership. The Kremlin was able to diminish man-
ifestations of public discontent and co- opt elites. Until 2011, the scope of 
mass political and social protests in Russia remained relatively low and 
was not perceived as dangerous. Repression was targeted and included 
personal harassment of a small number of participants in protest actions. 
Dissenting representatives of Russia’s establishment were not persecuted 
but rather discredited and isolated; independent media, NGOs and activ-
ists were contained and had little opportunity to inflict damage to the 
regime. After the global economic crisis of 2008– 9, resources for rapid 
economic growth in Russia were exhausted and the prosperity- based 
regime’s equilibrium was shaken. The rigged outcome of the 2011 parlia-
mentary elections triggered a wave of mass protests, which the Kremlin 
did not anticipate. Although the scale of protests was insufficient to chal-
lenge the regime’s survival, its demonstrative effects were alarming for 
Russia’s rulers. Vladimir Putin’s ‘tightening of the screws’ after his re- 
election in 2012 was a reaction by the Kremlin to this new threat. In May 
2012, a protest rally in Moscow culminated in violent clashes between 
participants and the police. Arrests, imprisonments, public discrediting 
and systemic pressure on leaders of the opposition followed (for exam-
ple, Alexey Navalny, Vladimir Ashurkov, Sergei Guriev, Lev Shlosberg). In 
February 2015, Boris Nemtsov, one of the leaders of the Russian political 
opposition, was shot dead near the Kremlin. His assassination occurred 
two days before an opposition rally, which was planned to launch a series 
of new protests against the regime; instead it became a march of com-
memoration. During the third term of Putin’s presidency, ‘the politics 
of fear’ has become a major instrument for maintaining authoritarian 
equilibrium.
Newly adopted repressive legislation has established harsher 
punishment for the violation of the new restrictions and increased the 
already wide- ranging powers of the law enforcement agencies, as well as 






















preventing the further spread of undesirable information, draining the 
funding of opposition activities and imposing tight constraints on inde-
pendent activism. The new law demands that NGOs receiving foreign 
funding should register as ‘foreign agents’. In common with other NGOs, 
the Dynasty Foundation, a major private sponsor of science- related 
research and education programmes, was labelled a ‘foreign agent’ and 
ultimately closed. The new law on ‘undesirable’ NGOs imposes crimi-
nal punishment on Russian individuals and organisations found to be 
collaborating with blacklisted foreign NGOs; after its adoption, several 
international donor organisations were forced to end their activities in 
Russia.
Not only does the Kremlin not prevent the emigration of its oppo-
nents, it assists in part in the process, rightly considering this to be an 
effective means of neutralising its opponents. As a consequence, the 
number of political prisoners in Russia remains rather low in compari-
son to many authoritarian regimes: the most comprehensive list, com-
piled in June 2015, cites no more than 50 names. It is to be expected 
that the Kremlin will further prioritise repression, that its scope and 
intensity will increase and that new targets will be hit by ‘the politics of 
fear’. The use of ‘politics of fear’ has most recently became widespread 
among authoritarian and semi- authoritarian regimes in Azerbaijan, 
Venezuela and Turkey, although its effect on isolating the regimes from 
threats are rather mixed. In essence, ‘the politics of fear’ becomes a 
vicious circle: small- scale state repression encourages further applica-
tion of these tools, and authoritarian regimes have a tendency to use 
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The Russian term brodiazhnichestvo, meaning vagrancy, had its origins in 
the legal framework of Imperial Russia, and was a pejorative term used 
to describe tramps and other destitute members of society. However, in 
the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev era, brodiazhnichestvo was com-
monly used to refer to persons engaging in ‘forbidden’ trades, private 
entrepreneurial activity, or speculation, the so- called ‘second economy’, 






















8.1 BrodiazhnicheStvo  (rUssIa)
Central Committee Commission led by Polianskii investigated the many 
facets of ‘anti- social’ ‘parasitical’ behaviour in contemporary Soviet life. 
This investigation revealed an uncomfortable picture of a society employ-
ing a range of informal practices to make up for the shortcomings of the 
state. The commission understood its task as the investigation of the 
many extra- systemic ways that Soviet citizens found to supplement or 
substitute regular wages and salaries and to find legislative ways of clos-
ing the loopholes that made them possible.
The law of 1961’s implicit reach was broad: it defined the ‘parasite’ 
as having many faces and noted it may be an embezzler (kaznokrad) plun-
dering socialist property, a bribe- taker, a swindler (zhulik), a speculator; 
or a young idler, [or] a flea- market trader (barakhol’shchik). Begging was 
mentioned once in the middle of a long list of parasitical second- economy 
activities, but neither vagrancy nor prostitution even rated a mention. 
What mattered was identifying all the processes whereby Soviet citizens 
were getting ‘unearned income’ instead of, or in addition to, their regular 
wages and salaries.
Polianskii’s commission investigated forbidden trades, specula-
tion, private entrepreneurial activity and in addition appointed working 
groups on such topics as currency forging, bribery, contraband, cheating 
customers in stores and illegal transactions involving land and housing 
space, as well as demanding investigation into a wide range of illegal 
trades that included moonshine (samogon- making (samogonovarenie), 
see 5.29 in this volume), folk medicine, fortune- telling, running broth-
els, and producing and selling pornography. The enquiry amounted to 
a wholesale investigation of the areas involving private ownership and 
entrepreneurship and the circumstances that were making it possible.
In towns there was a great variety of second-economy activity. 
People were using private cars to provide taxi and removal services, 
renting out rooms or ‘corners’ of their apartments or houses, renting out 
individually owned dachas, and using garden or dacha plots to grow pro-
duce for sale; truck drivers and railway employees were moving goods 
around the country for ‘grey market’ sale. Workers at electrical and radio 
factories regularly stole their products and sold them outside the plant. 
Enterprising people set up ‘clandestine miniature factories that turn out 
the notorious phonograph records made from X- ray film’ (Literaturnaia 
Gazeta 1960).
Similarly, all sorts of ‘parasitical’ entrepreneurial activity went 
on in the countryside, especially around the collective and state farms. 
Some farms established unregistered shops on their premises to produce 




















electrical fuses, spare parts for textile machines, glass for wrist watches, 
poly ethyline items’, using workers from collective farms (kolkhozniki) 
and ‘persons without fixed occupation’ as workforce (RGANI files in 
Fitzpatrick 2006). Kolkhozy also used middlemen to acquire needed 
spare parts and building materials, and to distribute agricultural pro-
duce. They and other enterprises, rural and urban, regularly hired moon-
lighters (so- called ‘shabashnik’ brigades) to do construction and repair 
work on contract. All this was, of course, in addition to the pettier forms 
of rural ‘parasitism’ (living off bee- keeping, carting, selling craft items or 
produce from the private plot.)
Artisans and craftsmen (outside cooperatives) were always an 
object of suspicion: these were difficult categories for Soviet authorities, 
who tended to regard non- factory production as both outmoded and 
potentially capitalist. Even when the trades were in themselves legal, 
there was the question of the way they got raw materials (often on the 
black market), together with the fact that they sold their produce, pos-
sibly ‘parasitically’ for profit. There were also illegal trades, artisan and 
craft activities that were explicitly forbidden by law by the Criminal Code 
or in special statutes. Brewing samogon (see 5.29 in this volume), mak-
ing religious objects, cutting gramophone records and developing pho-
tographs were among the illegal trades, but the list in law and practice 
was probably much longer, including preparation of any goods from pre-
cious metals or precious stones, betting and organising games of chance 
(Kondrashkov 1989).
The anti- parasite law was not intended to target people who were 
unemployed because they were invalids, old- age pensioners, pregnant 
women or housewives with young children. However, provision was still 
inadequate and some people on retirement and disability pensions sup-
plemented them by begging or petty trading.
The ‘shadow economy’ parasitism that was the central target of the 
law evoked a mixed response from the public. Kolkhozniki who did not 
volunteer to work on other projects on ‘labour days’, as well as ‘shabash-
niki’ working as contract labourers on kolkhozy and elsewhere (often 
these same ‘non- working’ kolkhozniki), were damned as parasites (GARF 
files in Fitzpatrick 2006) and resentment was also expressed against peo-
ple who rented out their dachas and other housing space for a high price. 
But others who participated in the public discussion were worried about 
labelling such common activities as dacha- renting parasitical – after all, 
many of ‘the public’ engaged in such activities themselves. It was not 
unusual for activities that were condemned in others to find justification 

















8.1 BrodiazhnicheStvo  (rUssIa)
It is not clear how often people were actually sent into exile as ‘par-
asites’ as a result of ‘unearned income’ from second- economy activities. 
Despite the draft law’s emphasis on ‘second-economy’ offences, police 
and other local authorities continued to understand the category of ‘par-
asites’ in more traditional terms: beggars, tramps, prostitutes and drunks 
making a disturbance on the street. The Ministry of Interior (MVD) 
reported that among those exiled as parasites there were ‘not a few’ car-
penters, joiners, painters, stonemasons, tailors, shoemakers, coopers and 
other tradesmen working privately (RGANI files in Fitzpatrick 2006). 
Sewing women and tailors were likewise liable: there are reports of para-
sitism charges against women – ‘getting rich at the expense of the toilers’ 
state’, to quote the standard anti- parasite rhetoric – who sewed dresses 
or made bras, paper flowers and homemade mirrors for sale at the kolk-
hoz markets (GARF files in Fitzpatrick 2006). In practice, of course, such 
small- scale private enterprise was often tolerated.
The 1961 law is interesting not so much for its direct results as 
for the way in which it exposed various fault lines in the society and 
confusion in the minds of the leaders about where the society was 
going. The party ideologists claimed that the society was moving inexo-
rably towards communism, that is, ever further away from capitalism 
and the remnants of capitalist consciousness and habits that were the 
soil in which parasitism grew. Yet to an outside observer, it might have 
appeared that its trajectory was exactly the opposite  – not away from 
‘capitalism’ (that is, a situation allowing scope for individual economic 
initiatives and acquisition and use of goods) but towards it. It was very 
striking, too, just how many kinds of parasites there were when one 
looked closely: it was as if a ‘second society’ of parasites coexisted with 
the ‘first’ society of toilers (or, even worse, that every toiler was a poten-
tial parasite). The discussions surrounding the anti- parasite law gave 
a vivid and informative picture of the great variety of stratagems and 
social niches developed by individual citizens; everything that mattered 
went on not in the formal structures of the society but in the interstices 
between (Starr 2003). The work of Polianskii’s Commission showed 
a considerable understanding of how the Soviet economy actually, as 
opposed to formally, worked.
The Soviet Union was not alone in using the vagrancy law to deal 
with ‘undesirable elements’ of society or using the law as a ‘catch all’ solu-
tion. In the United Kingdom, the Vagrancy Act of 1824 banning vagrancy 
and begging continues to be enforced to this day and it is claimed that it 
has been ‘repurposed over the last decade as a truly modern tool to police 














2014). In 1971 and 1972 vagrancy laws in the USA were challenged as 
being unconstitutional, however, until this time the law provided ‘an 
escape hatch from the Fourth Amendment’s protections against arrest 
without probable cause’ (Goluboff 2016). In Canada vagrancy continues 
to be a criminal act, being defined as ‘Every one commits vagrancy who ... 
supports himself in whole or in part by gaming or crime and has no law-
ful profession or calling by which to maintain himself’ (Criminal Code of 
Canada 1985). Western governments have also found ‘vagrancy’ a useful 
tool for exercising control.
8.2 Songbun (north korea)
James Pearson and daniel tudor
authors of north Korea confidential
Songbun is a socio- political classification system in North Korea, accord-
ing to which every citizen is assigned a class status on the basis of their 
perceived loyalty to the regime. Songbun classification has traditionally 
had a significant influence on the major life opportunities that are avail-
able to an individual, notably further education and career. However, 
since the turn of the century the growing importance of money in North 
Korean society means that in many cases the benefits of good songbun 
can be bought, and thus songbun classification has declined in impor-
tance for some sections of society.
The Korean word songbun comes from chulshin- songbun, a North 
Korean phrase meaning ‘family background’. Every citizen is assigned 
a class status on the basis of the socio- economic background of one’s 
family, including parents and grandparents, siblings, aunts, uncles and 
cousins. A second element is sahoe songbun, which is one’s individual 
socio- political behaviour. All North Koreans are classified into one of 
three classes: the ‘core’ (haeksim) or loyal class, the ‘wavering’ (dongyo) 
class and the ‘hostile’ (choktae) class. Importantly, however, most North 
Koreans are unaware of what their songbun status is, and it is therefore 
something of an invisible force.
The songbun system originated from a resolution of The Workers’ 
Party Politburo of 30 May 1957, which introduced the concept of divid-
ing North Korean society into loyal, neutral and hostile groups. Broadly, 
loyalists were to be drawn from among those who fought alongside Kim 
Il Sung or from forces that pledged allegiance to him; socialist intellec-
tuals and revolutionaries; and those who fought for the DPRK during 
the Korean War. Hostile persons were those who had been landowners 
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South Korea; religious groups (including Christians and shamanists); 
and collaborators with the old Japanese colonial regime. Neutrals were 
those who fell between the two. A series of lengthy investigations into 
the colonial era and military activities of every North Korean’s male rela-
tives (the DPRK is patrilinealist, as well as having a feudal mindset) was 
conducted. This was the effective starting point of the songbun system of 
social classification that exists to this day.
The most common and long- standing figures state that 28 per cent 
of North Koreans are in the loyal class, 45 per cent in the neutral class 
and 27 per cent in the hostile class (Tudor and Pearson 2015: 163). It is 
far easier to have one’s songbun downgraded than upgraded: one sim-
ple political mistake could bring one’s whole family into a lower class. 
For that reason, the hostile group estimate may well be on the low 
side: 40 per cent may be more realistic (Tudor and Pearson 2015: 163). 
The songbun system has both formal and informal aspects that render it 
a strange hybrid of official state practice and informal governance. With 
regards to the formal elements, songbun is a highly entrenched system 
that is constantly monitored and enforced by the state. Every individ-
ual’s status appears on their government file, and is taken into account 
whenever someone requests a promotion, applies to a university, or is 
arrested. Songbun investigations are very thorough and involve many 
layers of bureaucracy:  local police chiefs, residency registration offi-
cials and section chiefs of the Ministry of People’s Security all have to 
agree on a classification, and the higher up the social ladder one goes, 
the greater the involvement of the State Security Department as well. 
Better songbun is just about the only thing that cannot be bought in 
today’s North Korea:  the number of people one would need to bribe 
to significantly alter one’s songbun would render the whole venture 
impossible.
However, the songbun system may also be regarded as informal in 
several respects. The DPRK regime publicly denies that such a system 
even exists, despite the fact that the vast majority of its citizens appear 
to be aware of it (Collins 2012: 3– 4). Songbun thus represents a society-  
wide open secret: universally known, but conspicuously absent from 
official discourse (Ledeneva 2011: 724– 5). Significantly, the govern-
ment does not inform citizens of their songbun status, and indeed many 
people are not aware what their precise songbun status is. In these 
respects, the songbun system is comparable to other informal systems of 
governance used by totalitarian regimes to control their citizenry, such 











Bad songbun can adversely affect a person’s life in a very diverse 
range of ways. The military does not allow those of the very lowest 
songbun to serve. Poor songbun has also prevented athletes from being 
selected for national sports teams. There are many reports from defectors 
of being passed over for jobs in favour of lesser- qualified, but better- born 
competitors. Similarly, a person of good songbun who commits a crime 
may find leniency from a judge, where one with bad songbun would not.
Due to the effect of socialisation over the course of two or three 
generations, songbun has outgrown its political origins and evolved into 
a class system in its own right. An individual who possesses good songbun 
will almost inevitably study and work mainly with others of good song-
bun, in superior schools and workplaces. They will probably live in a rela-
tively decent apartment building, alongside others with good songbun. 
Moreover, individuals with good songbun almost always marry someone 
who has comparable songbun. If someone happens to fall in love with 
someone with bad songbun, that person will probably be poorer and of 
lower social status, prompting opposition from the higher songbun par-
ents. In Korean culture, parental opposition is an almost insurmountable 
obstacle to a match; indeed, this is still just about true even in South 
Korea, where most survey recipients say they would not defy their par-
ents by marrying someone they did not approve of. In any case, given 
that people only tend to mix with those of similar songbun status, the 
chances of meeting and falling in love with a person of different songbun 
are in practice quite low.
The influence of songbun has been somewhat eroded in the post- 
famine era (around 2000 onwards). Other than fear of punishment, 
money is the prime motivating force in today’s North Korea (see jang-
madang, 5.38 in this volume). Although one cannot buy better song-
bun itself, one can buy the effects of better songbun – university places, 
coveted jobs, high- quality apartments, medical care, greater freedom 
of movement, and immunity from prosecution or harsh punishment, in 
most cases. This is a phenomenon that has been observed in many coun-
tries making the change from a feudal to a market- based system. Many 
of the growing entrepreneurial class have poor songbun, but it scarcely 
makes a difference in their lives. The practice of bribing to gain better 
jobs is now very common in North Korea, although there are limits as to 
how high one can reach. Officialdom is full of lower- level people bribing 
those that are higher up, in the hope of moving up the hierarchy. Under 
a ‘normal’ government, money is collected by the top levels and distrib-
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Nevertheless, songbun has not been completely circumvented. 
While corruption and capitalism are providing the sharp operator and 
the talented outlier with opportunities to rise that they would never 
have had under Kim Il Sung, songbun still gives great advantages to 
some, while holding others back. Songbun is no longer the sole decid-
ing factor, but it is a gigantic head start. Ambitious and hard- working 
officials, who owe their position to high songbun, are the ones who 
are best placed to take advantage of major business opportunities (see 
jangmadang, 5.38 in this volume). Those barred from such opportuni-
ties are becoming increasingly disgruntled, according to a number of 
sources. When defections from North Korea became commonplace in 
the wake of the famine of 1994– 8, the driving force behind the trend 
was the simple need to eat. Today, though, more and more defectors 
were actually able to live relatively well in North Korea, but simply 
feel aggrieved that they have hit a ceiling due to their social status. 
‘I couldn’t develop myself [in North Korea]’, ‘Baljeon mothaettda’ is 
now one of the reasons being cited for defection (Tudor and Pearson 
2015: 168).
Ultimately, songbun acts as an anti- meritocratic force, giving 
unearned advantages and disadvantages to people based on an accident 
of birth. The fact that state officials virtually inherit their position due 
to good songbun and family ties likely incentivises them to be lazy; their 
main activity is the collection of bribes. In this respect, songbun is argua-
bly little different from class, caste or patronage systems found elsewhere 
in the world. The difference is that, rather than gradually evolving as a 
spontaneous social order, songbun was artificially designed and imple-
mented by a revolutionary regime to cement its political power, thus 
ensuring that class distinctions entrenched themselves very quickly fol-
lowing the almost total levelling of the social hierarchy caused by the 
Korean War of 1950– 3.
8.3 Dirt book (Uk)
anna Bailey
UCL, Uk
A ‘dirt book’, sometimes also called a ‘black book’, was an informal 
record of private or compromising information on individual Members 
of Parliament (MPs) kept by government whips in the United Kingdom 
parliament. The term is derived from the figurative use of the word ‘dirt’ 
as ‘scurrilous information or gossip; scandal’ (Oxford English Dictionary 



















surrounding it and the contested meaning of the term, it appears to have 
emerged in the late 1950s/ early 1960s. For the same reasons, it is hard to 
assess to what extent it is still practised.
It is important to note that the phrase ‘dirt book’ is not used by 
whips themselves or indeed parliamentarians in general (Brandreth 
2016). Rather, the phrase was coined by the British media. Indeed, it can 
be argued that the very concept of a dirt book is something of a misnomer 
and a media construct. This is because while whips do indeed gather and 
record information on their party’s MPs, only a very small proportion of 
it could be considered ‘dirt’ (Brandreth 2016). Brandreth suggests that a 
more accurate term would be ‘whips’ notes’, comparing their actual func-
tion to the kind of records a human resources (HR) department might 
keep on its employees, but more informal and subjective in nature. Any 
background information that might help the whips to understand and 
influence an MP’s behaviour would be recorded, such as off- the- cuff 
expressions of opinion; their hopes and ambitions; or any personal prob-
lems such as marital difficulties or alcohol abuse (Brandreth 2016).
To appreciate how the dirt book operated it is important to under-
stand the role of whips in the UK parliament. Whips are members of par-
liament responsible for organising their party’s parliamentary business, 
in particular ensuring that their members vote according to the party 
line. The term ‘whip’ is a shortened form of ‘whipper- in’, a hunting term 
that refers to the huntsman who keeps the hounds hunting as a pack and 
rounds up any strays (Cockerell 1995). Despite not formally being a mem-
ber of the Cabinet, the government’s chief whip attends Cabinet meetings 
and meets frequently with the prime minister, both officially and unof-
ficially. The Whips’ Office thus acts as ‘a two- way conduit between the 
leadership and the backbenchers’ (Cockerell 1995).
The whips’ role became increasingly professionalised in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, partly due to the leadership of Edward Heath 
who served as chief whip 1956– 9. Heath ‘systematically gathered infor-
mation about every member of the party, and developed the art of using 
this to maximum advantage’ (Shell 1995). It is at this time that the prac-
tice of the dirt book is said to have emerged, although whether such a 
book actually existed is unclear. When the Labour Party came to power 
in 1964 after 13 years of Conservative rule, the new Labour chief whip 
Edward Short found that it ‘had been the practice to keep a “dirt book” in 
which unsavoury personal items about members were recorded’, a prac-
tice he immediately ordered to be discontinued (Shell 1995). However, 
Shell suggests that this may not be sufficient evidence for the actual exist-
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simply out of the thoroughness with which Heath and his successors had 
gathered information’ (Shell 1995).
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, physical books were certainly 
in existence, as numerous ex- whips have given quite specific details 
about them (Baker et al. 1993: 153; BBC 1995; Cockerell 1995; Gibbon 
2014; Brandreth 2016). Lord Whitelaw (Conservative Party Chief Whip 
1964– 70) described them as, ‘just a little book where you wrote down 
various things you knew or heard about people’ (BBC 1995). Under the 
successive Conservative administrations of 1979– 97, it is said that the 
dirt books were A5 hardback exercise books that were bought in bulk, 
with the Whips’ Office consuming on average a book a week. They were 
kept in a metal safe in the Whips’ Office (Gibbon 2014; Brandreth 2016). 
Recording information in the books was a collaborative exercise: a whip 
would briefly take the book from the safe to write down any information 
they had gathered so that it could be shared by the whole whips’ team. 
Once a week the top sheet of the carbon copy was torn off and passed to 
the chief whip, who would pass any information he deemed relevant to 
the prime minister (Brandreth 2016).
A related practice was the fabled ‘shits’ list’. Non- compliant and 
rebellious MPs are colloquially referred to by whips as ‘shits’. According 
to Rupert Allason (Conservative MP 1987– 97), the shits’ list was writ-
ten on a blackboard with a curtain across it in the Whips’ Office. Allason 
stated that a whip revealed the shits’ list to him in order to demonstrate 
that he had not yet been placed on it (Cockerell 1995).
It is unclear to what extent information gathered by whips has been 
used to blackmail MPs into voting a particular way. Indeed, this may vary 
over time depending on the government’s situation and the personali-
ties of the individual whips holding office. Tim Fortescue, for example, 
implied that veiled threats to release compromising information were 
made: ‘When you are trying to persuade a member that he should vote 
the way he didn’t want to vote on a controversial issue – which is part 
of your job – it is possible to suggest that perhaps it would not be in his 
interest if people knew “something- or- other” – very mildly’ (BBC 1995). 
But another former whip stated that, ‘the blackmail tactic is rarely used. 
Possible targets might be near retirement, or have no further prospects 
of advancement’ (Baker et al. 1993: 153). Stephen Dorrell (Conservative 
Party whip 1987– 90) suggested that the use of ‘dirt’ was to a large extent 
a bluff or ‘confidence trick’, since ‘most whips know rather less about 
their colleagues’ lives than their colleagues might think’ (BBC 1995).
Contemporary and even historical study of dirt books is difficult 







the whips’ code of honour. Tristan Garel- Jones (Conservative Party 
whip 1982– 90) boasted that the Whips’ Office was ‘the last safe house 
in Europe – more secure than MI5’. His justification was that if what 
the whips actually did was exposed, the system would no longer work 
(Cockerell 1995). While some former whips have contributed to stud-
ies of the Whips’ Office, others have refused to discuss their role with 
researchers, even under conditions of anonymity. For example, one 
ex- whip told the documentary filmmaker Michael Cockerell, ‘I cannot 
discuss with an outsider what whips do; it would break our code of 
honour and confidentiality’ (Cockerell 1995). When Gyles Brandreth 
(Conservative Party whip 1995– 7) published his parliamentary dia-
ries in 1999 he entitled them Breaking the Code, since by publishing 
details of his work as a whip he was breaking the whips’ code. On the 
day of the book’s publication, Brandreth received an envelope contain-
ing nothing but a sheet of white paper with a large black spot, which 
he  took to be a symbolic ‘mark of shame’ from the Whips’ Office; he 
was  subsequently ostracised by his fellow former whips (Brandreth 
2015: xi).
The practice of the dirt book came to renewed public attention in 
2014, amid allegations that historic cases of child sex abuse by senior 
politicians had been covered up. Attention focused on comments made 
by former whip Tim Fortescue on the BBC’s 1995 documentary film 
Westminster’s Secret Service: The Whips’ Office. Fortescue implied that the 
whips might help MPs to cover up allegations of child sex abuse (BBC 
1995):
Anyone with any sense who was in trouble would come to the whips 
and tell them the truth, and say, ‘I’m in a jam, can you help?’. It 
might be debt, it might be a scandal involving small boys, or any 
kind of scandal … They’d come and ask if we could help and if we 
could, we did.
Fortescue added that, ‘We would do everything we can, because … if we 
could get a chap out of trouble then he’ll do as we ask for evermore’ (BBC 
1995). Prime Minister David Cameron publicly stated that any whips’ 
records held by the Conservative Whips’ Office would be turned over to 
the Home Office’s enquiry into historic child sex abuse (Hope and Riley- 
Smith 2015), although whether any of the books (or carbon copies from 
them) have survived is unclear.
As the work of the Whips’ Office continues to be shrouded in secrecy, 
it is difficult to know what form whips’ notes take today, and in what (if 











the practice of the dirt book should be treated critically. For example, 
Labour’s first chief whip under Tony Blair, Nick Brown, told Labour MPs 
following the 1997 general election that they need not worry about him 
operating any kind of ‘black book’ (Gibbon 2014). However, given the 
subjectivity of what could be considered a dirt book (and the loaded 
nature of the term), it is not clear what exactly a claim not to operate 
such a system would include and exclude. It is improbable that whips no 
longer keep records on their party members, as this would compromise 
their ability to do their job effectively (Brandreth 2016). Most impor-
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Kompromat is a Russian compound noun formed by shortening and 
blending the words ‘komprometiruyushy’ and ‘material’ or compromising 
material. While there is no direct English equivalent, kompromat refers 
to, ‘discrediting information that can be collected, stored, traded, or used 
strategically across all domains:  political, electoral, legal, professional, 
judicial, media, or business’ (Ledeneva 2006: 58).
Kompromat belongs to the general family of practices known as 
‘character assassination’ (see character assassination, 8.6 in this vol-
ume). As with black public relations (PR) campaigns (known as chornyi 
piar in Russia – see chernukha, 8.5 in this volume), the purpose of kom-
promat is to discredit opponents. However, unlike black PR, kompromat 
can also be used to blackmail competitors and does not necessarily need 
to be published in the public domain to be effective. Gathering, dissemi-
nating and manipulating kompromat is still practised in countries of the 
former Soviet Union and remains an important device to eliminate com-
petitors or protect the interests of government officials, state agencies or 
entrepreneurs.
The practice of gathering kompromat originated during the early 
years of the Soviet Union when security services collected condemning 
material on Communist Party members that could be traded or used to 
either punish or blackmail rivals. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, many government officials associated with the state or inter-
nal security services were left unemployed. Following the collapse of 

















Soviet Union allowed many of these individuals to adapt their former 
tradecraft (i.e. surveillance and intelligence gathering) in a commercial 
context. Former secret services employees, for example, established secu-
rity firms, which provided these services to the private sector. Nascent 
private security companies also maintained close connections with col-
leagues still working in state security agencies, which provided oppor-
tunities to acquire (for a price) previously undisclosed kompromat on 
private businesspersons and government officials; this led to the ‘semi- 
privatisation’ of kompromat.
Despite the de facto privatisation of kompromat, government agen-
cies in many former Soviet countries still gather kompromat, and in the 
case of Russia the secret branches of law enforcement, such as the FSB 
or Interior Ministry, monopolise these means at the expense of the oli-
garchs. Under President Putin, the capacity of non- state actors to gather 
and use kompromat is perceived as a threat that undermines the regime’s 
dominance over the means of information gathering. Nevertheless, the 
Russian state does not have a complete monopoly – government officials 
continue to gather or fabricate kompromat for personal political interests. 
For instance, Fyodor Andreyev, Chief Executive of Russian diamond min-
ing company Alrosa, stepped down in September 2014 for health reasons. 
Reportedly, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnev – in charge of supervis-
ing Alrosa – had played a role in Andreyev’s resignation. Apparently in 
response, kompromat questioning Trutnev’s record was printed on wek.
ru, a site commonly used to publish compromising material on political 
figures and oligarchs.
While the precise forms and use of kompromat by post- Soviet 
regimes may vary, the overall motivation remains the same  – to dis-
credit political opponents and ensure loyalty to the ruling regimes. 
For instance, ‘frozen files’ are held by central and regional tax and law 
enforcement agencies to be used against government officials and pri-
vate businesspersons if and when necessary. These files can be over-
looked so long as loyalty is maintained, but revived and a criminal case 
opened if the individual pursues competing political or commercial 
interests. For example, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma actively 
encouraged corruption, which could then be used to gather kompro-
mat as a means of control (Darden 2001); a tactic that continues to 
be employed by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (Hale 
2014). The Kremlin engages in similar tactics against leading oligarchs 
and potential political rivals. For instance, Mikhail Gutseriev, owner of 
Russian oil company Russneft, came under attack in 2007 when mem-
















which were related to abuse of office and inflicting damage to the state, 
dated back to 2002; however, the documentation was held ‘on file’ by 
the security services to be used at a time when the ruling elite felt they 
needed to exert pressure.
Kompromat may also be used within the regime itself, either to 
guarantee the continued loyalty of potential rivals, or as a result of politi-
cal infighting. For example, Ukrainian Member of Parliament (MP) and 
1999 presidential hopeful, Yevhen Marchuk, used President Kuchma’s 
bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, to gather kompromat on the President, 
which was used against him in the 1999 presidential election (Kuzio 
2014). A more recent example is the case of Rakhat Aliev, the former 
son- in- law of Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev. As head of 
Kazakhstan’s secret service (KNB), in 2005 Aliev allegedly wiretapped 
the offices of government officials and the president to gather kompromat 
on both his enemies and his allies.
Kompromat can either be genuine, fabricated, exaggerated or some 
combination of the three. The dubious legality of many business practices 
in Russia in the 1990s means that kompromat could be found on almost 
any individual who was active in business or politics during those years. 
The combination of underdeveloped political institutions and lack of an 
adequate legal framework created an environment where corruption and 
bribery could facilitate dubious business transactions, and were arguably 
unavoidable for a business to remain competitive in an economy where 
such practices were the norm. For instance, the chaotic privatisation pro-
cess that took place in the early 1990s was often facilitated through ques-
tionable and sometimes illegal business practices. Unofficial elements, 
such as ties to illicit networks or organised crime, were a common feature 
during the privatisation of state resources, especially in certain sectors 
of the economy such as extractives. Criminal influence during the 1990s 
meant that many businesses either employed criminal groups as a krysha 
(‘roof’, see 6.23 in this volume), or utilised criminal tactics for political or 
commercial gain.
Importantly, the veracity of kompromat is not necessarily impor-
tant; rather its utility is in how effective it can be as leverage against 
political or commercial opponents (Gambetta 2009). Unlike in many 
Western states where media outlets may act as watchdogs for political 
and commercial malfeasance, the publication of kompromat is less con-
cerned with exposing corrupt or illicit activity and more with finding a 
pliant agency or journalist that will publish (for a price) the allegations. 
Once the allegations are published in one source, other news agencies 

















investigations, the result of which varies from criminal persecution, res-
ignation from public office or commercial entity, to reputational risks 
that could affect domestic and international standing.
Finally, while there is ample evidence of kompromat being pub-
lished in the public domain, the mechanism’s real value rests in those 
that are unpublished. In some cases, the threat of publication is just as 
valuable (and sometimes more) than publishing the material. This may 
similarly be used against business opponents to pressure them into a 
range of things such as selling valuable assets at below market value, 








In Russia, the term chernukha refers to the creation and distribution of 
information as a means of undermining the reputation of a particular 
political or business figure. The term derives from the adjective chernyi 
(‘black’ in Russian) and the pejorative noun- making suffix - ukha. In late 
Soviet newspeak, it denoted a mode of criticising, or blackening, Soviet 
reality; later it shifted to depicting the grim reality of a decaying Soviet 
society ridden with alcoholism, sexual abuse and crime (Graham 2013). 
In the post- Soviet period, the term became associated with the emer-
gence in Russia of ‘political technologists’ and their attempts to smear 
the reputations of their patrons’ political rivals. Today, however, the term 
is used far beyond the professional community of political advisors, tech-
nologists and spin- doctors. Related phrases include zapuskat’ chernukhu 
(launching chernukha), rasprostranyat’ chernukhu (disseminating cher-
nukha) and chernyi piar (black public relations, or black PR) (Ledeneva 
2006: 32– 3).
The types of chernukha are defined by two variables: the legality or 
illegality of the method used, and the degree of transgression of moral/ 
ethical values. Means used may include defamation, libel, slander or 
kompromat (compromising material, see 8.4 in this volume) (Szilagyi 
2002; Wilson 2005; Ledeneva 2006: 58– 9), as well as the spread of any 
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the reputation of a person or a business. The financial sources of cher-
nukha are rarely disclosed but often involve dirty money.
The use of chernukha is common in the worlds of advertising, 
business and political communication, but peaks in electoral technolo-
gies. During electoral campaigns, political technologists aim not merely 
to improve the chances of their particular candidate, but also to use all 
available legal and illegal means to ruin the prospects of his or her rival. 
Andrew Wilson notes that the difference between legal PR campaigns 
and chernyi PR is that ‘the latter’s intent or true message is hidden, pos-
sibly even contrary to the superficial message’ (Wilson 2005:  70). For 
instance, a random individual might be quoted in social media as saying 
something along the lines of, ‘I am interested only in an effective out-
come, not in whether or not a mayoral candidate takes drugs; that is his 
or her business’. While such a statement is not illegal, it may well create 
a negative image of the candidate with voters, thereby undermining the 
candidate’s electoral prospects.
Another example illustrates how chernukha may be used in busi-
ness. At the height of the financial crisis of November/ December 2014, 
when the value of the rouble plummeted relative to other world cur-
rencies, many Russians withdrew roubles from their bank accounts 
and changed them into foreign currency. As a result, Russian banks suf-
fered a shortage of cash. In mid- December, the Russian press and social 
media spread rumours that, as of 18 December, Russia’s biggest bank, 
Sberbank, would limit cash withdrawals made at automated cash points 
(BBC Russian Service 2014). Sberbank promptly denied the reports, call-
ing them a provocation. At the same time, however, unidentified men 
were seen sticking notices on Sberbank ATMs asking clients to ‘with-
draw less cash so that there will be enough for other customers, in light 
of the restrictions soon to be imposed by Sberbank’. An investigation by 
Sberbank discovered that the rumours were being spread by a financial 
pyramid scheme. According to Sberbank, the scheme’s organisers had 
posted on their social media sites statements such as:  ‘The banks will 
cheat you! Come to us, we are honest!’ (Zakharets 2014).
Chernukha involves negative campaigning that, scholarly research 
suggests, may play an essential role in democratic governance (Mark 
2009; Schweitzer 2010; Sullivan and Sapir 2012; Walter 2014). What dis-
tinguishes Russian negative campaigning from its Western counterparts, 
however, is the ability of Russian political technologists to manipulate 
the law, treating it as an obstacle to be overcome and as a tool to be used 
on the path to victory. In addition, the weakness of Russian civil society, 




















and the volatile reputations of politicians all contribute to the effective-
ness of chernukha as an electoral technology (Ledeneva 2006: 45– 6).
When publishing leaflets vilifying their opponents during electoral 
campaigns, PR agencies are legally bound to disclose information both 
about themselves and about the client who placed the order. Without 
that, there is little chance of a printer taking on the work. Therefore, PR 
agencies often use a candidate as a front, or pay someone to put their 
name to the chernukha content and thus accept liability. They may set 
up a shell organisation with an impressive- sounding title (‘The Honest 
City’, ‘The Leninskiy District Council’) on whose behalf the leaflets will be 
published. Given that people rarely pay attention to the piles of electoral 
flyers that come through their letterboxes, and even less to the details of 
who placed the order, the main message of chernukha is delivered in the 
title. For example, the title at the top of a leaflet distributed in Tomsk in 
2009 reads, ‘A criminal case against Aleksandr Deyev’, thereby appearing 
to incriminate the individual named (Dezhurniy po gorodu). The subtitle 
at the bottom of the page reads, ‘Was there or wasn’t there [such a case]?’ 
While this means that no direct accusation has been made, the damage 
has already been done to the individual’s reputation.
It is difficult to establish how widespread the practice of chernukha 
is, but it is hard to think of an electoral campaign in Russia of the 1990s 
in which dirty tricks were not used by various candidates against their 
opponents (Hutcheson 2006: 60). Suggestions about how to deploy cher-
nukha in political and business relations are commonplace in Russian 
popular literature (Markov 2005; Gusev et  al. 2006). However, the 
gradual development of electoral authoritarianism following President 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to power has had a direct impact on competitive pol-
itics (Gel’man 2015: 77– 8, 81– 93). Chernukha and other PR technolo-
gies have been replaced by a set of cruder practices associated with the 
use by the authorities of the so- called administrative resource (Wilson 
2005: 270– 2).
At the same time, if chernukha were employed as a means of admin-
istrative control, it would turn into a powerful political instrument of pop-
ular mobilisation. One example of this might be the media campaign that 
began after President Putin’s return to the Kremlin in Spring 2012, and 
accelerated following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Russian 
media experts have pointed out that the campaign of popular mobilisa-
tion launched by the Kremlin to boost public support for its policies made 
heavy use of propaganda methods. These included undermining the rep-
utations of the Kremlin’s political opponents by disseminating through 
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image both of the West and of the Russian opposition (Gatov 2015: 
12– 4; Yakovlev 2015).
It is not easy to analyse chernukha merely by tracing the sources 
of negative campaigning. Since its production usually breaches some 
legislative norms and violates others, the producers of chernukha will 
in most instances either deny their authorship of it or claim that they 
were framed. Even so, it is possible to research chernukha by means of 
in- depth interviews with experts and political technologists. In addi-
tion, opinion polls held before and after a defamation campaign make it 
possible to assess what impact chernukha has had on the general public. 
Opinion polls with specifically tailored questions may help to identify the 
key stereotypes used in the production of chernukha and how they have 
changed over time.
Chernukha is closely intertwined with a number of informal prac-
tices such as krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility, see 3.10 Volume 1) 
and the use of kompromat, both of which are integral to the workings 
of informal networks in contemporary Russia. In competitive elections, 
negative campaigning has the potential to affect the balance between 
parties and candidates. In societies with the rule of law and independent 
media, it may be helpful for voters to learn in detail about the political 
agenda of a vilified candidate (Fernandes 2013: 286). In the context of 
the abuse of law and media manipulation, however, chernukha practices 
are more likely to create popular distrust in the media, public institutions 
and the electoral process and to lead to a state of cynicism that will make 
it increasingly hard for public figures to win the trust of the electorate or 
to persuade voters to take an active interest in politics (Ansolabehere and 
Iyenger 1996).
8.6 Character assassination (general)
sergei samoilenko and eric shiraev
George Mason University, Usa 
Jennifer keohane 
University of Baltimore, Usa 
and
Martijn Icks
University of amsterdam, the netherlands
‘Character assassination’ is a practice in which a deliberate and sustained 
effort is made to damage the reputation or credibility of an individual. 
Social groups or institutions can also be the target (Icks and Shiraev 


















campaign), and to the outcome of this process (e.g. a damaged reputa-
tion). It may involve various kinds of defamatory attacks, which are simi-
lar to the abusive and circumstantial attacks (argumentum ad hominem) 
used in adversarial contexts to steer attention away from the debated 
issue to the opponent’s personal traits or reputation (Walton 1998). 
However, unlike ad hominem attacks, character assassination does not 
have to take place in the context of a debate. It consists of a variety of 
possible attacks in the form of verbal and non- verbal assaults including 
spoken insults, rumours, campaign ads, pamphlets, cartoons and tweets. 
As a result of such campaigns, individuals may be rejected by their pro-
fessional community, or by members of their social or cultural environ-
ment. Damage sustained in the process of character assassination can 
last a lifetime and has been likened to annihilation.
Character assassination is a cross- cultural phenomenon that reveals 
itself in a variety of forms and methods in every political and social envi-
ronment. The issues of character assassination have been addressed in 
psychology, political science, history and communication studies (Icks, 
Keohane, Samoilenko, and Shiraev 2017). As a field of scholarly inquiry, 
it is often explained by the organising concepts of rationality and inten-
tionality, source credibility, political and societal image, public opinion, 
social norms and cultural values. The phenomenon of character assassi-
nation should be addressed from four different perspectives: the attacker, 
the victim, the media and the public. Character assassination should also 
be addressed in relation to studies of public opinion, reputation manage-
ment and image restoration.
In 2014 Icks and Shiraev introduced a classification of seven 
character assassination methods, which they defined as ‘anonymous 
lies’, ‘misquoting’, ‘silencing’, ‘acts of vandalism’, ‘name- calling’, ‘men-
tal illness’ and ‘sexual deviance’. The authors identified the website of 
Wikipedia as a common context for ‘anonymous lies’. Examples of ‘con-
tributions’ found here include falsifications of a person’s early biogra-
phy, suggestions of inappropriate sexual behaviour or sexual deviance 
and forged evidence about an individual’s inappropriate social ties or 
political associations. The second method, which the authors defined as 
‘misquoting’, is an amalgam of two practices: omitting significant details 
from a quote and/ or quoting out of context. This method can also refer 
to manipulatively selecting unfortunate or poor photographs taken in 
awkward situations, which then promulgate ridicule. A common aim for 
journalists or bloggers is to show a politician in a poor light: for example, 
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‘Silencing’ is a further long- term method of character assassination, 
which often occurs post- mortem. The distortion of history is an example 
of silencing. ‘Memory erasing’ also refers to the practice of avoiding any 
reference to an individual and their work by the attacker, in an attempt 
to erase their public record from collective memory. Even in antiquity, 
the Egyptians, the Romans, and other cultures applied memory sanctions 
against disgraced rulers and public figures, such as Pharaoh Akhenaten 
and the Roman Emperors Caligula and Nero. Their images were destroyed 
and their names erased from public consciousness. However, the art of 
memory erasure and the distortion of history were taken to a new level in 
totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Some of the most notorious 
examples of symbolic ‘vandalism’ were in Stalin’s Russia, where Trotsky, 
Yezhov and other prominent political and military figures were removed 
from pictures and history books. The concept of ‘memory hole’ was intro-
duced by George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984, where the Party’s Ministry 
of Truth systematically re- created all potential historical documents, and 
in effect, re- wrote history to match the often- changing state propaganda.
The character assassination method of ‘name- calling’ usually 
appears in a form of a quick, short insult, ridicule or in the application 
of specific, demonising labels. In politics, ideological labels such as ‘com-
munist’, ‘fascist’, ‘Nazi’, ‘capitalist’, ‘imperialist’ or ‘terrorist’ are quickly 
attached to political leaders and officials. Ridicule is a purposeful and 
contemptuous exaggeration or distortion in a comical context. Its humor-
ous nature helps attackers portray their victims as weak, stupid, unbal-
anced, irrational or hypocritical. If successful, it puts a negative slant on 
a candidate and his/ her policies so they appear less meaningful or impor-
tant than they actually are. Incompetence and ignorance are favourite 
themes of ridiculing.
Allegations of an individual experiencing a mental illness in the 
past or currently experiencing mental illness is a common character 
assassination ploy that is successful because of the strong social stigma 
attached to psychological disorders. This label associates the individual 
by implication with other negative notions such as lack of rationality and 
instability. In 2014, for example, during the tensions between Russia 
and Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea, a number of articles 
appeared in the press claiming that President Putin was erratic and 
unstable. Authors based their reports on rumours that ‘Putin has become 
increasingly withdrawn and isolated’ and ‘is appearing live on television 
less frequently’ (Hahn 2015).
Finally, with the growing influence of public opinion, moral behav-



















regard to sexual conduct, leaves an individual open to character attacks. 
Short- term character assassination attempts are frequently based on 
alleged inappropriate acts, such as having an extramarital affair. Long- 
term character attacks require allegations about a person’s persistent 
pattern of ‘deviant’ behaviour.
Character assassination can be applied in a number of contexts. 
In politics, character assassination is usually a part of a political ‘smear 
campaign’ that involves intentional, premeditated efforts to under-
mine an individual or group’s reputation and credibility. ‘Negative 
campaigning’, also known more colloquially as ‘mudslinging’, is the 
process of trying to gain advantage by referring to negative aspects 
of an opponent or of a policy rather than emphasising one’s own posi-
tive attributes or preferred policies. In US presidential politics a variety 
of strategies are employed including ‘cheap shots’, ‘falsification’ and 
‘smears’. ‘Cheap shots’ typically allude to a victim’s individual features, 
including, but not limited to, his or her credibility, competence and 
honesty; ‘falsifications’ are lies, which by the time they are used in 
an attack are often difficult to distinguish from facts. Direct attacks 
involve strong accusations about a person’s character flaws and tend 
to be based on facts.
‘Smears’ often consist of ad hominem attacks in the form of distor-
tions, half- truths or even outright lies. The attackers may involve double-
speak, raising false accusations, spreading innuendo or deliberately 
misinforming others about the opponent’s morals, integrity or public 
image. It may also involve manipulating and spinning technically true 
information, but presenting it in a misleading manner, devoid of neces-
sary context. Even when the facts behind a ‘smear’ campaign have been 
demonstrated to lack proper foundation, the tactic is often effective 
because the target’s reputation remains tarnished regardless of the truth. 
‘Smears’ are also effective in diverting attention away from the matter in 
question. Rather than responding to the original issue, the target of the 
smear has to correct the false information.
‘Political rumouring’ is not innocuous chatter, but rather a phenom-
enon with important electoral consequences. It may include painting an 
opponent as soft on criminals, dishonest, corrupt or as a danger to the 
nation. In modern election campaigns, individuals are more willing to 
believe the negative rumours about an opposition candidate than nega-
tive rumours about their own party candidates.
In the mid- 1990s, political marketing specialists in Russia intro-
duced a practice known as ‘black PR’ (public relations), which was used 
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Western politics, ‘black PR’ is best known for using compromising materi-
als (see kompromat, 8.4 in this volume) about politicians and other pub-
lic figures. These ‘black PR’ techniques were used in 2014 during regional 
elections in Russia. Examples included compromising material about the 
alleged criminal connections or past conviction of candidates, as well as 
information about their wealth, property and income. Such materials 
were used for a variety of purposes, including creating negative publicity, 
blackmailing and ensuring loyalty. The wave of kompromat was gener-
ated not only by the demands of the media owners, but also by the jour-
nalists themselves. Credible falsehoods, transcripts of taped telephone 
conversations and pseudo- events were thrown to the press in the guise 
of ‘news’. This questionable practice was able to flourish under Russian 
law, as journalists were not obliged to reveal their sources, except when 
ordered to do so by a court. Russian news reports showed compromising 
materials in a biased or incomplete way. The aim was not only to report 
negative news about an individual or an organisation, but the intent was 
also to obfuscate and confuse the viewer.
Fundamentally, an attack on one’s image, reputation or brand is 
dependent on audience perception. Studies in the field of motivated rea-
soning (Icks and Shiraev 2014) show that consumers are highly selective 
regarding what they deem is ‘credible’ information, preferring to accept 
what is most congruent with existing attitudes, expectations or actions. 
Five strategies of ‘image restoration’ for victims have been identified. 
Suggested responses include ‘denial’, ‘evading responsibility’, ‘reducing 
offensiveness’, ‘corrective action’, and ‘mortification’ (Benoit 1995). This 
image restoration theory is used to mitigate image damage following a 
threat to a reputation. As well as the strategies mentioned above, other 
tactics might also include attacks on the accuser.
Situational crisis communication theory (Coombs 2007) suggests 
that the level of reputation threat is determined by whether the public 
believes the organisation caused the crisis, is dependent on the organi-
sation’s crisis history and the organisation’s prior relational reputation 
with the public. Unfortunately for the victim, crises serve as an excel-
lent source of news material. Dramatic events often draw the attention 
of the media industry whose sole purpose is to shock their audience and 
to sensationalise events by showing them in a tragic or politicised con-
text. It is evident that character assassination techniques are increasingly 
employed in the news media along with ‘hate speech’ and other methods 
of psychological warfare. The surge of hype, hysteria and sensationalism 
in the media is particularly evident when events are positioned as major 

















character assassination techniques in the twenty- first century proves to 
be consistent with many observations that focus on the negative effects of 
the media on politics and society, such as simplification, and the negative 
representation of politics, which favours conflict and personalisation.
8.7 Psikhushka (Ussr)
robert van Voren
human rights in Mental health- fGIP, the netherlands
In most Western European countries, destigmatisation campaigns 
have slowly changed the perception of psychiatry. Several decades 
ago psychiatric institutions were generally seen as places of horror, 
and either euphemistically referred to with their location (‘Santpoort’ 
in Amsterdam, or ‘Vasaros 5’ in Vilnius) or with names that confirmed 
the general perception: madhouse, nuthouse or, in Russian equivalent, 
durdom. Psikhushka is a much more benign name and in fact the abbre-
viation of the Russian term for psychiatric hospital, psikhiatricheskaya 
bolnitsa. Yet in Soviet times it also acquired a much more ominous mean-
ing because of the many dissidents who wound up in the psikhushka for 
political reasons. Among the well- known victims were poetess Natalya 
Gorbanevskaya, biologist Zhores Medvedev, General Pyotr Grigorenko 
and the Ukrainian cyberneticist Leonid Plyushch (see Figure 8.7.1).
Political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union was widespread. 
There were individual cases in the early Soviet period, but during 
Stalinist times the psikhushka was mainly used to save people from the 
Gulag, and basically to hide individuals from Stalin’s executioners. Life 
in psychiatric hospitals was considered better than in the concentration 
camps of the Gulag, and thus the chances of survival were higher. The 
same happened later in Poland after martial law was declared in 1981 
and some Solidarność leaders were hidden in psychiatric institutions to 
avoid arrest. Similarly during the last years of the Soviet Union a number 
of young men had themselves hospitalised in a psikhushka in order to 
avoid being drafted into the army with the risk of being sent to the war 
in Afghanistan.
The practice of using psychiatry to hide people from the repres-
sive regime changed in the late 1940s, and even more so after Stalin’s 
death when Khrushchev claimed that he had released all political 
prisoners and had to explain why people were still arrested for politi-
cal reasons. ‘They are mad’, he claimed, explaining that there was no 
objective reason for people to go against the communist system and 




















(Bloch and Reddaway 1977). The political abuse of psychiatry became 
systemic under Yuri Andropov, who became Chairman of the KGB in 
1967 and set himself the task to fight the internal enemy, the dissident 
movement that was in his view a perfidious creation of Western intel-
ligence agencies designed to undermine the Soviet state. As we now 
know, he convinced the Politburo that there were many thousands of 
especially dangerous criminals in the USSR who were mentally ill, and 
based his proposal to the Politburo on a report by one of his subordi-
nates who maintained that only a quarter of the necessary psychiat-
ric beds were available and that many more were needed. The report 
also cited ‘especially dangerous crimes’ – these included trying to meet 
with foreigners, trying to flee the Soviet Union, disseminating leaflets 
and – the worst – calling for control mechanisms over the Communist 
Party (Van Voren 2010a).
Andropov’s plans prevailed and in the mid- 1970s many hospitals 
were enlarged or newly built. About one- third of the political prison-
ers wound up in psychiatric hospitals, where they were subjected to 
Figure 8.7.1 The Chernyakhovsk Special Psychiatric Hospital, 
where General Grigorenko was interned. The photo is from 2006, but 
everything looks exactly as in Soviet times.










‘treatment’ with neuroleptic drugs or tortured with other concoctions, 
such as being wrapped in wet linen, which would shrink when drying 
causing horrible pain. Other treatments included the use of outlandish 
‘drugs’ like sulphozine – a mixture of peach extract and sulphur – which 
when injected caused high fevers often leading to comatose conditions. 
The suggestion was that the fever ‘burned out the poison of mental 
illness’.
The diagnosis usually used to incarcerate people was that of ‘slug-
gish schizophrenia’, a slowly developing schizophrenia that was hard to 
detect by the patient or his environment, but held to be extremely dan-
gerous with alleged symptoms presenting as a struggle for the truth, 
perseverance, reform ideas or religious delusions. The theories on which 
the concept of ‘sluggish schizophrenia’ were based had been developed 
by Academician Andrei Snezhnevsky, who with his Moscow School of 
Psychiatry achieved an almost complete monopoly over psychiatry in 
1950. Other views were not allowed and that remained the case until the 
Soviet Union disintegrated in the years 1989– 91.
During the 1960s– 1980s thousands of completely sane individuals 
found their way to the psikhushka for political reasons, and many more 
people were incarcerated on the basis of faulty diagnoses, often people 
who in a normal environment would have benefitted from psychothera-
peutic help and would have subsequently continued their lives without 
issue. By 1988 some 10 million Soviet citizens were on a psychiatric reg-
ister, marked as having a mental illness and required to report regularly 
to a psychiatric outpatient clinic (Van Voren 2012).
The political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union came to an 
end during the last years of the country’s existence, yet for many peo-
ple the psikhushka remained a terrifying institution, which they took 
measures to avoid at all costs. In some of the former Soviet republics 
this perception is slowly changing, but it will take decades to undo the 
damage caused by the Soviet regime. At the present time in Russia and 
other former Soviet republics like Belarus and Kazakhstan there is yet 
again concern that political opponents are being sent to the psikhushka 
or being given a psychiatric diagnosis. Recent cases in Russia include 
the prosecution case against members of the feminist protest band Pussy 
Riot in 2012, who were put on trial for ‘blasphemy’ and in the course 
of the investigation psychiatrically examined. The psychiatrists claimed 
they suffered from ‘personality disorders’, with symptoms almost iden-
tical to the Soviet diagnosis of ‘sluggish schizophrenia’. Also the arrest 
and subsequent psychiatric diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in the 



















international attention. He was eventually released from hospital but 
still put on compulsory out- patient treatment. Regrettably, in many for-
mer Soviet republics attempts to humanise psychiatry have stalled alto-
gether or failed and progress made since the early 1990s is gradually 




In the late Soviet years, and particularly under Yuri Andropov’s time as 
Chairman of the KGB, psikhushka involved the frequent, systemic con-
finement of political and religious dissidents in psychiatric hospitals (Van 
Voren 2010). This practice was abandoned during Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
regime (1985– 91). However, under Vladimir Putin various cases of the 
psychiatric confinement of political opponents have emerged, suggest-
ing that psikhushka has returned. ‘The difference is that 25 years ago the 
people they sent to psychiatric prison were anti- Soviet …. Now the peo-
ple they send are those who oppose Putin’ (Vlassov 2012).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, legal and ethical policies 
were introduced in Russian psychiatry in order to establish real inde-
pendence from the state and to prevent its use for non- medical ends. 
However, in reality the abuse still exists. The problem lies ‘not in the law 
itself, but in its implementation’ (Van Voren 2013: 8). Psychiatry is used 
in ‘fraudulent’ criminal trials to influence legal outcomes. This occurs 
because many of the conditions that facilitated this practice in the Soviet 
times have not been fully reformed. The most significant condition is the 
‘unresolved problem of the dependence/ independence of the Russian 
judiciary as a whole’ (Gushansky 2009).
The case of Yulia Privedennaya in May 2008 highlights the issues. 
Privedennaya, leader of a charitable youth organisation and an anti- 
Putin activist, was arrested on suspicion of planning an illegal armed 
coup, of illegal deprivation of freedom and of torture of minors who were 
members of the youth organisation. Three months into her trial, she was 
forced to attend an outpatient examination at the Serbskii Centre, a psy-
chiatric hospital notorious for its role in the confinement of political dis-
sidents during Soviet times. This resulted in her month- long involuntary 
hospitalisation in the centre.
Reportedly, the prosecutor’s evidence could not prove 
Privedennaya’s guilt and for over two years the court failed to produce 
















Mikhail Trepashkin, Privedennaya’s defence lawyer, ‘it is clear that the 
psychiatrists were asked to come up with some kind of psychological dis-
order’ in order to confine Privedennaya (Politzeky 2010). It is suggested 
that prosecutors used the ‘psychiatric’ option to prolong Privedennaya’s 
trial when it had hit a ‘deadlock’ (Prava Cheloveka v Rossii 2008). 
Following her release from the hospital, the trial continued and she was 
sentenced to four and a half years in prison.
The use of psychiatry in Privedennaya’s trial is inextricably linked 
to non- accountability in the Russian judiciary. In this instance prolong-
ing the case appears to have given the prosecutors and the judge time to 
find new incriminating ‘evidence’. Thus the use of psychiatry in this case 
provided the prosecution with greater scope both to circumvent proce-
dural norms and to evade responsibility for proceeding with a false case. 
As Privedennaya states, psychiatry was used in order not to ‘shame the 
investigation’ (Elder 2010).
According to Yuri Savenko, psychiatrist and head of the Independent 
Psychiatric Association in Russia (IPA), psychiatry is now used as ‘part 
of a frequent procedure [in criminal trials] where there are no concrete 
justifications, it is more economical in terms of effort and time to acquire 
a psychiatric evaluation’ (Savenko 2010). In contrast to the Soviet era, 
psikhushka is no longer employed solely for the indefinite incarceration 
of a person, but is now used in a more subtle way to achieve ‘flexibility’ in 
a trial. Problematically, this practice is also more difficult to identify than 
that which existed in the Soviet period.
The lack of independence in forensic psychiatry is a major factor 
in facilitating psikhushka. There is said to be an ‘unwritten rule in court’ 
that assumes that ‘experts from the Serbskii Centre are always correct 
and independent experts do not have the right to evaluate and criticize 
them’ (Savenko 2013). The opinion of experts from the Serbskii Centre 
has therefore become irrefutable evidence in a trial, as exhibited in 
Privedennaya’s trial when challenges to the psychiatric diagnosis and 
requests for independent examination were ignored by the judge, despite 
the many testimonies asserting her sanity. Similarly, in the Soviet times, 
the Serbskii Centre’s opinion was ‘almost always accepted by the court 
and viewed as more authoritative than other commissions’ (Bloch and 
Reddaway 1977: 100).
Unlike the Soviet era, the use of psychiatry specifically against 
political opponents is not frequent or systematic in contemporary Russia. 
It is thought to occur selectively in order to influence public opinion and 
behaviour, with the wider aim of strengthening support for President 























authorities to enforce political conformity’ (Leonard 2010). In another 
example, Professor Gerhard Mangott considers the 2012 case of activist 
Kosenko’s hospitalisation following his arrest for his part in the Bolotnaya 
protests and subsequent diagnosis of ‘paranoid schizophrenia’ as a ‘signal 
to politically active citizens of Russia – not to participate in demonstra-
tions against the authorities’ (quoted in Sergeev 2013).
This can be understood as a strategy of ‘selective repression’ described 
by Vladimir Gel’man in ‘The Politics of Fear’ (2015 and introduction to 
chapter 8 in this volume). Its main function is not so much to punish oppo-
nents as to prevent the spread of opposition in society. Psychiatry achieves 
this in two ways. First, it displays the risks of vocal and public opposition 
to the rest of the population, thereby creating a fear of protesting. Second, 
it discredits the opposition, which serves to reinforce the view of Putin as 
the only source of political legitimacy. In this way, the opposition is con-
trolled either through fear or by genuine support for Putin.
Other instances in Russia where the use of psychiatry has been used 
to repress political opponents include the 2007 cases of Larissa Arap and 
Artyom Basyrov, both activists from ‘Other Russia’ (Garry Kasparov’s 
anti- Putin coalition), who were diagnosed with schizophrenia and force-
fully hospitalised for six weeks and one month respectively, resulting 
from their protest actions. It is believed that Arap’s hospitalisation was 
directly connected to her anti- Putin views and her critical articles about 
the hospital in Murmansk in which she was confined. Basyrov’s hospitali-
sation in Bashkortostan is similarly thought to have been related to his 
political activism as it occurred on the eve of a ‘demonstration of dissent’, 
which he helped to organise. Arap and Basryov were separately exam-
ined by the IPA, which concluded that there was no basis for their hos-
pitalisation. In 2012, psychiatry was also used against the feminist rock 
group ‘Pussy Riot’ following their anti- Putin protest in Moscow’s Christ 
the Saviour Church. Psychiatrists at Kashchenko hospital diagnosed 
them with a ‘personality disorder’ and recommended their isolation from 
society (Van Voren 2013).
In contrast to the late Soviet years, the main political function of 
psikhushka in today’s Russia lies not in the systematic confinement of 
political opponents, but in the psychological effects that selective hospi-
talisation and the diagnosis of opponents has on the general population. 
In contemporary Russia psikhushka is differently connoted. The practice 
may now be used in a more subtle way to support the ‘right’ verdict in 
fraudulent criminal trials. This, of course, has serious implications for 
upholding accountability in the Russian judiciary. The psychiatric con-





















opponent’s hospitalisation is not indefinite as it was in the Soviet era. 
Rather, it is used selectively against the most politically active citizens in 





Zersetzung was a technique used in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) by the secret police (Ministry for State Security, Ministerium 
für Staatssicherheit, commonly known as the Stasi). Its goal was to 
deter individuals from political activity and to disrupt opposition 
movements by creating existential uncertainty. Originally a scientific 
term, Zersetzung may be translated as ‘decomposition’. Its political 
use has a long history. Already in the nineteenth century, it carried 
negative connotations, warning of the dangers of social disintegration. 
Right- wing nationalists and anti- Semites used the term to denounce 
workers’ movements, women’s movements and Jews. After the First 
World War, the term came to be used to denote a ‘stab in the back’. 
The Nazis continued this practice, warning of alleged enemies who 
would weaken society and its sense of community. In the run- up to the 
Second World War, ‘undermining military force’ (Wehrkraftzersetzung) 
was declared a criminal offence. Under Germany’s Wartime Special 
Penal Code (Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung) of 1938, as many 
as 30,000 soldiers and civilians were tried and convicted, and many 
of them were sentenced to death. Besides that, however, Zersetzung 
could have a more positive meaning. Under the Weimar Republic 
(1919– 33), various political actors saw it as a way to weaken political 
rivals and infiltrate state institutions. For example, the secret service 
of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) disseminated subversive 
propaganda within the military, the Social Democratic Party and the 
Stormtroopers.
The GDR (1949– 90) set up the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) in 
1950. The Stasi presented itself as the successor of the KPD’s secret ser-
vice. But, unlike the former communist practice of Zersetzung, the task of 
East Germany’s secret police was not to undermine authority but to pro-
tect the communist dictatorship. Its main goal was accordingly to deter 
individuals and groups from activities considered dangerous to the state. 
The methods the Stasi used were also different. Rather than distribut-












collaborate, the Stasi used Zersetzung to create psychological unease and 
undermine trust among friends and like- minded persons. Zersetzung was 
deployed against dissidents and artists who criticised the state, church- 
based opposition groups, peace campaigners, applicants for emigration 
and nonconformist youth. In contrast to other repressive methods below 
the level of the criminal law, Zersetzung was generally successful as long 
as its sources were not detected.
Zersetzung was increasingly practised in the GDR after 1976 in reac-
tion to increasing numbers of applications for emigration. In the 1980s, 
as the authorities switched their focus from repressive to preventive 
measures, Zersetzung began to be used systematically. Implementation 
of preventive measures required more staff, which is one reason why the 
number of official members of the secret police doubled between 1971 
and 1989, along with an increase in the number of unofficial collabora-
tors. Stasi staff received special training at the Legal Academy (Juristische 
Hochschule) in Potsdam where ‘operative psychology’ was among the 
subjects taught.
However, Zersetzung was anything but a uniform practice. Each 
action was tailored to fit the individual character of the target(s). Human 
weaknesses were identified in order to exploit them. Be it family prob-
lems, mental health issues, homosexuality, alcohol addiction, profes-
sional ambition, fear of losing one’s children  – the Stasi targeted each 
individual’s most vulnerable point. Rumours and manipulated photo-
graphs were spread in order to create mistrust and confusion. Dissidents 
were confronted with threatening situations such as arbitrary interroga-
tions or damage to their personal belongings. Career advancement was 
blocked, family and other relationships were destroyed, travel bans were 
imposed. The Stasi might also try to criminalise or defame its victims as 
informants. In a number of cases, after many years of Zersetzung, indi-
viduals were forced to emigrate.
Wrecking people’s careers was a common method of Zersetzung. 
Among hundreds of victims were prominent dissidents such as Rudolf 
Bahro, Jürgen Fuchs and Robert Havemann. The treatment meted out to 
Wolfgang Templin, a philosopher and leading member of several peace 
and human rights groups, typified the Stasi’s techniques. Templin was 
sacked from his job, prevented from receiving his doctorate, and forced 
to earn a living with odd jobs such as librarian, fireman and forestry 
worker. Behind the scenes, the Stasi blocked all his job applications.
In Templin’s case, however, the Stasi failed to force him to aban-
don political activity. In December 1985 he became co- founder of one of 



















Human Rights (Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte). Thereupon 
the Stasi published a string of fake advertisements in newspapers and 
sent bogus letters signed with Templin’s name. The result was a year of 
psychological terror for his entire family, with strangers banging on their 
door on an almost daily basis. The Stasi also circulated malicious gossip 
in the neighbourhood. Most threatening of all were the Stasi’s instruc-
tions to the youth welfare service to take Templin’s children into custody.
Meanwhile, the family was provided with a large flat. The aim 
of this apparent privilege was to create suspicions that Templin was a 
Stasi informant. (In fact he had, when a student and as a member of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), collaborated with the Stasi, but 
he had openly and deliberately unmasked himself in 1975, and he left 
the SED in 1983.) To discredit him further, the Stasi arranged for the 
publication of fake interviews in the Western media complaining that 
Templin was trying to dominate the opposition movement. After Templin 
took part in a political protest demonstration in January 1988, he and his 
wife were forced temporarily to leave the GDR for West Germany. While 
he was there, the Stasi continued its Zersetzung, with the apparent aim of 
forcing Templin into permanent exile.
The Stasi deployed a number of different methods against peace, 
human rights and environmental groups that met in the protected space 
of churches. Informants were planted in such groups in order to obstruct 
and delay decisions by circulating rumours and creating splits between 
the leaders and the rest of the group. The secret police organised thefts 
and fostered mistrust by arbitrary arrests of group members with the aim 
of discrediting all the members of the group. In the case of the independ-
ent Pankow Peace Circle (Friedenskreis Pankow, founded in 1981), doz-
ens of SED members and functionaries of mass organisations were sent to 
the group’s meetings to disrupt discussions. As a result, the Peace Circle 
sank into insignificance.
All in all, several thousand members of various environmental, 
human rights and peace groups were subjected to Zersetzung. Even so, 
many groups remained in existence for years, and many dissidents con-
tinued their activities regardless of the clandestine attacks.
Zersetzung can be researched by combining critical analysis of 
Stasi files and oral history. For a number of reasons, however, this is 
not an easy task. The Stasi files are not complete. In some cases, the 
application of Zersetzung is only vaguely indicated. But there is also a 
danger of overestimating the Stasi’s criminal energy. Often, detailed 
plans were drafted but only partially realised. This also applies to scat-
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was to ensure that dissidents were preoccupied with their personal 
problems, and that groups were eroded from within. The goal was 
not, as a rule, to kill people. For example, in 2000 a research group 
(Projektgruppe Strahlen) refuted allegations that dissidents had been 
deliberately targeted with X- rays.
The Stasi used vast and detailed knowledge to construct legends. 
Mistrust and disinformation can often have long- lasting effects. In many 
cases, victims did not recognise the perfidious activities of the secret 
police. Many who voiced concerns were not believed. After the Stasi files 
were made accessible, dissidents such as Fuchs and Templin could docu-
ment how insidiously they had been attacked, and prove that they were 
not paranoid. However, there are still dubious cases that leave a sense of 
unease. Some 5,000 people are estimated to have suffered psychological 
damage. Since 1993, victims of Zersetzung can apply for rehabilitation 
when they provide evidence. But, since laws may not be retrospectively 
enforced, and since the activities of the Stasi were not illegal during the 
years of the GDR’s existence, the Stasi perpetrators were not prosecuted.
8.10 Smotryashchie, kuratory (russia, Ukraine)
andrew Wilson
UCL, Uk
Post- Soviet politics has always been notable for its unique terminology, 
reflecting the uniqueness of local political practices. The term smot-
ryashchie, which literally means ‘watchers’ or ‘overseers’, originates from 
criminal circles, when the ‘criminal authorities’ (avtoritety) would des-
ignate trusted individuals ‘to maintain order, resolve conflicts in prison, 
control the common fund of a criminal community, etc.’ (Vasylyev 2016). 
Smotryashchie had informal authority because of the bosses behind them 
and because their decisions were ‘guided by the laws of the criminal com-
munity’ (Vasylyev 2016).
It is symptomatic of the inter- penetration of organised crime and 
politics in countries such as Ukraine and Russia that the term is now 
widely used outside prison. Smotryashchie may represent organised 
crime in politics, but the term is also used for those who look after the 
interests of oligarchs and regional clans, so that the latter can keep a safe 
and deniable distance from corruption at the heart of government. They 
control the money flows and keep an eye on decisions that are supposed 
to favour their sponsors.
In Ukraine the term has a long history, but it came into wider use 




















era of President Viktor Yanukovych (in office from 2010 until his ouster 
in 2014)  was no longer around. The slogan of ‘de- oligarchisation’ was 
largely meaningless, but leading oligarchs took a step back from the 
more visible schemes of the old era. Yanukovych’s successor, President 
Petro Poroshenko, was not as crooked, but grew his business empire 
while he could. For all these reasons, smotryashchie were increasingly 
useful (Wilson 2016; Yaffa 2016).
Another term that became more noticeable during and after 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014 was kurator (‘curator’). 
Smotryashchie come from the informal arena. Kuratory (‘curators’), on 
the other hand, exist because the normal authorities, who were them-
selves steeped in informal culture, chose to shift certain functions even 
further into the informal arena. According to one Ukrainian analyst, 
smotryashchie are similar to kuratory, but a kurator is ‘a non- official rep-
resentative of a real authority’, whereas smotryashchie are official rep-
resentatives of informal actors (Vasylyev 2016). Smotryashchie are also 
more like delegates than representatives, and are more closely tied to 
their sponsors and to a certain set of rules, whereas kuratory are deliber-
ately given a level of operational freedom.
According to Gleb Pavlovsky – one of the leading architects of the 
original political system built under Russian President Vladimir Putin – 
kuratory exist today because the Kremlin has always relied on informal 
practices. However, kuratory became increasingly prominent follow-
ing Putin’s return to the Kremlin for his third presidential term in 2012, 
reflecting the development of a ‘new governance style’ that ‘relies on indi-
rection and interpretation rather than command and control’. In this sys-
tem, ‘curators’ are ‘semi- official figures through whom state governance 
flows. A curator is a political bureaucrat, a project manager authorised by 
the Kremlin to operate through personal agents’ (Pavlovsky 2016).
From 2014, with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine taking the 
form of so- called hybrid war, kuratory were perfect agents for disguise 
and deniability. According to Pavlovsky again, kuratory do not leave 
much of a paper trail:  ‘Approval for any particular proposal takes the 
form of otmashka, which can be translated as “go- ahead”, implying not 
so much an order as a license to act in a desired direction’ (Pavlovsky 
2016). Kuratory were behind the operations in Crimea and the Donbas. 
However, as Pavlovsky (2016) stresses, ‘The trouble with curators is that 
it’s far easier to set them loose than to rein them back in’.
Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu was at the top of the pyra-
mid. His main curator in Crimea was Oleg Belaventsev, an alleged for-
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oversaw the ‘choice’ of leaders for the coup d’état in February 2014 and, 
unusually perhaps, emerged from the shadows to be appointed Putin’s 
envoy to Crimea after the annexation. Another Shoigu protégé was 
Frants Klintsevich, head of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan, who 
organised the flight of ‘170 former soldiers, veterans of Afghanistan 
and Chechnya, sportsmen, bikers and participants of patriotic clubs’ to 
Sevastopol on 28 February 2014. ‘They were portrayed as demonstra-
tors, flurried Crimeans, who demanded the joining of Crimea to Russia. 
This was an improvised Maidan, just as earnest as the Kiev one. With the 
only difference that the majority of participants were Russian, that is, at 
that moment citizens of another state’ (Zygar’ 2016: 341; Kanev 2014). 
Putin’s aide Vladislav Surkov represented another line of influence. Two 
Ukrainian sources paint a different picture:  one implies Belaventsev 
was just a stooge for Surkov (Koshkina 2015); another stresses demand 
as well as supply, with the chair of the Crimean assembly Vladimir 
Konstantinov making key trips to Moscow in December 2013 to ask for 
support (Berezovets 2015: 65– 9; Zygar’ 2016: 337).
For the attempted uprising in eastern and southern Ukraine, how-
ever, there were a number of rival kuratory. ‘The main supporter of 
Russia’s active measures in the east of Ukraine was Putin’s adviser, the 
economist Sergey Glazyev’, who is originally from Zaporizhia in south- 
eastern Ukraine. But ‘from the start no one led the operation in the 
Donbas, there was no single centre for taking decisions. Putin did not 
want to undertake decisive actions. Every time he said to Glazyev: let the 
inhabitants of East Ukraine take the first step, then Moscow will support 
them further’ (Zygar’ 2016: 347, 346). The attempts of kuratory such as 
Glazyev to foment rebellion everywhere in eastern and southern Ukraine 
were not always successful (Melkozerova 2016). But, as the Donetsk and 
Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’ became regularised, the kuratory estab-
lished a regular presence there too (Peshkov 2016).
8.11 Telefonnoe pravo (russia)
alena Ledeneva with ružica Šimic Banovic




Telefonnoe pravo (lit. ‘telephone justice’ or ‘telephone law’) may be 
defined as ‘informal influence or pressure exerted on the judiciary’ 




















system on political orders. Telefonnoe pravo implies that the rule of law is 
overridden by the executive power, a power that acts as ‘law’ or ‘justice’ 
itself. This practice could therefore be translated as ‘telephone command’ 
or ‘telephone overrule’, though this would lose the irony of the reference 
to the law, which points to the gap that exists between formal law and 
actual practice, a gap normally bridged by political intervention and oral 
commands (Ledeneva 2008).
Data from two opinion surveys reveal that the Russian public is 
generally aware of telephone justice – exercised both through oral com-
mands and informal signals. Those with direct experience of the judi-
cial system are more likely to believe in its existence. Low expectations 
about state institutions in politics and business lead over time to the pro-
liferation of such practices (Ledeneva 2006). National surveys indicate 
low levels of trust in the Russian courts, particularly with regard to the 
system of judicial appointments and disciplinary procedures (Solomon 
2002; Hendley 2007; Mishina et al. 2007). This situation persists in spite 
of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s early statements about the impor-
tance of the rule of law and the impressive financial back-up of judicial 
reforms, including a 40 per cent pay raise for judges and material sup-
port of the courts, aimed at allowing judges to render justice fully and 
independently.
The legacy of informal practices operating in Soviet times has car-
ried over into the post- Soviet order. The gap between the written rules 
and the actual order of things under the Soviet regime was observable 
in all spheres: economic, political, social and legal. There is little contro-
versy about the existence of such a gap in the Soviet economic sphere 
(Berliner 1957; Fainsod 1963; Nove 1977). The scale and pervasiveness 
of reciprocal services has led some scholars to speak about a ‘second 
economy’, of which these transactions constitute the major component 
(Rigby 1981: 4– 5). Rigby also suggested a link between a ‘second econ-
omy’ and a ‘second polity’. Similarly, one can speak of a ‘second justice’ – 
that is, a set of informal practices widespread in the legal sphere. These 
practices emerged because there was no real separation of powers in the 
Soviet regime and because the judiciary was dependent on the execu-
tive. The second justice served the political purposes of the ruling class 
and the private interests of select individuals. Studies that managed to 
penetrate the workings of the Soviet political elites illustrate how the 
Communist Party intervened within the judiciary. It was the leading role 
of the Party, its status above the law, and its protection vis- à- vis the law 
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Judges’ independence and subordination to law were a convenient 
fiction until the end of the 1980s (Huskey 1992: 223). The ‘party cells at 
the workplace’ were the channels of both formal and informal influence 
in legal institutions. Virtually all Soviet judges were members of these 
party cells and were expected to implement the directives that the party 
apparatus communicated at party meetings (Huskey 1992: 223). Such 
briefings pushed judges to place party loyalty (partiynost’) above con-
cerns for legality (zakonnost’).
Even so, the prevalence of informal influence is difficult to docu-
ment. Pressures on judges ‘were hardly ever committed to paper. Instead, 
party officials avoided undue risks by confining themselves to oral 
instructions, either directly or on the telephone’ (Gorlizki 1997:  257). 
Oral and personal commands were seen as more important and were fol-
lowed more closely than written decrees (ukazy) and instructions (raspo-
ryazheniya) (Baturin et al. 2001: 424; Colton 2007: 325).
During the final years of the Soviet regime, the phenomenon of 
telefonnoe pravo was increasingly targeted in reforms of the judicial 
sphere. New legislation on the selection of judges was designed to pro-
tect the courts’ autonomy. Additional legislation outlawed interference 
in judicial decision- making and was reinforced by the party’s own cam-
paign of self- restraint in legal affairs. By the late 1980s, except in some 
conservative provincial areas, party officials reportedly abandoned 
the practice of instructing judges how to decide cases (Huskey 1992: 
224). Yet the practices of telefonnoe pravo have proven resilient in post- 
Soviet Russia. On a tip- off from above, criminal cases can be opened or 
closed, tax- evasion charges can be pursued or conveniently forgotten 
and law enforcement officers can continue an investigation or abandon 
it (Pastukhov 2002; Allina- Pisano 2005). A paradigmatic example of 
telefonnoe pravo was the Yukos case, in which international media and 
observers overwhelmingly pointed out that the judges who convicted 
oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky were following orders from above (see, 
for example, Kulikov 2005).
The difference between the formal flow of signed documents and 
informal (oral) commands illustrates the degree of discretion and non- 
transparency in post- Soviet Russia. The governance patterns rest upon, 
and help reproduce, concentric circles of ‘unwritten rules’ that are fluid, 
resistant to articulation and elusive. Such unwritten rules preserve dis-
cretion and achieve additional control on the basis of informal leverage 
in order to pursue declared goals. Their latent function, however, is to 
distinguish between insiders and outsiders and to benefit the insiders 

















our enemies we have the law’. The consequence is not only the selective 
use of the law, but also the use of the law for extra- legal purposes.
‘Telephone justice’ has increasingly been recognised as a problem 
to be tackled in an open way by representatives of Russia’s judicial and 
political institutions. For example, in 2005, the code of administrative 
court proceedings was drafted with instructions to judges and citizens on 
how to proceed in case of bureaucratic abuse or arbitrariness, and in 2006 
the Presidium of the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation recom-
mended the document ‘On reaction to inquiries by citizens and civil serv-
ants about cases in court proceedings’ for practical use (Ledeneva 2008). 
Similarly, tackling corruption in the legal sphere has been defined by 
leading politicians – including former President Dmitry Medvedev and 
former Deputy Prime Minister German Gref – as a key aspect of the devel-
opment of the Russian legal system (Ledeneva 2008; Medvedev 2008). 
However, the effectiveness of the measures undertaken so far is debat-
able in a country in which telefonnoe pravo is believed still to prevail is 
diminished by the dependence of Putin's political system – sistema – on 
the weakness of property right of its key economic subjects (Ledeneva 
2013).
8.12 Tsartsaani nüüdel (Mongolia)
Liz fox
UCL, Uk
Tsartsaani nüüdel refers to a distinctly Mongolian type of population 
movement that is arranged to influence the outcome of an election. The 
term most commonly refers to the practice of registering people to vote in 
a constituency where they are not in fact residents, in order to boost the 
votes for a specific candidate. The newly registered voters are usually pro-
vided with transportation on the day of the election and instructed to cast 
their votes for a particular candidate; they are then transported back to 
their home district, where their paperwork is re- registered to reflect their 
actual place of residence. Literally translated as ‘locust migration’, tsart-
saani nüüdel consists of two Mongolian words, tsartsaa meaning locust 
or grasshopper and nüüdel meaning migration or movement (Starosin 
et al. 2003). In its formal meaning, tsartsaani nüüdel denotes a swarm of 
locusts that descends onto the land and devours all the good grass before 
moving on to new pastures.
While there is practically no documentation regarding the history of 
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voters is brought in from outside in order to influence an election through 
their numbers, ‘swallowing’ up the votes of genuine local residents. The 
metaphor of ‘eating’ (ideh means to eat) is widely used in Mongolia to 
refer to the misappropriation of funds and resources. However, a signifi-
cant difference between a swarm of locusts and an invasion of voters is 
that, while locusts do not have a ‘boss’, significant planning and organi-
sation go into fixing voters’ paperwork and arranging their transporta-
tion. In other words, tsartsaani nüüdel is not a ‘spontaneous’ or ‘everyday’ 
practice. It is a top- down- directed strategy deliberately organised by 
elites in positions of power to influence elections in ways that will benefit 
themselves and/ or their business or personal networks.
Tsartsaani nüüdel is found in both the private and the public 
spheres. For example, in the capital of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, work-
ers in a local government office (horoo) may be instructed to re- register 
themselves in a neighbouring administrative district. Since the horoo 
is in charge of registering citizens’ residency papers, it is not difficult to 
organise this kind of tsartsaani nüüdel. Horoo leaders may engage (or be 
engaged) in tsartsaani nüüdel given that they have connections to political 
parties – unlike their workers who, as civil servants, are officially apoliti-
cal. Tsartsaani nüüdel is, however, most common in the private sector and 
can be remarkably ostentatious. It is not unheard of for the entire staff of 
a large company based in Ulaanbaatar to be temporarily ‘migrated’ to a 
remote countryside district hundreds of kilometres from the city centre. 
Company employees are housed for a few nights in the countryside and 
then returned from their ‘locust’ holiday migration. The bosses of such 
companies are generally well integrated into both the political and the 
business networks needed to facilitate these schemes.
Those who coordinate tsartsaani nüüdel clearly act because they 
believe they have something to gain from it, as do all those engaged in 
other election- related informal activities. Mongolia’s population of 3 mil-
lion people is small, which means that the movement of even a relatively 
small group can potentially have an impact on an election. Nevertheless, 
one must ask why tsartsaani nüüdel specifically is practised in Mongolia. 
The answer to this question may be illuminated through a comparison 
with the informal and/ or institutionalised practices known as gerryman-
dering and redrawing of constituency boundaries.
The overuse of the term ‘nomad’ and its associated concepts in the 
scholarship of Mongolia has been convincingly criticised by scholars such 
as Humphrey and Sneath (1999). Even so, mobility remains a key fea-
ture of Mongolian society in both rural and urban contexts and the coun-





























(Bruun 2006; Murphy 2015). As such, the state has experience of a popu-
lation on the move and horoos in Mongolia daily serve large numbers of 
people seeking to register their migration between the city and country-
side on temporary or semi- permanent bases. In this context, being able 
to identify tsartsaani nüüdel in the large volume of ‘formal’ movement 
may be difficult. In more sedentary societies, shifting votes from one con-
stituency to another is not usually done through the movement of people. 
Instead, political parties seek to redraw boundaries in ways that provide 
them with demographic advantages (Norris 2016: 2). Gerrymandering 
and/ or malapportionment are thus analogous to tsartsaani nüüdel, 
even though they work through an opposite mechanism:  namely, sta-
ble constituents, mobile constituencies. Until just a few months before 
Mongolia’s parliamentary election of 2016, gerrymandering could not 
take place because of a 2006 electoral reform law (Lindberg and Naran 
2016; OSCE 2016). Thus, to create advantageous demographic condi-
tions, the people themselves had to be moved.
The implications of tsartsaani nüüdel are hard to pin down since 
there have so far been no academic studies of the specific practice. It 
is, however, widely discussed in the Mongolian language media and on 
online social networks. In June 2016, on the eve of the parliamentary 
election, statistics were released detailing a few tsartsaani nüüdel cases 
and identifying which districts were the ‘worst offenders’ (Jargal 2016). 
While tsartsaani inüüdel remains a popular topic for discussion and is 
often used as a political weapon between rivals, by some accounts tsart-
saani nüüdel activity peaked in 2008 and has been declining since. If its 
use has indeed been declining, this may be due to various electoral and 
bureaucratic reforms, such as the replacement in 2008 of registration 
papers by plastic passport cards. While the transition period between the 
two forms of identification may have been rocky – some citizens ended 
up with both the old and the new ID and were allegedly able to vote 
twice – the contemporary card that is linked to a countrywide electronic 
database goes some way to regularising population movements. Another 
reform has involved restricting the registration of migration around the 
time of an election.
It could be argued that the primary effect of tsartsaani nüüdel is 
not so much its concrete effect on elections. There are, of course, mul-
tiple formal and informal means by which elections are influenced in 
‘functioning’ democracies, including Mongolia (Fritz 2007; Fox 2016; 
Norris 2016). Rather, tsartsaani nüüdel may be seen as having subtle 
but far- reaching effects. On the one hand, widespread discussion in 
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nüüdel and many even take it for granted. Those involved in tsartsaani 
nüüdel schemes by their bosses rarely complain or resist. This is often 
due to the instability of the job market in Mongolia: employees rarely 
take action that might put them at risk of losing their jobs. It may also 
reveal deep- rooted concepts of hierarchy that infuse many spheres 
of Mongolian society. In a darker sense, taking tsartsaani nüüdel for 
granted and feeling unwilling or unable to extricate oneself from such 
schemes may point to a generalised apathy towards the democratic 
process and even the rule of law in Mongolia (Sneath 2006; Reeves 
2011: 177– 9). In a context of economic stagnation and of stark and 
rapidly growing socio- economic inequality (Rossabi 2005: 248; Højer 
2007), tsartsaani nüüdel is often spoken about in the disappointed 
tones of those who feel left out of the benefits of moving ‘locusts’ from 
one place to another. Likewise, being involved as a ‘locust’ in such 
schemes may lead to confusion and insecurity regarding a central tenet 
of the democratic process: the secret ballot. Many who are instructed 
to vote for a particular candidate by their superiors feel that they can-
not be sure of the privacy of their vote. Just as they do not resist being 
moved from place to place for fear of losing a precious job, likewise 
voters may not take the risk of voting for any other than the ‘suggested’ 
candidate in case they are found out.
In some cases, tsartsaani nüüdel may also be used to refer to the 
movement of candidates. If, for example, a political party feels that a 
member of parliament’s success has reached ‘saturation point’ in a par-
ticular district, s/ he may be moved to ‘fresh pastures’ in another constitu-
ency. The assigning of candidates to constituencies is a complex process 
tightly controlled by political parties and rife with intense internal poli-
ticking. Both forms of tsartsaani nüüdel may provoke feelings of margin-
alisation among those who find themselves cast as locust pawns in the 
migratory games of the rich and powerful.
8.13 Vertical crowdsourcing (russia)
Gregory asmolov
king’s College London, Uk
‘Vertical crowdsourcing’ refers to the ways in which digital technologies 
can be harnessed by state institutions to create a semblance of openness 
and participation, while in practice neutralising citizens’ activity and 
exerting control over them. ‘Crowdsourcing’ in its regular sense refers to 
‘the practice of obtaining information or services by soliciting input from 




























offering compensation’ (Oxford English Dictionary 2016). In ‘vertical 
crowdsourcing’, state authorities solicit such participation in order to 
fake and/or control it.
Social media, social networking sites and crowdsourcing platforms 
can contribute to the empowerment of individual users, including new 
forms of civic participation (Amichai- Hamburger et al. 2008; Shirky 
2008). They can also increase transparency and accountability of state 
activity. Yet those same technologies can also be used by institutional 
actors to exert surveillance and control over individual users (Morozov 
2011; Gunitsky 2015). The ambivalence at the heart of ‘vertical crowd-
sourcing’ relies on the capacity of digital platforms to simultaneously 
replicate two layers of the relationship between institutions and citizens. 
The first layer approaches citizens as subjects for partnership, while the 
second layer approaches them as objects of governance (Foucault 1982). 
While such practices can be found worldwide, this entry focuses on the 
Russian- language Internet (colloquially known as ‘Runet’) as a case study 
of the various forms of vertical crowdsourcing.
In analysing vertical crowdsourcing, it is helpful to view digital 
users as occupying two simultaneous roles: subjects taking part in activ-
ity directed at specific goals alongside institutional actors; and objects of 
institutional actors’ activity that seeks to control and govern the users. 
It is the capacity of information technologies to produce symbolic (i.e. 
fake) constructions of transparency, accountability and user empower-
ment that enables their users to be constituted as subjects and objects 
at the same time: the digital user is a subject in the symbolic dimension, 
but an object of digital governance in the actual dimension. For instance, 
while on a symbolic level a given technology may propose an increase 
in transparency or new opportunities for engagement, on the actual 
level the user is either prevented from taking part in the activity and/or 
addressed as an object of control.
There are different types of digital tools that deal with transpar-
ency and accountability. One group of tools presents open data about 
the activities of specific organisations. While open databases can pro-
mote crowdsourcing of independent analysis and holding an organisa-
tion to account, in some cases they provide only limited information, or 
the data is not provided in a useable format. Accordingly, while in gen-
eral open data contributes to transparency, providing such data can also 
be a symbolic act that portrays an organisation as transparent, while 
in reality contributing little to transparency. A second set of tools deal-
ing with transparency and accountability is crowdsourcing platforms 
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issues reported. In 2011 as a part of an initiative by President Dmitry 
Medvedev, the Russian government launched an online platform ‘Russia 
without fools’ (Rossiya bez durakov). Medvedev claimed that the purpose 
of the website was, ‘to find the most nonsensical and harmful bureau-
cratic practices in Russia’. He stated that procedures would be changed 
and some officials might even lose their jobs on the basis of information 
crowdsourced from the website. However, the website was closed two 
years later (Zykov 2014).
Vertical crowdsourcing is often marked by so- called ‘Photoshop 
governance’: state authorities using digital technologies to substitute an 
actual solution in real life with a fake ‘solution’ in digital space (Asmolov 
2013). For example, local authorities in many countries use websites in 
order to allow citizens to submit reports about various type of problems 
e.g. potholes and other infrastructural issues. In principle, the submis-
sion of a report to the website should lead to action taken by the authori-
ties to resolve the problem. However, such websites can serve as tools 
that satisfy citizens’ need to complain easily, but with no consequent 
action taken by the authorities  – or even worse, the faking of action 
taken. For example, following the submission of a photo of a courtyard 
blocked by snow to a website run by the Moscow Mayor’s Office, a local 
official reported that the problem was solved by posting a photo show-
ing the yard free of snow. A  local blogger reported that the snow was 
digitally removed with Photoshop, while no actual action was taken on 
the ground.
The Russian presidential elections of 2012 provided a case of 
the symbolic construction of electoral transparency. The Russian gov-
ernment rolled out a system of webcams that broadcasted live video 
streams from 95,000 polling stations in Russia to a dedicated plat-
form (Webvybory2012.ru), where any citizen could follow the vot-
ing in every part of Russia. The Russian authorities used the project 
to respond to allegations of electoral fraud by claiming that the presi-
dential elections were among the most transparent in international 
practice. The project thus enabled the government to create a sym-
bolic construction of transparency that supported the legitimacy of 
the elections (Asmolov 2013). While in theory the webcams enabled 
public scrutiny of electoral conduct to be crowdsourced, in practice 
they obstructed it. Crucially, the platform did not allow any action to 
be taken once a fraud was detected. It was difficult to retrieve data 
from the video archive, and the courts that considered cases of elec-
tion fraud did not have a legal foundation to incorporate the webcam 














Another set of digital tools portrays citizens’ participation as a 
horizontal, bottom- up action (i.e. regular crowdsourcing), whereas in 
reality they are controlled and directed from above (i.e. vertical crowd-
sourcing). In 2014 the Moscow Mayor’s Office introduced a website 
called ‘Active Citizen’ (http:// ag.mos.ru) with the ostensible purpose of 
allowing Moscow residents greater participation in decision- making. But 
independent experts questioned if the website contributes to participa-
tion, with some (Babitzky, 2015) arguing that through online votes the 
website produces a semblance of participation in decision- making and 
creates the legitimisation of decisions already made by local authorities, 
while the actual mechanism of participation including online voting is 
not transparent and is open to manipulation. An online media investiga-
tion exposed falsification of online decisions, while an opposition local 
council member claimed that, ‘Active Citizen is used by the mayor’s office 
for imitation of citizens’ participation in decision- making by authorities’ 
(Mazhay and Chesnokov 2015).
Following the extensive wildfire in Russia in the summer of 
2010, and the 2012 severe flooding in Krymsk, South Russia, a num-
ber of independent projects proposed crowdsourcing mechanisms to 
facilitate horizontal, citizen- based responses to national emergen-
cies. In 2012, a state- affiliated organisation of emergency responders, 
RosSoyuzSpas, developed a website (Dobrovoletz.rf) as a platform to 
facilitate emergency response volunteering. Any citizen interested in 
volunteering in emergency response could register with the website. 
But unlike citizen- based projects, this ‘vertical crowdsourcing’ plat-
form did not provide data about the specific purposes of activity, and 
did not allow the users to select their form of participation. What it 
actually created was a registry of potential volunteers that was con-
trolled by the owners of the platform. Accordingly, while the official 
purpose of the platform was supporting citizen engagement in emer-
gency response, its actual purpose was controlling the potential inde-
pendent volunteers through the development of a digital top- down 
structure (Asmolov 2015).
State- sponsored platforms can be utilised for astroturfing: the con-
struction of a façade of bottom- up participation which is actually con-
cealed activity by a traditional top- down administration, and often has 
a paid nature (see astroturfing, 6.31 in this volume). Examples include 
state- sponsored trolling (Lawrence 2015) and state- sponsored vigilan-
tism. For instance, the MediaGvardia website presents itself as an oppor-
tunity to participate in civic Internet regulation by finding content that is 
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‘gay propaganda’ such as support groups for Russian LGBT teenagers). 
However, the website relies mostly on members of state- sponsored 
youth movements. It thus presents a façade of ‘public demand’ for the 
restriction of Internet freedoms while in reality the ‘activists’ are verti-
cally crowdsourced through state support. Digital platforms and conven-
tional crowdsourcing are typically considered as tools that contribute to 
transparency and accountability, as well to the participation of users as 
subjects. But when these tools are used by the state as forms of vertical 
crowdsourcing, transparency, accountability and participation become 
merely symbolic. Indeed, the same tools can position users as object of 
control, contributing to decreasing transparency and accountability and 
preventing genuine civic participation.
8.14 Cyberattacks by semi- state actors (general)
alistair faulkner
UCL, Uk
Cyberattacks deliberately exploit computer systems, technology- depend-
ent enterprises and networks using a malicious code resulting in disrup-
tive consequences that can compromise data (Kim et al. 2014). Malware 
and Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks are arguably the most 
prevalent forms of cyberattacks globally (Verizon 2016). Malware is code 
or software that is designed to disrupt data, hosts or networks. Damage 
from malware varies from minor irritation to entirely disabling systems 
and networks (Cisco 2016). DDOS attacks attempt to make a machine or 
network resource unavailable to its intended users and are often driven 
by political motivations (Nazario 2009). The inherent legal characteris-
tics associated with cyberspace and the use of semi- state actors by gov-
ernments to target political opponents arguably enables this practice to 
be categorised as informal.
Traditional forms of political targeting include physical violence, 
which breaks clearly defined laws that have been constructed to penal-
ise such illegal activity (Zimmermann 2013). Thus for example, a non- 
fatal physical attack on a political dissident within the UK constitutes a 
crime under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and if convicted, 
the offender (assuming they did not hold diplomatic immunity), could 
be sentenced to life in prison (CPS 2016). Empirical studies suggest 
that countries tend to observe almost all principles of international law 
(Pawlak and Petkova 2015), thus while countries tend to avoid overtly 
breaking international law, they may rely on legal technicalities or seek 























informal practices that are neither legal nor illegal to achieve their ends 
(Craig 2013).
In contrast to the substantial legal landscape covering physical 
crimes traditionally used to target political opponents, the cyberattack 
legal landscape is underdeveloped (despite vast legal issues surround-
ing cyberattacks), which, in conjunction with the use of semi- state 
actors, gives rise to the informal nature of this practice (Egloff 2015). 
International law has been slow to adapt to the increasing prevalence 
of cyberattacks as shown by United Nations (UN) Charter Article 2(4), 
which states that if actions do not include violence or the threat of vio-
lence, such actions do not constitute a cyberattack (UN 2016). Therefore, 
cyberattacks using malware or DDOS can be a powerful weapon with 
which governments can target political opponents internationally with-
out resorting to conventional attacks (such as war), which make a gov-
ernment subject to international law and have the potential to leave it 
exposed to economic and political repercussions. Furthermore, it is sig-
nificantly more cost effective to launch cyberattacks than conventional 
attacks and the effect of cyberattacks can nevertheless be great because 
industrialised states tend to be dependent upon computer networks 
(Hathaway and Crootof 2012).
Due to the current lack of international law regulating cyber-
attacks, governments are able to exploit the situation; therefore many 
nation-states have a vested interest in ensuring that existing laws, such 
as the UN Article 2(4), are not revised to make them applicable to 
cyberattacks. However, Sigholm (2013) hypothesises that should such 
laws be introduced, covertly outsourcing cyberattacks to semi- state 
actors could be a viable method to circumvent these new laws. Thus, 
many nations are keen to continue to exploit the grey area that exists 
currently within the legal landscape. National security is a concept 
through which a government protects the state and its citizens against 
aggression from domestic and external actors. Cyberattacks are argu-
ably one of the greatest threats and infringements to a nation’s national 
security. The alleged use of semi- state actors by a nation-state in cyber-
attacks, and the challenge of measuring the attack’s origin, enables a 
state to circumvent the aforementioned informal constraints by obtain-
ing a ‘plausible deniability’ because the attacker’s true identity is con-
cealed (Nazario 2009).
Egloff (2015) identifies three distinct categories of actors operat-
ing within cyberspace. First, he identifies state actors who comprise of 
cyber units of militaries, intelligence agencies and police forces. Second, 
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political and economic interest of a specific country. The last category 
he identifies is that of the criminal actors – the so- called cybercriminals. 
While criminals consciously break formal rules such as laws, state actors 
such as militaries work in accordance with the law, therefore the actions 
of semi- state actors can be seen to occupy the grey area between the legal 
and illegal (Egloff 2015).
There has been an increasing prevalence in the recruitment of semi- 
state actors by governments, resulting from their desire to benefit from 
the semi- state actor’s experience and leverage their cyber knowledge 
(Sigholm 2013; Lennon 2015). Semi- state actors are motivated to work 
with governments for a variety of reasons including curiosity, economic 
gain, political agendas, attraction to technical challenges or purely out of 
boredom (Sigholm 2013). However, in recent years there is an increas-
ing trend for governments to recruit semi- state actors with nationalistic 
tendencies to conduct cyberattacks (Egloff 2015).
The use of semi- state actors recruited through informal chan-
nels to conduct cyberattacks enables the instigating nation-state to 
achieve its strategic objectives while escaping recrimination (Sigholm 
2013) since this practice provides a country with a plausible deniabil-
ity (Nazario 2009) due to the difficulty in establishing the origin of 
cyberattacks (Elgoff 2015). First, the association between an attack 
and a specific hacker group needs to be established; this is sometimes 
determined on the basis of inference according to the specific targets 
selected, mistakes made or the techniques, tactics and procedures 
used. A frequent problem for researchers, however, is that attacks may 
be staged by a group deliberately using the known techniques, tactics 
and procedures of a different group in order to conceal the attacker’s 
true identity. Second, an association between a specific hacker group 
and a specific government needs to be established, which is extremely 
difficult to prove (Egloff 2015). Thus, when a specific government is 
attributed to a specific cyberattack, the political attribution is typically 
based on a researcher’s interpretation based on internal information 
such as the identity of the victim and type of attacks seen. Furthermore, 
external sources such as news reports may be used to validate the find-
ings (Nazario 2009).
Plausible deniability is essential because should cyberattacks be 
linked back to the initiating nation-state, repercussions could be politi-
cally damaging with the revelation of culpability having the potential to 
lead to escalating tension between two nations, which could ultimately 
lead to conventional warfare (Lewis 2011). Due to this potential for polit-











admit their involvement in initiating cyberattacks (Sigholm 2013). Since 
2007, Estonia, Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine have all suffered high 
profile cyberattacks allegedly originating from Russia. While there is 
arguably little beyond circumstantial evidence of the Russian govern-
ment’s involvement in attacks targeted at governments, organisations or 
individuals critical of the state, the existing evidence suggests that when 
organisations, individuals or countries oppose the Russian state, there 
is an increased likelihood of being the target of such an attack. These 
attacks are designed to counter opposition and ‘persuade’ or influence 
the country, organisation or individual to change their policy or stance 
(Ashmore 2009).
The informal practice of cyberattack has numerous economic 
effects on its target. As of 2014, the cost of cyberattacks on the global 
economy was in excess of $400 billion per annum, with the regions of 
North America, Europe and Asia experiencing the greatest losses while 
Africa suffered the least. This finding is attributed to differences in the 
income levels of these territories, with highly developed economies los-
ing the most and countries with emerging economies losing the least 
(CSIS 2014). However, these figures are not necessarily representative of 
the true costs of cyberattacks on the global economy. In the first instance 
the economic cost is difficult to measure due to a lack of consensus about 
what constitutes a cyberattack, resulting in an inconsistent approach 
to data collection (UNCTD 2005). Second, the financial losses result-
ing from cyberattacks are underreported (Pawlak and Petkova 2015). 
Finally, such figures fail to account for the intangible costs of the attacks 
such as the loss of business intelligence, intellectual property and dam-
age to reputation (Ernst and Young 2014).
8.15 Khokkeynaya diplomatiya (russia)
yoshiko M. herrera
University of Wisconsin- Madison, Usa
and
yuval Weber
national research University, higher school of economics, Moscow 
and harvard University, Cambridge, Usa
Khokkeynaya diplomatiya refers to the informal practice of utilising ama-
teur ice hockey for the development of personal, business and govern-
mental relationships in Russia. The term is widely used by the Russian 
media, as evidenced by millions of online results for the term on Yandex’s 
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‘hockey diplomacy’ can be found in the West in countries where ice 
hockey is a major sport, notably Canada and the USA.
Hockey diplomacy has its origins in 1960s America, with an initia-
tive taken by the CBS Television network to televise the Winter Olympic 
Games at Squaw Valley, California, in defiance of the prevailing political 
will. The coverage of ice hockey matches proved to be particularly popu-
lar with television viewers, and saw America defeat the USSR to win the 
Gold medal. However, rather than being portrayed simply as adversar-
ies in a capitalist versus communist contest, the Soviet players came to 
be much admired worldwide, paving the way for a softening of attitudes 
between the West and the USSR. It was hailed as a triumph in ‘soft diplo-
macy’ for both sides (Ehrmann 2014).
The successful introduction of Soviet ice hockey players to a world-
wide audience saw a continuation of hockey diplomacy. This culminated 
in the famous 1972 Summit Series which saw the best Canadian pro-
fessional players of the National Hockey League challenge the Soviet 
national team, the best ‘amateur’ players in the world (Soviet teams were 
not commercial organisations; their players were technically employees 
of the army, police and trade unions who played hockey in their spare 
time, although in practice they trained as professional players). Although 
the Canadians expected to defeat the Soviets easily, it was a closely 
fought contest and the experience left both sides transformed (Wilson 
2004):  the so- called ‘Red Machine’ of the Soviet Union emerged with 
its reputation further enhanced (Kolesnikov 2012); and the Canadians 
learnt a valuable lesson about hubris; their eventual triumph following 
adversity was noted as a key element in the development of post- war 
national identity (Kennedy 2009).
A revival of khokkeynaya diplomatiya has taken place in twenty- 
first- century Russia, led by the initiatives of Alexander Medvedev, cur-
rently the Deputy Chairman of Russian energy company Gazprom and 
former Director- General of Gazprom Export (2006– 14), whose respon-
sibilities include finding new export markets for Russian natural gas. 
Medvedev, a former hockey player at Leningrad State University, con-
ceived the idea of organising informal hockey matches and tournaments 
in new and emerging gas markets. Gazprom executives were invited to 
take part in the games, which were intended to provide a relaxed envi-
ronment in which to engage with potential clients and partners.
In 2006, Medvedev and Gazprom executives developed the initia-
tive further. They held an energy symposium at Harvard University in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and during the same visit arranged hockey 















American hockey executive working in sports media, publicised the 
efforts of Gazprom, which served as a way of attracting former Soviet 
hockey stars now living in the United States. The event brought Exxon, 
Chevron, PetroCanada, Alcoa, General Motors and other energy sec-
tor representatives together to participate in both the symposium and 
hockey matches, and successfully demonstrated that khokkeynaya 
diplomatiya could be a contemporary successor to 1970s- era diplomacy 
between Canada and the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was an expecta-
tion that if this khokkeynaya diplomatiya continued to develop it might 
emulate the success of the so- called 1970s ‘ping- pong diplomacy’. This 
initiative saw the United States and People’s Republic of China engage 
in a series of table tennis (ping- pong) exhibition matches that signalled 
a thaw in Sino- American relations, and more importantly paved the way 
for President Nixon’s visit to Beijing. Chinese Premier Chou En- lai later 
said, ‘Never before in history has a sport been used so effectively as a tool 
of international diplomacy’ (Bjola and Kornprobst 2013). It was hoped 
that Russia’s khokkeynaya diplomatiya would be similarly successful in 
terms of bridging the differences between Russia and the Western busi-
ness community.
In February 2006 an event was held in Russia in which Igor Larionov, 
a serial winner of the Olympics, World Championships, Stanley Cup, and 
the Soviet League was invited to play. The Gazprom Export Hockey Team, 
comprising of Gazprom employees, played alongside Russian hockey leg-
ends against other corporate teams featuring other former profession-
als. Subsequently, Medvedev and MacPherson organised matches for the 
Gazprom Export Hockey Team in regions where Gazprom was already 
doing business or wanted to do business. Territories visited by the 
team included the United States, Canada, England, Germany, Sweden, 
Finland, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
The direct consequences of khokkeynaya diplomatiya are difficult 
to assess, because the main benefit is in relationship building, and it 
is often difficult to judge the precise contribution it makes to business 
deals in terms of personal introductions and relationships, relative to 
other factors. However, one might draw inferences based on observa-
tions of hockey interactions and subsequent deals. A prominent exam-
ple of this might be the agreements from 2012 between Cisco Systems 
and the Skolkovo Foundation, which were worth $1 billion USD; in this 
case, a top Cisco executive and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime 
minister instrumental in representing Russia state interests in relation to 
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Medvedev and MacPherson’s overseas initiatives also led to a revival 
of hockey as a popular domestic sport in Russia, and successfully built 
upon the nostalgia for past Soviet successes. In a rare instance of civil 
society leading the government, the Russian state gave its imprimatur 
and poured considerable resources into making hockey a leading partici-
patory and spectator sport. The success and prominence of the Gazprom 
Export Hockey Team abroad brought greater attention to the small- scale 
recreational hockey league they officially played in, the Night Hockey 
League (NHL – a deliberate play on words referencing the elite US- 
Canadian league with the same acronym). From 2006 onwards, under 
the leadership of Alexander Yakushev, the hero of the 1972 Summit 
Series (and organised by the Russian Ice Hockey Federation under the 
leadership of Vladislav Tretiak, another hero of the Series), the NHL 
grew to a membership of over 2,000 teams comprising over 10,000 play-
ers in nearly 70 regions of Russia, with additional leagues in Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Serbia. The NHL league has in effect created an informal 
business network that forms one of the largest civil society organisations 
in the country.
President Putin has differentiated himself from his predecessors 
by identifying himself with sporting prowess – a symbol of strength. 
Although a latecomer to hockey, he has adopted the sport with relish 
and regularly plays with friends and colleagues such as the Minister of 
Defence Sergei Shoigu, other high- level politicians including Rashid 
Nurgaliyev, former Interior minister and current Deputy Secretary of the 
Presidential Security Council, Andrei Vorobyov, Moscow oblast gover-
nor, and Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich, as well as oligarchs 
like Vladimir Potanin, leading cultural figures such as saxophonist Igor 
Butman and a number of famous former ice hockey professionals. Other 
important participants are long- time personal friends of President Putin 
who have accumulated major shares in Russia’s strategic industries since 
he came to power; they include the Rotenberg brothers and Gennady 
Timchenko. Such individuals play an important role in sistema, the infor-
mal system of governance that has evolved under Putin (Ledeneva 2013: 
74– 6). Regular sporting gatherings, such as the late- evening ice hockey 
games, as well as the activities of the Yawara- Neva Judo Club (Putin’s 
favourite sport) thus provide key settings for the meeting of Putin’s infor-
mal inner circle (Bailey 2018).
The business- friendly approach, coupled with evident support at 
the highest level, led to success in attracting both expatriate and domes-
tic business executives to participate. They enjoy not only the exercise, 














from both business and government, as well as former sports legends. 
These matches attract not only legendary Russian players, but also North 
American greats like Phil Esposito and Mark Messier. The annual NHL 
season culminates in a countrywide open- entry hockey cup competition. 
The ultimate prize is winning an opportunity to play an exhibition match 
against President Putin’s team. It has been suggested that Khokkeynaya 
diplomatiya plays a part in actual diplomatic relations between Russia 
and the United States, as both John Kerry and Sergey Lavrov have spoken 
publicly of their mutual love of hockey. Indeed, John Kerry noted in 2013 
that ‘Sergei Lavrov and I are old hockey players and we both know that 
diplomacy, like hockey, can sometimes result in the occasional collision’ 
(Hughes 2013).
In recent developments, a revival of organised hockey at univer-
sity level in Russia is being encouraged, with an eye towards developing 
future khokkeynaya diplomatiya. MacPherson is inviting top university 
teams such as the Harvard Crimson to Moscow, and is planning to send 
Russian university teams to play their counterparts abroad. The Gubkin 
Russian State University of Oil and Gas, which continues to serve as an 
important hub for higher education in the energy business at both the 
undergraduate and graduate level in Russia, has an ice hockey team, 
nicknamed the Oilers. The Gubkin Oilers, supported by MacPherson, are 
in turn serving as an organisational model for universities across Russia 
and the former Soviet Union. This university- based initiative provides 
another way for future members of the Russian energy industry to con-
tinue the informal practice of playing hockey with business counterparts 
at home and abroad.
Conclusion: when do informal practices turn into 
informal institutions? Informal constitutions and 
informal ‘meta- rules’
scott newton
school of oriental and african studies, London, Uk
Informal and formal systems are mutually conditioning, implicative and 
interpenetrating; they do not simply form a neat inside and outside. 
Formal rules systems are never strictly formal in their interpretation/ 
application or entirely structured  – they always require a significant 
zone of discretion. By the same token, informal systems are never strictly 
informal or unstructured – they often possess some degree of standardi-














elaboration or comprehensiveness) to a kind of ‘informal constitution’. 
Unwritten rules are rules, nonetheless. Indeed, they may not even be 
unwritten in a strict sense – just unpublished. Finally, the discretionary 
zone in the interpretation and application of formal rules may itself be 
governed by a set of informal ‘meta- rules’ that tell civil servants when 
they can relax, suspend or modify rules, in respect of which persons, and 
in which circumstances. Those meta- rules can also be considered part of 
the informal constitution.
In Central Asia, the informal ‘meta- rules’ for the formal system 
and the ‘informal constitution’ both play significant roles. In the case 
of the informal constitution, the degree of structure varies. At one 
extreme stand examples such as vory- v- zakone, ‘thieves- in- law’ (see 
kanonieri qurdebi, 3.21 Volume 1) – the prison- based organised- crime 
network that developed within the Soviet prison system and is found 
today across the post- Soviet space as a kind of surviving ‘black USSR’. 
The vory- v- zakone, who played a significant role in high Kyrgyz politics 
in the 2000s, have an extensive code of conduct, of which all initiates 
are made aware and that regulates hierarchy and organisation, ethics 
and behaviour, obligations and enforcement. Less elaborate examples 
of rule- structured informal practices are the price list or fee schedule 
(preiskurant) for judicial bribery (as well as for the purchase of judicial 
and other official posts), said to exist in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (and 
likely elsewhere), subject to some degree of regularisation in respect 
of types of cases, levels of court (trial courts, appeal courts, Supreme 
Court) and sums in dispute, but fluctuating and far from codified. Thus, 
for instance, a Kyrgyz Supreme Court decision in 2005 that upheld the 
judicial ‘laundering’ of the Bitel mobile phone company’s ownership in 
the name of interests allied to the then President’s son, was reputed to 
have been secured by a bribe of $3 million – $1 million for each member 
of the three- judge panel. A Kazakh deputy- ministerial post awarded to 
a Kazakhstani Korean was reputed to have cost the Korean community 
$50,000 in the mid- 1990s.
Relatively rigorous and specified components of the informal con-
stitutions shade off into all manner of other customary or tacit rules, 
standards and guidelines for the ‘economy of favours’: how much, what 
and when to offer (reciprocity of favours or equivalence of value, mon-
etary or in- kind, present or future), to which bureaucrat at what level in a 
hierarchy, in what manner (directly, via an intermediary, with what pre-
cautions), at what stage of a decision- making process, with what degree 
of assurance or risk and so on. A law student’s ensuring a pass mark in 

















patronage of the highest political authorities are both and to the same 
degree generically regulated informal practices rather than ad hoc terms 
for one- off deals. Highly complex and rule- bound arrangements govern 
even simple and straightforward informal transactions; they need not 
even be capable of being articulated by actors, much less memorialised, 
to count as elements of the informal constitution. All that matters is that 
they exhibit a basic degree of systematicity and stability such that they 
can be learnt and internalised.
The informal meta- rules likewise vary in their degree of fixity, 
formality and elaboration. On the one hand, they govern the enforce-
ment of prohibitory and compulsory legislation (e.g. rules imposing 
liability, criminal, civil or administrative, for prohibited acts or failure 
to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements, from embez-
zlement of bank funds to failure to comply with tax code provisions). 
On the other, they govern the non- enforcement of enabling legisla-
tion (rules enabling issuances of licences or permits, for everything 
from registration of companies or political parties to uranium export 
licences).
Regarding selective enforcement, civil as well as criminal court 
cases involving well- known figures (such as the Bitel case mentioned 
above), in all phases, from initial complaint or investigation, through sub-
sequent procedural phases, trial and post- trial, are worth close reading 
because they demonstrate the results- orientated application of the formal 
rules from which the informal meta- rules can be inferred. For example, 
Mukhtar Ablyazov, chair and majority shareholder of a major Kazakh 
bank, was pursued in 2013 by the Kazakh authorities in the English courts 
for the alleged embezzlement of $4 billion. He owed his post in the first 
place to his political connections. The complex scheme of bad loans made 
to companies he controlled was well known to the Kazakh authorities 
and tolerated until he ran afoul of his political patrons, at which point 
charges were brought against him. The meta- rules determining enforce-
ment of criminal embezzlement were in this case apparently triggered by 
Ablyazov’s violation of the ‘informal constitution’ authorising his unu-
sual banking activities but conditioning them on reciprocal support (as 
defined by the relevant informal rules) for his patrons. Needless to say, 
anti- corruption legislation of all sorts is subject to precisely this sort of 
selective enforcement.
Regarding selective non- enforcement, the practical (politi-
cal) impossibility of registration as an opposition candidate or party 





















Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan) is a function of the deliberate, meta- 
rule governed refusal of the authorities to permit an officially dis-
favoured actor to do what the published rules authorise in the first 
place. Registration applications can be rejected on trivial grounds 
that might not otherwise (in respect of approved candidates) ever be 
invoked: invalidation of petition signatures or a candidate’s prior traf-
fic violations. The discretionary residuum in any system of formal rules 
always makes it possible to adduce prima facie plausible grounds for a 
decision disallowing in a particular case what is allowed in general. But 
the exercise of discretion by an Electoral Commission (or a Ministry of 
Justice company registry department) can be subject to strict regula-
tion by the informal meta- rules rather than by general standards of 
reasonableness or fairness.
The informal constitution is often parasitic on the formal consti-
tution (and the entire formal rule system), since the transactions and 
exchanges it builds and regulates typically serve to ensure, modify or pre-
vent a formal or official decision. The informal meta- rules do not operate 
as a way of circumventing the formal system (as in the case of informal 
practices), but rather of programming it, diverting it to undeclared agen-
das and sabotaging its decision- making processes.
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Concluding remarks to Volume 2: are 
some countries more informal than 
others? The case of Russia
Svetlana Barsukova




Russia is renowned for its unwritten rules. There are informal practices in 
all countries, as these volumes show, but some scholars have argued that 
in Russia such practices play a particularly important role (Shanin 1999; 
Barsukova and Radaev 2012). The difference, it is argued, lies not only 
in the scale and diversity of the practices. Rather it is that, for Russians, 
informality is not an option but a necessity, just as it is part and parcel of 
the system of governance (Ledeneva 2006, 2013).
The embeddedness of informality in Russia means that there is no 
clearly defined gap between formal rules and informal practices. The 
boundaries are blurred. Many informal practices are closely associated 
with formal rules, past or present. In medieval Russia, for example, the 
system of kormlenie (feeding) legally obliged the population to ‘feed’ the 
representatives of supreme power, thereby freeing the state from the bur-
den of paying the officials’ salaries. The abolition of this legal norm in the 
sixteenth century and the subsequent introduction of taxation did not, 
however, eliminate the practice. Kormlenie has become an unwritten rule 
defining the relationship between the authorities and the population, 
associated with a cultural tradition of tribute and gratitude (Kordonsky 
2016). While it would be an oversimplification to assume that corruption 
in modern Russia is derived from the practice of kormlenie, the embed-
dedness of ‘feeding’ and its association with cultural norms certainly 
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Informal practices do not, however, simply ‘inherit’ the features of 
former legal norms; they also engage with existing laws. Paradoxically, 
informal arrangements now widespread in the Russian economy exist 
not in spite of, but in strict accordance with, the letter of the law. These 
include practices such as kickbacks (otkat), manipulation of bankruptcy 
proceedings (zakaznoe bankrotstvo), corporate raiding (reiderstvo) and 
customs- duty allowances (tamozhenniye l’goty). For example, Russia’s 
notorious bankruptcy law of 1998 triggered the manipulative use of the 
law by virtue of the very low threshold it laid for instigating bankruptcy 
charges. By the same token, this legislation to improve transparency and 
financial discipline in effect made the redistribution of property much 
easier. Similarly, the Russian authorities in 1996 freed the National 
Sports Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church from the obligation 
to pay taxes and excise  duty on imports of alcohol and cigarettes; this 
cost the Russian budget trillions of roubles but enriched the officials who 
had lobbied for the measures. It is important to note that the practices in 
question had nothing to do with smuggling, but everything to do with the 
award of legal privileges to import.
Thus, the law creates the framework for informal practices. ‘To 
build a scheme’ (postroit’ skhemu) is a popular expression used by busi-
ness people to denote a clever combination of law- abiding actions serv-
ing as a façade to hide informal arrangements between participants in 
the ‘scheme’. A kickback is, for example, seen as an informal reward 
for someone who facilitates a deal, a procurement contract or success 
in an open tender. In response to such realities, the nineteenth- century 
historian Nikolai Karamzin’s laconic description of the workings of the 
Russian government – ‘Voruyut’, ‘They steal’ – has today been adapted to 
‘They steal in full compliance with the law’. Nowadays, state officials are 
seen as using the law instrumentally – for example, enforcing regulations 
in order to put pressure on business. The law has come to be evaluated in 
terms of its capacity to generate informal income (vzyatkoemkost’).
It is not only big players who use formal rules in order to implement 
informal arrangements. There is no clear divide in the lives of ordinary 
people between the formal and the informal, between the informal and 
the corrupt. Moreover, the formal position guarantees access to certain 
resources while the informal norm puts pressure on the gatekeeper to 
engage in informal practices. For example, teachers provide private les-
sons and tutoring (repetitorstvo); workers perform individual orders, often 
during working hours and using company equipment (kalym, shabashka); 
police officers provide protection for businesses and secure the interests 
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aimed at reputational attacks (chernukha); security officials collect com-
promising materials (kompromat) to be used as a bargaining tool to secure 
the compliance of political rivals or business competitors. People assemble 
a ‘portfolio’ of informal earnings that not only complements their formal 
income, but is in a sense inseparable from it (Zaslavskaya and Shabanova 
2002). This is because their formal employment serves as a source of infor-
mal earnings and of clientele, and as the basis of their reputation and evi-
dence of their professionalism. Motives of engagement are perceived as 
material and personal, but societal forces are also at play.
Even though they are declared to be subversive and are targeted by 
the authorities, informal practices support the working of formal insti-
tutions and legal frameworks, acting as bridges between formal rules 
and realities. Under the USSR’s ideological ban on profit- making, on the 
one hand, and the shortages resulting from the defects of the centrally 
planned economy, on the other, a whole gallery of social images emerged, 
ideologically censured but functionally necessary: illegal producers of 
goods for the population (tsekhoviki); black market dealers reselling 
goods in short supply at a higher price than in the state system of trade 
(spekulyanty); illegal currency- dealers challenging the state monopoly 
on foreign exchange transactions; bootleggers engaged in the clandes-
tine manufacture of alcoholic beverages. These ‘enemies’ of the Soviet 
system provided the regime with an invaluable service: they reduced the 
deficit, cut inflation and expanded consumer choice.
Meanwhile, the failures of state doctrine forced the Soviet popula-
tion to satisfy their material and cultural needs through informal chan-
nels. In the late 1940s, for example, popular enthusiasm for jazz spurred 
the use of X- ray images for music recording (roentgenizdat or ‘music on 
the bones’). In the 1960s, demand for original songs and rock music led 
to the spread of informal recording studios (magnitizdat). While sup-
posedly ‘alien’ to the Soviet regime, these practices provided the popu-
lation with certain liberties and limited freedom of choice, coexisting, 
albeit uneasily, with the regime’s ideological constraints. In this sense, 
the Soviet regime parasitised on informal practices that it suppressed 
but also tolerated, since it would not have been able to claim legitimacy 
without them. As Charles Tilly put it, blat practices explained the para-
dox of the Soviet system: how both people and regime survived under a 
set of impossible constraints (private communication 2007). The impor-
tance of ambivalence – being both subversive and supportive of the 
regime – can also be observed in post- Soviet Russia.
A striking example of the functional ambivalence of informal prac-
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enabling Russia’s post- Communist transition. The weakness of the state 
when it launched radical economic reforms in the early 1990s meant that 
it was unable to establish an effective system of property rights and con-
tract enforcement. ‘Violent entrepreneurs’ or bandits took matters into 
their own hands, challenging the state’s supposed monopoly on violence 
and, by so doing, enabled the development of the market (Volkov 2002). 
While this undoubtedly determined the model of the market that was 
adopted in Russia, at the same time it made the market possible.
Informal practices are both accommodating and resistant to change. 
On the one hand, they adapt to change and serve to soften external con-
straints. On the other, they are grounded in informal norms and channel 
peer pressure within social circles. Thus, the survival of peasant com-
munities under the harsh constraints of Tsarist Russia was enabled by 
the barter- based system of mutual help (pomochi). The urbanisation and 
monetisation of the economy in the twentieth century rendered pomo-
chi somewhat redundant; they did not, however, transform the pattern 
of mutual help in communities, which merely evolved and adapted to 
new conditions (vzaimozachyoty). During the Soviet period, mutual help 
became widespread in blat networks, within which ‘favours of access’ to 
goods and services were circulated.
The post- Soviet reforms of the 1990s brought in an abundance of 
goods and services and reduced people’s dependence on blat for consump-
tion. Even so, the pattern of mutual help continues to play an essential 
role in social networks, now maintained by reciprocal exchanges of gifts 
and intergenerational transfers to enable the redistribution of resources 
within a social network. A special case of generalised reciprocity is obsh-
chak, a common fund for mutual support among members of a crimi-
nal community. Despite – or perhaps because of – the diversity of these 
informal practices, the pattern of mutual help and dependence remains 
embedded in social solidarity, the need for which increases as conditions 
grow more severe. This focus on the severity of constraints is part of the 
association of informality with poverty, or development, yet making this 
explicit leads to the conclusion that severe constraints can be found in cer-
tain settings in all societies – in the armed services, prisons, state security 
agencies, criminal gangs and youth subcultures, schools and corporate 
settings – regardless of the level of poverty and development.
The notion of legal corruption is accordingly as relevant for devel-
oping countries as for developed ones (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011). 
The blurred boundaries defining where informality stops and corruption 
begins are not always easily grasped by such dichotomies as legal/ illegal, 
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of systemic corruption, where the pressure ‘to do as the Romans do’ is 
routine (see Persson et al. 2013; Bauhr 2012 on corruption as a collective 
action problem).
Subcultures and social stratification constitute important dimen-
sions of informality in all countries but, again, it is essential to relate 
these to political rigidity. Practices of self- expression, or non- conform-
ism, tend to oppose the official state rhetoric and mainstream behaviour, 
pointing to rising needs and trends in society. Thus, the USSR’s stilyagi – 
the ‘stylishly dressed dudes’ of the 1960s – challenged the myth of a 
monolithic ‘Soviet people’ and stood instead for the increasing demand 
for Westernisation and consumerism. In post- Soviet Russia sullen, 
sports- gear- wearing youths (normalnye patsany) enforce the masculine 
order in working- class neighbourhoods, embodying the cult of force and 
denial of Western ‘tolerance’. And even the shocking padonki, calling to 
ignore Russian grammar in cyberspace, represent a poor and absurdist, 
often offensive, linguistic self- expression indicative of protest against the 
establishment and educational elitism. As narrow subcultural groups, 
these informal practices are the ultimate expression of the maturing of 
mass sentiment.
The role of the state in shaping informal practices, in all their diver-
sity, is conceptualised in political science according to types of formal/ 
informal interactions: Helmke and Levitsky (2004) speak of comple-
mentary, accommodating, competing or substitutive; Barsukova (2004) 
adds symbiosis (whereby formal and informal institutions are mutually 
exploitative). It is the last type, the symbiosis of the formal and infor-
mal, that is especially relevant to understanding the systemic nature of 
the relationship between informality and corruption, and not exclusively 
in Russia. Given the scale of symbiotic co- dependence (and sometimes 
role- reversal) between ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ that is depicted in the 
Russian entries in this volume, we tend to agree with those scholars of 
urban studies and planning theory who question the analytical useful-
ness of the binary categories ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ (Guha- Khasnobis 
et al. 2006; Roy 2011: 224, 233).
National surveys have been shown by scholars of regional corrup-
tion to be misleading (Rothstein et al. 2013). Moreover, experiments 
by behavioural economists have found no country variation. Tests of 
people’s predisposition to game the system by lying point to the key 
importance of the context (not necessarily the same as the ‘country’), 
peer pressure and what has come to be called ‘quantitative moral-
ity’, whereby people cheat but within limits and as appropriate, so 
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Scientifically speaking, the norms of bending the rules are defined 
much more by social circle and context than by geographical borders. 
However, accepting this without caveats would be just as misleading 
as believing socially construed stereotypes, such as ‘Russia is a klep-
tocracy’ or ‘Switzerland’s informal norm is to follow the formal rule’. 
Thus, the answer to the question of whether some countries are more 
informal than others is ‘No, but yes’. As many entries in this volume 
show, focusing on the ambivalence of the actual constraints that shape 
informal practices – residing in the grey zones between ‘no’ and ‘yes’, 
sociability and instrumentality, ‘us’ and ‘them’, need and greed, carrots 
and sticks – may be a more promising way forward in handling com-
plexity. In this sense, every country is an interesting case to research.
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Adat (North Caucasus, Russia): system of Chechen customary laws and 
norms practised in the North Caucasus among ethnic Vainakh and 
the diaspora.
Agashka (Kazakhstan): an influential figure with strong personal 
connections; a patron.
Aidagara (Japan): social networks in Japan.
Alga aploksnē (Latvia): lit. ‘salary in an envelope’, arrangement 
whereby an employee receives the legal minimum salary officially, 
and the remainder in cash, enabling the employer to avoid social 
insurance contributions.
Allegados (Chile): poor families who live in a single room in a relative’s 
house without paying rent.
Amici, amigos (Mediterranean and Latin America): social actors 
involved in a relationship of instrumental friendship.
Aploksne/ aploksnīte (Latvia): lit. ‘envelope’, unofficial payments made 
to doctors and (less frequently) public officials for services they are 
required to provide by law.
Artistic repossession (general – totalitarian regimes): artists ‘reclaiming’ 
control over their work in totalitarian regimes by manipulating the 
restrictions imposed on them by the state.
Astroturfing (USA, UK): the attempt to create an impression of 
widespread grassroots support for a policy, individual or product, 
where little such support exists.
Avos’ (Russia): a ‘lackadaisical’ attitude to chance in the world, used in 
both economic and non- economic contexts.
Azganvan popokhutyun (Armenian diaspora): surname change by 
ethnic Armenians living in Georgia, usually for reasons of ethnic 
identity.
Baksheesh (Middle East, North Africa and sub- continental 
Asia): facilitation payment made to officials, etc.
Bapakism (Indonesia): Javanese culture of patriarchy; refers to being the 







Barakholka (Kazakhstan): pejorative term for an outdoor, open- air flea 
market where second- hand goods are bought and sold.
Barone universitario (Italy): literally ‘barons’, academics holding 
powerful positions who influence decisions in universities, 
especially with regard to academic appointments.
Benāmi (India): in Hindu law, a transaction or property made or held 
under a fictitious name or that of a third party, who acts as a ‘front’ 
owner on behalf of the real owner.
Biombo (Costa Rica): an illegal payment made to a medical professional 
in exchange for providing preferential treatment to a patient or a 
patient’s family within the state- funded health care system.
Birzha (Georgia): group of male teenagers or young men who meet 
regularly in open spaces (squares, courtyards, street corners).
Bitcoin (general): peer- to- peer electronic currency system.
Blat (Romania): fee- dodging, match- fixing, illicit activity.
Blat (Russia and former Soviet Union): getting things done through 
personal contacts, ‘pulling strings’ or the exchange of favours.
Boda- boda taxis (Uganda): informal motorcycle taxis.
Brodiazhnichestvo (Russia): term for vagrancy used to legislate 
against persons engaging in dissent, forbidden trades, private 
entrepreneurial activity or speculation in the Soviet Union.
Brokerage (general): flow of valued resources from one actor to another 
via an intermediary.
Budženje (Serbia): jerry- building, cobbling together, jury- rigging or 
bodging carried out on houses, cars and household and electrical 
objects.
Buôn có bạn, bán có phường (Vietnam): informal vendors’ associations 
in Vietnam.
Bustarella (Italy): lit. ‘little envelope’, euphemism for a bribe.
Caffè sospeso (Naples, Italy): lit. ‘suspended coffee,’ forward paying for 
a cup of coffee for a future customer.
Campamento (Chile): informal urban settlements which typically lack 
at least one of the three basic services (electricity, drinking water 
and sewage system).
Cash for access (UK): British politicians/ political parties receiving 
payment to provide access to influential individuals, usually with 
the aim of lobbying.
Cash in hand (general): a business taking payment for goods or services 
by cash, usually for a lower price than other forms of payment, so 






Character assassination (general): deliberate and sustained effort to 
damage the reputation or credibility of an individual.
Chelnoki (Russia and former Soviet Union): small traders who resell 
goods purchased abroad, normally in China.
Chernukha (Russia): use of the public media instrumentally in order to 
damage an opponent’s reputation.
Chir (Chechnya, Igushetia): blood feud/ blood revenge.
Chơ ̣ cóc (Vietnam): lit. ‘toad markets’; informal markets in socialist 
Vietnam.
Chorizo (Latin America): lit. ‘sausage’, euphemism for corruption/ 
corrupt acts by government officials.
Coima (Argentina): euphemism for a petty bribe.
Compadrazgo (Chile): system of exchanges of favours within an 
ideology of friendship.
Cyberattacks by semi state actors (general): attacks on political 
opponents using semi- state actors to exploit computer systems and 
disrupt data, hosts or networks.
Dacha (Russia): out- of- town dwelling and plot of land for intermittent 
use by urbanites.
Dalali (India): brokerage.
Dangou/Dango (Japan): bid- fixing in supposedly competitive tenders.
Dash (Nigeria and other West African countries): ubiquitous tip that 
can also serve as a facilitation payment to a public servant.
Deryban (Ukraine and Russia): the expropriation and informal sharing 
of state property among private actors.
Dirt book (UK): record of compromising information on Members of 
Parliament (MPs) held by party whips to ensure voting discipline.
Dizelaši (Serbia): 1990s’ youth subculture also involved in fuel 
smuggling resulting from the wartime fuel shortage.
Dzhinsa (Russia): media article or report, often paid, which is staged or 
created on purpose in order to promote a certain idea, individual or 
company.
Egunje (Nigeria): involuntary ‘gift’ extorted from the giver by a corrupt 
official.
Esusu (Nigeria): informal community- based savings scheme.
Externe Personen (Germany): private sector individuals working in the 
German civil service.
Fakelaki (Greece): infamous envelopes of money given for such diverse 






Favela (Brazil): slum in urban Brazil.
Fimi media (Croatia): siphoning off state funds, embezzlement.
Flipping (UK): British Members of Parliament (MPs) manipulating 
the classification of their ‘second home’ to maximise expenses 
claims.
Futbolna frakcia (Bulgaria): gangs of football supporters that have their 
own symbols, rituals, etc.
Gap (Uzbekistan): informal get- togethers over dinner by groups of 
people, usually of the same age, enabling them to socialise and 
share information, and sometimes also operating a rotating 
savings fund.
Gestión (Mexico): negotiating access to public goods or services in a 
private manner.
Goudui and yingchou (China): ways entrepreneurs form informal ties 
with state officials – through banqueting, karaoke, brothels, etc.
Graffiti (general): street art, unsolicited markings on property not 
owned by oneself, usually in a public space.
Guanxi (China): personal or social connections to get things done, 
acquire a scarce commodity, or gain access to an opportunity.
Hacktivism (general): the commission of computer crimes to further 
political or social ends.
Hawala (Middle East, India and Pakistan): informal system of money 
exchange prevalent throughout South Asia and the Middle East.
Hongbao (China): handing over informal payments disguised as a gift.
Hyvä Veli (Finland): interpersonal network associated with favouritism.
Informal mining (general): ‘off- the- books’ mining around the world.
Inmaek (South Korea): lit. ‘people entangled like a vine’, network of 
social ties and relationships developed in the course of one’s life.
Insider trading (general): trading of shares, bonds, etc. by individuals 
with access to non- public information about companies related to 
the sale.
Jaan- pehchaan (India): facilitation of business by exchange of favours.
Jangmadang (North Korea): unofficial markets in North Korea, from 
physical markets with small- time traders to de facto private 
businesses run by state officials, operating under the guise and 
licences of state- socialism.
Janteloven/Jantelagen (Scandinavia): set of norms embodied 
in informal practices that confer negative attitudes towards 
individuality, individual self- expression and measures of success.
Jeitinho (Brazil): seeking personal favours by cajoling, sweet- talking and 





Jinmyaku (Japan): personal connections of vital importance in 
business, politics and aspects of day- to- day life.
Jugaad (India): ways of solving problems with limited resources or by 
getting a round formal constraints.
Kalym (Russia) moonlighting and/ or using company tools or vehicles to 
undertake private work.
Kanonieri qurdebi (Georgia): ‘thieves- in- law’, professional criminals 
who have elite status in the organised crime environment.
Kastom (Solomon Islands and Melanesia): the assertion of traditional 
values and cultural practices in a modern context.
Keiretsu (Japan): Japanese system of corporate governance in which 
firms are interlinked.
Khokkeynaya diplomatiya (Russia): utilising amateur ice hockey for the 
development of personal, business and government relationships.
Klüngel (Cologne, Germany): the exchange of favours among friends 
and acquaintances in political and business settings in Cologne.
Kolesiostwo (Poland): a non- market exchange of favours between 
friends and colleagues restricted to the professional sphere.
Kombinacja (Poland): bending rules to access resources, scheming to 
earn money and acquire opportunities.
Kompromat (Russia): compromising materials used to control or exert 
power over others.
Korapsen (Papua New Guinea): euphemism for corruption in Papua 
New Guinea, but with distinctive local connotations.
Kormlenie (Russian Empire): lit. ‘feeding’, the practice in pre- modern 
Russia of maintaining local officials at the expense of those they 
governed.
Kraken (The Netherlands): living in – or using otherwise – a dwelling 
without the consent of its owner.
Krugovaia poruka (Russia and Europe): collective responsibility or 
irresponsibility (cover-up).
Krysha (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus): lit. ‘roof’, individuals or organisations 
providing a range of services, predominantly illicit, ranging 
from protection and patronage to enforcement of contracts and 
settlement of disputes.
Kula (Tanzania): lit. ‘eating’, gaining access to resources to satisfy 
needs, often a euphemism for corruption.
Kumoterstwo (Poland): mutual exchange of favours, especially for 
relatives, friends or colleagues.
Kumstvo (Montenegro and Balkans): godparenthood; an informal 




relations and useful contacts for parents and improve life chances 
for the newborn.
Kupona (Kosovo): non- registration of transactions or not printing 
receipts for the purpose of tax avoidance.
Kuratory (Russia, Ukraine): representatives of political power in a 
corporate setting.
L’argent du carburant (sub- Saharan Africa): a metaphor designating a 
small sum of money given to customs officials.
Loteria / Lloteria (Albania): private lottery scheme/ collective savings 
scheme.
Mafia Raj (India): criminal power networks.
Magharich’ (Armenia): traditional gift- giving practice in Armenian 
culture, which in more modern times has also become a 
euphemism for a bribe.
Magnitizdat (USSR): re- recording and distributing uncensored 
speeches or music on cassette tapes in the USSR.
Mahallah (Uzbekistan): Islamic local governance groupings; also 
community- based, informal economic and welfare practices.
Materit’sya (Russia): category of obscene language.
Mateship (Australia): friendship links/ loyalty to friends (generally 
male).
Mita (Gabor Roma, Romania): a multifunctional cash gift among the 
Gabor Roma.
Mordida (Mexico): lit. ‘to bite’, euphemism for a bribe or backhander.
Mukhayyam (OPT): informal dwelling – refugee camps in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.
Nachbarschaftshilfe (Germany and German-speaking countries): lit. 
‘neighbourhood watch’ acts of mutual assistance and support 
in times of crisis usually involving no payment; cover for illegal 
earnings.
Nash chelovek (Russia): ‘our person’, one of us.
Natsnoboba (Georgia): informal contacts and networks.
No-entry (India): a deed of sale of land, which has been signed by a 
notary, but without paying tax or being registered by the Land 
authorities.
Normalnye patsany (Russia): members of urban street gangs.
Obshchak (Russia): informal welfare system in penal and criminal 
communities.







Old-boy network (UK): members of a network arising from membership 
of the alumni of a prestigious school or college.
Old corruption (UK): system of sinecures in eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century British political system.
Omertà (Italy): unwritten code of keeping silent about crimes or 
deviant acts, particularly those perpetrated by mafia groups.
Otkat (Russia): diversion of part of the money allocated for a purchase 
to the person responsible for the purchase; equivalent of the 
English term ‘kickback’.
Paid favours (UK): acts of one- to- one material help within wider 
kinship, friendship and neighbourly networks that are reimbursed 
with money.
Pabrčiti/ Pabirčenje (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hertzegovina):  
gleaning, collection of grains that are left over in the field after 
harvest.
Padonki (Russia): Slang Internet language used by Russian speakers.
Padrino system/balimbing (Philippines): network of symbiotic 
relationships between a patron (godfather or godmother) and 
a  client (godchild) within the context of Catholic values and 
interpersonal bonds.
Pantouflage (France): practice of leaving a civil service position, 
typically on secondment, to obtain work in the private sector.
Parteibuchwirtschaft’ (Austria and Germany): informal distribution 
of jobs, material goods and distinctions based on memberships or 
links to a particular political party.
Pituto (Chile): use of connections to gain some advantage (commonly a 
job), regardless of merit.
Political machinery (USA): informal means of organising political 
parties in urban centres in the USA in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
Pomochi (Russia): an occasion of collective helping, for free, of a 
member of a Russian village to complete a large task.
Pork barrelling (USA): in politics, securing preferential funds for a local 
project paid for out of the national budget.
Potemkin villages (USSR): a façade built to deceive or to hide an 
undesirable fact or condition.
Pozornost’/ d’akovné/ Všimné (Slovakia): expressing gratitude for official 
or unofficial services, typically by means of a small gift or sum of 
money; can also be a euphemism for a bribe.







Psikhushka (USSR and Russian Federation): use of psychiatric services 
as means of controlling and repressing political opponents.
Pulling strings (UK/USA): using useful connections to secure 
preferential treatment or access to services/ information.
Pyramind schemes (general): operators recruiting unsuspecting 
investors with promise of high returns.
Quàn jiǔ (China): toasting people as a means of building 
relationships.
Raccomandazione (Italy): lit. ‘recommendation’ or ‘reference’, the use 
of social connections in order to get things done, especially in the 
context of patron– client relations.
Rad  na  crno (Serbia): lit. ‘black labour’, payment for jobs that are not 
officially registered or that are only partially reported to the state 
authorities.
Reiderstvo (Russia and former Soviet Union): corporate raiding by 
illegal, semi- legal or unethical means.
Repetitorstvo (Russia and FSU): supplementary private tutoring.
Rod- re (Thailand): mobile street vendors in Bangkok.
Roentgenizdat (USSR): unofficial production of records on discarded 
X- rays.
Rushyldyq (Kazakhstan): loyalty to and use of extended kinship ties; 
‘clanism’.
S vrutka (Bulgaria): lit. ‘with a twist’, practice of bending the rules and 
pulling strings in order to achieve a goal.
Sadghegrdzelo (Georgia): Georgian word for ‘toast’, which follows a 
generally uniform, yet not entirely fixed, structure at a festive meal 
(supra).
Salam credit (Afghanistan): informal agricultural credit system for 
poppy farmers.
Samizdat (USSR): reproduction of censored and underground 
publications by hand, passed from reader to reader.
Samogonovarenie (Russia): the distilling of homemade spirits (samogon).
Schwarzwohnen (GDR): lit. ‘black living’, the illegal occupation of 
accommodation in the German Democratic Republic.
Seilschaft (Germany): lit. ‘rope alliances’, cronyism in career promotion 
in business and politics.
Shebeen (South Africa): illicit establishment serving alcohol, 
particularly to black Africans under apartheid.
Shpargalka (Russia): crib sheets to cheat in an examination, often 
tolerated by examiners.





Sitwa (Poland): informal networks within public authorities; ‘amoral 
familism’.
Skipping (general): urban foraging technique involving collecting 
objects or food items from the waste.
Small- scale smuggling (general): bending or subverting the rules of 
goods transportation across national borders.
Smotryashchie/alt. kuratory (Russia, Ukraine): functionaries looking 
after certain interests (state, oligarchic or regional).
Sociolismo (Cuba): the use of social networks to obtain goods and 
services in short supply to circumvent state rationing and the 
inefficiencies of the command economy.
Songbun (North Korea): socio- political classification system, according 
to which every North Korean citizen is assigned a class status on 
the basis of their perceived loyalty to the regime.
Songli (China): gift- giving as a form of social exchange and developing 
network relations.
Sosyudad (Philippines): informal savings and lending scheme.
Spaza (South Africa): small informal grocery shop operated from 
residential premises in townships.
Squatting (general): informally settling on vacant land or occupying 
abandoned buildings.
Štela (Bosnia and Hertzegovina): use of contacts/ informal connections 
to obtain goods or services.
Stoyanshik (Georgia): person that watches over cars parked in public 
spaces; an informal parking attendant/ guard.
Stróman (Hungary): someone acting on behalf of someone else, such as 
a ‘front’ owner or chief executive officer (CEO) of a company.
Švercovanje (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro): 
fare- dodging on public transport.
Tal/alt. taljenje, taliti, utaliti, rastaliti (Serbia and countries of former 
Yugoslavia): an agreement between parties to combine their 
resources for financial gain, often via illegal means.
Tamozhennye l’goty (Russia): excise privileges for the importation 
of alcohol and tobacco excise- free, extracted from the state by 
charitable foundations in the 1990s.
Tandas and Cundinas (Mexico and South-Western USA): rotating credit 
associations.
Tangentopoli (Italy): system of political corruption in Italy based on 
kickbacks, which culminated in a judicial investigation leading to 
the demise of the so- called First Republic.







Tapş (Azerbaijan): obtaining favours on behalf of others, typically 
through network connections.
Tazkia (Iraqi Kurdistan): letter of support based on party political 
membership, which grants members exclusive access to positions 
within the public service sector.
Telefonnoe pravo (Russia): oral commands, informal influence and 
pressure of the executive on judiciary.
Torpil (Turkey): use of connections to find private solutions to the 
problems faced when dealing with bureaucracy.
Trafika (Czech Republic): assigning a fellow politician to an office in a 
state- owned company in return for their support.
Tsartsaani nüüdel (Mongolia): a distinctly Mongolian type of 
population movement that is arranged before an election in order 
to influence its outcome.
Uhljeb (Croatia): person who became a public administration employee 
through a nepotistic relationship or a political party affiliation 
and does not usually possess the required qualifications for that 
position.
Uruuchuluk (Kyrgyzstan): lineage- based identity that shapes how the 
Kyrgyz construe their social world and the extent and quality of 
their relations with others.
Vay mượn (Vietnam): form of informal loan.
Verlan (France): French slang formed by changing the order of syllables.
Vertical crowdsourcing (Russia): digital technologies harnessed by 
the state to create semblance of openness, while in practice 
neutralising citizens’ activity and exerting control.
Vetterliwirtschaft/ Copinage (Switzerland): lit. network of little cousins, 
providing mutual favours or preferential treatment.
Veza (Serbia): lit. ‘connection’, the use of informal contacts in order to 
obtain access to opportunities that are not available through formal 
channels.
Vitamin B (Germany): use of networks to obtain benefits, enabling 
favouritism.
Vrski (Macedonia): use of personal connections to obtain goods and 
services.
Vruzki (Bulgaria): connections or ties used for social exchange of 
favours, similar to pulling strings.
Vzaimozachety (Russia): Russian term meaning ‘mutual exchange in 
kind’, and referring to a specific type of inter- firm transactions, 







Vzyatkoemkost’ (Russia): in a narrow sense, the potential of a piece of 
legislation to create opportunities for bribery; in a broader sense, 
a legal framework that grants state officials discretionary power to 
extort bribes, obedience or other forms of benefits.
Wantoks (Solomon Islands, Melanesia): informal clan- based 
expectations of welfare and monetary support resulting in 
overheads for businesses and nepotism in politics.
Wastā (Middle East, North Africa): the deployment of intermediation 
on behalf of an individual or a group to secure some benefit that 
would be otherwise unobtainable or too burdensome.
Window dressing (general): the deliberately misleading manipulation of 
a company’s income statement and balance sheet in order to create 
a falsely attractive image and thereby conceal poor performance or 
monetary losses.
Yingchou (China): making informal ties in business through 
banqueting, karaoke, brothels, etc.
Yongo (South Korea): personal or network connections resulting from 
strong particularistic ties based on kin, educational institution, and 
region.
Yonjul (South Korea): informal ties between people who are members 
of a social network oriented towards a certain goal.
Zakaznoe bankrotstvo (Russia): lit. ‘bankruptcy to order’, use of 
loopholes in bankruptcy law to launch hostile takeover.
Zalatwianie (Poland): getting something done in an easier way, a 
euphemism describing a range of informal behaviours carried 
out mostly to obtain benefits by avoiding the use of arduous legal 
activities or formal rules.
Zarobitchanstvo (Ukraine): earnings made through labour migration, 
both internal and external.
Zersetzung (GDR): term used by the East German secret police to 
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weak ties, 1- 59, 1- 69
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state, 2- 233
whips, party, 2- 432– 5
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2- xiv, 2- 259– 61, 2- 278, 2- 503
wine, 1- 133, 1- 134, 1- 290, 2- 191, 2- 276, 
2- 397– 9, 2- 400
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X- ray discs, see also roentgenizdat, 1- 342,  
1- 346, 1- 347, 1- 350
Yemen, 1- 152, 1- 224
yin and yang, 1- 5, 1- 131
yingchou, 2- 400, 2- 401– 3, 2- 503
yongo, 1- 79, 1- 233– 6, 2- 503
yonjul, 1- 79– 82, 1- 233, 2- 503
Yorubas, 1- 148, 1- 149– 50, 2- 66– 8
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